Lithuania

   

Executive Accountability

#20
Key Findings
With a mixed record on oversight issues, Lithuania falls into the middle ranks internationally (rank 20) in the area of executive accountability. Its score on this measure has improved by 0.4 points since 2014.

Citizen policy knowledge is not highly developed, although public-education campaigns and efforts to improve information availability are ongoing. Voter turnout races are low and declining. While the state-funded media produces some high-quality analysis, the media are in general distrusted. Internet-based sources have expanded coverage, but are also used to spread disinformation.

While parliamentarians have considerable resources and strong formal oversight powers, the quality of laws suffers due to high number of laws passed. The audit office suffers from a lack of operational independence. The several ombuds offices have taken an increasingly proactive approach to human-rights violations, and the data-protection authority is both independent and effective.

Key political parties have shifted to increasingly democratic means of selecting candidates and making decisions. Interest groups generally have limited ability to formulate well-crafted policies.

Citizens’ Participatory Competence

#22

To what extent are citizens informed of public policies?

10
 9

Most citizens are well-informed of a broad range of public policies.
 8
 7
 6


Many citizens are well-informed of individual public policies.
 5
 4
 3


Few citizens are well-informed of public policies; most citizens have only a rudimental knowledge of public policies.
 2
 1

Most citizens are not aware of public policies.
Political Knowledge
5
Citizens have access to some government information, but the public in large part lacks the civic awareness and policy knowledge that enables an adequate understanding of government policymaking and facilitates participation. Therefore, citizens and other external stakeholders rarely engage in policymaking; indeed, less than one-third participate in solving public issues at the municipal level, according to data from the Lithuanian Ministry of the Interior. Voter turnout rates are very low in comparative perspective, and have been declining over time.

Several initiatives aimed at improving the citizens’ access of information do exist, however. The Public Management Improvement Program is designed to achieve this goal by defining the scope and content of public information to be made accessible, and by centralizing the provision of information about the government’s performance. In addition, the Lithuania 2030 Strategy envisioned the implementation of programs devoted to educating responsible citizens. Despite this, Lithuania still faces substantial challenges with regard to increasing its citizens’ participatory capacity. In its review of Lithuania’s open-government programs, the OECD recommended supporting the development of Lithuania’s civil society through capacity-building and collaboration with the activities of the newly established NGO Council, with the ultimate aim of engaging citizens more deeply in government policymaking processes.

The process of drafting the long-term “Lithuania 2050” strategy has involved significant public consultation with various stakeholders. In addition, the debate on the future of Europe, held within the framework of the EU’s Conference on the Future of Europe, resulted in a number of initiatives by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, academics and the local representatives of the European Commission seeking to involve the general public in discussions about the EU and national policy responses to current challenges.

Citations:
Reference to the Report of the Ministry of the Interior: vakokybe.vrm.lt/get.php?f.867 Reference to the Public Management Improvement Program: http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=418407&p_query=vie%F0ojo%20valdymo%20tobulinimo%20programa&p_tr2=2.
OECD, Public Governance Review Lithuania- Fostering Open and Inclusive Policy Making Key Findings and Recommendations. 2015.

Does the government publish data and information in a way that strengthens citizens’ capacity to hold the government accountable?

10
 9

The government publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
 8
 7
 6


The government most of the time publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
 5
 4
 3


The government publishes data in a limited and not timely or user-friendly way.
 2
 1

The government publishes (almost) no relevant data.
Open Government
7
There are several main reporting mechanisms on the overall performance of the government and its institutions. First, every year the government presents to the parliament an annual performance report where overall performance and performance in the policy areas of individual ministries as well as thematic areas are reported. Second, the Lithuanian government publishes quarterly, semi-annual or annual reports on the implementation of annual performance priorities. Third, every year the institutions that manage appropriations from the state budget publish their annual performance reports on the implementation of strategic-performance plans (including budgetary programs) and the achievement of performance targets (i.e., outputs, outcomes and impacts). However, the National Audit Office found in its 2015 performance report that these government reports failed to include more than half of the outcome-level monitoring indicators whose targets were not achieved, and that information on unachieved outcomes was ambiguously reported. Also, reporting on the implementation of the 2015 priorities was incomplete, with less than half of all performance results presented by the government.

The scope of information presented in the annual performance reports of Lithuanian budgetary institutions is large, but they sometimes omit important information and lack a critical assessment of organizational performance. The Lithuanian government has committed to taking action to address the challenge of incomplete, selective and biased reporting.

An open-government data initiative is part of a national plan of information society development. The Ministry of Economy and Innovation launched the initiative during the 2008 to 2012 government term, when the potential of opening up government data was first recognized. Parts of the necessary infrastructure have been in place since implementation of the first EU directive on public sector information. For instance, the Information Society Development Committee created a preliminary open data portal (http://opendata.gov.lt) where information on available datasets is published. The Ministry of Transport and Communications intends to spend around €4 million on the development of an advanced open data portal. In order to exploit the opportunities presented by government data, government ministries and agencies are encouraged to open up data to the public. Despite a recent increase in the scope of government data published online, Lithuanian authorities should pursue a more experimental approach to discover how data can add value to the public sector, to society and to the economy. The program of the Šimonytė government (which took office in late 2020) contains provisions on open government and the provision of greater quantities of government data to the general public. Legal steps to make this possible were taken in 2021.

Lithuania joined the multilateral Open Government Partnership initiative in 2011. In subsequent years, the Office of the Government developed action plans for improving open-government practices throughout the country (the fifth action plan was approved in 2021). During the review period, Lithuania signed the Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents (2015) and the UN Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (2015). In 2016, the government approved three major initiatives to make public institutions more accountable to society, reduce corruption and increase transparency, while also increasing public engagement. However, implementation has been undermined by a lack of measurable targets and meaningful collaboration with civil society.

Citations:
Valstybės kontrolė (2016). Programinio biudžeto sistema: strateginių veiklos planų sudarymas ir įgyvendinimo stebėsena, Nr. VA-P-60-2-17.

Legislative Actors’ Resources

#10

Do members of parliament have adequate personnel and structural resources to monitor government activity effectively?

10
 9

The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring all government activity effectively.
 8
 7
 6


The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring a government’s major activities.
 5
 4
 3


The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
 2
 1

The resources provided to the members of parliament are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
Parliamentary Resources
9
Members of parliament as a group have adequate personnel and structural resources to monitor government activities in an effective way. They have resources including personal staff; personnel assigned to parliamentary committees, commissions and other structures; and access to the Parliamentary Research Unit. Expenses incurred by calling experts for testimony or consultation can be reimbursed, although members of parliament are usually unwilling to allocate adequate sums to commission external impact assessment studies, as they fear being seen by the media as wasting taxpayer money. Thus, despite the presence of resources, political incentives frequently prevent them from engaging in effective parliamentary oversight. For instance, during its 2012 to 2016 term, the parliament passed more than 2,500 legislative acts. During the spring 2017 session, the parliament adopted 421 legal acts (i.e., about seven legal acts per every sitting), a record for a parliamentary session. The large number of laws adopted undermines the quality of these laws. After President Nausėda vetoed two bills during his first two weeks in office, the president’s team criticized the quality of laws adopted by the parliament. One positive development noted by OECD has been a significant decline in the use of the urgency procedure to pass legislation, following several decisions by the Constitutional Court in 2020-2021.

Parties that form a part of governing coalitions are often unwilling to engage in self-monitoring, while opposition parties are frequently incapable of constructive external oversight. Although the parliament does not often commission independent research, it can produce internal conclusions or reports, or invite experts to various parliamentary meetings. In addition, the parliament utilizes the results of audit reports produced by the National Audit Office. It is also often the case that members of parliament employ their party colleagues as advisers or assistants on the basis of trust rather than because these individuals have a particular expertise.

Citations:
STRATA/OECD, Mobilising Evidence at the Centre of Government in Lithuania : Strengthening Decision-Making and Policy Evaluation for Long-term Development, https://www.oecd.org/regreform/mobilising-evidence-at-the-centre-of-government-in-lithuania-323e3500-en.htm
OECD, Mobilising Evidence at the Centre of Government in Lithuania. Strengthening decision-making and policy evaluation for long-term development, Paris: OECD, 2021.

Are parliamentary committees able to ask for government documents?

10
 9

Parliamentary committees may ask for most or all government documents; they are normally delivered in full and within an appropriate time frame.
 8
 7
 6


The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are slightly limited; some important documents are not delivered or are delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
 5
 4
 3


The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are considerably limited; most important documents are not delivered or delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
 2
 1

Parliamentary committees may not request government documents.
Obtaining Documents
9
Members of parliament have the right to obtain information not only from the government itself but also from various government agencies, enterprises and other public sector organizations. When carrying out their oversight function, parliamentary committees can request information and relevant documents from ministries and other state institutions. These are normally delivered in full and within an appropriate time-frame. Opposition members also often ask for the government’s position on politically salient policy issues. There are some restrictions concerning the access of information considered to be sensitive for reasons of state security. In addition, information from ongoing pretrial investigations and other investigations cannot be provided if this could harm the investigations.

Are parliamentary committees able to summon ministers for hearings?

10
 9

Parliamentary committees may summon ministers. Ministers regularly follow invitations and are obliged to answer questions.
 8
 7
 6


The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are slightly limited; ministers occasionally refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
 5
 4
 3


The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are considerably limited; ministers frequently refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
 2
 1

Parliamentary committees may not summon ministers.
Summoning Ministers
9
Parliamentary committees are able to summon ministers and the heads of most other state institutions (with the exception of court judges). Invited people, who also attend parliamentary commissions and other groups, typically answer questions posed by the members of the parliament and provide other relevant information. In some cases, vice-ministers or other authorized civil servants can serve as substitutes for ministers. However, rather than being used as a forward-looking mechanism, this instrument of parliamentary control is often restricted to the explanation of government activities on an ex post basis. In addition, during crises (e.g., during management of the pandemic), the frequent practice of vice-ministers substituting for ministers who were busy with crisis-management duties sometimes led to frictions between members of parliament and particular ministers.

Are parliamentary committees able to summon experts for committee meetings?

10
 9

Parliamentary committees may summon experts.
 8
 7
 6


The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are slightly limited.
 5
 4
 3


The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are considerably limited.
 2
 1

Parliamentary committees may not summon experts.
Summoning Experts
9
When considering draft legislation, parliamentary committees can receive and consider comments from experts. Committees can also invite experts to participate in special hearings focusing on draft legislation or engage in a parliamentary oversight function. Committees can establish preparatory working groups whose membership can involve experts or scientists. The extent to which experts are involved in the activities of parliamentary committees varies by specific committee and policy issue. However, the degree to which expert advice is actually integrated into the legislative process remains unclear, as there is no requirement for members of parliament to conduct impact assessments of their legislative proposals. In addition, external expert assessments of particular draft laws are sometimes commissioned as a political instrument intended to delay adoption of those legal norms. Funds allocated for external impact assessment studies are usually inadequate in any case, because members of parliament are concerned that they might be criticized for wasting taxpayer money.

Are the task areas and structures of parliamentary committees suited to monitor ministries effectively?

10
 9

The match between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are well-suited to the effective monitoring of ministries.
 8
 7
 6


The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are largely suited to the monitoring ministries.
 5
 4
 3


The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are partially suited to the monitoring of ministries.
 2
 1

The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are not at all suited to the monitoring of ministries.
Task Area Congruence
8
There is extensive congruence between the current structure of 16 parliamentary committees and the primary areas of competence of Lithuania’s 14 ministries. The Committee for the Future is the most recent one, established in 2020. However, there are a few mismatches. On the one hand, some ministries (Economy, Transport, and Communications) and other state institutions are monitored by a single Committee on Economics. On the other hand, there are several horizontal parliamentary committees (including committees on Audit, European Affairs and Human Rights). The parliament also has 10 standing commissions, some of which are related to policy areas assigned to the Lithuanian ministries (especially the Commission for Energy and Sustainable Development, the most active of these bodies). Thus, the composition of parliamentary committees allows government policy to be monitored on both a sectoral and horizontal basis.

Committees meet on a regular basis, but the bulk of committee activities are related to the consideration of draft legislation. The workload of individual committees in the legislative process varies substantially, with the committees on Legal Affairs, State Administration and Local Authorities, Social Affairs and Labor, and Budget and Finance accounting for about 55% of the legislative review work delegated to the committees. The amount of attention given to the exercise of the parliamentary oversight function remains insufficient, but the exact amount depends on the particular committee.

Citations:
Alvidas Lukošaitis, “Parlamentinės kontrolės įgyvendinimas Lietuvoje: metodologinės pastabos apie trūkinėjančią “šeiminko-samdinio grandinę”//Politologija. 2007, nr. 2

Media

#25

To what extent do media in your country analyze the rationale and impact of public policies?

10
 9

A clear majority of mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies.
 8
 7
 6


About one-half of the mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies. The rest produces a mix of infotainment and quality information content.
 5
 4
 3


A clear minority of mass media brands focuses on high-quality information content analyzing public policies. Several mass media brands produce superficial infotainment content only.
 2
 1

All mass media brands are dominated by superficial infotainment content.
Media Reporting
5
A minority of mass-media organizations, whether TV, radio, print or online, provide high-quality information content analyzing government decisions. Since it is quite expensive to provide high-quality analysis within Lithuania’s small media market, the state-funded National Radio and Television is in the best position to undertake in-depth analysis of government decisions. Andrius Tapinas, a famous Lithuanian journalist and television host, launched a weekly political discussion show, which attracted thousands of viewers. Other mass-media brands tend to produce infotainment-style programming. Major internet news portals also provide fact checking with respect to policymakers’ statements, but only a minority conduct deeper research into policy issues. New forms of media in the form of Facebook posts, YouTube videos and podcasts partly help to remedy this situation, but these channels are also often used to spread unsubstantiated claims and disinformation. Although the Lithuanian media are regarded as quite independent, they are not widely trusted by the public. Indeed, in November 2021, only 27% of respondents to a national survey stated they trusted the media, and 34% said they did not.

Citations:
http://www.vilmorus.lt/en

Parties and Interest Associations

#20

How inclusive and open are the major parties in their internal decision-making processes?

10
 9

The party allows all party members and supporters to participate in its decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and agendas of issues are open.
 8
 7
 6


The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, all party members have the opportunity to participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are rather open.
 5
 4
 3


The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, a number of elected delegates participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are largely controlled by the party leadership.
 2
 1

A number of party leaders participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are fully controlled and drafted by the party leadership.
Intra-party Decision-Making
7
Lithuanian parties usually restrict decision-making to party members. Although in many cases, all party members can participate in important decisions, their capacity to influence the most critical party decisions is insufficient. Some political parties are more democratically structured than others: in 2007, the Social Democratic party of Lithuania, the Lithuanian Christian Democrats and the Homeland Union were found to be the most democratic in terms of internal decision-making. The latter two parties have since merged to form a party whose leader is directly elected by all party members. In 2018, this party selected its candidate for president (Ingrida Šimonytė) during primary elections, which were open to members of the public in addition to party members. In 2017, members of the Social Democratic party of Lithuania directly elected the party’s chair for the first time in the party’s history. Gintautas Paluckas, who won the party election, started the process of renewing the party elite. Between 2001 and 2015, the party was dominated by members over the age of 50. As a result of Paluckas’ victory, the party leadership decided to split from the ruling coalition led by the Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union. Most of the party’s serving members of parliament continued to support the Skvernelis government after forming the Social Democratic and Labor parliamentary group, and later establishing a new political party. In 2021, a member of the European Parliament, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, was elected as the head of the Social Democratic party. In 2021, Gabrielius Landsbergis was reelected as the chairman of the conservative party – he was the only candidate for the post, as others had canceled their candidacies in favor of Landsbergis.

Some other political parties are primarily used as a platform for their leaders to express their own political interests. Following the success of non-party candidates in the 2015 municipal elections, the Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union brought together a group of non-party candidates for the 2016 parliamentary elections. Many of these candidates, campaigning as a movement rather than a political party, won against the candidates of established political parties. Many of Prime Minister Skvernelis’ parliamentary group and government ministers were not party members. A number of them followed Skvernelis when he decided to establish a new party after disagreements with the head of the Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union. Most of the members of the current Šimonytė government are party members, but the prime minister herself is not.

Citations:
G. Žvaliauskas, Ar partijos Lietuvoje yra demokratiškos? Technologija, Kaunas, 2007.
G. Žvaliauskas, Lietuvos socialdemokratų partijos elito kaita 2001–2015 m. laikotarpiu, Viešoji politika ir administravimas, 2017, T. 16, Nr. 1, p. 52-67.

To what extent are economic interest associations (e.g., employers, industry, labor) capable of formulating relevant policies?

10
 9

Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
 8
 7
 6


Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
 5
 4
 3


Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
 2
 1

Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
Association Competence (Employers & Unions)
6
Most Lithuanian interest associations, including employers’ associations and trade unions, have a rather limited ability to formulate well-crafted policies. They typically lack skilled research staff, and only rarely engage in cooperation with academic bodies or individual experts to commission impact assessments of draft legal initiatives. The Investors’ Forum, which represents foreign investors in Lithuania, is one of the exceptions, as it has regular annual meetings with the government and provides policy recommendations based on its members’ input. This association successfully advocated the adoption of a more flexible labor code as part of the new “social model.” The Infobalt IT industry association is also actively engaged in representing its interests in the e-governance policy area. Some economic-interest organizations, including the Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists (which is represented on the Tripartite Council and the European Economic and Social Committee), have improved their policy-formulation capacities. Some business associations and even individual businesses support think tanks. In 2019, the University of Pennsylvania recognized the Lithuanian Free Market Institute as being among the most influential public policy centers in Central and Eastern Europe, ranking it 152th in the region. An accord signed by the government, business organizations, and trade unions in October 2017 encourages employee participation in trade unions and the formation of business associations as well as supports the capacity-building efforts of social partners.

Citations:
University of Pennsylvania. “2019 Global Go To Think Tanks.” https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=think_tanks

To what extent are non-economic interest associations capable of formulating relevant policies?

10
 9

Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
 8
 7
 6


Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
 5
 4
 3


Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
 2
 1

Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
Association Competence (Others)
5
The capacity of noneconomic interest associations to formulate well-crafted and relevant policy proposals varies by group. Most lack skilled staff members and do not engage in cooperation with academic bodies or individual experts. Moreover, the lawmaking and regulatory impact-assessment processes do not sufficiently ensure the participation of relevant stakeholders. Business interest groups tend to have stronger abilities to formulate policies than do social or environmental groups. The Lithuanian Catholic Church is an important player in Lithuanian politics, with its influence typically focused on a small number of policy issues. However, this interest group unsuccessfully lobbied the president to veto legislation designed to make it easier for families to access assisted insemination services. The Non-Governmental Organizations’ Information and Support Center facilitates cooperation between NGOs as they seek to represent their interests.

Independent Supervisory Bodies

#14

Does there exist an independent and effective audit office?

10
 9

There exists an effective and independent audit office.
 8
 7
 6


There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is slightly limited.
 5
 4
 3


There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
 2
 1

There does not exist an independent and effective audit office.
Audit Office
8
The National Audit Office is accountable to the parliament and the president. The auditor general is appointed by the parliament based on a nomination by the president. The parliament’s Committee on Audit considers financial-, compliance- and performance-audit reports submitted by the office, and prepares draft parliamentary decisions relating to the implementation of audit recommendations. The office also cooperates with other parliamentary committees. The leaders of the parliamentary Committee on Audit at one time used audit reports for political purposes, especially after an opposition-party member was appointed to head it. The National Audit Office also performs the functions of an independent fiscal institution, monitoring compliance with EU fiscal-policy norms. According to the OECD review released in 2019, this unique institutional setup, in which the independent fiscal institution (founded in 2015) is part of National Audit Office, results in several challenges; for instance, there is a lack of a clear public identity and a lack of operational independence, and the office has difficulties in recruiting and retaining senior staff members. On the other hand, the Budget Policy Monitoring Department (BPMD) was praised for having quickly established “a reputation for solid independent analysis,” contributing to fiscal transparency as well as parliamentary and public debates.

Over the last few years, the National Audit Office criticized the government’s draft budgets for their lack of compliance with fiscal-discipline provisions and poor allocation of government expenditure. While these criticisms are not always taken into account, there seems to have been progress over time. In its 2020 report to the parliament, the National Audit Office reported that 80% of its recommendations had been implemented, up from 60% in 2018. The National Audit Office was ranked as the best state institution in 2016 by the Lithuanian magazine Veidas due to its representation of state interests, competence and exceptional performance.

Citations:
OECD Independent Fiscal Institutions Review, Lithuania’s Fiscal Independent Institution, 2019, https://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/lithuania-independent-fiscal-institutions-review-2019-en.pdf



https://www.valstybeskontrole.lt/TVS/Content/Administracine_informacija/Veiklos_ataskaitos/2020_metu_VK_veiklos_ataskaita.pdf

Does there exist an independent and effective ombuds office?

10
 9

There exists an effective and independent ombuds office.
 8
 7
 6


There exists an effective and independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is slightly limited.
 5
 4
 3


There exists an independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is considerably limited.
 2
 1

There does not exist an effective and independent ombuds office.
Ombuds Office
8
The parliament has several ombuds offices, including the general ombudsmen’s office, with two appointed ombudspersons, and the special ombudsman’s offices on Equal Opportunities and Children’s Rights. These institutions supervise state institutions, with a particular focus citizens’ human rights and freedoms. They engage in public advocacy on behalf of citizens, and initiate certain actions, but as a group the ombuds offices lack sufficient legal authority to act as a single national institution for human rights. In 2017, these offices became accredited by the United Nations as a national institution of human rights matching the Paris principles. The effectiveness of these ombuds offices has depended on the interplay of several factors. First, citizens have shown at best mixed interest in pursuing complaints through these offices, although the number of complaints remained high in recent years (the highest number of complaints, 1,805, was registered in 2014, with about half of complaints typically recognized as valid). Second, the offices adopted a more proactive attitude toward investigations, focusing on the most significant violations of human rights (e.g., in prisons and other detention facilities). Third, although most of the offices’ recommendations are implemented (up to 95%), some state and municipal institutions are sometimes unwilling to take adequate action in response to the recommendations.

In 2020, the ombuds offices submitted 1,672 recommendations. The majority of them (1,013) were submitted to institutions, and advised making improvements in public administrative practices so as to avoid violating human rights and freedoms. The pandemic presented certain challenges to the ombuds offices. First, their capacity to protect human rights and freedoms was to some extent curtailed; second, the nature of complaints shifted, as some complaints were related to potential violations of pandemic-management rules. During the illegal migration crisis in 2021, the ombuds offices increased their focus on the rights of immigrants and their living conditions.

Citations:
LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS SEIMO KONTROLIERIŲ NACIONALINĖS ŽMOGAUS TEISIŲ INSTITUCIJOS
2020 METŲ VEIKLOS ATASKAITA, 2021, https://www.lrski.lt/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Ataskaita-uz-2020-LT.pdf
LR Seimo kontrolierių įstaiga, Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo kontrolierių – Nacionalinės žmogaus teisių institucijos – 2017 metų veiklos ataskaita, 2018.

Is there an independent authority in place that effectively holds government offices accountable for handling issues of data protection and privacy?

10
 9

An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
 8
 7
 6


An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is slightly limited.
 5
 4
 3


A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are strongly limited.
 2
 1

There is no effective and independent data protection office.
Data Protection Authority
9
An independent and effective data protection authority exists in Lithuania. The State Data Protection Inspectorate (VDAI) is responsible for the supervision and control of enforcement of legal protections for personal data. The status of the government agency gives the agency the legal and policy independence necessary for making regulatory decisions. With experience exceeding 25 years and a staff of about 30, the agency has adequate capacities and resources to focus on the implementation of the General Data Protection Regulation that came into force in 2018. However, despite the allocation of two additional positions, the State Data Protection Inspectorate was unable to recruit new staff in 2017 due to a shortage of financial resources. In 2020, 31 positions out of 38 were filled. In addition, some observers argue that the Inspectorate should provide more information and advisory services regarding the management of personal data in public sector organizations and business enterprises.

The pandemic presented the Inspectorate with a number of challenges; for instance, it was tasked with advising government institutions and the private sector on how to organize their activities in a new environment. There were additional important tasks related to the increasing level of digitalization and the need to protect personal data. According to the Inspectorate, the pandemic “expanded the Inspectorate’s scope of activity and demanded quick decisions.”

Citations:
VDAI, Valstybės duomenų apsaugos inspekcijos 2020 metų veiklos ataskaita, 2021, https://vdai.lrv.lt/uploads/vdai/documents/files/2020%20m_%20VDAI%20veiklos%20ataskaita%202021-02-26.pdf
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