How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?

The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
There is strong central oversight of the federal ministries by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, which reports directly to the prime minister. The federal public service, while independent of the government, is strongly motivated to support the government’s program. Underpinning the effectiveness of oversight is the government’s ability to dissolve, merge or reconfigure ministries at any time. Thus, a non-compliant ministry is unlikely to survive.
When appointed to a portfolio, a minister receives a mandate letter from the prime minister, while a deputy minister receives one from the clerk of the Privy Council. The importance of mandate letters depends on changing political and economic circumstances. In the case of the current government, ministers’ mandate letters detail priorities for their departments as seen from the center. The minister is subsequently evaluated on his or her success in achieving the objectives set out in the mandate letter. This procedure results in the PCO continually monitoring line-department activities to ensure they are in line with the mandate letter.

The current Liberal government has, for the first time, made public the mandate letters. The media and the general public are now in a position to better monitor the activities of ministers to assess the degree to which they achieve the tasks set out in the mandate letters.
The Prime Minister’s Office has successfully monitored line ministries in all stages of the policy process, enforcing obedience to the political will of the central leadership. As all core executive figures have been Fidesz party stalwarts, control has functioned largely through party discipline.
Under new regulations regarding the monitoring and oversight of ministries originally introduced in 2016 and updated in 2018, the Prime Minister’s Office must review bills from all ministries, with the exception of the national budget bill. Accordingly, all bills need to be sent to the Prime Minister’s Office no later than one week before the respective cabinet meeting. Before the bill can be discussed by the cabinet, a statement from the Prime Minister’s Office needs to be processed (Reglur um starfshætti ríkisstjórnar, No. 791/2018). This regulatory change is a step toward stronger, formal monitoring of ministerial bills.
Regulations on government procedures. (Reglur um starfshætti ríkisstjórnar. Nr. 791/2018).
The president’s advisory ministry (Secretaría General de la Presidencia, Segpres) and the respective budgetary units of the government monitor the line ministries (especially within the annual performance evaluation). If necessary, arrangements and modifications are made in order to ensure effective alignment with the government program. Monitoring of effectiveness seems to have improved slightly since 2011.
Line ministry activities are generally well monitored, but several factors influence the impact of oversight, including: the strength of the prime minister; the relationship of the minister with the president; the political position of the minister within the majority or as a local notable; media attention; and political pressure. This traditional pattern under the Fifth Republic failed to work during the first 30 months of the Hollande presidency due to the president’s weakness and reluctance to arbiter between ministers and divergent preferences. It was only after the September 2014 crisis and the forced resignation of dissident ministers that Prime Minister Manuel Valls was able to exercise improved oversight of the ministries. The monitoring of ministers by Macron and his prime minister is tighter than it has ever previously been under the Fifth Republic. A special software application has been developed that gives Macron the full information about decisions taken by each minister, allowing him to step in as deemed necessary.
New Zealand
In the 1990s, New Zealand became a global leader in the use of New Public Management strategies. The country implemented one of the most radical sets of reforms in the world (Bouckaert et al. 2010). Performance of agencies is measured by outputs and managed by a “contract’ between ministers and chief executives. While these strong vertical accountabilities have clear benefits, they leave few incentives for public servants to work together to address complex problems. Recent governments have tried to correct this by encouraging cross-agency collaboration – in particular, through the Better Public Services reform agenda launched in 2012 and the Public Service Act 2020. These reforms have produced a synthesis that blends managerial autonomy with collective approaches, resulting in a management style that is both hierarchical and horizontal (Scott et al. 2021)
Bouckaert et al. (2010) The Coordination of Public Sector Organizations
Shifting Patterns of Public Management. Palgrave Macmillan.
Scott et al. (2021) Theoretical Paradigms in the Reform of the New Zealand Public Service: Is post-NPM still a myth? Paper prepared for the 2021 World Congress for Political Science, Lisbon.
Formally, ministries are not very involved in the implementation of policies. It is rather the task of agencies to implement policies. Nevertheless, Swedish ministries still control the implementation process of the agencies. The relationship between ministries and agencies implies monitoring by communication and mutual adaptation, rather than through a hierarchical chain of command.
Switzerland’s government features neither a prime minister’s office nor line ministries, but does offer functional equivalents. Given the rule of collegiality and the consociational decision-making style, as well as the high level of cooperation at lower levels of the Federal Administration, there is little leeway for significant deviation from the government line. Monitoring is built into the cooperative process of policy formulation and implementation.
The tight integration between the Prime Minister’s Office and the Cabinet Office enables prime ministers to be effective in determining the strategic direction of the government. Through Treasury Approval Point processes, the Treasury has long had an important monitoring role, which goes beyond the role of finance ministries in other countries. Decision-making is concentrated in strategic units and in informal meetings. Ministers have to reveal their preferences in cabinet meetings, cabinet committees and bilateral meetings with the prime minister or chancellor. Consequently, monitoring is relatively easy for the core executive, also by means of the single department plans.

Some recent initiatives have reinforced central oversight, including the merger of the Major Projects Authority and Infrastructure UK into the Infrastructure and Projects Authority, which reports to both the Cabinet Office and HM Treasury. There are implementation task forces set up at ministerial level to drive delivery in a focused set of priority areas and an implementation unit in the Cabinet Office, which works on behalf of the prime minister to track the delivery of priority policies and the wider government program. It intervenes where delivery or operational performance is at risk, or progress is unclear in order to strengthen implementation capability across the civil service. The Financial Management Reform launched in 2014 has been evaluated as a success by the Institute for Government.

The Department for Exiting the European Union oversaw departments’ progress toward implementing the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union. The department identified individual workstreams that needed to be taken forward, and worked closely with departments and other parts of central government to monitor delivery in these areas. On January 31, when Brexit took effect, the department was dissolved.

In a similar way, the government was able to set up new taskforces or inter-departmental initiatives related to the pandemic. For vaccines, this was an undeniable success, whereas test and trace had a more checkered history. But the point remains that implementation is closely monitored.
Whitehall’s Financial Management Reform:
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
For sensitive political issues, the prime minister has a strong incentive to monitor line ministries. Yet when it comes to less important issues or details, he or she has neither the time nor the means for close monitoring. The prime minister’s control is indirect. It is exercised through the members of the cabinet. Non-implementation will quickly become a political issue.
Jørgen Grønnegård et al. Politik og forvaltning. 4. ed., 2017.
The government monitoring of ministries is indirect in nature and the same mechanisms that foster ministerial compliance tend to have monitoring functions as well. These include the preparation and coordination of matters in cabinet committee meetings as well as other formal and informal meetings. In general, the various forms of interministerial coordination also fulfill monitoring functions. However, these forms are characterized by cooperative and consultative interactions rather than critical interactions. While the Prime Minister’s Office does monitor ministries, the monitoring is implicit rather than explicit.
The lax monitoring of line ministries by the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), a characteristic of previous review periods, has largely been addressed. On the one hand, throughout the economic crisis, the PMO monitored the implementation of most line ministries’ activities to avoid any further deterioration in public finances, owing to uncontrolled government expenditure. On the other hand, after the change in government in 2019, the center of government, now titled the Presidency of Government, tightened procedures for monitoring line ministries’ implementation activities, introducing a “new governance model.” The model was crystallized in the legal stipulations adopted in July 2019, which enhanced the mechanisms supporting the prime minister by establishing new units and procedures at the Presidency of Government. The model entails close coordination of policy measures prepared in ministries, and follow-up of the cabinet’s and the prime minister’s decisions.
The law establishing the new governance model is Law 4622/2019.
The annual budgetary process, and in particular the preparation of expenditure estimates, involves individual ministries submitting preliminary estimates to the Department of Finance. This is the opening of a battle for resources, as the department seeks to reconcile the sum of departmental claims with the total available for public spending. Whereas monitoring and oversight of most line ministry spending and policy implementation have been effective in recent years, the problem of large cost over-runs at the Ministry of Health and confusion about the medium-term strategy for public health are long-standing and unresolved issues. Notably, the Sláintecare strategy is an ongoing, incremental reform of the healthcare service in Ireland, which is designed to deliver equal access to healthcare services for every citizen based on patient need and not ability to pay (Gov, 2018).

Having corrected its excessive deficit in 2015 and 2016, Irish policymakers have since been constrained by the rules of the EU fiscal compact in framing annual budgets. This has limited government flexibility with regard to tax cuts and expenditure increases. However, these constraints have been somewhat offset by revenue buoyancy, which has resulted from unexpectedly rapid economic growth in recent years, particularly associated with high tax receipts from multinational corporations that are present in the country. Freedom of information laws and the media have the potential to provide vital checks on ministerial overreach.
Gov (2018) Sláintecare, Government of Ireland, available at:
The monitoring of the implementation of the government program is delegated to one of the undersecretaries attached to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and supported by a special office of the presidency (Ufficio per l’attuazione del programma di governo). This office monitors the main legislative activities of the ministries and more recently has started to monitor regularly also the implementation activities related to the legislation adopted. The office publishes a monthly report. However, monitoring has tended to be a formal activity that simply documents what has been done rather than being a real instrument of political control. Under the Draghi government, the monitoring of line ministry activities has been significantly strengthened. The State General Accounting Department (Ragioneria Generale dello Stato, RGS) of the Finance Ministry has gained an enhanced role and is responsible for monitoring all activities mandated under the PNRR.
on the monitoring of implementation see: (accessed 31.12.2021)
on the role of RGS see: (accessed 31.12.2021)
As far as implementation of the government declaration is concerned, the government office monitors ministry performance in implementing legislation, cabinet decisions and prime-ministerial decisions. A high degree of compliance has been reported in this regard.

Similarly, the PKC planning center monitors how ministries are achieving the policy goals stated in the government declaration and reports to the prime minister. Progress reports are not only a monitoring tool, but also provide substantive input into the prime minister’s annual report to parliament.

However, the recent disarray around COVID-19 management, especially with regard to coordinating vaccination processes, indicates that when the government has new, additional tasks to handle outside its regular functions, no meaningful central monitoring occurs.
The Office of the Government effectively monitors policy implementation, through several channels. First, it administratively tracks the execution of government actions assigned to different ministries and other state institutions. Second, through its information system of monitoring, it assesses the achievement of government priorities and linked policy objectives on the basis of performance indicators. Progress in the implementation of policy is discussed during cabinet meetings and other government-level deliberations. However, information derived from this monitoring process is only infrequently used to propose corrective action when progress is deemed insufficient. Thus, the monitoring process does not always prevent the prioritization of sectoral or bureaucratic over full-government and horizontal interests in policy implementation. As part of one EU-funded project, the Office of the Government reviewed monitoring and evaluation practices, and made a number of recommendations as to how performance measurement could be improved in line ministries (including the development of key performance indicators or indicator libraries in various policy areas). Despite the implementation of this project, the National Audit Office stated that the country’s monitoring and reporting system continues to lack quality information, while the government and line ministries often provide incomplete information regarding the achievement of their policy aims and objectives in their reports.
Norway has a small, consensual and transparent system of governance. The Office of the Prime Minister is aware of what takes place within the each ministry. The cabinet is quite cohesive. There is always a tug-of-war between line and coordinating ministries, but line ministries virtually never deviate from the government line. To do so would require a degree of intergovernmental disagreement and breakdown of discipline that has not been seen for a very long time.
South Korea
In general, the offices of the president and the prime minister effectively monitor line-ministry activities. The South Korean government utilizes e-government software (the Policy Task Management System) to monitor the implementation of policies in real time. However, political monitoring or pressure is more influential than e-government, and is the usual tool used to supervise ministries. Ministries have little leeway in policy areas that are important to the president. However, while ministerial compliance is largely assured in the Korean system, the ministerial bureaucracy has a certain degree of independence deriving from its members’ status as tenured civil servants. Because ministers have a comparatively short tenure, it is difficult for them to guide and monitor compliance in the bureaucracy. Generally, the degree of independence within the bureaucracy varies substantially, and is stronger in areas that are comparatively less important to the president.
The president and the White House monitor activities in departments and agencies to widely varying degrees, depending on the centrality of the activities to the president’s political agenda. Agencies and programs that are not the focus of presidential policy initiatives and are not politically controversial may get little attention from the White House, and in fact may receive most of their political direction from Congress or the congressional committees with jurisdiction over the policy area. Recent years have seen a number of serious failures of administrative control.

Under the Trump administration, unprecedented severe staffing deficiencies in both the White House and the departments diminished the capacity for monitoring. The Biden White House is working toward rebuilding this capacity through a massive hiring campaign.
The basic law on the issue of the government establishes the prime minister’s responsibility over the government’s advancement of policy goals. This includes monitoring and guiding the work of appointed line ministers. In recent years, the PMO has introduced best-practices reforms featuring elements of transparency, sharing and benchmarking that have improved the systematic monitoring of ministries. A special committee formed to review the PMO identified its comparative weakness when dealing with recommendations from the ministries of Finance and Defense, aggravated by the PMO’s tendency to take on the responsibility for executing policies from weaker ministries such as Welfare and Health, thus expending its workload. However, three new professional units have been established in the PMO, each in charge of monitoring related ministries. Moreover, there has been a major improvement in monitoring with the government’s annual coordination of all ministerial reports on the implementation of governmental decisions. Currently, the PMO thus has strong ministerial oversight capacities.
“Reorganization of structure,” Civil Service Commissioner information booklet No. 2, October 2012: (Hebrew).

“Report on the implementation of governmental decisions 2016,” PMO wesite, (Hebrew)

“The committee to review the PMO’s,” Official state publication, February 2012, (Hebrew)

Environment and Health Fund, Ministry of Health, “Health and Environment in Israel 2017,”, (Hebrew)
The presidential office can choose who it monitors and how. There are two caveats to this statement, however. First, Mexico is a federal system, and there are thus strong limits to the central government’s power as many competencies fall, at least partially, to the states or even the local level. Second, independent agencies headed by individuals of cabinet rank have taken on an expanding role during the last two decades. Yet where the central authority has power, it uses it. Under President López Obrador, the government has sought to concentrate power in the presidency and limit the autonomy of independent agencies. Hence, the presidency does monitor the rest of the government and the administration. However, in many instances, inadequate implementation is due to structural deficiencies in the systemic capacity of monitoring systems, particular in the areas of health and internal security. In core problem areas such as security and health, the central government’s capacity is rather poor.
Ministries are obliged to keep the Chancellery of the Prime Minister informed about legislative progress regularly. The Center for Strategic Analysis helps Prime Minister Morawiecki and PiS party leader, and since October 2021 Deputy Prime Minister Kaczyński to monitor line ministries’ implementation activities. However, as PiS’s coalition partners have become more assertive and rifts within the government have increased, monitoring has become less effective.
Ministries in Portugal are not independent of the prime minister. The prime minister is also assisted by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and by the Office of the Adjunct Secretary of State of the Prime Minister. These entities can and do monitor all line ministries’ implementation activities. However, the lack of in-depth policy capacity and the reality of limited resources limit the overall degree of control.
The activities of all line ministries are monitored by the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), the Government Office (GO), and ultimately the Council of Ministers. The PMO oversees the flow of political and sectoral information and keeps the prime minister abreast of the activities of all line ministries. The GO, headed by the powerful deputy prime minister, monitors the activities of line ministries through the weekly meetings which prepare the way for Council of Ministers meetings. The capacity of the GO to monitor ministers improved since 2015 due to legislation that introduced a new system for systematically assessing policy implementation, in the form of a periodic evaluation report that is prepared in close consultation with line ministries. Nevertheless, this monitoring cannot guarantee that no sectoral ministry will ever prioritize vertical over horizontal interests. The organizational resources of these central offices are limited, and these bodies rarely engage in direct coordination of ministerial departments. Only the prime minister or his deputy are entitled to play this role. The cabinet reshuffle in July 2021 was intended to improve this function.
Funciones del Ministerio de la Presidencia
Under the new system, offices produce projects, councils transform projects into policies and the ministries implement policies. Besides, the Office of the Commander in Chief, Intelligence Department, Department of Defense Industry, National Security Council, Directorate of Religious Affairs, State Supervision Council, and Communication Department are affiliated with the Presidency. The Department of Administrative Affairs conducts monitoring and the State Supervision Council performs a control function.

The Presidency’s 2021 Annual Program initiates several monitoring objectives ranging from health, education, judiciary, development, domestic violence, and family life. It is stressed that monitoring will be performed by effective mechanisms in collaboration with the relevant public entities such as ministries, and assessed regularly. The results of these efforts remain to be seen
Cumhurbaşkanlığı Strateji ve Bütçe Başkanlığı. 2021 Yılı Cumhurbaşkanlığı Yıllık Programı.
There is no specific institution for monitoring ministries in the Austrian core executive. The Chancellor’s Office is tasked with coordinating line ministries’ activities rather than monitoring them. However, this coordination does allow it to monitor departmental activities to some extent, particularly regarding the implementation of the coalition agreement. Overall, the nature of delegation in the Austrian political executive reflects the established tradition of coalition government. It is the coalition parties’ leaders (i.e., the chancellor and the vice-chancellor) that have significant influence over the individual ministers affiliated with their party, though even they lack the resources to monitor the work of individual departments in detail.
The hierarchical structures inside ministries is such that the line minister (or ministers, when a ministry’s set of responsibilities are shared by more than one government portfolio) controls the ministry at the political level. The ministry itself is presided over by a general administrator, whose nomination used to be purely political, but is now (at least partly) determined through a competitive exam. The fact that the tenure of the general administrator and the minister are different opens the gate to potential tensions between the minister and the ministry.
According to the Basic Law, ministers are fully responsible for governing their own divisions. However, they are bound to the general government guidelines drawn up by the chancellor or the coalition agreement. Concerning topics of general political interest, the cabinet makes decisions collectively. The internal rules of procedure require line ministers to inform the chancellor’s office about all important issues. However, in some cases, the Chancellery lacks the sectoral expertise to monitor line ministries’ policy proposals effectively.
A 6 fits better to the text than the 5. There is clearly monitoring of all line ministries through the Spiegelreferate. Only “of some line ministries” would not be correct.
Generally speaking, the Cabinet Secretariat, upgraded over a decade ago, offers a means of monitoring ministry activities. In recent years, its staff has expanded, improving its monitoring capacity. However, effective use of the secretariat has been hindered in the past by the fact that the ministries second specialists to serve as secretariat employees. It de facto lacks the ability to survey all activities at all times, but former long-serving chief cabinet secretary Yoshihide Suga, who later became premier in 2020, served as an effective enforcer of official positions.

At the same time, some critics argue that the need to handle the simmering scandals engulfing Prime Minister Abe prior to his resignation in 2020 distracted him and his central staff from following up on major policy issues.
Heizo Takenaka, The season of economic policy (Commentary), The Japan Times, 1 July 2018,
There is no formal monitoring by the Prime Minister’s Office, as no institutional resources exist to carry this out. The small size of the government administration and ongoing discussions between ministers, foster a high level of transparency without the necessity of explicit monitoring tools. In case of conflicts, the prime minister moderates and acts as conciliator.
Schroen, Michael (2008): “Das politische System Luxemburgs,” in: Wolfgang Ismayr (ed.): Die Politischen Systeme Westeuropas, 4th ed., VS Springer Verlag, Wiesbaden, pp. 483 – 514.
The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries and the structures for doing so effectively are being continually refined. The PMO has an office dedicated to monitoring which is increasingly fine-tuning the system. The PMO does not have a unit to assess policies in the ministries. Instead, the ministries themselves must do this work according to impact assessment procedures and the policy cycle. If problems surface in a ministry, the PMO steps in to assist. Furthermore, the cabinet office, which is part of the PMO, monitors policy implementation by line ministries, ensuring that they implement the decisions made by the PMO. However, because of constituency demands and the likely imminence of a general election, cracks have begun to appear in the system.
Bartolo insists that ministries should support each other, pull the same rope Independent 10/06/15
Times of Malta 17/10/18 79% of budget measures implemented
Times of Malta 15/02/22 Chris Fearne says he opposes Marsascala marina project
The government has a special office in charge of monitoring the activities of line ministries and other public bodies, the Control Body of the Prime Minister. In spite of having limited staff and resources, this office monitors the activity of most line ministries fairly effectively.
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
In Czechia, the government office formally monitors the activities of the line ministries. However, the fact that Czech governments have tended to be coalition governments has strongly limited the actual monitoring of ministries. Under the Babiš government, the online system Supervizor, designed to collect and publish data on the financial management of ministries and authorities, was used to monitor the ANO ministries only. This follows the Czech tradition that, in a coalition, government ministries are in the exclusive purview of the party that controls them and others, including the prime minister, are not expected to intervene.
The Prime Minister’s Office has a small staff that performs mainly supportive and technical tasks. Thus, the capacity to monitor the line ministries’ activities from the core executive is limited. Even though the prime minister has little power over ministers, they rarely challenge the government program. Still, sometimes line ministers break with consensus, which results in bilateral talks with the prime minister.
The Government Office formally monitors the activities of the line ministries, however, the diverse composition of the center-right coalition governments has strongly limited the actual monitoring of ministries, especially the monitoring of ministries led by junior coalition partners.
The weak capacity of the Government Office (GO) and the predominance of coalition governments have limited the GO’s role in monitoring line ministries’ implementation activities. Under the Janša and previous governments, the GO tended to respect the assignment of ministries in the coalition agreement, so that most monitoring took place in coalition meetings.
The Council of Ministers’ administration typically lacks the capacity to monitor the implementation activities of the line ministries.

The 2021 government has announced that it plans to reduce the number of public servants by 8%, which is a potentially reachable but risky goal in terms of the administrative capacity to monitor ministries.

The chief secretary of the Council of Ministers’ administration and the specialized directorates of the administration can exercise oversight of most of the line ministries’ policy activities, especially in the areas financed through EU funds.

The chief secretary and the directorates also provide some administrative support to the prime minister and the head of his political cabinet, who exercise more direct control over the ministries on a political basis. The exercise of control tends to be informal, through the party apparatuses, and the strictness with which control is applied seems to be a function of the political context, especially under a coalition government.
The primary central-government core-executive bodies, the General Secretariat of the Government and Prime Minister’s Office, do not have the capacity to fully monitor the policies implemented by line ministries. Their restrictive remits constitute a major capacity gap. Greater monitoring power lies with the Ministry of Finance, as the 2010 Fiscal Responsibility Act has given it far-reaching powers to monitor the activities of any organization drawing funds from the central budget.
According to the constitution, the direction and control of the government and general policy lie with the Council of Ministers. This creates a circular relationship since each minister is the sole authority in her/his ministry. The DGEPCD, renamed to the DGC, has some monitoring functions, but scope its unclear. The Secretariat of the Council of Ministers monitors the implementation of cabinet decisions. The website EXANDAS offers ministers and citizens a picture of the progress of works and policies. However, visualization and figures are not an evaluation tool.

While the law on fiscal responsibility assigns the finance minister a central role in overseeing and coordinating budgetary and fiscal issues, the ultimate control lies with the Council of Ministers. No instance other than the cabinet has such powers.
1. Project EXANDAS,
Given the Prime Minister Office’s lack of capacity to coordinate and follow up on policy proposal and bills, systematic monitoring of line ministries’ implementation activities is scarcely possible. The child benefits policy catastrophe shows this clearly: Although the child benefit system was a bill designed by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, its implementation was entrusted to the tax authorities (in the role of allocator of tax benefits), formally part of the Ministry of Finance. When the first alarming signs of the affair became public, neither the minister of social affairs nor the prime minister were sufficiently well-informed or felt responsible to intervene. Even legal appeals fell on deaf ears in the Supreme Court, and an alarming report by the Ombudsman was neglected. Non-intervention on other departments’ turf and a hard division between policymaking/legislation and implementation practice hamper and complicate monitoring.

Since 2013 to 2014, General Audit Chamber studies have focused on salient and financially relevant policy issues on departmental domains. In 2012, the General Audit Chamber reported that just 50% of governmental policy initiatives were evaluated. Most of these evaluations incorrectly were considered effectiveness studies. Hence, parliament remains largely ill-informed about the success of governmental goals and objectives. In 2017, the audit chamber launched a website for monitoring ministerial compliance of its recommendations. Three out of five recommendations made by the audit chamber were complied with, according to ministerial self-reports. In 2019, policy failures were signaled with regard to sustainability targets, nitrogen emissions policy for agriculture and building activities, and toxic risks policy for soil and paints. Eventually, judging by the new coalition agreement, these failures appear today to be leading to remedial action.
R.B. Andeweg & G.A. Irwin (2014), Governance and Politics of The Netherlands. Houdmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 188, 198-203

Teller Report, November 23 2021. Weekers warned Asscher about allowance affair: “If only I had persisted’

Algemene Rekenkamer, 2021. Voortgangsmeter aanbevelingen
The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
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