Executive Capacity
#38Key Findings
Lacking a smoothly functioning administration, Croatia falls into the bottom ranks internationally (rank 38) with respect to executive capacity. Its score in this area has declined by 0.3 points relative to its 2014 level.
Strategic decisions are often made on a pro forma basis, and lack follow-through. A recently passed long-term strategic plan lacks deadlines and benchmarks. A Prime Minister’s Office unit tasked with monitoring and analyzing policies has little independent sectoral expertise. Consultation between the line ministries and the PMO is thus rather formal, focusing on technical issues.
A relatively new RIA law and RIA strategy have improved the assessment framework, though only a small share of bills undergo the full RIA procedure, and the public has little interest in the process. Ex post evaluations are rare. Public sector trade unions have put increasing pressure on the government for salary increases, with little agreement in sight.
The public information campaign around COVID-19 vaccination was deemed a failure. Bureaucratic delays in the post-earthquake reconstruction of Zagreb and the Banija area have been catastrophic. A moderate decentralization campaign is underway, but a long-awaited territorial reform aimed at reducing municipal fragmentation has been shelved.
Strategic decisions are often made on a pro forma basis, and lack follow-through. A recently passed long-term strategic plan lacks deadlines and benchmarks. A Prime Minister’s Office unit tasked with monitoring and analyzing policies has little independent sectoral expertise. Consultation between the line ministries and the PMO is thus rather formal, focusing on technical issues.
A relatively new RIA law and RIA strategy have improved the assessment framework, though only a small share of bills undergo the full RIA procedure, and the public has little interest in the process. Ex post evaluations are rare. Public sector trade unions have put increasing pressure on the government for salary increases, with little agreement in sight.
The public information campaign around COVID-19 vaccination was deemed a failure. Bureaucratic delays in the post-earthquake reconstruction of Zagreb and the Banija area have been catastrophic. A moderate decentralization campaign is underway, but a long-awaited territorial reform aimed at reducing municipal fragmentation has been shelved.
How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?
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9
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
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3
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
2
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1
In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
Since joining the European Union in 2013, strategic-planning capacity in Croatia has increased substantially, in part due to the learning process that took place during the accession period, but also thanks to Croatia’s inclusion in the EU strategic-planning exercise organized within the framework of the European Semester. Moreover, many local and regional self-government units have realized that success in drawing EU funds largely depends on the quality of strategic planning.
Despite the introduction of new institutional and procedural arrangements, policymaking in Croatia continues to be dominated by short-term political interests. Strategic decisions are still very often made pro forma, lack political support and end up being shelved. Also, in numerous cases, strategies are inconsistent and lack some of the elements that strategic documents should contain. A good case in point has been the fate of the National Development Strategy 2030, announced by the second Plenković government as an umbrella strategy. Back in 2017/18, interest associations and ordinary citizens were invited to provide their input with much acclaim. On 5 February 2021, the Croatian parliament finally adopted the National Development Strategy of the Republic of Croatia, which covers the period through 2030. Presenting the strategy in the parliament, Plenković emphasized that it focuses on four developmental pillars: sustainable economy and society, strengthening resilience to crises, the green and digital transition, and balanced regional development. The problem, however, is that there are no deadlines or benchmarks in the document as adopted by parliament that would enable the fulfillment of these goals to be monitored.
Ivo Bićanić, a leading Croatian economist, has criticized the strategy, emphasizing that it is “irreparably bad” because it is a “sterile and toothless document” that does not create obligations for this or future governments, and does not limit the implementation of their programs, whatever they may be. Plenković and Minister of Regional Development and EU Funds Nataša Tramišak promised that as many as 67 sectoral strategic documents would be harmonized with Strategy 2030 by 2022. The question remains, however, whether any further strategies and policies will emerge from this “umbrella strategy.” For example, other democratic countries often adopt such general development documents, but their adoption is followed by the kind of clearly articulated sectoral policies that Croatia has generally not developed. Thus, it seems that in Croatia, daily politics have again trumped long-term strategic planning.
Citations:
Bićanić, I. (2020) Bićanić: Nismo baš svi bedaci. Za taj novac strategiju su mogli napisati Rodrik i Acemoglu, recenziju
Krugman i Stiglitz i još bi ostalo za Ekonomski institut, (We are not all fools. For that money, Rodrik and Acemoglu could write a strategy, peer-review Krugman and Stiglitz, and more would remain for the Institute of Economics), Web-portal Ideje, November 15, 2020 (https://ideje.hr/bicanic-nismo-bas-svi-bedaci-za-te-novce-strategiju-su-mogli-napisati-rodrik-i-acemoglu-recenziju-krugman-i-stiglitz-i-jos-bi-ostalo-za-ekonomski-institut/).
Petak, Z. (2018) Policy-Making Context and Challenges of Governance in Croatia, in: Z. Petak, K. Kotarski (eds.), Policy-Making at the European Periphery: The Case of Croatia. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 29-45.
Despite the introduction of new institutional and procedural arrangements, policymaking in Croatia continues to be dominated by short-term political interests. Strategic decisions are still very often made pro forma, lack political support and end up being shelved. Also, in numerous cases, strategies are inconsistent and lack some of the elements that strategic documents should contain. A good case in point has been the fate of the National Development Strategy 2030, announced by the second Plenković government as an umbrella strategy. Back in 2017/18, interest associations and ordinary citizens were invited to provide their input with much acclaim. On 5 February 2021, the Croatian parliament finally adopted the National Development Strategy of the Republic of Croatia, which covers the period through 2030. Presenting the strategy in the parliament, Plenković emphasized that it focuses on four developmental pillars: sustainable economy and society, strengthening resilience to crises, the green and digital transition, and balanced regional development. The problem, however, is that there are no deadlines or benchmarks in the document as adopted by parliament that would enable the fulfillment of these goals to be monitored.
Ivo Bićanić, a leading Croatian economist, has criticized the strategy, emphasizing that it is “irreparably bad” because it is a “sterile and toothless document” that does not create obligations for this or future governments, and does not limit the implementation of their programs, whatever they may be. Plenković and Minister of Regional Development and EU Funds Nataša Tramišak promised that as many as 67 sectoral strategic documents would be harmonized with Strategy 2030 by 2022. The question remains, however, whether any further strategies and policies will emerge from this “umbrella strategy.” For example, other democratic countries often adopt such general development documents, but their adoption is followed by the kind of clearly articulated sectoral policies that Croatia has generally not developed. Thus, it seems that in Croatia, daily politics have again trumped long-term strategic planning.
Citations:
Bićanić, I. (2020) Bićanić: Nismo baš svi bedaci. Za taj novac strategiju su mogli napisati Rodrik i Acemoglu, recenziju
Krugman i Stiglitz i još bi ostalo za Ekonomski institut, (We are not all fools. For that money, Rodrik and Acemoglu could write a strategy, peer-review Krugman and Stiglitz, and more would remain for the Institute of Economics), Web-portal Ideje, November 15, 2020 (https://ideje.hr/bicanic-nismo-bas-svi-bedaci-za-te-novce-strategiju-su-mogli-napisati-rodrik-i-acemoglu-recenziju-krugman-i-stiglitz-i-jos-bi-ostalo-za-ekonomski-institut/).
Petak, Z. (2018) Policy-Making Context and Challenges of Governance in Croatia, in: Z. Petak, K. Kotarski (eds.), Policy-Making at the European Periphery: The Case of Croatia. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 29-45.
Does the government regularly take into account advice from non-governmental experts during decision-making?
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9
In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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For major political projects, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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3
In some cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
2
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1
The government does not consult with non-governmental experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
The 2009 Societal Consultation Codex, which serves as a set of guidelines for the policymaking process, mentions the consultation of academic experts. In practice, however, the involvement of academic experts in the policymaking process remains rare. Moreover, it is largely limited to the early phases of policy formulation and does not extend to the final drafting of legislation, let alone the monitoring of implementation.
Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills according to the government’s priorities?
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9
The GO / PMO provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO evaluates most draft bills according to the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise but does not evaluate draft bills.
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1
The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
Until 2014, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) lacked a central policy unit able to evaluate and coordinate the activities of the line ministries. At the beginning of 2014, a unit for public policy coordination and support to the prime minister was established in the Prime Minister’s Office. The unit is tasked with coordinating and monitoring public polices performed by line ministries. However, the capacity of the staff to provide reliable applied policy analysis is limited.
Within the Prime Minister’s Office, Plenković’s government has a Service for Public Policies and Support to the Prime Minister, which is primarily responsible for systematic monitoring and analysis of individual public policies, and has the task of preparing expert opinions and studies and strategic development plans and analyses. In addition, the service prepares all relevant position papers for the prime minister for his meetings in the narrow government cabinet, as well as his addresses to the parliament and the European Council.
The head of the service is Tena Mišetić, and the PMO as a whole is headed by Zvonimir Frka Petešić. In the political public, these two persons are considered to have decision-making power greater than most government ministers, but all available data and analyses suggest that the PMO has comparatively little independent sectoral policy expertise, and thus lacks the capacity to evaluate the policy substance of draft bills.
Within the Prime Minister’s Office, Plenković’s government has a Service for Public Policies and Support to the Prime Minister, which is primarily responsible for systematic monitoring and analysis of individual public policies, and has the task of preparing expert opinions and studies and strategic development plans and analyses. In addition, the service prepares all relevant position papers for the prime minister for his meetings in the narrow government cabinet, as well as his addresses to the parliament and the European Council.
The head of the service is Tena Mišetić, and the PMO as a whole is headed by Zvonimir Frka Petešić. In the political public, these two persons are considered to have decision-making power greater than most government ministers, but all available data and analyses suggest that the PMO has comparatively little independent sectoral policy expertise, and thus lacks the capacity to evaluate the policy substance of draft bills.
To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?
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9
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There are inter-related capacities for coordination between GO/PMO and line ministries.
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The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
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Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
2
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Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
Ministries normally enjoy huge leeway in transforming government priorities into legislation, and there is no stable and transparent arbitration scheme that would give the Prime Minister’s Office a formal role in settling interministerial differences. Since the Service for Public Policies and Support to the Prime Minister does not have the capacity to evaluate line ministry policies in the way that central-government policy offices do in most democracies, consultation between line ministries and the Prime Minister’s Office is rather formal, and focuses only on technical and drafting issues.
Citations:
Giljević, Z. (2015): Utjecaj okoline organizacije na upravu koordinaciju: Ministarstvo uprave kao studija slučaja (The Influence of Organizational Environment on Administrative Coordination: Croatian Ministry of Public Administration as a Case Study), in: Hrvatska i komparativna javna uprava 15(4): 875-908.
Citations:
Giljević, Z. (2015): Utjecaj okoline organizacije na upravu koordinaciju: Ministarstvo uprave kao studija slučaja (The Influence of Organizational Environment on Administrative Coordination: Croatian Ministry of Public Administration as a Case Study), in: Hrvatska i komparativna javna uprava 15(4): 875-908.
How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?
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The vast majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
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Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
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There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
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There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
The rules of procedure of the Croatian government provide for different kinds of cabinet committees and assign a major role in policy coordination to them. The prime minister and the vice prime ministers form the core cabinet (Uži kabinet vlade). In addition, there are various permanent and non-permanent cabinet committees that focus on particular issues. As there is little ex ante coordination among ministries, controversies are often pushed upwards, with cabinet committees playing an important role in resolving conflicts. However, the quality of coordination suffers from the fact that cabinet committees are absorbed by these disputes and other matters of detail.
How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?
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Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
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There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
Coordination between line ministries in shaping certain elements of public policies is normatively determined by the Rules of Procedure of the Government. The direct coordination of policy proposals by ministries is limited. There is no stable and transparent scheme for settling interministerial differences within the bureaucracy. The ministries in charge of drafting proposals rarely set up working groups that include peers from other ministries or government bodies. Deadlines for comments by other ministries are often too abbreviated, capacities for comments are sometimes inadequate, and comments made by other ministries are often not taken seriously. In addition, there are no clear criteria as to when multi-sectoral working groups need to be formed for particular policy proposals.
Citations:
Musa, A., Petak, Z. (2015): Coordination for Policy in Transition Countries: Case of Croatia, in: Mednarodna revija za javno upravo/International Public Administration Review 13(3-4): 117-159.
Citations:
Musa, A., Petak, Z. (2015): Coordination for Policy in Transition Countries: Case of Croatia, in: Mednarodna revija za javno upravo/International Public Administration Review 13(3-4): 117-159.
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
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Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Informal coordination both between the coalition partners and between different party factions in the HDZ has played an important role in interministerial coordination under the Plenković government. The strong reliance on decisions in coalition meetings or party bodies has helped maintain the tradition of keeping strategic decisions and policy coordination largely within the political parties’ ambit, preventing the development of more formal and transparent mechanisms of policy coordination or a strengthening of the public administration’s role.
How extensively and effectively are digital technologies used to support interministerial coordination (in policy development and monitoring)?
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The government uses digital technologies extensively and effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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The government uses digital technologies in most cases and somewhat effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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The government uses digital technologies to a lesser degree and with limited effects to support interministerial coordination.
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The government makes no substantial use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.
The digitalization of public administration is an undisputed goal of the government, but has not proceeded smoothly. The Croatian government established the Central State Office for the Development of the Digital Society in 2016. One of the basic tasks of the Office has been to bundle the existing 28 different digitalization strategies within an umbrella strategy that allows for the co-funding of initiatives from EU funds in the next Multiannual EU Financial Framework for the years 2021 – 2027.
According to a 2021 European Commission report, Croatia has implemented the principles of the European Interoperability Framework well or at a medium level.
However, the effective use of digital technologies in government and administration is still hindered by fragmentation and the tendency to subject such issues to laborious bureaucratic processes in organizational siloes. As a result, digital technologies do not play a major role in interministerial coordination.
Citations:
https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/inline-files/DPA_Factsheets_2021_Croatia_vFinal.pdf
According to a 2021 European Commission report, Croatia has implemented the principles of the European Interoperability Framework well or at a medium level.
However, the effective use of digital technologies in government and administration is still hindered by fragmentation and the tendency to subject such issues to laborious bureaucratic processes in organizational siloes. As a result, digital technologies do not play a major role in interministerial coordination.
Citations:
https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/inline-files/DPA_Factsheets_2021_Croatia_vFinal.pdf
To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?
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RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
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RIA are not applied or do not exist.
The EU accession process has accelerated the development of RIA in Croatia. In July 2011, the Kosor government adopted a RIA bill and re-established the Government Office for Coordination of the Regulatory Impact Assessment System that had been abolished in July 2009 as a reaction to populist critique. In accordance with the RIA Action Plan for 2013 – 2015, the office became a department of the government’s Legislation Office, and RIA implementation coordinators were appointed in all ministries. Since 2012, all government bodies have been obliged to prepare annual regulatory plans specifying which of their planned regulations should undergo a RIA. A new RIA law passed in 2017 requires a full RIA to be carried out for all new laws that will potentially have a large environmental or social impact. In addition, a Regulatory Impact Assessment Strategy for 2018 – 2023 has sought to improve the implementation of RIA. While progress has been made in strengthening the regulatory policy framework, only a small number of bills undergo the complete RIA procedure. According to the government’s report on conducted legislative activities, only 17 out of 125 laws planned to be passed in 2020 were subject to RIA, of which only two laws (12%) ultimately underwent RIA procedures. A total of 145 laws were planned to be passed in 2021, of which 20 laws were expected to undergo regulatory impact assessment procedures. Moreover, RIA documents are generally of low quality, particularly the parts identifying options and analyzing effects. This has in part to do with the fact that state administration bodies have limited professional and analytical capacities. The professional and administrative capacities of the Legislation Office are insufficient to ensure the application of the RIA system and quality control of RIA documents.
Citations:
Petak, Z. (2015): Evidence-Based Policy Making and the Implementation of Regulatory Impact Assessment in Croatia, in: Management and Business Administration: Central Europe 23(2): 147-162.
Citations:
Petak, Z. (2015): Evidence-Based Policy Making and the Implementation of Regulatory Impact Assessment in Croatia, in: Management and Business Administration: Central Europe 23(2): 147-162.
Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?
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RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
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The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
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3
The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
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RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
In Croatia, there is no independent body that evaluates RIA assessments on a regular basis. However, stable partnerships with representatives of the business community (Croatian Chamber of Commerce, Croatian Employers Association, Croatian Chamber of Crafts, Croatian Banking Association), some civil society organizations (Croatian Law Center, Croatian Youth Network, Forum for Quality Foster Care, Croatian Business Council for Sustainable Development) and unions (Trade Union of Textile, Footwear, Leather and Rubber Industry) provide for the involvement of stakeholders. The openness of the RIA process and the transparency of RIA results differ among ministries. Some ministries have opened the entire RIA process to the public, asking stakeholders for feedback to their bill drafts. Other ministries ignore the importance of getting feedback from the public, thereby undermining the effectiveness of the whole RIA project. The public itself does not seem to be very interested in the RIA process. It often questions its necessity and mocks it.
Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?
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Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
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Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
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Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
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Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
Croatia adopted a sustainability strategy in 2009. However, neither this strategy nor the RIA Strategy or subsequent RIA action plans provide for comprehensive sustainability checks. RIAs are supposed to consider a broad range of impacts, including fiscal, economic, social and environmental, but the actual quality of assessments is low. There is no systematic differentiation between the short, medium and long term.
To what extent do government ministries regularly evaluate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of public policies and use results of evaluations for the revision of existing policies or development of new policies?
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Ex post evaluations are carried out for all significant policies and are generally used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are carried out for most significant policies and are used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are rarely carried out for significant policies and are rarely used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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1
Ex post evaluations are generally not carried out and do not play any relevant role for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
The process of Europeanization and Croatia’s EU membership have opened the space for the use of evaluation studies in Croatian public administration at the central and local government levels. Methods and theoretical approaches to evaluation are exchanged through the Croatian Evaluation Network, which is comprised of experts interested in evaluation practice. However, Croatian policymakers are yet to introduce effective ex post evaluation mechanisms for the already passed legislative and regulatory measures. Thus, ex post evaluations of significant policies are rarely carried out, and are even more rarely used by policymakers as a source of evidence and inspiration. If ex post evaluations are carried out, the success indicators tend to be too general and insufficiently precise.
Does the government consult with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner?
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The government always consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
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The government in most cases consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
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The government does consult with societal actors, but mostly in an unfair and clientelistic manner.
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The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
Consultation of societal actors in Croatia has been governed by the 2009 Societal Consultation Codex. It has been strengthened with the introduction of the government’s Central Web Portal for Public Consultations in 2015. According to the Right of Access to Information Act of 2013, all government proposals for regulations related to citizens’ interests have to be submitted for comments via this portal. In the period under review, critical comments by the scientific community and the general public on the web platform led the government to withdraw the envisaged amendments to the law on the prevention of conflict of interest, which would have reduced the prerogatives of the parliamentary commission on conflict of interest. The second major instrument for societal consultation – the tripartite dialogue between representatives of the government, employers’ associations and trade unions, the Economic and Social Council (ESC) – has continued to be marked by a lack of trust and respect. The trade unions left the ESC in April 2019, following a dispute with the government over the role of the ESC and have not participated in its work since then.
In October and November 2019, a large strike among teachers in primary and secondary schools broke out, ending only at the beginning of December that year. Trade unions in the education sector demanded a salary increase of 18.3%, which Plenković’s government declined to agree to. In the end, the unions agreed to a much smaller increase, which the government pledged to pay in three phases. The government’s problems with the education-sector union have thus temporarily ended. However, during 2021 and early 2022, other public-sector unions also sought to improve working conditions for their members. By mid-January 2022, no basic collective agreement defining substantive rights had yet been signed. The unions were continuing to argue that the government’s refusal to raise base public-sector salaries was unacceptable.
In October and November 2019, a large strike among teachers in primary and secondary schools broke out, ending only at the beginning of December that year. Trade unions in the education sector demanded a salary increase of 18.3%, which Plenković’s government declined to agree to. In the end, the unions agreed to a much smaller increase, which the government pledged to pay in three phases. The government’s problems with the education-sector union have thus temporarily ended. However, during 2021 and early 2022, other public-sector unions also sought to improve working conditions for their members. By mid-January 2022, no basic collective agreement defining substantive rights had yet been signed. The unions were continuing to argue that the government’s refusal to raise base public-sector salaries was unacceptable.
To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?
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Ministries are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
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Ministries most of the time are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
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Ministries occasionally issue public statements that contradict the public communication of other ministries or the government strategy.
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Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually consistent with the government’s strategy.
The Prime Minister’s Office is formally responsible for policy coordination and the communication of policy to the general public through the Public Relations Service. In practice, however, ministries have often followed their own communication strategies, only to reverse their stance following criticism from the Prime Minister’s Office or other line ministries. This was best exemplified during the longest strike in Croatia’s history, which was orchestrated by teachers’ trade unions in 2019. The Ministry of Education and PMO were not communicating effectively in developing a coherent and common set of proposals for the negotiation process.
The failure of the government’s communication strategies has been clearly demonstrated by the failure of the public-information campaign around COVID-19 vaccination. Even before the campaign was conceived, about 35% of the population said they did not intend to be vaccinated, and in early 2022, just about that percentage of the population remained unvaccinated.
However, sociologists’ research have found that among those who do not intend to be vaccinated, only 45% opposed any vaccinations, and a majority of 55% simply distrust the existing coronavirus vaccine. These are precisely the citizens that the government and the headquarters for civil protection should have reached with their communications, but failed to do so.
The failure of the government’s communication strategies has been clearly demonstrated by the failure of the public-information campaign around COVID-19 vaccination. Even before the campaign was conceived, about 35% of the population said they did not intend to be vaccinated, and in early 2022, just about that percentage of the population remained unvaccinated.
However, sociologists’ research have found that among those who do not intend to be vaccinated, only 45% opposed any vaccinations, and a majority of 55% simply distrust the existing coronavirus vaccine. These are precisely the citizens that the government and the headquarters for civil protection should have reached with their communications, but failed to do so.
To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?
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The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
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6
The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
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The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
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The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
During his first year in office, Prime Minister Andrej Plenković announced far-reaching reforms. The HDZ’s election program served as the basis for a relatively comprehensive National Reform Program presented to the European Commission in April 2017. However, the program lacked a clear schedule and its implementation has suffered from the Agrokor crisis and the mid-2017 change in the governing coalition. The tax reform adopted at the end of 2016 was the only major reform implemented during Plenković’s first year in office. However, even this reform was implemented only partially, as the government gave up the already prepared introduction of a property tax in June 2017. As for pensions and healthcare, the Plenković government came up with reforms only in autumn 2018. The announced reform of public administration has progressed slowly.
The limited effectiveness of the Plenković government is also reflected in the 2020 European Commission’s European Semester report. According to the report, the level of implementation of the recommendations submitted to successive Croatian governments between 2014 and 2019 (i.e., Milanović, Orešković and Plenković governments) is rather low. Only 43% of all country-specific recommendations addressed to Croatia have recorded at least “some progress,” while another 43% of recommendations have recorded “limited” or “no progress,” and only in 7% have either full implementation or substantial progress been recorded. Reform activity in relation to key structural policy areas such as the judiciary, the health sector, education, pensions, social policy and reform of the public administration has stalled in recent years.
In 2020, Plenković’s government continued the legacy of previous governments of passing multiple laws using the urgent procedure, albeit to a lesser extent than in previous years. In 2015, 85 laws were passed using this urgent procedure, which requires only one reading by the parliament, while only 35 laws were passed using the regular procedure. In 2020, 70 laws were passed using the urgent procedure, while 68 laws were passed utilizing the regular procedure. Unfortunately, the intense use of this procedure significantly downgrades the overall quality of laws passed.
However, the biggest policy-implementation problem has been the catastrophic delay in the reconstruction of Zagreb and the Banija area, which were severely damaged in the 2020 earthquakes. In Banija, by mid-January the government had not instituted the construction of a single house, so renovation efforts had been limited to those funded by a small number of private donations. The state-led construction was expected to begin only in February 2022.
Citations:
European Commission (2020): Commission Staff Working Document – Country report Croatia 2020. SWD(2020) 510 final, Brussels (https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/2868b45e-5944-11ea-8b81-01aa75ed71a1).
Kotarski, Kristijan (2019) http://www.hanns-seidel-stiftung.com.hr/assets/images/uploads/euro_introduction_to_croatia.pdf
Vlada Republike Hrvatske (2021) Izvješće o provedbi plana zakonodavnih aktivnosti (Report on the Implementation of the Plan of Legislative Activities). Zagreb: Ured za zakonodavstvo. (https://zakonodavstvo.gov.hr/UserDocsImages//dokumenti//210928%20Izvjesce%20PZA%20VRH%202020%20final.pdf)
The limited effectiveness of the Plenković government is also reflected in the 2020 European Commission’s European Semester report. According to the report, the level of implementation of the recommendations submitted to successive Croatian governments between 2014 and 2019 (i.e., Milanović, Orešković and Plenković governments) is rather low. Only 43% of all country-specific recommendations addressed to Croatia have recorded at least “some progress,” while another 43% of recommendations have recorded “limited” or “no progress,” and only in 7% have either full implementation or substantial progress been recorded. Reform activity in relation to key structural policy areas such as the judiciary, the health sector, education, pensions, social policy and reform of the public administration has stalled in recent years.
In 2020, Plenković’s government continued the legacy of previous governments of passing multiple laws using the urgent procedure, albeit to a lesser extent than in previous years. In 2015, 85 laws were passed using this urgent procedure, which requires only one reading by the parliament, while only 35 laws were passed using the regular procedure. In 2020, 70 laws were passed using the urgent procedure, while 68 laws were passed utilizing the regular procedure. Unfortunately, the intense use of this procedure significantly downgrades the overall quality of laws passed.
However, the biggest policy-implementation problem has been the catastrophic delay in the reconstruction of Zagreb and the Banija area, which were severely damaged in the 2020 earthquakes. In Banija, by mid-January the government had not instituted the construction of a single house, so renovation efforts had been limited to those funded by a small number of private donations. The state-led construction was expected to begin only in February 2022.
Citations:
European Commission (2020): Commission Staff Working Document – Country report Croatia 2020. SWD(2020) 510 final, Brussels (https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/2868b45e-5944-11ea-8b81-01aa75ed71a1).
Kotarski, Kristijan (2019) http://www.hanns-seidel-stiftung.com.hr/assets/images/uploads/euro_introduction_to_croatia.pdf
Vlada Republike Hrvatske (2021) Izvješće o provedbi plana zakonodavnih aktivnosti (Report on the Implementation of the Plan of Legislative Activities). Zagreb: Ured za zakonodavstvo. (https://zakonodavstvo.gov.hr/UserDocsImages//dokumenti//210928%20Izvjesce%20PZA%20VRH%202020%20final.pdf)
To what extent does the organization of government provide mechanisms to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?
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9
9
The organization of government successfully provides strong mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
8
7
6
7
6
The organization of government provides some mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
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3
4
3
The organization of government provides weak mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
2
1
1
The organization of government does not provide any mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
The organization of that Croatian government generally provides only weak incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program. The situation has not changed significantly under last two Plenković governments (2016-2022). Interministerial coordination and regular communication between relevant ministries are very rare and of poor quality. As a result, numerous issues that the ministries should deal with eventually end up on the prime minister’s desk. This substantially reduces the ministries’ capacity for autonomous – full or partial – implementation of the government policies they are entrusted with. All this also slows down the whole policy implementation process because the prime minister has to deal with too many less important issues instead of concentrating on the strategic development of government policies.
A good example of this has been the inefficiency in implementing the reconstruction of buildings damaged in the earthquakes that hit Croatia in 2020. The Law on Reconstruction of Buildings Damaged in the Zagreb Earthquake was passed despite numerous warnings from the architectural profession and civil engineers that it was too complicated to be enforceable. As a result, a year later, in October 2021, the law was amended, but reconstruction was still very slow. The example once again showed that ministries are organized in a way that complicates decision-making processes aimed at implementing the government’s policies.
In many cases, required documents are missing, or months are taken to repeal unnecessary regulations that are hampering implementation. For example, it took six months to repeal a provision requiring public financial and technical control over building projects funded via public procurement mechanisms. Nowhere in the official documentation did it say that it was necessary to have this control; however, this proved to be a condition that had to be met before funds could be disbursed for reconstruction. Ministries and agencies generally have procedures in place that significantly slow down the implementation of government policies.
A good example of this has been the inefficiency in implementing the reconstruction of buildings damaged in the earthquakes that hit Croatia in 2020. The Law on Reconstruction of Buildings Damaged in the Zagreb Earthquake was passed despite numerous warnings from the architectural profession and civil engineers that it was too complicated to be enforceable. As a result, a year later, in October 2021, the law was amended, but reconstruction was still very slow. The example once again showed that ministries are organized in a way that complicates decision-making processes aimed at implementing the government’s policies.
In many cases, required documents are missing, or months are taken to repeal unnecessary regulations that are hampering implementation. For example, it took six months to repeal a provision requiring public financial and technical control over building projects funded via public procurement mechanisms. Nowhere in the official documentation did it say that it was necessary to have this control; however, this proved to be a condition that had to be met before funds could be disbursed for reconstruction. Ministries and agencies generally have procedures in place that significantly slow down the implementation of government policies.
How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
8
7
6
7
6
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
5
4
3
4
3
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
2
1
1
The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
The primary central-government core-executive bodies, the General Secretariat of the Government and Prime Minister’s Office, do not have the capacity to fully monitor the policies implemented by line ministries. Their restrictive remits constitute a major capacity gap. Greater monitoring power lies with the Ministry of Finance, as the 2010 Fiscal Responsibility Act has given it far-reaching powers to monitor the activities of any organization drawing funds from the central budget.
How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?
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9
9
The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
8
7
6
7
6
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
5
4
3
4
3
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
2
1
1
The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
In 2015, Croatia had about 75 executive agencies, six of which were regulatory agencies. The tasks of these agencies were determined by law. The two most important monitoring instruments are certain reporting requirements and the representation of ministers or senior civil servants on the agencies’ management boards. Reports are not based on predefined performance indicators but are more a loose and often self-congratulatory review of agencies’ activities in the past year. They are seldom discussed after publication. As a result, the agencies enjoy a relatively large amount of discretion and face primarily political constraints. The proliferation of agencies has been a source of waste and inefficiency. The Orešković government continued the evaluation of agencies begun under the Milanović government and eventually proposed the elimination of nine agencies. Under the first Plenković government, this proposal was not implemented. The second Plenković government eventually came up with its own reform proposal in August 2018. The government announced a plan to reduce the number of agencies and to make the others more efficient; in this plan, only a few agencies were abolished or shut down, and the rest were merged with other agencies. In September of that year, trade unions responded to the proposal, saying the social partners had not been consulted on the future of some bodies of immediate interest, and opposed the merger of the four agencies.
The government’s proposal aimed to downsize public administration by reforming 54 public organizations, including state agencies, state institutions and state-owned enterprises, which will be either closed, merged with other agencies or subsumed within line ministries. Agencies will be brought within a new framework, which will involve a higher degree of homogeneity across the system. A continuing problem is the lack of a publicly accessible online list of all executive agencies and their annual reports, which would enable any changes to their number, size or functioning to be tracked.
The government’s proposal aimed to downsize public administration by reforming 54 public organizations, including state agencies, state institutions and state-owned enterprises, which will be either closed, merged with other agencies or subsumed within line ministries. Agencies will be brought within a new framework, which will involve a higher degree of homogeneity across the system. A continuing problem is the lack of a publicly accessible online list of all executive agencies and their annual reports, which would enable any changes to their number, size or functioning to be tracked.
To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?
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9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
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7
6
The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
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The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
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1
The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
The division of competencies between central and subnational governments has been relatively stable. By far the most important revenue source of subnational governments is the personal-income tax, which contributes about 90% of all tax revenues and slightly more than half of total revenues. The remaining taxes account for only around 6% of total revenue, the most important being the property tax (approximately 3.3% of total revenue). The second most important source of revenue is the various types of administrative fees (user charges being the most significant among them, as they collectively make up approximately 17% of total subnational revenues). Grants from the central government (often administered via counties) and various assistance funds from abroad rank third. Finally, about 8% of subnational governments’ revenues derive from the various types of property they own (business premises, apartments).
Strong regional and local differences have long hindered subnational governments from being properly financed. Many municipalities and towns, most of them in rural areas, are poor and therefore face severe difficulties in providing public services. In addition, due to a lack of consistent long-term policies, the allocation of central-government grants is complex, unclear and subject to sporadic alteration. Although local government units have substantial autonomy in providing services related to economic activity, preschool education, and culture, sports and religious activities, they have limited autonomy in financing such responsibilities because the proceeds from tax sharing and central-government grants are earmarked. Moreover, many public services depend on financing from both central and local government levels, undermining their coherent delivery. In 2018, the Plenković government decided to transfer some income tax revenue to municipalities and cities. This has enhanced fiscal capacities within these local governments. However, the level of effective administrative and political decentralization remains low according to analyses by the Committee of the Regions.
Citations:
Koprić, I., A. Musa, V. Dulabić (2016): Local government and local public services in Croatia, in: H. Wollmann, I. Koprić, G. Marcou (eds.), Public and social services in Europe: from Public and municipal to private sector provision. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 201-215.
Bajo, A., M. Primorac (2018): Croatia: instruments of fiscal equalisation, in: W. Bartlett, S. Kmezic and K. Djulic (eds.), Fiscal Decentralisation, Local Government and Policy Reversals in Southeastern Europe, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 53-80.
Committee of the Regions division of powers report: https://portal.cor.europa.eu/divisionpowers/Pages/Croatia.aspx
Strong regional and local differences have long hindered subnational governments from being properly financed. Many municipalities and towns, most of them in rural areas, are poor and therefore face severe difficulties in providing public services. In addition, due to a lack of consistent long-term policies, the allocation of central-government grants is complex, unclear and subject to sporadic alteration. Although local government units have substantial autonomy in providing services related to economic activity, preschool education, and culture, sports and religious activities, they have limited autonomy in financing such responsibilities because the proceeds from tax sharing and central-government grants are earmarked. Moreover, many public services depend on financing from both central and local government levels, undermining their coherent delivery. In 2018, the Plenković government decided to transfer some income tax revenue to municipalities and cities. This has enhanced fiscal capacities within these local governments. However, the level of effective administrative and political decentralization remains low according to analyses by the Committee of the Regions.
Citations:
Koprić, I., A. Musa, V. Dulabić (2016): Local government and local public services in Croatia, in: H. Wollmann, I. Koprić, G. Marcou (eds.), Public and social services in Europe: from Public and municipal to private sector provision. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 201-215.
Bajo, A., M. Primorac (2018): Croatia: instruments of fiscal equalisation, in: W. Bartlett, S. Kmezic and K. Djulic (eds.), Fiscal Decentralisation, Local Government and Policy Reversals in Southeastern Europe, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 53-80.
Committee of the Regions division of powers report: https://portal.cor.europa.eu/divisionpowers/Pages/Croatia.aspx
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
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7
6
7
6
Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
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3
4
3
The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
2
1
1
The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
The autonomy of local and regional self-government units is very limited. In violation of the European Charter on Local Self-Government, local units are usually not allowed to regulate and expand their autonomous scope of activities on their own. In the case of activities devolved to local self-government units by the central government, a central-government body issues instructions to county prefects and mayors. The Ministry of Administration can dissolve the representative bodies of local or regional self-government units if they violate the constitution or laws. “Lex Šerif,” a special law passed in 2017, strengthened mayors vis-à-vis local assemblies by allowing mayors to dissolve the assemblies when they do not adopt budgets. This was an attempt on behalf of the ruling HDZ to provide more power to mayors from their own ranks in the face of growing political fragmentation in local assemblies since 2017 election. On 1 January 2020, special laws came into force entrusting certain tasks formerly implemented by the state administration to county governments. By entrusting these tasks to counties, the government intended to encourage the process of further decentralization.
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?
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9
9
Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
5
4
3
4
3
Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
2
1
1
Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
There are no national standards for public services in Croatia. Modern systems for the improvement of service quality such as ISO, EFQM or similar public-management standards are not implemented in the Croatian public sector. Moreover, the productivity, efficiency and quality of local self-government units are not systematically measured, and local government budgets are currently monitored only on the basis of the economic purposes of local government spending, rather than on its outcomes. There is not even a catalogue of services that local and regional self-government units (municipalities, towns, countries) should provide to the local community. The absence of clear national standards is felt particularly in the field of social policy. Here, the implementation of central-government regulation has differed strongly among municipalities. Some have even ignored legal requirements such as the provision in the Act on Social Welfare that municipalities should use 5% of their budgets for housing allowances for socially marginalized groups.
To what extent is government enforcing regulations in an effective and unbiased way, also against vested interests?
10
9
9
Government agencies enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
8
7
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7
6
Government agencies, for the most part, enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
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3
4
3
Government agencies enforce regulations, but ineffectively and with bias.
2
1
1
Government agencies enforce regulations ineffectively, inconsistently and with bias.
Ensuring impartial enforcement of the law and implementation of regulations by public administration bodies independently of the political, economic or social interests of those subject to regulation is a significant problem in Croatia. The underlying reasons lie in the existence of interest groups that enjoy strong protection through political patronage and in the corruptive tendencies of a part of the street-level bureaucracies dealing with the enforcement of regulation (i.e., inspectorates, tax administration, land registry administration, etc.) The politicization of the civil service and weak governance structures have led to the prevalence of institutions of clientelism and regulatory capture. The introduction of the State Inspectorate in 2018, which encompasses 17 previously independent inspectorates, has failed to ensure compliance. On 1 April 2019, the Plenković government finally legally established the State Inspectorate as the central state administration body.
To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?
10
9
9
The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
8
7
6
7
6
In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
2
1
1
The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.
Croatia’s accession to the European Union and NATO has been accompanied by substantial changes in domestic government structures, ranging from the reintroduction of RIA to the passage of the Societal Consultation Codex and the strengthening of capacities for policy coordination. However, the ability of the Croatian administration to absorb the newly available EU funds has remained limited, and the Plenković government has done little to adapt domestic government structures to international and supranational developments. In 2019, some cosmetic changes were made to the governance structure. State administration offices in 21 Croatian counties were revoked and some of their competencies transferred to counties. Unfortunately, this reform will not significantly decrease the out-sized public administration apparatus. The reform only entails the reshuffling of competencies and personnel, and will not alter structures or processes. The long-awaited reform of the territorial organization of the country is effectively being shelved. The excessive fragmentation thus remains, with a total of 556 municipalities and towns.
Citations:
Puljiz, J., Maleković, S., Keser, I. (2018): Cohesion Policy in Croatia: What Have We Accomplished so Far? in: Z. Petak, K. Kotarski (eds.), Policy-Making at the European Periphery: The Case of Croatia. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 285-302.
Citations:
Puljiz, J., Maleković, S., Keser, I. (2018): Cohesion Policy in Croatia: What Have We Accomplished so Far? in: Z. Petak, K. Kotarski (eds.), Policy-Making at the European Periphery: The Case of Croatia. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 285-302.
To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?
10
9
9
The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
2
1
1
The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
Croatia has supported major global reform initiatives, especially in environmental affairs. However, the Plenković governments have not paid much attention to improving the country’s capacity to engage in global affairs or to assessing the global repercussions of national policies. Unlike her predecessor, President Kolinda Grabar Kitarović was not very active in improving cooperation with the other successor states of the former Yugoslavia. President Milanović has not as yet changed that direction, leaving relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia strained.
To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?
10
9
9
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
5
4
3
4
3
The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
2
1
1
There is no monitoring.
There is no regular self-monitoring of the institutional arrangements of Croatian governments. Monitoring occurs only on an ad hoc, selective basis. Public organizations are supposed to prepare annual reports, but often fail to do so, and do not use these reports to examine deficiencies.
To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?
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9
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The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
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7
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The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
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The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
2
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1
The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
Upon taking office, each of the two Plenković governments slightly changed the cabinet structure. In April 2017, the first created a new expert council, the Council for Demographic Revival. The change in the governing coalition in mid-2017 has led to changes in ministers but has left the cabinet structure untouched. In the period under review, little progress was made in reforming public administration. It remains to be seen whether the ambitious goals of the Mechanism for Recovery and Resilience, which emphasize a strong focus on reforms and investments that encourage green and digital transition, will drive the institutional reforms implemented by the second Plenković government in the 2022-2024 period.
Citations:
Koprić, I. (2018): Croatia, in: N. Thijs, G. Hammerschmid (eds.), Public Administration Characteristics and Performance in EU28. Luxemburg: European Union, 100-140 (https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/97f87f51-9608-11e8-8bc1-01aa75ed71a1).
Citations:
Koprić, I. (2018): Croatia, in: N. Thijs, G. Hammerschmid (eds.), Public Administration Characteristics and Performance in EU28. Luxemburg: European Union, 100-140 (https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/97f87f51-9608-11e8-8bc1-01aa75ed71a1).