Sweden

   

Social Policies

#4
Key Findings
With its highly developed welfare state, Sweden falls into the top ranks internationally (rank 4) with regard to social policies. Its score on this measure has declined by 0.3 points since 2014.

The healthcare system offers high-quality care through a single-payer tax-funded system. The pandemic exposed and deepened an ongoing labor shortage in the sector. COVID-19 death rates were higher than those in other Scandinavian countries. Family policies are generous, with extensive maternal and paternal leave and ample child-care provision.

Education is a key political focus due to comparatively low test rankings. However, access is extremely equitable. University funding has been increased, with financial assistance provided as part of the pandemic response. Gender inclusion is a particular strength, but young people and recent immigrants have difficulties in finding work. A radical right-wing party has changed the political landscape.

The pension system is sound and sustainable. The country has received significant immigration flows in recent years, but integration has proved challenging. A new policy has tightened residency requirements. Crime rates have risen, with organized crime and criminal gangs an increasing concern.

Education

#4

To what extent does education policy deliver high-quality, equitable and efficient education and training?

10
 9

Education policy fully achieves the criteria.
 8
 7
 6


Education policy largely achieves the criteria.
 5
 4
 3


Education policy partially achieves the criteria.
 2
 1

Education policy does not achieve the criteria at all.
Education Policy
7
Education policy remains high on the political agenda in Sweden, partly as a result of a low international ranking a few years ago. The highest ranking the Swedish educational system received in the international PISA comparison, which measures the aptitude of 15-year-old students in math, learning comprehension and the natural sciences, was in the year 2000, when the system started. Sweden subsequently slipped in the rankings until 2012 (Ekonomifakta, 2021). As of 2018, the most recent year of available results, the country was ranked at 11th place, which is still not satisfactory for an economy highly dependent on knowledge industries for its economic growth and international competitive advantage.

For this reason, the quality of education is a major concern for politicians as well as for businesses. In order to improve the quality of the Swedish education system, the National Agency for Education (Skolverket) operates seven national development programs focusing on areas such as digitalization, school and work life, systematic quality, and assessment and grading. Substantial resources are also channeled into educational research, with the Swedish Institute for Educational Research (www.skolfi.se) serving as a major funder. Rules granting municipalities responsibility for the provision of schools since 1989, as well as the introduction of a school voucher system in the 1990s, have led to a far-reaching privatization of schools, broad variation in pedagogical approaches and the methods used for teaching and learning, and the implementation of different learning platforms (see Edmark et al. 2014, Hinnerich and Vlachos 2017). In 2020, 84% of the Swedish population was reported to have at least a high school education, above the average of about 79% for all OECD countries (OECD, 2021).

In an effort to reverse a downward trend in terms of schools’ and teachers’ reputations and pedagogical suitability, the government introduced national certifications for teachers at all school levels in 2011. Only certified teachers are eligible for permanent positions. A new career program for teachers was launched in 2013, providing opportunities for professional development and higher salaries. As a corollary to this, the prognosis of the Swedish National Agency for Education (Skolverket) is that there will be a lack of qualified teachers through 2035, mainly at the level of high school professional education and in subjects taught in the 7th to 9th grades (Skolverket, 2021). Concomitantly, the skills required to enter a teachers’ education program at universities today are relatively low, hence there is very little competition for entrance into those programs. As a result, new teachers may have only a limited aptitude to teach successfully.

A key means of assessing Sweden’s education policy involves looking at the extent to which the education system successfully provides a skilled labor force. Some education policy experts support a two-tier model where apprenticeships facilitate a smooth transition from work-related secondary education programs into employment in industry and services, and where students who seek to continue their education arrive at universities well-prepared. In Sweden, a very large proportion of the population is integrated into the labor market. Contrary to the high official youth unemployment rate, the OECD’s NEET indicator (not in employment, education or training) shows that the integration of Swedish young people into the labor market is just as successful as it is in Germany, the country praised for its dual education system.

Another way to assess Sweden’s education policy concerns equitable access to education. Education policy has performed rather well in this respect. If anything, the system is “too equitable” in that requirements to enter some programs in university are so low that basically anyone who applies is admitted, which could trigger a “race to the bottom” in tertiary education standards. Nevertheless, equitable access to adult education has been realized to a very large extent. Sweden is rather successfully targeting the ambitious goals of lifelong learning, as a high percentage of adults are regularly in contact with further education organizations. In 2020, the number of adults in Sweden with three years or more of post-secondary education was 29%, up from 16% in 2000 (SCB, 2021).

Finally, the government invested in more university places and provided additional financial assistance for prospective students as part of its pandemic response. Meanwhile, education remains high on the political agenda, although performance problems continue to persist.

Citations:
Edmark, Karin, Markus, Frölich, and Verena Wondratschek, Verena. 2014. “Sweden’s School Choice Reform and Equality of Opportunity.” Labour Economics, 30, 129-142.

Ekonomifakta. 2021. ”Resultat PISA – internationellt.” https://www.ekonomifakta.se/fakta/utbildning-och-forskning/provresultat/resultat-pisa/

Hinnerich, Björn Tyrefors and Jonas Vlachos. 2017. “The Impact of Upper-Secondary Voucher School Attendance on Student Achievement. Swedish Evidence Using External and Internal Evaluations.” Labour Economics, 47, 1-14.

OECD. 2021. Education at a Glance 2021: OECD Indicators.” https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/b35a14e5-en/1/3/2/1/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/b35a14e5-en&__cf_chl_f_tk=MpZC4u2xYCwjmDhMXelWFHhkDUqT3LfJ9KJq.QHLAtk-1642419412-0-gaNycGzNCWU&_csp_=9689b83a12cab1f95b32a46f4225d1a5&itemIGO=oecd&itemContentType=book

SCB. 2021. ”Utbildningsnivån i Sverige.” https://www.scb.se/hitta-statistik/sverige-i-siffror/utbildning-jobb-och-pengar/utbildningsnivan-i-sverige/

Skolverket. 2021. ”Fortsatt Stor Brist på Behöriga Lärare – men Behovet Minskar.” https://www.skolverket.se/om-oss/press/pressmeddelanden/pressmeddelanden/2021-12-14-fortsatt-stor-brist-pa-behoriga-larare – men-behovet-minskar

Social Inclusion

#6

To what extent does social policy prevent exclusion and decoupling from society?

10
 9

Policies very effectively enable societal inclusion and ensure equal opportunities.
 8
 7
 6


For the most part, policies enable societal inclusion effectively and ensure equal opportunities.
 5
 4
 3


For the most part, policies fail to prevent societal exclusion effectively and ensure equal opportunities.
 2
 1

Policies exacerbate unequal opportunities and exclusion from society.
Social Inclusion Policy
7
Social inclusion policies have traditionally been a feature of Swedish political life and social welfare. An encompassing welfare system with broad eligibility for (rather than means-based) benefits has resulted in an egalitarian society. In recent years, however, a range of challenges have arisen in areas such as the integration of immigrant populations, and efforts to address unemployment and poverty have fallen short (Schierup and Ålund 2011). As in many European countries, a growing radical right-wing party (Sweden Democrats) has changed the political landscape (Rydgren and van der Meiden 2019).

An examination of social inclusion policies over time in Sweden reveals that gender inclusion has worked quite well, while other areas are more problematic. The Gini coefficient is low (0.27 in 2021), but has been steadily increasing over the past five decades (SCB, 2021). Young people and recent immigrants have a harder time finding jobs. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated existing societal cleavages. Whereas women were not hit as hard (financially) by the pandemic in Sweden because of established family policies and the explicit goal of Swedish policymakers to avoid lockdowns in schools and kindergartens, this was not the case for young people and recent immigrants, partly due to their overrepresentation in the service sector and in jobs with part-time or precarious contacts.

The government’s work with the so-called Agenda 2030 showed that low-income people, people with disabilities and older people living in care homes disproportionately died during the pandemic. Additionally, foreign-born women and girls are disproportionately susceptible to forced marriages, unwanted pregnancies, gender-based violence and sexually transmitted diseases; while mental illness is a rising problem among low-income populations, people with intellectual disabilities women and girls – though suicide is more common among men (Regeringskansliet, 2021).

If we compare Sweden with other countries, we find that recent developments challenge the country’s historical position as a leader in the public provision of welfare through wealth redistribution and as a country with extremely low levels of poverty. Together, the data and recent developments suggest that Sweden is gradually losing its leading role in these respects and is today largely at par with other European countries in terms of its poverty levels and income distribution. If Sweden could previously boast an egalitarian and inclusive society, there is less justification to do so today. Reflecting on the 2014 general elections, Bo Rothstein concluded that “the days of Swedish exceptionalism are over” (Rothstein, 2014). Not only does Sweden currently have a strong anti-immigration party in its parliament, core data on Sweden’s welfare state are moving toward levels found among comparable, average-performing countries. This pattern continued to hold true in 2021, not least during the pandemic crisis.

Citations:
Ekonomifakta. 2021. “Ginikoefficient – internationellt.” https://www.ekonomifakta.se/fakta/arbetsmarknad/loner/ginikoefficient – internationellt/

Regeringskansliet [Government Offices of Sweden]. 2021. “Sveriges Genomförande av Agenda 2030 för Hållbar Utveckling.” https://www.regeringen.se/4aa057/contentassets/378ab5cbd6b148acaeccc9413cc0e1ba/sveriges-genomforande-av-agenda-2030-prop.-201920188

Rothstein, Bo. 2014. “The End of Swedish Exceptionalism.” Foreign Affairs, September 18.

Rydgren, Jens, and Sara van der Meiden. 2019. “The Radical Right and the End of Swedish Exceptionalism.” Eur Polit Sci 18, 439–455.

SCB. 2021. “Ginikoefficient, 1975-2019.” https://www.scb.se/hitta-statistik/statistik-efter-amne/hushallens-ekonomi/inkomster-och-inkomstfordelning/inkomster-och-skatter/pong/tabell-och-diagram/inkomster–ekonomisk-standard-riket/gini-koefficient/

Schierup, Carl-Ulrik, and Aleksandra Ålund. 2011. “The End of Swedish Exceptionalism? Citizenship, Neoliberalism and the Politics of Exclusion.” Race & Class, 53(1), 45-64.

Health

#13

To what extent do health care policies provide high-quality, inclusive and cost-efficient health care?

10
 9

Health care policy achieves the criteria fully.
 8
 7
 6


Health care policy achieves the criteria largely.
 5
 4
 3


Health care policy achieves the criteria partly.
 2
 1

Health care policy does not achieve the criteria at all.
Health Policy
7
Sweden offers universal healthcare regardless of employment status through a single-payer, tax-funded system. Healthcare is regulated and controlled at the national level, while the planning, financing and provision of healthcare services, including specialist and hospital care, is the responsibility of the 21 regions. Healthcare spending per capita was the fourth-highest in the EU in 2019, or third-highest if counted as a share of GDP. Even though the growth in public spending had not been modest in the years leading up to the pandemic, the government increased it substantially in 2020 and 2021 as part of the response to the COVID-19 crisis (OECD, 2021).

Primary healthcare is provided in local healthcare centers. There has been some degree of privatization when it comes to local healthcare centers, but hospitals are publicly owned (Blomqvist and Winblad 2014; Rönnestad and Oskarsson 2020; see also Sparf and Petridou 2021). The number of people with private health insurance has increased considerably in recent years, though it remains marginal (OEDC, 2021). Regardless, it presents a concern when it comes to equitable access to services.

The Swedish healthcare system is based on the premise that healthcare must be egalitarian, accessible, evidence-based, effective and based on people’s individual needs. Accessibility is one of the premises of good care quality according to the Health and Medical Services Act (Socialstyrelsen 2020). Despite this mission, there have been intractable problems with accessibility. The picture is nuanced, however. On the one hand, during the first 12 months of the pandemic, only one in six people reported any unmet needs with regard to medical care, which is lower than the EU average. The reason for this may be the step-up in teleconsultation (and digital tools had already been widely used) as a concerted effort to combat the consequences of the pandemic. On the other hand, excessive waiting times for specialist consultations and non-urgent surgeries have been a staple of the Swedish healthcare system (OECD, 2021).

The key challenge is a governance problem. Healthcare is driven by three contending sources: elected officials, the medical profession and the market. These three sources send different signals, make different priorities and allocate resources differently. This bureaucratic split at the top has the effect of reducing quality, inclusiveness and cost efficiency. Governance problems are rarely solved by pouring more financial resources into the organization, which has thus far largely been the typical political response to problems in the healthcare sector.

Responses to remedy the problems plaguing healthcare have spanned decades and include changes in legislation (including the waiting-time guarantee), continuous national assessments of waiting times, and contractual agreements between the government and the regions (Socialstyrelsen 2020). Pre-pandemic waiting time rules for care were as follows:
• An individual seeking primary healthcare shall be able to contact a primary healthcare provider on the same day.
• An individual seeking primary healthcare shall have a medical opinion by a doctor or other primary-care physician within three days.
• Those needing specialist healthcare shall not wait more than 90 days for a visit after a referral has been sent out.
• Those in need of an operation or other specialist treatment shall not wait for more than 90 days (Socialstyrelsen 2020). Faced with a longer waiting time, one has the right to seek care in a region other than the region in which one is registered. Waiting times are reported in a database and are made available to the public. In practice, this does not provide solutions, but it increases the transparency of the system. Indeed, one may travel to a different region to receive care, but that is hardly a realistic option for many patients. Furthermore, this does not always entail shorter wait times.

Compared internationally, people in Sweden wait longer for access to primary care. Moreover, they typically do not have a regular physician, though they have a regular local healthcare center. However, increasingly fewer people in Sweden feel that the physician they meet is aware of their medical history. Additionally, people with complex health problems report coordination failures that result in dissatisfaction with the healthcare they receive (Inspektionen för vård och omsorg 2020; Myndigheten för vård-och omsorgsanalys 2020).

The pandemic has exposed (and deepened) the existing lack of qualified personnel. There exist regional variations, but for example, 19 of 21 regions report that they lack nurses, while many regions also report a paucity of psychologists, dentists, delivery and X-ray nurses, and specialist doctors, with rural areas having greater shortages than big cities (Inspektionen för Vård och Omsorg, 2021). The findings of the Coronavirus Commission concur that the health system was able to respond effectively to the pandemic only by repurposing scarce personnel from other activities, and by delaying other healthcare services and procedures (Coronakommissionen, 2021).

The Swedish response to the pandemic garnered international (and some domestic) criticism (for a discussion, see Coronavirus Commission, 2021; Petridou, 2020; Zahariadis et al. 2021). The Coronavirus Commission (Coronakommissionen, 2021) generally posits that the response to the pandemic was slow, and it is true that COVID-19 death rates in Sweden were higher than those in other Scandinavian countries, overwhelmingly within the elderly population (OECD, 2021; Petridou 2020). However, life expectancy is higher than in most other EU countries, even accounting for the spike in deaths in 2020, while gender and social inequalities are not as prominent as elsewhere when it comes to life expectancy. The Public Health Agency of Sweden expects that this picture will change somewhat since the excess mortality due to the pandemic was higher among lower income and immigrant populations (OECD, 2021; Folkhälsomyndigheten, 2021).

In summary, the healthcare system in Sweden is sound and provides good quality care to all citizens, but it is still characterized by labor shortages, and healthcare services suffered due to the pandemic.

Citations:
Blomqvist, Paula and Ulrika Winblad. 2014. “Sweden: Continued Marketization within a Universalist System. In “Health Care Systems in Europe under Austerity: Institutional Reforms and Performance,” eds. E. Pavolini, and A. M. Guillén. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 9–30.

Coronakommissionen. 2021. “Delbetänkande 2: Sverige under pandemi.” SOU 2021:89. https://coronakommissionen.com

Folkhälsomyndigheten (Public Health Agency of Sweden, PHAS). 2021. “Utrikesfödda och Covid-19 – Konstaterade Fall, IVA-vård och Avlidna Bland Utrikesfödda i Sverige 13 Mars-15 februari 2021.” https://www.folkhalsomyndigheten.se/contentassets/2dddee08a4ec4c25a0a59aac7aca14f0/utrikesfodda-och-covid-19.pdf

Inspektionen för Vård och Omsorg. 2020. ”Iakttagelser i Korthet.” Nr 1/2020. https://www.ivo.se/publicerat-material/iakttagelser-i-korthet/man-tycks-vara-mer-nojda-med-hur-varden-och-omsorgen-samordnas/

Myndigheten för Vård- och Omsorgsanalys. 2020. ”Vården ur Befolkningens Perspektiv: IHP 2020.” https://www.vardanalys.se/rapporter/varden-ur-befolkningens-perspektiv-2020/

OECD. 2021. “Sweden: Country health profile, 2021.” https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/sweden-country-health-profile-2021_b9027e42-en

Petridou, Evangelia. 2020. “Politics and Administration in Times of Crisis: Explaining the Swedish Response to the Covid-19 Crisis.” European Policy Analysis 6: 147-58.

Rönnerstrand, Björn and Maria Oskarson. 2020. “Standing in Line When Queues Are on the Decline: Services Satisfaction Following the Swedish Health Care Waiting Time Guarantee.” Policy Studies Journal 48: 469-93.

Socialstyrelsen (National Board of Health and Welfare). 2020. “Uppföljning och Analys av Överenskommelsen om Ökad Tillgänglighet 2020. Delrapport december 2020.” https://www.socialstyrelsen.se/globalassets/sharepoint-dokument/artikelkatalog/ovrigt/2020-12-7066.pdf

Sparf, Jörgen, and Evangelia Petridou. 2021. “Sweden: Country Report.” University of Stavanger, Report no.98.

Vårdanalys (Swedish Agency for Health and Care Services Analysis). 2020. ”Vården ur Primärvårdsläkarnas Perspektiv 2019 – En Jämförelse mellan Sverige och Tio Andra Länder.” Rapport 2020:5 https://www.vardanalys.se/rapporter/ihp-2019/

Zahariadis, Nikolaos, Evangelia Petridou, Theofanis Exadaktylos, and Jörgen Sparf. 2021. “Policy Styles and Political Trust in Europe’s National Responses to the Covid-19 Crisis.” Policy Studies: 1-22.

Families

#3

To what extent do family support policies enable women to combine parenting with participation in the labor market?

10
 9

Family support policies effectively enable women to combine parenting with employment.
 8
 7
 6


Family support policies provide some support for women who want to combine parenting and employment.
 5
 4
 3


Family support policies provide only few opportunities for women who want to combine parenting and employment.
 2
 1

Family support policies force most women to opt for either parenting or employment.
Family Policy
10
Sweden has been politically and economically committed to strong family policy for the past 50 years. Major features of Sweden’s policy have been the separation of spouses’ income and individual taxation, the expansion of public and private day care centers and a very generous parental leave program provided to both women and men, which has created much better possibilities to combine a professional career with parenthood.

The basic difference between the Social Democratic and Green parties, on the one hand, and the center-right parties, on the other, is that the former emphasize gender equality whereas the latter emphasize freedom of choice. Both constellations of parties are, however, fully committed to the overarching goals of family policy and see it as integral to promoting gender equality.

Benefits include an obligatory two-week leave for mothers immediately before or after they give birth. This is either paid, or the compensation is deferred to a subsequent period of leave (Dufvander and Löfgren, 2020). The other parent is entitled to 10 days of paid leave associated either with childbirth or adoption (to be taken within 60 days). For both parents, 77.6% of their regular salary is paid by the Swedish Social Insurance Agency (Försäkringskassan). The 10-day benefit is gender-neutral and is given to the parent that was not pregnant. If the parent who has been pregnant is a single parent, the benefit may be allocated to another person who is close to them (Dufvander and Löfgren, 2020).

Beyond this short-term benefit, the Swedish system for parental leave is comprehensive, egalitarian and flexible. Each parent is entitled to full-time leave from work until their child is 18 months old, regardless of whether they are using paid benefits. Parents with joint custody are eligible for 240 days of parental leave benefit each until the child turns 12 years old; some days are transferrable between them while others are non-transferable (Försäkringskassan 2021). For 390 of the total 480 days, the benefits provided during parental leave are based on income – up to an earnings ceiling. A flat rate of SEK 180 per day is provided for the remainder of the time (Försäkringskassan 2021). Parents can take full-time or part-time paid leave days, and can combine paid and unpaid leave to enable parents to stay at home longer. Regardless, all parental leave benefits offer pension credits (Dufvander and Löfgren, 2020).

Additionally, early childhood education and care services are provided beginning at 12 months. This is full-time for the children of full-time employed parents, and part-time for unemployed parents’ children (Dufvander and Löfgren, 2020).

Regarding the pandemic response, the government made a conscious decision to keep the schools open (Petridou 2020) in order to allow parents to continue going to work. Measures enacted in 2020 to make it easier for parents to stay home and take care of their sick children remained in place in 2021, and as of January 2022 they were set to expire in March 2022 (Försäkringskassan, 2022).

Citations:
Duvander, Ann-Zofie and Niklas Löfgren. 2020. “Sweden Country Note.” in Koslowski, A., Blum, S., Dobrotić, I., Kaufman, G. and Moss, P. (eds.) “International Review of Leave Policies and Research 2020.” http://www.leavenetwork.org/lp_and_r_reports/


Försäkringskassan. 2022. “Coronaviruset – Det Här Gäller.” https://www.forsakringskassan.se/privatpers/coronaviruset-det-har-galler


Försäkringskassan. 2021. “Parental Benefit.”https://www.forsakringskassan.se/english/parents/when-the-child-is-born/parental-benefit

Petridou, Evangelia. 2020. “Politics and Administration in Times of Crisis: Explaining the Swedish Response to the Covid-19 Crisis.” European Policy Analysis 6: 147-58.

Pensions

#4

To what extent does pension policy realize goals of poverty prevention, intergenerational equity and fiscal sustainability?

10
 9

Pension policy achieves the objectives fully.
 8
 7
 6


Pension policy achieves the objectives largely.
 5
 4
 3


Pension policy achieves the objectives partly.
 2
 1

Pension policy does not achieve the objectives at all.
Pension Policy
8
Sweden’s pension system succeeds in preventing poverty among senior citizens, but those living only on the very basic pension have problems making ends meet. The average income of people over 65 is currently 14% lower than for the total population, which is close to the OECD average of 12%. Although old-age income inequality and poverty rates among people over the age of 65 have increased, they are still below the OECD average (OECD, 2021). Inequalities are alleviated partly by eligibility for additional support from social welfare programs for pensioners living on a baseline pension with limited savings and no private pension.

The stability of the pensions system was a problem for a long time but appears to have improved, due to major reforms of the whole pension system in Sweden. One result of the pension reforms is a new public-private mix, strengthening capital funded occupational and private pension schemes. The distributional principles appear to be sound but the volatility of the stock market during the most recent past has meant a major source of uncertainty about how stable and sustainable the system will be in the future. The strengths of the system that emerged after the reforms of 1998 include its consensual character, the fact that the national system is unified, adequacy (the fact that it works well for most people), fiscal sustainability, high coverage, and flexibility on whether to draw the entire amount at the time of retirement. One aspect that contributes to income inequalities is the insufficient degree to which family structure is accounted for, thus resulting in a higher incidence of poverty among single retirees than pensioner couples (Barr, 2013).

Regarding equity in the system, the results are mixed. Ideally, a pension system ensures equity among pensioners, the active work force and the adolescent generation. If equity refers to basically similar living conditions, Sweden’s system fails in this respect. If equity however refers to a provision of baseline material goods related to needs, the performance of the system looks better. Some studies state that the new Swedish pension system does not undermine intergenerational equity, as long as the entry into the labor market for the adolescent generation is not blocked.

Even though the pandemic affected the health of the older populations disproportionately, pensions and the income of current pensioners were protected, as shortfalls in pension contributions were largely covered by transfers from the national budget (OECD, 2021). The 2021 budget included provisions for tax reductions for people receiving pensions, as well as an increase in housing subsidies (Finanspolitiska rådet, 2021). Finally, a 2019 agreement between most political parties resulted in a plan to increase the retirement age from the current 65 years to 66 in 2023 and 67 in 2026 (OECD, 2021).

In summary, the Swedish pension system is sound and sustainable, though increasing income inequalities are a point of concern.

Citations:
Barr, Nicholas. 2013. “The Pension System in Sweden. Report to the Expert Group on Public Economies.” 2013:7 https://eso.expertgrupp.se/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Till-webben-ESO-2013-7.pdf

Finanspolitiska Rådet. 2021. Svensk Finanspolitik: Finanspolitiska Rådets Rapport 2021.” https://www.fpr.se/download/18.3e9ba604179f5fc737de1d0/1624285470841/Svensk%20finanspolitik%202021.pdf

OECD. 2021. “Pensions at a Glance: How does Sweden Compare?” https://www.oecd.org/sweden/PAG2021-SWE.pdf

Integration

#30

How effectively do policies support the integration of migrants into society?

10
 9

Cultural, education and social policies effectively support the integration of migrants into society.
 8
 7
 6


Cultural, education and social policies seek to integrate migrants into society, but have failed to do so effectively.
 5
 4
 3


Cultural, education and social policies do not focus on integrating migrants into society.
 2
 1

Cultural, education and social policies segregate migrant communities from the majority society.
Integration Policy
7
By most international comparisons, Sweden has a generous immigration policy. The country has received a large number of refugees from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria and, in 1992, from the former Yugoslavia. In the European setting, Sweden stands out as one of the most immigration-friendly countries (together with Germany).

As is the case across Europe, geopolitical disturbances elsewhere in the world have triggered waves of immigration to Sweden. In 2015 and 2016, Sweden respectively received some 163,000 and 29,000 asylum-seekers; in 2017 the number was about 25,700, and in 2018, about 21,500. The number of asylum-seekers increased further to almost 22,000 in 2019.

For 2020, even though the prognosis was that 20,000 to 30,000 asylum-seekers would arrive in Sweden, many of whom were slated to arrive as part of the family reunification program, the number dropped to just under 13,000 applications, mainly as an effect of COVID-19. The decrease continued in 2021 with a total of about 11,400 asylum-seekers. Permanent residency was granted to about 140,000 refugees between 2015 and 2020. (Migrationsverket, 2021)

The increasing immigration flows before the pandemic hit represented a major challenge, unprecedented in size and scope, to Swedish integration policy. The related policies cover a wide range of measures, from language training to supportive labor market and housing policies. Most of the policies are implemented locally. Given the extensive autonomy of Swedish local governments, the instruments vary regionally. There are now political signals that local autonomy should no longer prevent individual local authorities from being requested by the central government to receive asylum-seekers.

As a result of the “January Accord” (see Regeringskansliet, 2021a), a parliamentary committee was convened to examine the country’s migration policy (Regeringskansliet, 2021b). The report of this committee (“A sustainable immigration policy in the long-term”) proposed a number of measures indirectly aimed at restricting eligibility for permanent residency and naturalization. These include a shift toward offering provisional residency, the imposition of employment requirements for renewals and the migration of family members, and a language requirement for Swedish citizenship applicants. Measures went into effect in July 2021.

Persons born outside Sweden typically have a harder time finding employment than do native-born residents. A recent report by Statistics Sweden reveals that, indeed, foreign-born people and people born in Sweden with a non-Swedish background generally perform more poorly at the high school level than students who were born in Sweden with a Swedish background. The percentage of people not in employment, education, or training (NEET) is higher among foreign-born people and people born in Sweden with a non-Swedish background than among people born in Sweden, and when these groups were compared based on the grades they received in high school (i.e., same performance level), the former group earned somewhat higher marks than the latter (SCB, 2021).

It is difficult to argue that integration policy in Sweden considered as a whole has been successful. In terms of both educational attainment and employment, immigrants in Sweden find it difficult to integrate. The government has signaled the difficulty it is having with its integration policies by tying the issue of radicalization to criminality in the new law that will come into effect in 2023. This law is aimed at organized gangs, which have been a serious problem in the country in the past few years. Indeed, there is not a lack of political or economic commitment to integration policy. To the contrary, integration policy remains a very important policy sector and related political activities are far-reaching. Swedish integration policy ranks highly from a comparative perspective. The activities of the ombudsman and the minister for immigration and equality ensure that immigration issues have a high public salience.

Citations:
Migrationsverket (The Swedish Migration Agency). 2021. “Statistics.” https://www.migrationsverket.se/English/About-the-Migration-Agency/Statistics/Asylum.html

Regeringskansliet (Government offices of Sweden). 2021a. “Ett År Sedan Regeringsförklaringen – mer än 500 Regeringsbeslut med Koppling till Januariavtalet.“
https://www.regeringen.se/artiklar/2020/01/ett-ar-sedan-regeringsforklaringen/

Regeringskansliet (Government offices of Sweden). 2021b. “En Långsiktigt Hållbar Migrationspolitik.” SOU 2020:54.

SCB (Statistics Sweden). 2021. “Integration – Gymnasiebetyg, Vidare Studier och Arbetsmarknad.” https://www.scb.se/contentassets/ae46b5d54637491c9e4427d6edf8d650/le0105_2020a01_br_be57br2101.pdf

Safe Living

#28

How effectively does internal security policy protect citizens against security risks?

10
 9

Internal security policy protects citizens against security risks very effectively.
 8
 7
 6


Internal security policy protects citizens against security risks more or less effectively.
 5
 4
 3


Internal security policy does not effectively protect citizens against security risks.
 2
 1

Internal security policy exacerbates the security risks.
Internal Security Policy
6
The rate of violent crime, and specifically homicides involving firearms, have been on the rise for a decade in Sweden (Brottsförebyggande rådet, 2021a). The daily news is full of such incidents, which mostly take place within a few urban areas and are tied to organized crime and criminal gangs. The item is high on the political agenda, though not all political parties agree on how to fix the problem.

In the 2018 election campaign, law and order-related issues played a major role. It seems clear that many people living in cities now feel increasingly unsafe. This means, for instance, that they will be less inclined to be outdoors after dark and less assured of the police’s capacity to guarantee safety and solve crimes. The response time, particularly outside metropolitan areas, is today longer than what many people find acceptable.

The trend in Western European countries has been that crime rates increased in the period 1960 to 1990, followed by a decrease continuing through today. In Sweden, there has been an upward trend since the middle of the 2000s. In Europe in 2017, 8 people per 1 million were victims of violent crime compared to 11 per 1 million in Sweden for that year and 12 per 1 million in 2020. The rate of violent crime involving firearms paints an even bleaker picture. Since 2013, homicides involving firearms have increased dramatically. While the rate of 1.6 deaths per 1 million inhabitants is on the descent in Europe, in Sweden the rate of four deaths per 1 million people is on the ascent. Finally, if one looks at violent crime among people between the ages of 20 and 29, that number goes up to 18 deaths per 1 million inhabitants. However, the occurrence of violent crime is rare outside the context of organized crime and certain urban areas, and researchers have not yet found the exact causes and, consequently, appropriate solutions (Brottsförebyggande rådet, 2021b). There is a growing understanding that some share of the rising crime levels in metropolitan areas reflect a failure of integration programs.

In 2015, regional police districts and core national staff were merged into one central police authority. A recent evaluation by the Swedish Agency for Public Management (Statskontoret, 2018) found that the organizational reform has not improved performance and that the organization remains fragmented.

The red-green coalition government and the center-right parties agreed that recruiting more police officers is an important component of the response to this situation. The goal for the years 2016-2024 was to hire 10,000 additional police officers. In 2021, the government indicated that the program was about halfway complete, with 5,000 recruitment positions yet to be filled by 2024 (Regeringskansliet, 2021).

Citations:
Brottsförebyggande rådet [The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention]. 2021a. “Konstaterade Fall av Dödligt Våld. En Granskning av Anmält Dödligt Våld 2020.” https://bra.se/download/18.1f8c9903175f8b2aa707b0a/1617022436822/Sammanfattning_D%C3%B6dligtv%C3%A5ld_2020.pdf

Brottsförebygande rådet [The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention]. 2021b. Dödligt Skjutvapenvåld i Sverige och Andra Europeiska Länder.” Rapport 2021:18. https://bra.se/publikationer/arkiv/publikationer/2021-05-26-dodligt-skjutvapenvald-i-sverige-och-andra-europeiska-lander.html

Regeringskansliet (Government Offices of Sweden). 2021. “Brå ska Analysera Polistillväxten.” https://www.regeringen.se/artiklar/2021/06/bra-ska-analysera-polistillvaxten/

Statskontoret. 2018. “Ombildningen till en Samlad Polismyndighet. Slutrapport.” (Report number 2018:18) (Stockholm: Statskontoret).

Global Inequalities

#1

To what extent does the government demonstrate an active and coherent commitment to promoting equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries?

10
 9

The government actively and coherently engages in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries. It frequently demonstrates initiative and responsibility, and acts as an agenda-setter.
 8
 7
 6


The government actively engages in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries. However, some of its measures or policies lack coherence.
 5
 4
 3


The government shows limited engagement in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries. Many of its measures or policies lack coherence.
 2
 1

The government does not contribute (and often undermines) efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries.
Global Social Policy
10
Promoting global social justice is an overarching policy goal for Swedish governments regardless of ideological orientation. Sweden combines bilateral strategies with active involvement in multilateral efforts toward global social justice. Additionally, public spending on development issues is comparably very high. There has been a gradual shift from conventional aid to developing countries, mainly sub-Saharan countries, toward aid directed at countries closer to Sweden. This involves, for instance, promoting democratization and civil society in Eastern Europe. There are growing concerns about the effectiveness and efficiency of some foreign aid programs and the risk of aid being used for unintended purposes by actors in the receiving country. That said, the commitment to international solidarity and aid to developing countries remains very strong (Pierre, 2015).

The foreign policy field is a particularly gendered sector (Aggestam and Townes, 2018). The red-green governments (since 2014) launched a campaign of feminist foreign policy, which has gained international attention, as international solidarity has a gender dimension that has long been ignored. This foreign policy approach has been introduced in various international venues such as the United Nations and European Union. The new government has also become known for showing less tolerance than its predecessors for what it describes as medieval punishment techniques employed in some countries, which has caused some diplomatic friction. More broadly, the return of the Social Democrats to government reenergized Swedish foreign policy. It has become more visible but also more controversial.

Despite the complex outcome of the 2018 elections, gender mainstreaming has continued to characterize Sweden’s foreign policy (Regeringskansliet, 2021a;2021b). The explicit goals of this policy are: 1) to promote full respect for human rights; 2) to promote freedom from physical, psychological, and sexual violence; 3) to contribute to the prevention of conflict and reconstruction after conflict; 4) to promote political participation and influence across all parts of society; 5) to promote economic rights and independence, and sexual and reproductive health and rights (Regeringskansliet, 2021a).

Sweden plans to use its rotating presidencies in international organizations as well as its considerable diplomatic clout to push through a gender equality agenda culminating in the Swedish EU presidency in 2023; however, parliamentary elections will have taken place prior to that, in September 2022, and it remains to be seen what effect that will have on the country’s feminist foreign policy. The current government’s commitment to gender mainstreaming in foreign policy is further evidenced in its Agenda 2030 proposition, which was adopted by the parliament in December 2021, and contains specific instruments designed to work toward social justice (Regeringskansliet, 2021c). Sweden remains a leader in the field of international social justice and specifically gender equality.

Citations:
Aggestam, Karin, and Ann Towns. 2018. “The Gender Turn in Diplomacy: A new Research Agenda.” International Feminist Journal of Politics. 21(1), 9-28.

Pierre, Jon. (ed.) 2015. “The Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics.” Oxford University Press. Section 7.

Regeringskansliet [Government Offices of Sweden]. 2021a. “Feministisk Utrikespolitik och Arbetet för Jämställdhet och alla Kvinnors och Flickors Rättigheter, Representation och Resurser åren 2014-2021.” https://www.regeringen.se/4aaebe/contentassets/20abe79bed9a484aa084d18f66cc2d10/resultat-av-den-feministiska-utrikespolitiken-20142021

Regeringskansliet [Government Offices of Sweden]. 2021b. “Utrikesförvaltningens Handlingsplan för Feministisk Utrikespolitik 2019-2022 med Inriktning och Åtgärder för År 2021.” https://www.regeringen.se/491ecf/globalassets/regeringen/lena-micko-test/utrikesforvaltningens-handlingsplan-for-feministisk-utrikespolitik-2019-2022-med-inriktning-och-atgarder-for-ar-2021.pdf

Regeringskansliet [Government Offices of Sweden]. 2021c. “Sveriges Genomförande av Agenda 2030.” Proposition 2019/20:188. https://www.regeringen.se/4aa057/contentassets/378ab5cbd6b148acaeccc9413cc0e1ba/sveriges-genomforande-av-agenda-2030-prop.-201920188
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