To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
10
Sweden
In early 20th-century Sweden, the relationship between labor and industry underwent significant evolution, marked by a series of compromises aimed at addressing the pressing social and economic challenges of the time. One pivotal agreement was reached in 1938 with the establishment of the Saltsjöbaden Agreement, a landmark accord that laid the groundwork for collective bargaining and labor rights. Spearheaded by the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) and the Swedish Employers Association (SAF), this agreement aimed to strike a balance between the interests of workers and employers, fostering a cooperative framework for resolving labor disputes and negotiating fair wages and working conditions. The Saltsjöbaden Agreement emphasized the importance of mutual respect, dialogue, and compromise, setting a precedent for collaborative labor relations that would come to define Sweden’s social model.
Central to the compromise between labor and industry in early 20th-century Sweden was the concept of “wage solidarity” (lönesolidaritet), which sought to ensure equitable pay scales across various industries and professions. This principle, enshrined in subsequent agreements following the Saltsjöbaden pact, aimed to mitigate income disparities and foster a sense of social cohesion. Additionally, the compromise facilitated the establishment of comprehensive social welfare programs, including universal healthcare and unemployment benefits, which provided a safety net for workers and their families. Through these compromises, Sweden achieved a delicate equilibrium between the demands of labor and the imperatives of industry, laying the foundation for its renowned welfare state and cementing its reputation as a model for progressive social policy (Elvander 1988).
A legacy of this agreement is that the government is not involved in salary negotiations between labor unions and employers. As a consequence, there is no governmentally mandated minimum wage. The right to unionization is legislated (SFS 1976:580). Three major unions cover the gamut of professions: LO (public and private blue-collar professions), TCO (public and private white-collar professions), and Saco (academics and professions such as civil engineers and lawyers) (Nordiskt Samarbete, n.d.). These organizations are major players in shaping public policy. They have the resources, both monetary and expertise, to influence the policy process.
Central to the compromise between labor and industry in early 20th-century Sweden was the concept of “wage solidarity” (lönesolidaritet), which sought to ensure equitable pay scales across various industries and professions. This principle, enshrined in subsequent agreements following the Saltsjöbaden pact, aimed to mitigate income disparities and foster a sense of social cohesion. Additionally, the compromise facilitated the establishment of comprehensive social welfare programs, including universal healthcare and unemployment benefits, which provided a safety net for workers and their families. Through these compromises, Sweden achieved a delicate equilibrium between the demands of labor and the imperatives of industry, laying the foundation for its renowned welfare state and cementing its reputation as a model for progressive social policy (Elvander 1988).
A legacy of this agreement is that the government is not involved in salary negotiations between labor unions and employers. As a consequence, there is no governmentally mandated minimum wage. The right to unionization is legislated (SFS 1976:580). Three major unions cover the gamut of professions: LO (public and private blue-collar professions), TCO (public and private white-collar professions), and Saco (academics and professions such as civil engineers and lawyers) (Nordiskt Samarbete, n.d.). These organizations are major players in shaping public policy. They have the resources, both monetary and expertise, to influence the policy process.
Citations:
Nordiskt Samarbete. n.d. “Fackförbund i Sverige.” https://www.norden.org/sv/info-norden/fackforbund-i-sverige
Nordiskt Samarbete. n.d. “Fackförbund i Sverige.” https://www.norden.org/sv/info-norden/fackforbund-i-sverige
9
Belgium
Belgium’s socioeconomic model is characterized by consensual (neo-corporatist) policymaking, whereby the government consults established stakeholders to facilitate policy acceptance (Pauly et al. 2021). When strategic decisions involve key socioeconomic issues, representatives of social partners – powerful and well-structured employers’ organizations and trade unions – systematically negotiate bilateral agreements, which are then presented to the executive for approval. Unionization rates in Belgium remain very high, with membership rates close to 50% in 2019, one of the highest in Europe.
Technological changes related to service platforms (such as Uber), the internationalization of the economy, trade agreements like CETA, and efforts by the previous right-wing government to reduce the power of workers’ unions have eroded unions’ influence. Despite these challenges, unions remain quite powerful.
Belgium has three national union confederations: the General Labor Federation of Belgium (ACOD/FGTB), the Confederation of Christian Trade Unions (ACV/CSC), and the General Confederation of Liberal Trade Unions of Belgium (CGSLB/ACLVB), with the first two being the most significant. It is common for these three unions to form a “common front.” The main employers’ organization in Belgium is the VBO/FEB (Verbond van Belgische Ondernemingen/Fédération des Entreprises de Belgique), which operates nationwide and includes members from various employers’ organizations, each specializing in a particular industry or sector.
Both trade unions and employers’ organizations possess well-developed study services with technical expertise, often extending beyond their traditional focus areas.
Technological changes related to service platforms (such as Uber), the internationalization of the economy, trade agreements like CETA, and efforts by the previous right-wing government to reduce the power of workers’ unions have eroded unions’ influence. Despite these challenges, unions remain quite powerful.
Belgium has three national union confederations: the General Labor Federation of Belgium (ACOD/FGTB), the Confederation of Christian Trade Unions (ACV/CSC), and the General Confederation of Liberal Trade Unions of Belgium (CGSLB/ACLVB), with the first two being the most significant. It is common for these three unions to form a “common front.” The main employers’ organization in Belgium is the VBO/FEB (Verbond van Belgische Ondernemingen/Fédération des Entreprises de Belgique), which operates nationwide and includes members from various employers’ organizations, each specializing in a particular industry or sector.
Both trade unions and employers’ organizations possess well-developed study services with technical expertise, often extending beyond their traditional focus areas.
Citations:
Pauly, R., Verschuere, B., De Rynck, F., and Voets, J. 2021. “Changing Neo-Corporatist Institutions? Examining the Relationship Between Government and Civil Society Organizations in Belgium.” Public Management Review 23 (8): 1117-1138.
Unionization rates: https://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=TUD&lang=fr
Pauly, R., Verschuere, B., De Rynck, F., and Voets, J. 2021. “Changing Neo-Corporatist Institutions? Examining the Relationship Between Government and Civil Society Organizations in Belgium.” Public Management Review 23 (8): 1117-1138.
Unionization rates: https://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=TUD&lang=fr
Denmark
In a comparative perspective, with a trade union density of nearly 65% in 2021, the degree of unionization in Denmark is very high (Statistics Denmark, 2021). There is a long tradition of involving economic and social actors at all stages of the policy cycle, sometimes even in the implementation phase. Both formally and informally, there are valuable contacts between the government and main interest organizations (e.g., trade unions, employers, various business organizations and NGOs) as well as heads of major companies. Interest organizations provide important information for politicians and civil servants. Corporatism still plays a role, although its nature has changed over the years. Danish governments gain information and create legitimacy for adopted policies through the tripartite negotiations.
Tripartite negotiations between social partners (employee and employer organizations) are frequently used to settle labor market issues. This was most recently evident during the COVID-19 crisis, where a large number of tripartite agreements demonstrated the system’s flexibility and adaptability. Other examples of recent tripartite cooperation include initiatives to improve immigrant integration into the labor market and expand lifelong learning programs.
The cooperative approach is also formalized through the Economic Council, established in 1962, which includes representatives from large organizations, the administration, the central bank and independent experts. The Council operates independently, continuously analyzing and commenting on economic developments, economic policies and structural issues in specific policy areas.
Union membership is voluntary (fees are tax-deductible up to a cap, which in 2023 was DKK 6.000) and is not required for unemployment insurance. While membership has been on a declining trend over the long term, there has recently been a small rise. Collective agreements cover most of the labor market and thus also include workers who are not union members.
Tripartite negotiations between social partners (employee and employer organizations) are frequently used to settle labor market issues. This was most recently evident during the COVID-19 crisis, where a large number of tripartite agreements demonstrated the system’s flexibility and adaptability. Other examples of recent tripartite cooperation include initiatives to improve immigrant integration into the labor market and expand lifelong learning programs.
The cooperative approach is also formalized through the Economic Council, established in 1962, which includes representatives from large organizations, the administration, the central bank and independent experts. The Council operates independently, continuously analyzing and commenting on economic developments, economic policies and structural issues in specific policy areas.
Union membership is voluntary (fees are tax-deductible up to a cap, which in 2023 was DKK 6.000) and is not required for unemployment insurance. While membership has been on a declining trend over the long term, there has recently been a small rise. Collective agreements cover most of the labor market and thus also include workers who are not union members.
Citations:
Statistics Denmark. 2021. “Stigende antal fagforeningsmedlemmer i 2022.” https://www.dst.dk/da/Statistik/nyheder-analyser-publ/nyt/NytHtml?cid=46006
Statistics Denmark. 2021. “Stigende antal fagforeningsmedlemmer i 2022.” https://www.dst.dk/da/Statistik/nyheder-analyser-publ/nyt/NytHtml?cid=46006
Latvia
Within the framework of the tripartite social dialogue in Latvia, social partners – the Free Trade Union Confederation of Latvia (LBAS), the Latvian Chambers of Commerce (LTRK), the Employers Confederation of Latvia (LDDK), and the Latvian Association of Local Government (LPS) – are recognized as the social partners for the government and engage in dialogue regularly. Thus, employers and business associations possess the organizational resources to be present at all stages of policymaking. Their influence on policymaking issues varies, although they can unite smaller CSOs under their umbrella. However, the trade union density is 11.6% (data of 2018 in OECD/AIAS ICTWSS database).
The government has ensured that all opportunities for social partners to participate in policymaking, via online tools, access to governmental information, and participation in government meetings, are available.
The Foreign Investors’ Council in Latvia (FICIL) is an NGO established by foreign investors in Latvia. It can identify policy problems and advocate for policy proposals. FICIL’s priorities for the coming years include combating the shadow economy and addressing labor force availability and skills.
The government has ensured that all opportunities for social partners to participate in policymaking, via online tools, access to governmental information, and participation in government meetings, are available.
The Foreign Investors’ Council in Latvia (FICIL) is an NGO established by foreign investors in Latvia. It can identify policy problems and advocate for policy proposals. FICIL’s priorities for the coming years include combating the shadow economy and addressing labor force availability and skills.
Citations:
OECD/AIAS ICTWSS database. https://www.oecd.org/employment/ictwss-database.htm
Nacionālā trīspusējās sadarbības padome. https://www.mk.gov.lv/lv/nacionala-trispusejas-sadarbibas-padome
Foreign Investors` Council in Latvia. https://www.ficil.lv
OECD/AIAS ICTWSS database. https://www.oecd.org/employment/ictwss-database.htm
Nacionālā trīspusējās sadarbības padome. https://www.mk.gov.lv/lv/nacionala-trispusejas-sadarbibas-padome
Foreign Investors` Council in Latvia. https://www.ficil.lv
Slovenia
The Slovenian political system is neo-corporatist, providing representation for employers and employees in the Economic and Social Council (ESS), a tripartite body of social partners and the government of the Republic of Slovenia. The ESS addresses issues and measures related to economic and social policy and other matters specific to agreements between the partners. Representatives of employers and employees are also included in the National Council, the second house of Slovenia’s bicameral parliament, which represents social, economic, professional, and local interests. The institution consists of 40 members: four employers, four representatives of employees, and four representatives of farmers, artisans, and independent professionals. Consequently, the organizations of employers and employees are the most institutionalized, professionalized, and supported by expert staff.
Although the trade unions and employer representatives are among the strongest non-state actors, there has been a clear trend toward declining trade union membership in recent years. Trade union membership fell sharply in the first half of the 1990s, even as the number of trade unions in Slovenia increased. Additionally, associations of successful businesspeople outside the institutionalized employer framework, such as the Slovenian Business Club, are gaining public attention and expressing concerns on various issues, including those outside the business sector.
In 2023, trade unions representing various professional groups in the public sector were notably active. These groups included education professionals, police officers, customs officers, nurses, judicial officials, local government employees, professional firefighters, the army, bus drivers, and more. Many of these unions have threatened or carried out strikes and other protests throughout the year.
The government is currently advocating for joint negotiations with all trade unions as part of the wage system reform. On January 15, 2024, the doctors’ union began a general strike, which will continue until a strike agreement is reached or lifted. However, a resolution is not yet in sight. Consequently, work in the public healthcare system is restricted, increasing pressure on the government, even though the majority of the public and civil society do not support the doctors’ strike.
Although the trade unions and employer representatives are among the strongest non-state actors, there has been a clear trend toward declining trade union membership in recent years. Trade union membership fell sharply in the first half of the 1990s, even as the number of trade unions in Slovenia increased. Additionally, associations of successful businesspeople outside the institutionalized employer framework, such as the Slovenian Business Club, are gaining public attention and expressing concerns on various issues, including those outside the business sector.
In 2023, trade unions representing various professional groups in the public sector were notably active. These groups included education professionals, police officers, customs officers, nurses, judicial officials, local government employees, professional firefighters, the army, bus drivers, and more. Many of these unions have threatened or carried out strikes and other protests throughout the year.
The government is currently advocating for joint negotiations with all trade unions as part of the wage system reform. On January 15, 2024, the doctors’ union began a general strike, which will continue until a strike agreement is reached or lifted. However, a resolution is not yet in sight. Consequently, work in the public healthcare system is restricted, increasing pressure on the government, even though the majority of the public and civil society do not support the doctors’ strike.
Citations:
E-uprava: Državni svet- sestava, področje delovanja in pristojnosti. https://e-uprava.gov.si/drzava-in-druzba/e-demokracija/o-demokraticnih-procesih/drzavna-ureditev/drzavni-svet-sestava-podrocje-delovanja-in-pristojnosti.html
Živa Broder. 2016. Sindikalno gibanje v Sloveniji od osamosvojitve do danes. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede. http://dk.fdv.uni-lj.si/magistrska/pdfs/mag_broder-ziva.pdf
Rakar, Tatjana, and Tomaž Deželan. 2023. “The Strength of Civil Society in Slovenia after Three Decades of Post-Communist Experience.” In Handbook of Civil Society and Social Movements in Small States, eds. Lino Briguglio. Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 248-261. DOI: 10.4324/9781003341536-21.
SBC. 2024. “Imamo državo ugrabljeno s strani drugorazrednih uradnikov.” Available at https://www.sbc.si/novice/2024/01/imamo-drzavo-ugrabljeno-s-strani-drugorazrednih-uradnikov
E-uprava: Državni svet- sestava, področje delovanja in pristojnosti. https://e-uprava.gov.si/drzava-in-druzba/e-demokracija/o-demokraticnih-procesih/drzavna-ureditev/drzavni-svet-sestava-podrocje-delovanja-in-pristojnosti.html
Živa Broder. 2016. Sindikalno gibanje v Sloveniji od osamosvojitve do danes. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede. http://dk.fdv.uni-lj.si/magistrska/pdfs/mag_broder-ziva.pdf
Rakar, Tatjana, and Tomaž Deželan. 2023. “The Strength of Civil Society in Slovenia after Three Decades of Post-Communist Experience.” In Handbook of Civil Society and Social Movements in Small States, eds. Lino Briguglio. Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 248-261. DOI: 10.4324/9781003341536-21.
SBC. 2024. “Imamo državo ugrabljeno s strani drugorazrednih uradnikov.” Available at https://www.sbc.si/novice/2024/01/imamo-drzavo-ugrabljeno-s-strani-drugorazrednih-uradnikov
Switzerland
The right to form professional associations is enshrined in Art. 28 of the constitution. Trade union representation is split across several organizations. The Swiss Trade Union Federation is the leading union organization, and is historically close to the Social Democratic Party. It is strongest in membership figures (48% of all trade union members, 2021). Travail.Suisse was formed by a fusion of Catholic trade unions and unions for salaried employees. It is politically independent but close to the Social Democrats and the Center Party, and represents about 20% of all trade unionists (2021). The remaining smaller organizations account for about another third of all trade unionists (FSO 2024).
There are three types of associations representing capital. Economiesuisse (https://economiesuisse.ch/en) represents employers on the political level, the Swiss Employers’ Association is the main negotiation partner with the trade unions, and the Swiss Union of Arts and Crafts represents small and medium-sized enterprises.
Swiss interest organizations are pragmatic and avoid rigidly ideological stances. Of course, the major interest organizations do have their ideologies, but this does not prevent them from entering rational discussions with other organizations and political parties. Furthermore, interest organizations in general have access to more substantial professional resources and often have a better-informed view of problems than do political parties. Switzerland is well-known for its liberal corporatist integration of interest organizations into the state. Trade unions are the junior partners, with the main axis of influence constituted by employers’ interest organizations and the state. Interest organizations have an important role in developing and implementing policies. Since about the 1990s, this corporatist arrangement has been weakened but not eliminated by two developments. First, policymaking influence has shifted somewhat to the interaction between government and parliament. One of the major reasons for this change is the increasing Europeanization of Swiss policymaking. In addition, the power of the Swiss Employers’ Association has been weakened by the increasing internationalization of industries, with many foreign-managed or foreign-owned companies now active in the country (Armingeon 1997; 2011; Mach et al. 2020; 2021; 2023).
Hence, the major civil society organizations (CSOs) have the organizational strength to independently formulate policies and to participate in an integrated policy formulation process with the government. They pursue a policy of social partnership. While trade unions directly represent only about 20% of all employees, their collective agreements cover about half of all employees, and they are respected as representatives of the working class. In addition to these strong corporatist features – with traditional key players having established access to the decision-making process – additional citizen groups have gained access to the administrative and parliamentary venues in the last decades. The threat of referendums and a weakly professionalized parliament explain the system’s relative openness to demands from civil society groups. Corporatist groups remain, however, by far the most dominant interest groups in the decision-making process (Christiansen et al. 2017).
There are three types of associations representing capital. Economiesuisse (https://economiesuisse.ch/en) represents employers on the political level, the Swiss Employers’ Association is the main negotiation partner with the trade unions, and the Swiss Union of Arts and Crafts represents small and medium-sized enterprises.
Swiss interest organizations are pragmatic and avoid rigidly ideological stances. Of course, the major interest organizations do have their ideologies, but this does not prevent them from entering rational discussions with other organizations and political parties. Furthermore, interest organizations in general have access to more substantial professional resources and often have a better-informed view of problems than do political parties. Switzerland is well-known for its liberal corporatist integration of interest organizations into the state. Trade unions are the junior partners, with the main axis of influence constituted by employers’ interest organizations and the state. Interest organizations have an important role in developing and implementing policies. Since about the 1990s, this corporatist arrangement has been weakened but not eliminated by two developments. First, policymaking influence has shifted somewhat to the interaction between government and parliament. One of the major reasons for this change is the increasing Europeanization of Swiss policymaking. In addition, the power of the Swiss Employers’ Association has been weakened by the increasing internationalization of industries, with many foreign-managed or foreign-owned companies now active in the country (Armingeon 1997; 2011; Mach et al. 2020; 2021; 2023).
Hence, the major civil society organizations (CSOs) have the organizational strength to independently formulate policies and to participate in an integrated policy formulation process with the government. They pursue a policy of social partnership. While trade unions directly represent only about 20% of all employees, their collective agreements cover about half of all employees, and they are respected as representatives of the working class. In addition to these strong corporatist features – with traditional key players having established access to the decision-making process – additional citizen groups have gained access to the administrative and parliamentary venues in the last decades. The threat of referendums and a weakly professionalized parliament explain the system’s relative openness to demands from civil society groups. Corporatist groups remain, however, by far the most dominant interest groups in the decision-making process (Christiansen et al. 2017).
Citations:
Armingeon, Klaus. 1997. “Swiss Corporatism in Comparative Perspective.” West European Politics 20: 164-179.
Armingeon, Klaus. 2011. “A Prematurely Announced Death? Swiss Corporatism in Comparative Perspective.” In Switzerland in Europe: Continuity and Change in the Swiss Political Economy, eds. Christine Trampusch and André Mach. London/New York: Routledge, 165-185.
Christiansen, Peter Munk, André Mach, and Frédéric Varone. 2018. “How Corporatist Institutions Shape the Access of Citizen Groups to Policy-Makers: Evidence from Denmark and Switzerland.” Journal of European Public Policy 25 (4): 526-545. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2016.1268194.
FSO (Federal Statistical Office, Bundesamt für Statistik). 2024. “Gewerkschaften und andere Arbeitnehmerorganisationen: Zahl der Mitglieder.” https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/arbeit-erwerb/gesamtarbeitsvertraege-sozialpartnerschaft/gewerkschaften.assetdetail.25085550.html
Mach, André, Frédéric Varone, and Steven Eichenberger. 2020. “Transformations of Swiss Neo-Corporatism: From Pre-Parliamentary Negotiations toward Privileged Pluralism in the Parliamentary Venue.” In The European Social Model under Pressure, eds. Romana Careja, Patrick Emmenegger, and Nathalie Giger. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 51-68. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-27043-8_4
Mach, André, Thomas David, and Stéphanie Ginalski. 2021. “From Quiet to Noisy Politics: Transformations of Swiss Business Elites’ Power.” Politics & Society 49 (1): 17-41.
Mach, André, and Steven Eichenberger. 2023. “Interest Groups.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 337–354. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.17
Armingeon, Klaus. 1997. “Swiss Corporatism in Comparative Perspective.” West European Politics 20: 164-179.
Armingeon, Klaus. 2011. “A Prematurely Announced Death? Swiss Corporatism in Comparative Perspective.” In Switzerland in Europe: Continuity and Change in the Swiss Political Economy, eds. Christine Trampusch and André Mach. London/New York: Routledge, 165-185.
Christiansen, Peter Munk, André Mach, and Frédéric Varone. 2018. “How Corporatist Institutions Shape the Access of Citizen Groups to Policy-Makers: Evidence from Denmark and Switzerland.” Journal of European Public Policy 25 (4): 526-545. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2016.1268194.
FSO (Federal Statistical Office, Bundesamt für Statistik). 2024. “Gewerkschaften und andere Arbeitnehmerorganisationen: Zahl der Mitglieder.” https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/arbeit-erwerb/gesamtarbeitsvertraege-sozialpartnerschaft/gewerkschaften.assetdetail.25085550.html
Mach, André, Frédéric Varone, and Steven Eichenberger. 2020. “Transformations of Swiss Neo-Corporatism: From Pre-Parliamentary Negotiations toward Privileged Pluralism in the Parliamentary Venue.” In The European Social Model under Pressure, eds. Romana Careja, Patrick Emmenegger, and Nathalie Giger. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 51-68. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-27043-8_4
Mach, André, Thomas David, and Stéphanie Ginalski. 2021. “From Quiet to Noisy Politics: Transformations of Swiss Business Elites’ Power.” Politics & Society 49 (1): 17-41.
Mach, André, and Steven Eichenberger. 2023. “Interest Groups.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 337–354. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.17
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
Austria
The role of capital and labor interest groups remains notably strong in Austria (Karlhofer 2020). In many cases, these groups continue to formulate nearly complete laws independently, which parliament subsequently only needs to approve. Significant associations include the Austrian Economic Chambers (Wirtschaftskammern) and the Federation of Austrian Industry (Die Industriellenvereinigung) for businesses and employers; the Austrian Trade Union Federation (Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund) and the Austrian Federal Chamber of Labor (Arbeiterkammern) for employees; and the Chamber of Agriculture (Landwirtschaftskammern) for farmers. Membership in the various chambers is mandatory; the fees, amounting to 0.5% of the gross salary, are automatically deducted from it. Other membership fees to professional associations or donations to civil society organizations are tax-deductible.
The power of the major associations from the economic and labor sectors to shape politics and public policies may have been reduced as a result of Austria’s integration into the European Union, but in domestic politics their influence remains strong. Though formally independent of political parties, the groups have various individual links to the parties, especially to the Social Democratic Party and the Austrian People’s Party. Moreover, their influence is enhanced by their acting in a coordinated, neo-corporatist way through the social-partnership network.
These established patterns have begun to change in recent decades, particularly in the past few years (Paster 2022). The SPÖ’s closest allies have lost ground since the party’s fall from power in 2017. The formation of a new coalition government between the ÖVP and the Greens in early 2020 continued the post-2017 policies. The ÖVP-Green government was, in fact, the first national government that did not include any ministers representing the social partners (Sozialpartner).
The social partners have not only suffered from changing government complexions; compared to the peak of the Social Partnership, public trust and support have been shrinking. In 2022, just 35% of respondents declared they had much or very much trust in the social partners (i.e., employers’ and employees’ associations). By contrast, 24% of respondents had little or no trust at all (Statista 2024). Some of this distrust stems from the influence of the FPÖ, a party that is not represented in these organizations and is therefore fairly skeptical. On the other hand, employers’ and workers’ organizations have gained more access to public opinion through newly founded economic research and lobbying institutions like Agenda Austria and Momentum Institute.
The power of the major associations from the economic and labor sectors to shape politics and public policies may have been reduced as a result of Austria’s integration into the European Union, but in domestic politics their influence remains strong. Though formally independent of political parties, the groups have various individual links to the parties, especially to the Social Democratic Party and the Austrian People’s Party. Moreover, their influence is enhanced by their acting in a coordinated, neo-corporatist way through the social-partnership network.
These established patterns have begun to change in recent decades, particularly in the past few years (Paster 2022). The SPÖ’s closest allies have lost ground since the party’s fall from power in 2017. The formation of a new coalition government between the ÖVP and the Greens in early 2020 continued the post-2017 policies. The ÖVP-Green government was, in fact, the first national government that did not include any ministers representing the social partners (Sozialpartner).
The social partners have not only suffered from changing government complexions; compared to the peak of the Social Partnership, public trust and support have been shrinking. In 2022, just 35% of respondents declared they had much or very much trust in the social partners (i.e., employers’ and employees’ associations). By contrast, 24% of respondents had little or no trust at all (Statista 2024). Some of this distrust stems from the influence of the FPÖ, a party that is not represented in these organizations and is therefore fairly skeptical. On the other hand, employers’ and workers’ organizations have gained more access to public opinion through newly founded economic research and lobbying institutions like Agenda Austria and Momentum Institute.
Citations:
Statista. 2024. “https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/1097082/umfrage/vertrauen-in-die-sozialpartner-in-oesterreich”
Paster, Thomas. 2022. “Sozialpartnerschaft und Arbeitgeber* innenverbände in Österreich.” In Sozialpartnerschaftliche Handlungsfelder: Kontinuitäten, Brüche und Perspektiven: Aktuelle Befunde, eds., 29-43. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden.
Karlhofer, Ferdinand. 2020. “The Present and Future State of Social Partnership.” Austro-Corporatism. Routledge, 119-146.
Hofmann, Julia, Carina Altreiter, Jörg Flecker, Saskja Schindler, and Ruth Simsa. 2019. “Symbolic Struggles over Solidarity in Times of Crisis: Trade Unions, Civil Society Actors and the Political Far Right in Austria.” European Societies 21 (5): 649-671. DOI: 10.1080/14616696.2019.1616790
Statista. 2024. “https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/1097082/umfrage/vertrauen-in-die-sozialpartner-in-oesterreich”
Paster, Thomas. 2022. “Sozialpartnerschaft und Arbeitgeber* innenverbände in Österreich.” In Sozialpartnerschaftliche Handlungsfelder: Kontinuitäten, Brüche und Perspektiven: Aktuelle Befunde, eds., 29-43. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden.
Karlhofer, Ferdinand. 2020. “The Present and Future State of Social Partnership.” Austro-Corporatism. Routledge, 119-146.
Hofmann, Julia, Carina Altreiter, Jörg Flecker, Saskja Schindler, and Ruth Simsa. 2019. “Symbolic Struggles over Solidarity in Times of Crisis: Trade Unions, Civil Society Actors and the Political Far Right in Austria.” European Societies 21 (5): 649-671. DOI: 10.1080/14616696.2019.1616790
Czechia
In the Council for Economic and Social Accord, trade unions and employer associations actively comment on bills pertaining to social and economic issues during tripartite meetings with the government. The consultation process has become more transparent due to the electronic publication of legislative norms and regulations. Notably, major employers and trade unions possess substantial resources and expertise, enabling them to formulate coherent policies.
Trade unions and employers’ organizations often have differing aims and opinions on various issues. However, they are united in their support for this means of communication and issue joint statements when they feel ignored by the government, as seen in the early preparations for the government’s so-called consolidation package (discussed under Sustainable Budgeting Policies).
The main employers’ organization, the Union of Industry and Transport of the Czech Republic (Svaz průmyslu a dopravy České republiky, SPČR), has emphasized its opposition to higher business taxes and increased taxes on energy, claiming these harm the metallurgy and mineralogy industries. This organization consistently expresses opinions on current economic policy issues and lobbies the government and politicians both through and independently of the tripartite structures. It has persistently argued for government help in relaxing rules to allow the recruitment of more workers from abroad. This, along with many of its other demands, has not been a priority for trade unions.
For trade unions, the central issues have been the protection of living standards and public sector pay levels. To press these issues, the main trade union center, the Czech and Moravian Confederation of Trade Unions (Českomoravská konfederace odborových svazů, ČMKOS), organized a day of protest on November 27, 2023, including a one-hour token work stoppage at some workplaces. This protest was linked with demonstrations by employees in education against the perceived threat of pay cuts. While this action has not led to immediate changes in government policy, there may be a long-term impact on a government with internal divisions and a stated commitment to improving the education system.
Trade unions and employers’ organizations often have differing aims and opinions on various issues. However, they are united in their support for this means of communication and issue joint statements when they feel ignored by the government, as seen in the early preparations for the government’s so-called consolidation package (discussed under Sustainable Budgeting Policies).
The main employers’ organization, the Union of Industry and Transport of the Czech Republic (Svaz průmyslu a dopravy České republiky, SPČR), has emphasized its opposition to higher business taxes and increased taxes on energy, claiming these harm the metallurgy and mineralogy industries. This organization consistently expresses opinions on current economic policy issues and lobbies the government and politicians both through and independently of the tripartite structures. It has persistently argued for government help in relaxing rules to allow the recruitment of more workers from abroad. This, along with many of its other demands, has not been a priority for trade unions.
For trade unions, the central issues have been the protection of living standards and public sector pay levels. To press these issues, the main trade union center, the Czech and Moravian Confederation of Trade Unions (Českomoravská konfederace odborových svazů, ČMKOS), organized a day of protest on November 27, 2023, including a one-hour token work stoppage at some workplaces. This protest was linked with demonstrations by employees in education against the perceived threat of pay cuts. While this action has not led to immediate changes in government policy, there may be a long-term impact on a government with internal divisions and a stated commitment to improving the education system.
Citations:
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-08/czech-unions-demand-up-to-10-wage-growth-as-inflation-slows
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-08/czech-unions-demand-up-to-10-wage-growth-as-inflation-slows
Finland
In Finland’s consensus-oriented political system, interest organizations and associations – especially employers’ and employees’ organizations – are regularly consulted in the course of policymaking. The major civil society organizations (CSOs) are cooperative and capable of forming alliances.
According to Greve et al. (2020), the role of trade unions and work councils as social partners has been more limited in Finland than in other Nordic countries. They were consulted during the preparation of the government support packages, but not as extensively as in Denmark, for example. One reason for this could be that many unemployment-related issues (e.g., short-term work and wage supplement systems) were already covered by national regulation.
Although the corporatist system adopted in the 1960s has now declined, the exchange of views and information with a variety of social interests remains integral to the everyday activities of the Finnish government. Through mechanisms such as committee hearings, joint-council memberships and expert testimony, bills and drafts are circulated to interested parties who are then invited to critique the draft legislation. Reforms of the earnings-related pension system, for example, are still negotiated in a tripartite manner. However, recent developments have indicated a weakening in the role played by tripartite negotiation of labor market agreements between the government, employers’ associations and employee organizations.
Labor union membership fees are tax deductible. Employers’ and employees’ associations possess significant financial strength, which enables them to hire policy experts. Although labor union membership is declining, rates remain relatively high compared with other European countries.
According to Greve et al. (2020), the role of trade unions and work councils as social partners has been more limited in Finland than in other Nordic countries. They were consulted during the preparation of the government support packages, but not as extensively as in Denmark, for example. One reason for this could be that many unemployment-related issues (e.g., short-term work and wage supplement systems) were already covered by national regulation.
Although the corporatist system adopted in the 1960s has now declined, the exchange of views and information with a variety of social interests remains integral to the everyday activities of the Finnish government. Through mechanisms such as committee hearings, joint-council memberships and expert testimony, bills and drafts are circulated to interested parties who are then invited to critique the draft legislation. Reforms of the earnings-related pension system, for example, are still negotiated in a tripartite manner. However, recent developments have indicated a weakening in the role played by tripartite negotiation of labor market agreements between the government, employers’ associations and employee organizations.
Labor union membership fees are tax deductible. Employers’ and employees’ associations possess significant financial strength, which enables them to hire policy experts. Although labor union membership is declining, rates remain relatively high compared with other European countries.
Citations:
Greve, B., Blomquist, P., Hvinden, B., and van Gerven, M. 2020. “Nordic Welfare States – Still Standing or Changed by the COVID‐19 Crisis?” Social Policy & Administration 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1111/spol.12675
Greve, B., Blomquist, P., Hvinden, B., and van Gerven, M. 2020. “Nordic Welfare States – Still Standing or Changed by the COVID‐19 Crisis?” Social Policy & Administration 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1111/spol.12675
Germany
The Basic Law, the German constitution, allows all German citizens to form associations and organizations (Article 9, Passage 1) and specifically to form trade unions and employers’ organizations for all professions (Article 9, Passage 3) to preserve and improve labor and economic conditions (Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1949).
As a result, Germany has many trade unions and business organizations. These organizations are economically and politically independent and are funded by membership fees, which are tax-deductible for both employees and employers (Rütters/Mielke, n.d.; Hans Böckler Stiftung, 2013; Vereinigte Lohnsteuerhilfe e.V., 2023).
Wage bargaining in Germany operates autonomously. Trade unions and employer organizations negotiate wages and working conditions independently without political intervention. The government does not typically intervene in collective bargaining rounds and is not entitled to settle disputes between unions and business organizations (Strünck, n.d.). Government pleas and other political institutions usually do not affect these negotiations and are quickly rejected by the negotiating parties. There are no serious debates about limiting the autonomy of wage bargaining (Lesch et al., 2023: 26).
Major civil society organizations (CSOs) have the organizational strength to independently formulate policy proposals. For example, the Initiative New Social Market Economy (Initiative Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft, INSM), funded by the employers’ organizations of the metal and electro industries, aims to rethink and improve the German social market economy. It was initially kickstarted with €100 million in funding (Hans Böckler Stiftung, 2013). On the trade union side, in 2022, a reform of the works constitution law (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) was proposed by experts from the German Trade Union Federation (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) and several law professors (Verdi, 2022).
Labor and capital CSOs generally play an advisory role in the policymaking process. They can make proposals, although the federal government is not obliged to react to them. It is unclear to what extent the government feels compelled to respond to these proposals, but governments often actively seek CSO advice. For instance, in July 2022, Chancellor Scholz invited trade unions and employer organizations to participate in a “Concerted Action” to discuss dealing with inflation and the energy crisis.
Many trade unions and business organizations come together in umbrella organizations. The German Trade Union Federation (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) is an umbrella organization for eight major German trade unions, representing approximately six million members. Membership has declined since German reunification (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, n.d.). The Confederation of German Employers (Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände) is the main umbrella organization for employers’ organizations. It consists of 14 state associations and 46 federal professional associations from nearly every economic sector, representing about one million enterprises with more than 30 million employees (Die Arbeitgeber, n.d.).
Compared to many other European countries, the number and intensity of strikes in Germany are low. In the 2010s, an average of 18 working days per 1,000 employees were lost each year due to strikes. This is largely due to German strike law, which disallows strikes for political reasons (Deutschlandfunk, 2023).
Most Germans hold favorable views of unions. Specifically, 69% of Germans support strong unions, and 51% associate positive views with trade unions, while only 15% have a negative perception. (Nienhüser et al. 2022: 29).
As a result, Germany has many trade unions and business organizations. These organizations are economically and politically independent and are funded by membership fees, which are tax-deductible for both employees and employers (Rütters/Mielke, n.d.; Hans Böckler Stiftung, 2013; Vereinigte Lohnsteuerhilfe e.V., 2023).
Wage bargaining in Germany operates autonomously. Trade unions and employer organizations negotiate wages and working conditions independently without political intervention. The government does not typically intervene in collective bargaining rounds and is not entitled to settle disputes between unions and business organizations (Strünck, n.d.). Government pleas and other political institutions usually do not affect these negotiations and are quickly rejected by the negotiating parties. There are no serious debates about limiting the autonomy of wage bargaining (Lesch et al., 2023: 26).
Major civil society organizations (CSOs) have the organizational strength to independently formulate policy proposals. For example, the Initiative New Social Market Economy (Initiative Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft, INSM), funded by the employers’ organizations of the metal and electro industries, aims to rethink and improve the German social market economy. It was initially kickstarted with €100 million in funding (Hans Böckler Stiftung, 2013). On the trade union side, in 2022, a reform of the works constitution law (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) was proposed by experts from the German Trade Union Federation (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) and several law professors (Verdi, 2022).
Labor and capital CSOs generally play an advisory role in the policymaking process. They can make proposals, although the federal government is not obliged to react to them. It is unclear to what extent the government feels compelled to respond to these proposals, but governments often actively seek CSO advice. For instance, in July 2022, Chancellor Scholz invited trade unions and employer organizations to participate in a “Concerted Action” to discuss dealing with inflation and the energy crisis.
Many trade unions and business organizations come together in umbrella organizations. The German Trade Union Federation (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) is an umbrella organization for eight major German trade unions, representing approximately six million members. Membership has declined since German reunification (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, n.d.). The Confederation of German Employers (Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände) is the main umbrella organization for employers’ organizations. It consists of 14 state associations and 46 federal professional associations from nearly every economic sector, representing about one million enterprises with more than 30 million employees (Die Arbeitgeber, n.d.).
Compared to many other European countries, the number and intensity of strikes in Germany are low. In the 2010s, an average of 18 working days per 1,000 employees were lost each year due to strikes. This is largely due to German strike law, which disallows strikes for political reasons (Deutschlandfunk, 2023).
Most Germans hold favorable views of unions. Specifically, 69% of Germans support strong unions, and 51% associate positive views with trade unions, while only 15% have a negative perception. (Nienhüser et al. 2022: 29).
Citations:
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 1949. Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/BJNR000010949.html
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. n.d. “Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB).” https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/lexika/politiklexikon/17341/deutscher-gewerkschaftsbund-dgb/
Deutschlandfunk. 2023. “Warum in Deutschland viel weniger gestreikt wird als in Frankreich.” https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/streikrecht-deutschland-frankreich-warnstreiks-generalstreik-100.html
Die Arbeitgeber. n.d. “Unsere Mitglieder.” https://arbeitgeber.de/Mitglieder/
Hans Böckler Stiftung. 2013. “Was kostet die Mitgliedschaft im Arbeitgeberverband?” Magazin Mitbestimmung 10/2013. https://www.boeckler.de/de/magazin-mitbestimmung-2744-was-kostet-die-mitgliedschaft-im-arbeitgeberverband-5176.htm
INSM. n.d. “Alles über die INSM.” https://www.insm.de/insm/ueber-die-insm/faq
Lesch, H., Bach, H., and Vogel, S. 2023. “Tarifautonomie in der Legalitätskrise.” https://www.iwkoeln.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Studien/policy_papers/PDF/2023/IW-Policy-Paper_2023-Tarifautonomie-Legitimit%C3%A4tskrise.pdf
Nienhüser, W., Peetz, D., Murray, G., Troup, C. 2022. “Social Media, the Internet and the Crisis of Unionism.” Hans Böckler Stiftung Working Paper https://www.boeckler.de/de/faust-detail.htm?produkt=HBS-008499.
Rütters, P., and Mielke, S. n.d. “Gewerkschaften.” Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/lexika/handwoerterbuch-politisches-system/202034/gewerkschaften
Stiftung Warentest. 2024. “Geschichte: Sechs Jahrzehnte Verbraucherschutz.” https://www.test.de/unternehmen/stiftung-5017075-5843545/
Strünck, C. n.d. “Tarifpolitik/Tarifautonomie, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.” https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/lexika/handwoerterbuch-politisches-system/202193/tarifpolitik-tarifautonomie
Verdi. 2022. “Reformvorschlag zum Betriebsverfassungsgesetz.” https://www.verdi.de/themen/mitbestimmung/betriebsrat/++co++2ab42768-a174-11ed-a51b-001a4a160129
Vereinigte Lohnsteuerhilfe e.V. 2023. “Gewerkschaftsbeitrag von der Steuer absetzen.” https://www.vlh.de/arbeiten-pendeln/beruf/gewerkschaftsbeitrag-von-der-steuer-absetzen.html
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 1949. Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/BJNR000010949.html
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. n.d. “Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB).” https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/lexika/politiklexikon/17341/deutscher-gewerkschaftsbund-dgb/
Deutschlandfunk. 2023. “Warum in Deutschland viel weniger gestreikt wird als in Frankreich.” https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/streikrecht-deutschland-frankreich-warnstreiks-generalstreik-100.html
Die Arbeitgeber. n.d. “Unsere Mitglieder.” https://arbeitgeber.de/Mitglieder/
Hans Böckler Stiftung. 2013. “Was kostet die Mitgliedschaft im Arbeitgeberverband?” Magazin Mitbestimmung 10/2013. https://www.boeckler.de/de/magazin-mitbestimmung-2744-was-kostet-die-mitgliedschaft-im-arbeitgeberverband-5176.htm
INSM. n.d. “Alles über die INSM.” https://www.insm.de/insm/ueber-die-insm/faq
Lesch, H., Bach, H., and Vogel, S. 2023. “Tarifautonomie in der Legalitätskrise.” https://www.iwkoeln.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Studien/policy_papers/PDF/2023/IW-Policy-Paper_2023-Tarifautonomie-Legitimit%C3%A4tskrise.pdf
Nienhüser, W., Peetz, D., Murray, G., Troup, C. 2022. “Social Media, the Internet and the Crisis of Unionism.” Hans Böckler Stiftung Working Paper https://www.boeckler.de/de/faust-detail.htm?produkt=HBS-008499.
Rütters, P., and Mielke, S. n.d. “Gewerkschaften.” Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/lexika/handwoerterbuch-politisches-system/202034/gewerkschaften
Stiftung Warentest. 2024. “Geschichte: Sechs Jahrzehnte Verbraucherschutz.” https://www.test.de/unternehmen/stiftung-5017075-5843545/
Strünck, C. n.d. “Tarifpolitik/Tarifautonomie, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.” https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/lexika/handwoerterbuch-politisches-system/202193/tarifpolitik-tarifautonomie
Verdi. 2022. “Reformvorschlag zum Betriebsverfassungsgesetz.” https://www.verdi.de/themen/mitbestimmung/betriebsrat/++co++2ab42768-a174-11ed-a51b-001a4a160129
Vereinigte Lohnsteuerhilfe e.V. 2023. “Gewerkschaftsbeitrag von der Steuer absetzen.” https://www.vlh.de/arbeiten-pendeln/beruf/gewerkschaftsbeitrag-von-der-steuer-absetzen.html
Lithuania
Most major civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to shape public policies, although in practice this depends on the particular CSO. Major societal actors, such as trade unions and business organizations, are consulted through institutionalized arrangements – such as the Tripartite Council – as well as through various ad hoc means.
According to the OECD/AIAS ICTWSS Database, trade union density was 10% in 2021, a rise from 7.4% in 2019, while employer organization density was 33% in 2016 (later data is not available). Lithuanian legislation allows taxpayers to donate up to 0.6% of their personal income tax to trade unions and their associations of choice when declaring their annual income. Business organizations are funded by membership fees.
Traditionally, business organizations have been more adept at raising funds and developing expertise to voice their opinions on policy initiatives. The Investors’ Forum, the Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists and the Lithuanian Business Confederation are among the most well-resourced business associations. These organizations possess substantial analytical capacities, enabling them to formulate their own policy proposals and contribute to debates on economic and social policy initiatives presented by the government. Recently, major business associations have collaborated to provide common assessments of government initiatives, such as the tax reform debated from 2021 to 2023.
The visibility and capacities of major economic and social CSOs are enhanced through their participation in EU-wide networks of similar organizations. For instance, the Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists is a member of Business Europe. Meanwhile, although the visibility and capacities of trade unions have also increased recently, and the Confederation of Trade Unions now plays a more prominent political role than previously, this role remains somewhat weaker than that of employers.
The government frequently consults with social partners on various issues, but it is more inclined to engage with employer organizations than trade unions. Given the government’s limited capacity to shape and coordinate broad political compromises, these consultations tend to be formal rather than substantive contributions to policymaking, particularly on issues that directly impact specific interests. For instance, in 2022 – 2023, the involvement of major societal actors in the review of tax exemptions initiated by the Ministry of Finance did not result in any workable agreement. However, a similar involvement in the preparation of the long-term Lithuania 2050 strategy, led by the State Progress Council, was more productive. Notably, both initiatives included employers but not unions.
According to the OECD/AIAS ICTWSS Database, trade union density was 10% in 2021, a rise from 7.4% in 2019, while employer organization density was 33% in 2016 (later data is not available). Lithuanian legislation allows taxpayers to donate up to 0.6% of their personal income tax to trade unions and their associations of choice when declaring their annual income. Business organizations are funded by membership fees.
Traditionally, business organizations have been more adept at raising funds and developing expertise to voice their opinions on policy initiatives. The Investors’ Forum, the Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists and the Lithuanian Business Confederation are among the most well-resourced business associations. These organizations possess substantial analytical capacities, enabling them to formulate their own policy proposals and contribute to debates on economic and social policy initiatives presented by the government. Recently, major business associations have collaborated to provide common assessments of government initiatives, such as the tax reform debated from 2021 to 2023.
The visibility and capacities of major economic and social CSOs are enhanced through their participation in EU-wide networks of similar organizations. For instance, the Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists is a member of Business Europe. Meanwhile, although the visibility and capacities of trade unions have also increased recently, and the Confederation of Trade Unions now plays a more prominent political role than previously, this role remains somewhat weaker than that of employers.
The government frequently consults with social partners on various issues, but it is more inclined to engage with employer organizations than trade unions. Given the government’s limited capacity to shape and coordinate broad political compromises, these consultations tend to be formal rather than substantive contributions to policymaking, particularly on issues that directly impact specific interests. For instance, in 2022 – 2023, the involvement of major societal actors in the review of tax exemptions initiated by the Ministry of Finance did not result in any workable agreement. However, a similar involvement in the preparation of the long-term Lithuania 2050 strategy, led by the State Progress Council, was more productive. Notably, both initiatives included employers but not unions.
Citations:
OECD and AIAS. 2021. Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State.
Intervention and Social Pacts, Lithuania – main characteristics and indicators of collective bargaining. OECD Publishing, Paris. www.oecd.org/employment/ictwss-database.htm (accessed 19.12.2023)
Lithuanian Ministry of Social Security and Labor. “The Tripartite Council (in Lithuanian).” https://socmin.lrv.lt/lt/administracine-informacija/lr-trisale-taryba#Tri%C5%A1al%C4%97s%20tarybos%20nariai
Government of Lithuania. “State Progress Council (in Lithuanian).” https://sena.lrv.lt/lt/aktuali-informacija/lietuva-2050/valstybes-pazangos-taryba-2
OECD and AIAS. 2021. Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State.
Intervention and Social Pacts, Lithuania – main characteristics and indicators of collective bargaining. OECD Publishing, Paris. www.oecd.org/employment/ictwss-database.htm (accessed 19.12.2023)
Lithuanian Ministry of Social Security and Labor. “The Tripartite Council (in Lithuanian).” https://socmin.lrv.lt/lt/administracine-informacija/lr-trisale-taryba#Tri%C5%A1al%C4%97s%20tarybos%20nariai
Government of Lithuania. “State Progress Council (in Lithuanian).” https://sena.lrv.lt/lt/aktuali-informacija/lietuva-2050/valstybes-pazangos-taryba-2
Norway
Half of all employees are members of trade unions, with 80% in the public sector and 38% in the private sector. The largest organization is the Confederation of Trade Unions (LO), which includes roughly half of the unionized workers. On the capital side, the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprises (NHO) is the dominant organization for companies across all business sectors. State policies promote organization, and membership fees for individuals and companies are tax-deductible.
Although the LO and the NHO do not have a monopoly on organizing workers and companies respectively, they enjoy a privileged position in policymaking. The tripartite system of collaboration among the state, labor, and capital, with its historical roots in the 1930s, remains a cornerstone in public policymaking across all policy fields, not just economic matters. These organizations are resourceful and can mobilize significant expertise to serve their interests.
Influence on public policies occurs through participation in problem analysis, expert committees, and policy preparations, as well as in the consultation process before legislation is proposed, rather than through direct interaction with legislators. There is a long-standing culture of balancing cooperation and conflict between labor and capital. All governments, irrespective of ideology, listen carefully to the social partners. Government policy proposals opposed by both labor and capital will likely suffer weak support among the general public and will most likely be shelved or significantly changed.
The dominant roles of the LO and the NHO are frequently criticized by other less resourceful organizations. In particular, public sector employees are critical of the roles of these dominant organizations in the system of wage setting.
Although the LO and the NHO do not have a monopoly on organizing workers and companies respectively, they enjoy a privileged position in policymaking. The tripartite system of collaboration among the state, labor, and capital, with its historical roots in the 1930s, remains a cornerstone in public policymaking across all policy fields, not just economic matters. These organizations are resourceful and can mobilize significant expertise to serve their interests.
Influence on public policies occurs through participation in problem analysis, expert committees, and policy preparations, as well as in the consultation process before legislation is proposed, rather than through direct interaction with legislators. There is a long-standing culture of balancing cooperation and conflict between labor and capital. All governments, irrespective of ideology, listen carefully to the social partners. Government policy proposals opposed by both labor and capital will likely suffer weak support among the general public and will most likely be shelved or significantly changed.
The dominant roles of the LO and the NHO are frequently criticized by other less resourceful organizations. In particular, public sector employees are critical of the roles of these dominant organizations in the system of wage setting.
Citations:
https://www.nho.no/en/
https://www.lo.no/language/english/
https://www.nho.no/en/
https://www.lo.no/language/english/
Slovakia
The existing legislation in Slovakia provides numerous opportunities to cultivate civil society organizations (CSOs). The primary public funding source for CSOs is tax assignation, which amounts to approximately €80 million annually, supplemented by state budget allocations through competitive schemes and programs.
Major CSOs can cooperate and form alliances, although there are limitations due to their policy fields and normative orientations (Koncepcia rozvoja občianskej spoločnosti na Slovensku na roky 2021–2030, 2021). The rules for membership in the Government Council for CSOs encourage organizations to unite with similar entities to gain membership.
Public involvement in major CSOs’ activities is generally limited, with more significant support typically arising during specific crises (Analýza socioekonomického prínosu neziskového sektora a stavu a trendov rozvoja občianskej spoločnosti, 2020).
Each government in Slovakia formally supports the development of civil society organizations (CSOs) and is legally required to consult major CSOs on draft legislation. The Plenipotentiary for the Development of Civil Society, an advisory body within the Ministry of Interior, regularly prepares development concepts. Since March 10, 2022, this position has been held by Filip Vagač, a well-known CSO expert and activist. The Government Council for CSOs, established in 2012, includes state secretaries (junior ministers) from various ministries, giving the government more influence. CSOs are represented according to the Chamber of CSOs’ representative rules, but only the chair (Minister of Interior) can propose new members.
The main CSOs representing labor and capital primarily access policymaking through the tripartite mechanism – the Economic and Social Council – as well as social dialogue platforms and various advisory bodies at government and ministerial levels. This dialogue includes trade unions, business and professional organizations, CSOs, territorial and professional self-government bodies, trade and professional chambers, consumer groups, NGOs, and churches.
Trade unions and employer associations are the main non-state actors in capital and labor. The Confederation of Trade Unions (KOZ) represents 25 sectoral unions and an umbrella organization, collectively representing up to 25% of employees. The main employer association, AZZZ, represents 35 employers’ unions and associations, covering about 50% of employer organizations. Two umbrella associations represent almost all self-governments. These negotiations focus on various economic and social policy issues, primarily minimum wage rules and other labor-related matters. Many business representatives not in the Economic and Social Council are united in umbrella and coordination associations, positioning them well to provide policy proposals. Many cooperate with different think tanks. Due to leadership changes, trade unions have suffered from fragmentation but have recently improved their negotiation capacity.
Several CSOs in Slovakia possess sufficient organizational strength to formulate policies independently or engage in integrated policy formulation processes with the government. Notable players include INEKO, IVO, INESS, and Aliancia Fair Play (Analýza socioekonomického prínosu neziskového sektora a stavu a trendov rozvoja občianskej spoločnosti, 2020; Vladovič, 2008).
The practices of the Slovak governments from 2020 to 2023 (except for the short-lived Ódor government) have been problematic. Igor Matovič’s capacity to cooperate with other actors was limited (Malý and Nemec, 2023). The new government under Prime Minister Robert Fico holds a negative view of politically oriented CSOs, sometimes referring to them as foreign agents. The system of tax assignation is currently under discussion. (Správy RTVS, 4 November 2023).
Major CSOs can cooperate and form alliances, although there are limitations due to their policy fields and normative orientations (Koncepcia rozvoja občianskej spoločnosti na Slovensku na roky 2021–2030, 2021). The rules for membership in the Government Council for CSOs encourage organizations to unite with similar entities to gain membership.
Public involvement in major CSOs’ activities is generally limited, with more significant support typically arising during specific crises (Analýza socioekonomického prínosu neziskového sektora a stavu a trendov rozvoja občianskej spoločnosti, 2020).
Each government in Slovakia formally supports the development of civil society organizations (CSOs) and is legally required to consult major CSOs on draft legislation. The Plenipotentiary for the Development of Civil Society, an advisory body within the Ministry of Interior, regularly prepares development concepts. Since March 10, 2022, this position has been held by Filip Vagač, a well-known CSO expert and activist. The Government Council for CSOs, established in 2012, includes state secretaries (junior ministers) from various ministries, giving the government more influence. CSOs are represented according to the Chamber of CSOs’ representative rules, but only the chair (Minister of Interior) can propose new members.
The main CSOs representing labor and capital primarily access policymaking through the tripartite mechanism – the Economic and Social Council – as well as social dialogue platforms and various advisory bodies at government and ministerial levels. This dialogue includes trade unions, business and professional organizations, CSOs, territorial and professional self-government bodies, trade and professional chambers, consumer groups, NGOs, and churches.
Trade unions and employer associations are the main non-state actors in capital and labor. The Confederation of Trade Unions (KOZ) represents 25 sectoral unions and an umbrella organization, collectively representing up to 25% of employees. The main employer association, AZZZ, represents 35 employers’ unions and associations, covering about 50% of employer organizations. Two umbrella associations represent almost all self-governments. These negotiations focus on various economic and social policy issues, primarily minimum wage rules and other labor-related matters. Many business representatives not in the Economic and Social Council are united in umbrella and coordination associations, positioning them well to provide policy proposals. Many cooperate with different think tanks. Due to leadership changes, trade unions have suffered from fragmentation but have recently improved their negotiation capacity.
Several CSOs in Slovakia possess sufficient organizational strength to formulate policies independently or engage in integrated policy formulation processes with the government. Notable players include INEKO, IVO, INESS, and Aliancia Fair Play (Analýza socioekonomického prínosu neziskového sektora a stavu a trendov rozvoja občianskej spoločnosti, 2020; Vladovič, 2008).
The practices of the Slovak governments from 2020 to 2023 (except for the short-lived Ódor government) have been problematic. Igor Matovič’s capacity to cooperate with other actors was limited (Malý and Nemec, 2023). The new government under Prime Minister Robert Fico holds a negative view of politically oriented CSOs, sometimes referring to them as foreign agents. The system of tax assignation is currently under discussion. (Správy RTVS, 4 November 2023).
Citations:
OECD and AIAS. 2021. Slovak Republic. Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State.
Intervention and Social Pacts. OECD Publishing, Paris. https://www.oecd.org/employment/collective-bargaining-database-slovakrepublic.pdf
Zákon 595/2003 o dani s príjmov. https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2003/595/20170201#paragraf-50
Zákon 523/2004 o rozpočtových pravidlách verejnej správy. https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2004/523/
Zákon 583/2004 o rozpočtových pravidlách územnej samosprávy. https://www.epi.sk/zz/2004-583
Legislatívne pravidlá vlády. https://www.vlada.gov.sk/share/RVLP/lpv_sr-14122022.pdf?csrt=411327310783031006
Vladovič, M. 2008. “Think tanky a ich vplyv na politický systém.” Slovenská politologická revue 3 (7): 95-122.
Koncepcia rozvoja občianskej spoločnosti na Slovensku na roky 2021 – 2030. 2021. Bratislava: Úrad splnomocnenca vlády SR pre rozvoj občianskej spoločnosti
Analýza socioekonomického prínosu neziskového sektora a stavu a trendov rozvoja občianskej spoločnosti. 2020. Bratislava: Úrad splnomocnenca vlády SR pre rozvoj občianskej spoločnosti.
Malý, I., and Nemec, J. 2023. “‘Non-Standard’ Political Parties and The Capacity to Govern in Turbulent Times: Slovakia 2020-2022.” Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences Special issue: 101-117.
Správy RTVS. 2023. “Robert Fico avizuje nový zákon: Mimovládne organizácie by boli označené ako zahraniční agenti. Môže to pomôcť proti dezinformáciám.” https://spravy.rtvs.sk/2023/11/robert-fico-avizoval-novy-zakon-mimovladne-organi-zacie-by-boli-oznacovane-ako-zahranicny-agent/
OECD and AIAS. 2021. Slovak Republic. Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State.
Intervention and Social Pacts. OECD Publishing, Paris. https://www.oecd.org/employment/collective-bargaining-database-slovakrepublic.pdf
Zákon 595/2003 o dani s príjmov. https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2003/595/20170201#paragraf-50
Zákon 523/2004 o rozpočtových pravidlách verejnej správy. https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2004/523/
Zákon 583/2004 o rozpočtových pravidlách územnej samosprávy. https://www.epi.sk/zz/2004-583
Legislatívne pravidlá vlády. https://www.vlada.gov.sk/share/RVLP/lpv_sr-14122022.pdf?csrt=411327310783031006
Vladovič, M. 2008. “Think tanky a ich vplyv na politický systém.” Slovenská politologická revue 3 (7): 95-122.
Koncepcia rozvoja občianskej spoločnosti na Slovensku na roky 2021 – 2030. 2021. Bratislava: Úrad splnomocnenca vlády SR pre rozvoj občianskej spoločnosti
Analýza socioekonomického prínosu neziskového sektora a stavu a trendov rozvoja občianskej spoločnosti. 2020. Bratislava: Úrad splnomocnenca vlády SR pre rozvoj občianskej spoločnosti.
Malý, I., and Nemec, J. 2023. “‘Non-Standard’ Political Parties and The Capacity to Govern in Turbulent Times: Slovakia 2020-2022.” Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences Special issue: 101-117.
Správy RTVS. 2023. “Robert Fico avizuje nový zákon: Mimovládne organizácie by boli označené ako zahraniční agenti. Môže to pomôcť proti dezinformáciám.” https://spravy.rtvs.sk/2023/11/robert-fico-avizoval-novy-zakon-mimovladne-organi-zacie-by-boli-oznacovane-ako-zahranicny-agent/
Netherlands
The Netherlands reaches agreement on socioeconomic policy through consultation. This happens at different levels. In companies, the works council consults with management. At the branch level, trade unions negotiate collective bargaining agreements with employers’ organizations. At national level, there are the Social and Economic Council (SER) and the Labor Foundation. All these forms of consultation constitute long-standing parts of the Dutch consultation economy.
At the national level, the SER) is an advisory body in which entrepreneurs, employees and independent experts (“crown members”) work together to reach agreement on important socioeconomic issues. The SER is tasked with promoting entrepreneurship, decent work, sustainable growth and an inclusive society with a balanced income distribution. The SER advises the government and parliament on major issues of socioeconomic policy. The SER also facilitates agreements and covenants. Examples are the establishment of the Energy Agreement (2013) and its successor, the Climate Agreement (2019); the (unsuccessful) Agriculture Agreement (2023); and various covenants for international corporate social responsibility.
At the sectoral level, trade unions in the Netherlands have a major role in negotiating with employers over working conditions and wages. In collective bargaining agreements (CAOs) – of which there are over 600 – unions agree on behalf of workers how much their salaries will rise. Apart from these, CAOs also pay attention to labor scarcity, workers’ distance to the labor market, hybrid working conditions, climate and sustainability issues, welfare functions, and specific types of leave. Union members can then vote on whether they approve of a negotiated settlement. If approved, a collective bargaining agreement applies both to members and nonmembers of a union. By 1 January 2023, 667 CAOs had been negotiated, covering 5.9 million workers.
Fifteen years ago, 1.9 million Dutch people were members of a trade union. That figure has now fallen to only 1.4 million. Moreover, a considerable portion of today’s union members are already retired. Although membership fees are partly paid for by employers (the “vakbondstientje,” as a small percentage of wages) and are partly tax deductible, younger people frequently do not even consider membership. This trend raises the issue of how representative trade unions can be now that their membership ranks are eroding significantly. The size of a union’s strike fund determines the scope of its power. Apart from membership fees, trade unions have paradoxically become dependent on obligatory and voluntary employers’ contributions through so-called social funds. Unions are not very transparent about where their resources come from. It is estimated that in 2019, the largest trade unions depended on employers’ contributions for only about 22% of their revenues. The small Alternative for Trade Union (AVV), with some 1,400 members, was found to lean almost entirely (96%) on employer contributions.
Experts believe it is time to fundamentally rethink the system of collective labor relations, unions and their financing. Declines in membership figures not only make unions less representative, but also limits their effectiveness. De Unie is already experimenting with a different collective bargaining agreement model; in collaboration with a research institute specialized in surveys and consultative procedures, major themes and needs of a representative sample of all workers in a particular industrial sector are mapped, and the results inform the negotiation strategy. In this way, there appears to be a solution for sectors and companies in which there are few union members but both parties would like to enter into a collective bargaining agreement. Employers may come to prefer dealing with smaller unions. And smaller unions may enter into collective bargaining agreements to bring in money for their members rather than because they think it’s a good agreement for all workers.
At the national level, the SER) is an advisory body in which entrepreneurs, employees and independent experts (“crown members”) work together to reach agreement on important socioeconomic issues. The SER is tasked with promoting entrepreneurship, decent work, sustainable growth and an inclusive society with a balanced income distribution. The SER advises the government and parliament on major issues of socioeconomic policy. The SER also facilitates agreements and covenants. Examples are the establishment of the Energy Agreement (2013) and its successor, the Climate Agreement (2019); the (unsuccessful) Agriculture Agreement (2023); and various covenants for international corporate social responsibility.
At the sectoral level, trade unions in the Netherlands have a major role in negotiating with employers over working conditions and wages. In collective bargaining agreements (CAOs) – of which there are over 600 – unions agree on behalf of workers how much their salaries will rise. Apart from these, CAOs also pay attention to labor scarcity, workers’ distance to the labor market, hybrid working conditions, climate and sustainability issues, welfare functions, and specific types of leave. Union members can then vote on whether they approve of a negotiated settlement. If approved, a collective bargaining agreement applies both to members and nonmembers of a union. By 1 January 2023, 667 CAOs had been negotiated, covering 5.9 million workers.
Fifteen years ago, 1.9 million Dutch people were members of a trade union. That figure has now fallen to only 1.4 million. Moreover, a considerable portion of today’s union members are already retired. Although membership fees are partly paid for by employers (the “vakbondstientje,” as a small percentage of wages) and are partly tax deductible, younger people frequently do not even consider membership. This trend raises the issue of how representative trade unions can be now that their membership ranks are eroding significantly. The size of a union’s strike fund determines the scope of its power. Apart from membership fees, trade unions have paradoxically become dependent on obligatory and voluntary employers’ contributions through so-called social funds. Unions are not very transparent about where their resources come from. It is estimated that in 2019, the largest trade unions depended on employers’ contributions for only about 22% of their revenues. The small Alternative for Trade Union (AVV), with some 1,400 members, was found to lean almost entirely (96%) on employer contributions.
Experts believe it is time to fundamentally rethink the system of collective labor relations, unions and their financing. Declines in membership figures not only make unions less representative, but also limits their effectiveness. De Unie is already experimenting with a different collective bargaining agreement model; in collaboration with a research institute specialized in surveys and consultative procedures, major themes and needs of a representative sample of all workers in a particular industrial sector are mapped, and the results inform the negotiation strategy. In this way, there appears to be a solution for sectors and companies in which there are few union members but both parties would like to enter into a collective bargaining agreement. Employers may come to prefer dealing with smaller unions. And smaller unions may enter into collective bargaining agreements to bring in money for their members rather than because they think it’s a good agreement for all workers.
Citations:
ser.nl, Wat is de SER?
Wikipedia. “Boerenprotesten tegen stikstofbeleid. Protestacties vanaf 2019 tegen stikstofbeleid van de Nederlandse overheid.” https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boerenprotesten_tegen_stikstofbeleid
Wikipedia. n.d. “Energieakkoord voor duurzame groei.”
Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid. 2023. “Cao-afspraken 2023.”
Rouffaer, FTM, and Claessens. 2023. “Vakbond De Unie morrelt aan de fundamenten van het poldermodel.” 25 November.
www.unie.nl, 24 March 2023. Mearsk: Start DigiC traject - De Unie
ser.nl, Wat is de SER?
Wikipedia. “Boerenprotesten tegen stikstofbeleid. Protestacties vanaf 2019 tegen stikstofbeleid van de Nederlandse overheid.” https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boerenprotesten_tegen_stikstofbeleid
Wikipedia. n.d. “Energieakkoord voor duurzame groei.”
Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid. 2023. “Cao-afspraken 2023.”
Rouffaer, FTM, and Claessens. 2023. “Vakbond De Unie morrelt aan de fundamenten van het poldermodel.” 25 November.
www.unie.nl, 24 March 2023. Mearsk: Start DigiC traject - De Unie
7
Estonia
According to the constitution, everyone is free to belong to unions and federations of employees and employers. The conditions and procedures for resolving labor disputes and exercising the right to strike are provided by law. Legislation facilitates union membership through tax deductions from membership fees; otherwise, trade unions and employers’ organizations must be self-financing.
The Estonian Trade Union Confederation (EALK) comprises 15 branch unions and represents employees’ interests in collective-bargaining agreements, protecting their rights in labor relations. Due to the country’s communist past and current liberal market economy, the popularity of trade unions is low. Union density is 6%, and about the same share of employees is covered by collective bargaining agreements. These agreements are predominantly made at the company level; in some areas – as is the case for teachers and healthcare workers – they are made at the branch level. Compared to many Western European countries, the policy-formulation capacity of trade unions is relatively weak. The EALK head office includes a secretariat that prepares various documents, including draft law proposals, and organizes cooperation between members. However, it lacks a dedicated research or analysis unit responsible for preparing specific policy proposals.
Limited financial resources restrict the ability to commission external policy analyses from universities or private think tanks. Typically, trade unions are invited to contribute to policymaking processes initiated by the government. In recent years, EU initiatives on regulating statutory minimum wage, platform work, working from home, and work and leisure time have significantly shaped the domestic social dialogue agenda.
The Estonian Employers’ Confederation (ETKL) is more influential. It includes more than 2,000 companies and 50% of employers, and is more active in shaping policies. ETKL has working groups that prepare the organization’s platform for each public policy area. For every parliamentary election, ETKL publishes an “Employers’ Manifesto” with strategic proposals for policymakers.
Despite some progress, social dialogue in Estonia remains rather fragile. There is no permanent tripartite council, and the representatives of social partners on the tripartite Unemployment Insurance Board and Health Insurance Board are often overruled by the government (Toots 2022). The most stable achievement of tripartism has been the enactment of the statutory minimum wage as part of the State Budget Act.
The Estonian Trade Union Confederation (EALK) comprises 15 branch unions and represents employees’ interests in collective-bargaining agreements, protecting their rights in labor relations. Due to the country’s communist past and current liberal market economy, the popularity of trade unions is low. Union density is 6%, and about the same share of employees is covered by collective bargaining agreements. These agreements are predominantly made at the company level; in some areas – as is the case for teachers and healthcare workers – they are made at the branch level. Compared to many Western European countries, the policy-formulation capacity of trade unions is relatively weak. The EALK head office includes a secretariat that prepares various documents, including draft law proposals, and organizes cooperation between members. However, it lacks a dedicated research or analysis unit responsible for preparing specific policy proposals.
Limited financial resources restrict the ability to commission external policy analyses from universities or private think tanks. Typically, trade unions are invited to contribute to policymaking processes initiated by the government. In recent years, EU initiatives on regulating statutory minimum wage, platform work, working from home, and work and leisure time have significantly shaped the domestic social dialogue agenda.
The Estonian Employers’ Confederation (ETKL) is more influential. It includes more than 2,000 companies and 50% of employers, and is more active in shaping policies. ETKL has working groups that prepare the organization’s platform for each public policy area. For every parliamentary election, ETKL publishes an “Employers’ Manifesto” with strategic proposals for policymakers.
Despite some progress, social dialogue in Estonia remains rather fragile. There is no permanent tripartite council, and the representatives of social partners on the tripartite Unemployment Insurance Board and Health Insurance Board are often overruled by the government (Toots 2022). The most stable achievement of tripartism has been the enactment of the statutory minimum wage as part of the State Budget Act.
Citations:
OECD/AIAS ICTWSS database. Main indicators and characteristics of
collective bargaining. Estonia. https://www.oecd.org/employment/collective-bargaining-database-Estonia.pdf
ETKL. 2022. “Employers’ Manifesto 2022. ‘Time to be ahead of the time’.” https://employers.ee/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2023/11/The-Employers-Manifesto-2022.docx.pdf
Toots, Anu. 2022. “Social Governance Reforms in a Quasi-Bismarckian Welfare State: How Estonia Moved from Tripartism to Etatisation.” Studies of Transition States and Societies 14 (1): 37-55.
OECD/AIAS ICTWSS database. Main indicators and characteristics of
collective bargaining. Estonia. https://www.oecd.org/employment/collective-bargaining-database-Estonia.pdf
ETKL. 2022. “Employers’ Manifesto 2022. ‘Time to be ahead of the time’.” https://employers.ee/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2023/11/The-Employers-Manifesto-2022.docx.pdf
Toots, Anu. 2022. “Social Governance Reforms in a Quasi-Bismarckian Welfare State: How Estonia Moved from Tripartism to Etatisation.” Studies of Transition States and Societies 14 (1): 37-55.
Ireland
Most Irish CSOs exert pressure on the legislature and government through pressure politics or pluralism. Some, however, are better integrated into the policy formulation process via quasi or neo-corporatism or social partnership, which is the Irish term for social dialogue (O’Donnell 2021). While few CSOs leverage their own academic staff or think tanks, or engage in collaborative efforts with academic institutions, many employ a research or policy officer (McInerney 2021). In the 1990s and 2000s, processes involving capital and labor in Ireland also opened up, to a lesser extent, to agricultural, community and voluntary and environmental pillars.
The Irish 1937 constitution has a corporatist orientation, but collective bargaining is not facilitated through legislation. The OECD/AIAS ICTWSS database records no recent social pacts in Ireland. Some policies have facilitated the cultivation of CSOs, such as public funding and making union membership dues tax-deductible. Major CSOs, representing capital and labor, have the organizational strength of peak organizations (ICTU and IBEC). They utilize financial resources, policy experts and connections to other think tanks to independently formulate policies and participate in integrated policy formulation processes with the government, such as pre-budget and policy consultations and national economic dialogue. These major CSOs are cooperative and capable of forming alliances, acting both as confederations and in siloed ways. The general population typically participates in and supports major CSO activity through volunteering, social, sporting and charitable activities, with less involvement in sectoral influencing or political activity (Murphy and O’Connor 2021).
The concept of a “social partnership” was a feature of Irish politics and policymaking from 1986 to 2010, during which successive governments prioritized sectors such as unions, business, farming and community, voluntary and environmental organizations (O’Donnell 2021). This was associated with the developmental characteristics of the Irish state and an “innovative form of networked governance.” In 2010, it was replaced by a relatively weak process of social dialogue. Despite this, a consensus-oriented culture remains among many societal actors. Although attempts to renew social partnership in 2022 have not progressed, some CSOs remain close to and have access to policy-influencing processes and institutions. There is considerable ambiguity regarding whether the government feels obliged to respond to the policy proposals put forward.
McGinnity et al. (2021) have shown that trade union and staff association membership in Ireland is lower than in comparable countries and has issues with effectiveness. While the right to join a trade union is recognized under international treaties and protected under the Irish constitution, it appears this right may not be fully realized for all workers. OECD data indicates that unemployment benefits in Ireland are comparably poor, being the third lowest in the OECD when measured by the share of previous income (OECD 2024), increasing the risk of poverty and deprivation when out of work.
The Irish 1937 constitution has a corporatist orientation, but collective bargaining is not facilitated through legislation. The OECD/AIAS ICTWSS database records no recent social pacts in Ireland. Some policies have facilitated the cultivation of CSOs, such as public funding and making union membership dues tax-deductible. Major CSOs, representing capital and labor, have the organizational strength of peak organizations (ICTU and IBEC). They utilize financial resources, policy experts and connections to other think tanks to independently formulate policies and participate in integrated policy formulation processes with the government, such as pre-budget and policy consultations and national economic dialogue. These major CSOs are cooperative and capable of forming alliances, acting both as confederations and in siloed ways. The general population typically participates in and supports major CSO activity through volunteering, social, sporting and charitable activities, with less involvement in sectoral influencing or political activity (Murphy and O’Connor 2021).
The concept of a “social partnership” was a feature of Irish politics and policymaking from 1986 to 2010, during which successive governments prioritized sectors such as unions, business, farming and community, voluntary and environmental organizations (O’Donnell 2021). This was associated with the developmental characteristics of the Irish state and an “innovative form of networked governance.” In 2010, it was replaced by a relatively weak process of social dialogue. Despite this, a consensus-oriented culture remains among many societal actors. Although attempts to renew social partnership in 2022 have not progressed, some CSOs remain close to and have access to policy-influencing processes and institutions. There is considerable ambiguity regarding whether the government feels obliged to respond to the policy proposals put forward.
McGinnity et al. (2021) have shown that trade union and staff association membership in Ireland is lower than in comparable countries and has issues with effectiveness. While the right to join a trade union is recognized under international treaties and protected under the Irish constitution, it appears this right may not be fully realized for all workers. OECD data indicates that unemployment benefits in Ireland are comparably poor, being the third lowest in the OECD when measured by the share of previous income (OECD 2024), increasing the risk of poverty and deprivation when out of work.
Citations:
OECD. 2023. “AIAS ICTWSS Database.” https://www.oecd.org/employment/ictwss-database.htm
World Justice Project. 2023. “WJP 2023 Rule of Law Index | Ireland Insights.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/downloads/WJPInsights2023.pdf
O’Donnell, R. 2021. The Social Partners and the NESC: From Tripartite Dialogue via Common Knowledge Events to Network Knowledge. Bristol: Policy Press.
McGinnity, F., H. Russell, I. Privalko, and S. Enright. 2021. Monitoring Decent Work in Ireland. Dublin: ESRI and Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission (IHREC). https://doi.org/10.26504/bkmnext414
McInerney, C. 2021. “Think Tanks and their Role in Policy Making in Ireland.” In Policy Analysis in Ireland, eds. J. Hogan and M. P. Murphy, 157-170. Bristol: Policy Press.
Murphy, M. P., and O’Connor, O. 2021. “Civil Society Organisations and Policy Analysis.” In Policy Analysis in Ireland, eds. J. Hogan and M. P. Murphy, 171-186. Bristol: Policy Press.
IHREC. 2023. “Collective Bargaining and the Irish Constitution - Barrier or Facilitator.” https://www.ihrec.ie/documents/collective-bargaining-and-the-irish-constitution-barrier-or-facilitator/
OECD. 2023. “AIAS ICTWSS Database.” https://www.oecd.org/employment/ictwss-database.htm
World Justice Project. 2023. “WJP 2023 Rule of Law Index | Ireland Insights.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/downloads/WJPInsights2023.pdf
O’Donnell, R. 2021. The Social Partners and the NESC: From Tripartite Dialogue via Common Knowledge Events to Network Knowledge. Bristol: Policy Press.
McGinnity, F., H. Russell, I. Privalko, and S. Enright. 2021. Monitoring Decent Work in Ireland. Dublin: ESRI and Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission (IHREC). https://doi.org/10.26504/bkmnext414
McInerney, C. 2021. “Think Tanks and their Role in Policy Making in Ireland.” In Policy Analysis in Ireland, eds. J. Hogan and M. P. Murphy, 157-170. Bristol: Policy Press.
Murphy, M. P., and O’Connor, O. 2021. “Civil Society Organisations and Policy Analysis.” In Policy Analysis in Ireland, eds. J. Hogan and M. P. Murphy, 171-186. Bristol: Policy Press.
IHREC. 2023. “Collective Bargaining and the Irish Constitution - Barrier or Facilitator.” https://www.ihrec.ie/documents/collective-bargaining-and-the-irish-constitution-barrier-or-facilitator/
Japan
Japanese law protects citizens’ rights to form a union and engage in collective bargaining. The Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengô), which has about seven million members, is an umbrella organization that represents trade unions in the public and private sectors. It is the most important organization on the labor side and traditionally an integral part of labor policymaking, sending members to ministerial advisory councils (shingikai) and being invited by the government to join policy debates on the cabinet level. Traditionally, Rengô has supported opposition parties and was increasingly sidelined under LDP-led governments until 2012. Since then, ties to the ruling LDP have somewhat intensified. In 2017, Rengô initially agreed to negotiate a reform of overtime regulations with employers and the government, but eventually withdrew its support following protests from its members. Trade unions failed to raise real wages for almost three decades. However, labor shortages and inflation helped trade unions push through unusually high raises in collective bargaining in 2023.
The Japanese political system has been known for granting large corporations organized in the Japan Business Federation (Nippon Keidanren), the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, as well as the Japan Association of Corporate Executives privileged access to and influence on policymaking. Many large corporations maintain their own think tanks, such as the Mitsubishi Research Institute, and issue their own regulatory and policy reform proposals. While the aims of different industry sectors are not always coherent, they are often reflected in the policies of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. Keidanren and member firms also enjoy a strong presence in advisory councils – especially on economic policy – while trade unions are not necessarily represented.
The Japanese political system has been known for granting large corporations organized in the Japan Business Federation (Nippon Keidanren), the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, as well as the Japan Association of Corporate Executives privileged access to and influence on policymaking. Many large corporations maintain their own think tanks, such as the Mitsubishi Research Institute, and issue their own regulatory and policy reform proposals. While the aims of different industry sectors are not always coherent, they are often reflected in the policies of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. Keidanren and member firms also enjoy a strong presence in advisory councils – especially on economic policy – while trade unions are not necessarily represented.
Citations:
“After decades of stagnation, wages are finally rising in Japan.” The Economist, April 13. https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2023/04/13/after-decades-of-stagnation-wages-in-japan-are-finally-rising
“LDP aims to bolster ties with Japan’s largest trade union.” The Japan Times, April 25. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/04/25/national/politics-diplomacy/ldp-aim-bolster-ties-rengo/
OECD. 2021. “Main Indicators and Characteristics of Collective Bargaining.” https://www.oecd.org/employment/collective-bargaining-database-japan.pdf
“After decades of stagnation, wages are finally rising in Japan.” The Economist, April 13. https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2023/04/13/after-decades-of-stagnation-wages-in-japan-are-finally-rising
“LDP aims to bolster ties with Japan’s largest trade union.” The Japan Times, April 25. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/04/25/national/politics-diplomacy/ldp-aim-bolster-ties-rengo/
OECD. 2021. “Main Indicators and Characteristics of Collective Bargaining.” https://www.oecd.org/employment/collective-bargaining-database-japan.pdf
New Zealand
When mapping the landscape of civil society organizations involved in capital and labor issues, one cannot help but note that political power is tilted in favor of business interests at the expense of organized labor (Nicholls 2021).
Historically, New Zealand had a strong trade union sector, because a union voice in politics was institutionally mandated under the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act. However, the neoliberal market-oriented reforms of the 1980s and 1990s severely undercut the role of trade unions. Most importantly, the Employment Contracts Act 1991 deregulated labor markets and turned all collective contracts into individual contracts between an individual employee and their employer. As a result of these institutional reforms, trade union density dropped below 18% according to 2018 figures (OECD 2021). Today, the three largest trade unions all represent public sector workers: the Public Service Association, the NZ Nurses Organization and the New Zealand Educational Institute (New Zealand Companies Office 2022). The New Zealand Council of Trade Unions acts as the umbrella organization for around 40 affiliated unions. Only a few unions continue to be formally affiliated with the Labour Party, the largest being the Engineering, Printing and Manufacturing Union (EPMU) (Aimer 2015). In 2022, the Labour government under Ardern passed the Fair Pay Act, which would have strengthened trade unions by allowing sector-wide collective employment negotiations, but this was repealed after the 2023 election by the new National Party government.
The rise in business influence relative to organized labor can also be attributed to new patterns of business lobbying (Nicholls 2021). In 1986, a new lobby group known as the Business Roundtable was established. The group distinguished itself from previous business member-based organizations in that its primary goal was not to represent business owners in wage negotiations or other matters of employment relations but to advocate policy interests. In 2012, the Business Roundtable merged with the New Zealand Institute to form the New Zealand Initiative (NZI), which today operates more as a think tank than an interest group, mobilizing support for pro-market economic and social policies.
In short, the application of free-market imperatives meant that trade unions lost their political influence during the 1980s and 1990s, although their connection with the Labour Party means they have some influence when Labour is in government. Meanwhile, the retention and extension of the neoliberal policy regime – both under Labour and National governments – suggests that “it has been big business and financial lobbies that have gained insider status and influence in the political realm” (Grey 2015: 464). That said, there are a number of CSOs and the Human Rights Commission that champion issues of equal pay, pay transparency and the need to close the ethnic gender pay gap (Beehive 2023; HRC, 2021).
Historically, New Zealand had a strong trade union sector, because a union voice in politics was institutionally mandated under the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act. However, the neoliberal market-oriented reforms of the 1980s and 1990s severely undercut the role of trade unions. Most importantly, the Employment Contracts Act 1991 deregulated labor markets and turned all collective contracts into individual contracts between an individual employee and their employer. As a result of these institutional reforms, trade union density dropped below 18% according to 2018 figures (OECD 2021). Today, the three largest trade unions all represent public sector workers: the Public Service Association, the NZ Nurses Organization and the New Zealand Educational Institute (New Zealand Companies Office 2022). The New Zealand Council of Trade Unions acts as the umbrella organization for around 40 affiliated unions. Only a few unions continue to be formally affiliated with the Labour Party, the largest being the Engineering, Printing and Manufacturing Union (EPMU) (Aimer 2015). In 2022, the Labour government under Ardern passed the Fair Pay Act, which would have strengthened trade unions by allowing sector-wide collective employment negotiations, but this was repealed after the 2023 election by the new National Party government.
The rise in business influence relative to organized labor can also be attributed to new patterns of business lobbying (Nicholls 2021). In 1986, a new lobby group known as the Business Roundtable was established. The group distinguished itself from previous business member-based organizations in that its primary goal was not to represent business owners in wage negotiations or other matters of employment relations but to advocate policy interests. In 2012, the Business Roundtable merged with the New Zealand Institute to form the New Zealand Initiative (NZI), which today operates more as a think tank than an interest group, mobilizing support for pro-market economic and social policies.
In short, the application of free-market imperatives meant that trade unions lost their political influence during the 1980s and 1990s, although their connection with the Labour Party means they have some influence when Labour is in government. Meanwhile, the retention and extension of the neoliberal policy regime – both under Labour and National governments – suggests that “it has been big business and financial lobbies that have gained insider status and influence in the political realm” (Grey 2015: 464). That said, there are a number of CSOs and the Human Rights Commission that champion issues of equal pay, pay transparency and the need to close the ethnic gender pay gap (Beehive 2023; HRC, 2021).
Citations:
Aimer, P. 2015. “The Labour Party.” In J. Hayward, ed. Government and Politics in Aotearoa New Zealand. 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Beehive. 2023. “Government Acts to Close Gender Pay Gap.” https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/government-acts-close-gender-pay-gap
Grey, S. 2015. “Interest Groups and Policy.” In J. Hayward, ed. Government and Politics in Aotearoa New Zealand. 6th edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
HRC. 2021. “Human Rights Commission Inquiry into the Pacific Pay Gap.”
New Zealand Companies Office. 2022. “Union Membership Return Report.” https://www.companiesoffice.govt.nz/all-registers/registered-unions/annual-return-membership-reports/
Nicholls, K. 2021. “Interest Groups and Lobbying.” In Government and Politics in Aotearoa New Zealand, 7th ed., ed. J. Hayward. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Aimer, P. 2015. “The Labour Party.” In J. Hayward, ed. Government and Politics in Aotearoa New Zealand. 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Beehive. 2023. “Government Acts to Close Gender Pay Gap.” https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/government-acts-close-gender-pay-gap
Grey, S. 2015. “Interest Groups and Policy.” In J. Hayward, ed. Government and Politics in Aotearoa New Zealand. 6th edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
HRC. 2021. “Human Rights Commission Inquiry into the Pacific Pay Gap.”
New Zealand Companies Office. 2022. “Union Membership Return Report.” https://www.companiesoffice.govt.nz/all-registers/registered-unions/annual-return-membership-reports/
Nicholls, K. 2021. “Interest Groups and Lobbying.” In Government and Politics in Aotearoa New Zealand, 7th ed., ed. J. Hayward. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Spain
The Spanish constitution mandates trade unions and employers’ associations to advocate for and safeguard the economic interests of workers and employers. It establishes a model of neo-corporatism, authorizing these organizations to represent workers in collective bargaining and participate in mandatory preliminary conciliation procedures before presenting disputes to government conciliation agencies. Although trade union density is low (18%), Spain’s biggest trade unions (UGT and CCOO) and employers’ associations have the organizational strength to independently formulate policies to which the government responds. Both main trade unions tend to collaborate and defend common platforms. According to the OECD, employer organization density is higher (88%). However, governments may proceed with policies even without CSO support in the absence of agreement.
During the review period, the government actively engaged in dialogue with UGT, CCOO, and employers’ associations, signing several agreements, including one on raising the minimum wage. Numerous meetings were convened to discuss policy proposals. The 2023 labor market reform strengthened trade unions by amplifying the significance of indefinite contracts.
Post-COVID-19, the government, trade unions, and employers’ associations met within the Social Dialogue Board for Recovery, Transformation, and Resilience (2021–2026), serving as a channel for dialogue on the RRP’s design and implementation. Membership dues for professional associations, business associations, official chambers, and trade unions are tax-deductible.
Due to the prevalence of self-employed workers and small businesses, trade unions play a lesser role than in countries with significant industrial sectors. From January to September 2023, 588 strikes occurred, involving 210,410 workers, marking an increase compared to 2022. However, the number of days lost to strikes has been below the EU average in recent years. Trade unions have been successful in mobilizing and collective bargaining.
During the review period, the government actively engaged in dialogue with UGT, CCOO, and employers’ associations, signing several agreements, including one on raising the minimum wage. Numerous meetings were convened to discuss policy proposals. The 2023 labor market reform strengthened trade unions by amplifying the significance of indefinite contracts.
Post-COVID-19, the government, trade unions, and employers’ associations met within the Social Dialogue Board for Recovery, Transformation, and Resilience (2021–2026), serving as a channel for dialogue on the RRP’s design and implementation. Membership dues for professional associations, business associations, official chambers, and trade unions are tax-deductible.
Due to the prevalence of self-employed workers and small businesses, trade unions play a lesser role than in countries with significant industrial sectors. From January to September 2023, 588 strikes occurred, involving 210,410 workers, marking an increase compared to 2022. However, the number of days lost to strikes has been below the EU average in recent years. Trade unions have been successful in mobilizing and collective bargaining.
6
Australia
The formal rules of the Australian political economy permit CSOs to build strength through membership and fundraising, using those resources to shape public policies. Individuals’ registration and membership fees, and contributions to political parties and other CSOs, can be tax-deductible, incentivizing individuals to join and be active. Membership and activity levels fluctuate depending on the political agenda.
The political and policy influence of particular CSOs is highly dependent on the government’s identity and who it chooses to listen to. Parliamentary processes, such as inquiries during the lawmaking process, have become important forums for CSO access and influence. The most influential CSOs can receive attention from decision-makers through contacts in the executive branch and party structures.
The record of CSO influence across major policy areas is mixed. For example, there is evidence of government consultation with CSOs in the integrity domain in crafting recent laws to create a federal anti-corruption commission. Government officials exchanged ideas with academic researchers, anti-corruption policy experts, journalists, and industry professionals at the 2023 National Integrity Summit hosted by Transparency International (Attorney-General’s Department 2023).
However, the influence of CSOs in the contentious domains of asylum and immigration has been more muted, with both major political parties taking a hard line on these matters. Recently, the High Court struck down the law that allowed Australian governments to indefinitely detain immigrants who remained in Australia without a visa and could not be deported (Ghezelbash and Talbot 2023). Following this, the government swiftly introduced new legislation allowing for the detention of individuals deemed to be at “high risk” of committing serious offenses, imposing a test on non-citizens not applied to Australian citizens.
Regarding labor relations, trade unions have a long history of activism in Australian politics, policy, and society. However, their influence has waned as their membership base has continued to shrink over several decades (McAlpine and Roberts 2017). Factors contributing to this trend include changes in the economy’s structure, such as the decline of the manufacturing sector, and changes to industrial relations laws reducing unions’ capacity to recruit members and take workplace action. Notably, collective agreements reached by employers and unions apply to both union members and non-members, creating a free-rider problem where non-members benefit from union bargaining without incurring costs.
The political and policy influence of particular CSOs is highly dependent on the government’s identity and who it chooses to listen to. Parliamentary processes, such as inquiries during the lawmaking process, have become important forums for CSO access and influence. The most influential CSOs can receive attention from decision-makers through contacts in the executive branch and party structures.
The record of CSO influence across major policy areas is mixed. For example, there is evidence of government consultation with CSOs in the integrity domain in crafting recent laws to create a federal anti-corruption commission. Government officials exchanged ideas with academic researchers, anti-corruption policy experts, journalists, and industry professionals at the 2023 National Integrity Summit hosted by Transparency International (Attorney-General’s Department 2023).
However, the influence of CSOs in the contentious domains of asylum and immigration has been more muted, with both major political parties taking a hard line on these matters. Recently, the High Court struck down the law that allowed Australian governments to indefinitely detain immigrants who remained in Australia without a visa and could not be deported (Ghezelbash and Talbot 2023). Following this, the government swiftly introduced new legislation allowing for the detention of individuals deemed to be at “high risk” of committing serious offenses, imposing a test on non-citizens not applied to Australian citizens.
Regarding labor relations, trade unions have a long history of activism in Australian politics, policy, and society. However, their influence has waned as their membership base has continued to shrink over several decades (McAlpine and Roberts 2017). Factors contributing to this trend include changes in the economy’s structure, such as the decline of the manufacturing sector, and changes to industrial relations laws reducing unions’ capacity to recruit members and take workplace action. Notably, collective agreements reached by employers and unions apply to both union members and non-members, creating a free-rider problem where non-members benefit from union bargaining without incurring costs.
Citations:
Attorney-General’s Department. 2023. “The National Integrity Summit 2023.” https://www.counterfraud.gov.au/news/general-news/national-integrity-summit-2023
Ghezelbash, D., and A. Talbot. 2023. “High Court Reasons on Immigration Ruling Pave Way for Further Legislation.” The Conversation November 28. https://theconversation.com/high-court-reasons-on-immigration-ruling-pave-way-for-further-legislation-218699
Peterie, M., and Nethery, A. 2023. “What is the government’s preventative detention bill? Here’s how the laws will work and what htey mean for Australia’s detention system.” The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-governments-preventative-detention-bill-heres-how-the-laws-will-work-and-what-they-mean-for-australias-detention-system-219226
McAlpine, K., and Roberts, S. 2017. The Future of Trade Unions in Australia. Australian Institute of Employment Rights. https://www.aierights.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Future-of-unions.pdf
Attorney-General’s Department. 2023. “The National Integrity Summit 2023.” https://www.counterfraud.gov.au/news/general-news/national-integrity-summit-2023
Ghezelbash, D., and A. Talbot. 2023. “High Court Reasons on Immigration Ruling Pave Way for Further Legislation.” The Conversation November 28. https://theconversation.com/high-court-reasons-on-immigration-ruling-pave-way-for-further-legislation-218699
Peterie, M., and Nethery, A. 2023. “What is the government’s preventative detention bill? Here’s how the laws will work and what htey mean for Australia’s detention system.” The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-governments-preventative-detention-bill-heres-how-the-laws-will-work-and-what-they-mean-for-australias-detention-system-219226
McAlpine, K., and Roberts, S. 2017. The Future of Trade Unions in Australia. Australian Institute of Employment Rights. https://www.aierights.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Future-of-unions.pdf
Canada
Canada has a free associational system with very limited direct funding for interest groups and civil society organizations. This applies to both business and labor.
Overall, larger, well-resourced CSOs that prioritize policy work tend to have the most capacity. This is true of business associations and, to a lesser extent, trade union centrals. The unionization rate in Canada is currently slightly below 30%, a figure that should not obscure variations over time, between men and women, and among employment sectors. For example, “Over the last four decades, unionization rates fell by 16 percentage points among men but remained stable among women” (Statistics Canada, 2022). Moreover, the unionization rate is much higher in the public sector than in the private sector, where the labor movement is less represented now than it was 30 or 40 years ago.
The party in power can also be more or less open to CSO input in policymaking. Shutting groups out is always possible. At the federal level, pro-business governments are the norm, which has enhanced the influence of business associations while undermining the influence of trade unions. This has been true throughout Canadian history and continues to the present day.
Overall, larger, well-resourced CSOs that prioritize policy work tend to have the most capacity. This is true of business associations and, to a lesser extent, trade union centrals. The unionization rate in Canada is currently slightly below 30%, a figure that should not obscure variations over time, between men and women, and among employment sectors. For example, “Over the last four decades, unionization rates fell by 16 percentage points among men but remained stable among women” (Statistics Canada, 2022). Moreover, the unionization rate is much higher in the public sector than in the private sector, where the labor movement is less represented now than it was 30 or 40 years ago.
The party in power can also be more or less open to CSO input in policymaking. Shutting groups out is always possible. At the federal level, pro-business governments are the norm, which has enhanced the influence of business associations while undermining the influence of trade unions. This has been true throughout Canadian history and continues to the present day.
Citations:
Brooks, S., and A. Stritch. 1991. Business and Government in Canada. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall.
Stritch, Andrew. 2007. “Business Associations and Policy Analysis in Canada.” In Policy Analysis in Canada: The State of the Art, eds. L. Dobuzinskis, M. Howlett, and D. Laycock, 242–59. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Stritch, Andrew. 2018. “Policy Analytical Capacity and Canadian Business Associations.” In Policy Analysis in Canada, 297–317. Policy Press. https://doi.org/10.1332/policypress/9781447334910.003.0014
Jackson, Andrew, and Bob Baldwin. 2007. “Policy Analysis by the Labour Movement in a Hostile Environment.” In Policy Analysis in Canada: The State of the Art, eds. L. Dobuzinskis, M. Howlett, and D. Laycock, 260–72. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Statistics Canada. 2022. “Unionization in Canada, 1981 to 2022.” https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/36-28-0001/2022011/article/00001-eng.htm
Brooks, S., and A. Stritch. 1991. Business and Government in Canada. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall.
Stritch, Andrew. 2007. “Business Associations and Policy Analysis in Canada.” In Policy Analysis in Canada: The State of the Art, eds. L. Dobuzinskis, M. Howlett, and D. Laycock, 242–59. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Stritch, Andrew. 2018. “Policy Analytical Capacity and Canadian Business Associations.” In Policy Analysis in Canada, 297–317. Policy Press. https://doi.org/10.1332/policypress/9781447334910.003.0014
Jackson, Andrew, and Bob Baldwin. 2007. “Policy Analysis by the Labour Movement in a Hostile Environment.” In Policy Analysis in Canada: The State of the Art, eds. L. Dobuzinskis, M. Howlett, and D. Laycock, 260–72. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Statistics Canada. 2022. “Unionization in Canada, 1981 to 2022.” https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/36-28-0001/2022011/article/00001-eng.htm
Greece
Civil society organization (CSO) participation in Greek policymaking follows global trends, becoming less frequent and substantive. In Greece, CSO involvement is also episodic and highly partisan. While labor unions were once more involved in negotiating sectoral agreements, their role has diminished since the bailout era of the 2010s, under the guise of austerity measures. This trend continued under the radical left-right coalition led by SYRIZA and persists under the current conservative government. Although CSOs participate in parliamentary debates and have access to draft bills, their recent contributions have primarily been obstructive, often in the form of strikes to prevent policy adoption.
Legislation generally supports the development of CSOs defending capital and labor interests. The government provides public funding to major labor confederations, such as the GSEE (private sector unions) and ADEDY (civil service unions). However, business associations, including those representing industrialists (SEV), shipowners (EEE), and liberal professionals like lawyers, engineers, and doctors, do not receive government funding. In some associations, such as the strong bank employee unions, membership dues are compulsorily deducted from employees’ salaries.
The two aforementioned confederations have established associated think tanks, providing expertise for participation in the policymaking process. However, since the economic crisis of 2010, union input has been less influential in policy formulation.
Public participation in labor CSOs has also declined, with only a small proportion of the population expressing trust in labor unions (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2021). Despite this, unions frequently organize strikes, which have the capacity to disrupt policy implementation rather than policy formulation. Nonetheless, the government remains responsive to policy proposals from major CSOs. Representatives of capital and labor, along with other interest groups, are invited to parliamentary committee sessions to debate bills and participate in social partner negotiations to set minimum wages and salaries.
Legislation generally supports the development of CSOs defending capital and labor interests. The government provides public funding to major labor confederations, such as the GSEE (private sector unions) and ADEDY (civil service unions). However, business associations, including those representing industrialists (SEV), shipowners (EEE), and liberal professionals like lawyers, engineers, and doctors, do not receive government funding. In some associations, such as the strong bank employee unions, membership dues are compulsorily deducted from employees’ salaries.
The two aforementioned confederations have established associated think tanks, providing expertise for participation in the policymaking process. However, since the economic crisis of 2010, union input has been less influential in policy formulation.
Public participation in labor CSOs has also declined, with only a small proportion of the population expressing trust in labor unions (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2021). Despite this, unions frequently organize strikes, which have the capacity to disrupt policy implementation rather than policy formulation. Nonetheless, the government remains responsive to policy proposals from major CSOs. Representatives of capital and labor, along with other interest groups, are invited to parliamentary committee sessions to debate bills and participate in social partner negotiations to set minimum wages and salaries.
Citations:
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 2021. “The Situation of Trade Unions in Greece.” FES Briefing compiled by G. Bythimitris, September. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/athen/18276.pdf
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 2021. “The Situation of Trade Unions in Greece.” FES Briefing compiled by G. Bythimitris, September. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/athen/18276.pdf
Israel
Civil society organizations representing a diverse spectrum of economic opinions are very active in the public sphere. Comparative OECD data from 2017 indicates that 25% of Israeli employees are members of labor unions (OECD, 2017). The unions are consulted on and negotiate wage agreements across different sectors. For public service employees, membership in a labor union is mandatory. Membership fees are not tax deductible. Large organizations have the financial and informational strength to formulate policies, and many have registered lobbyists in the Knesset.
In many cases, different organizations form coalitions and work together on various issues.
When major organizations put forward policy proposals, the government responds to them. This is evident in many pieces of legislation initiated by civil society organizations. These organizations also receive media attention and can voice their demands publicly. Although they influence policy design, the power of labor unions, as a key actor in policy design, has been decreasing since 1985. The primary institutions involved in formulating macroeconomic policy are the Ministry of Finance and Israel’s central bank. Thus, although the organizations still have some veto power, their power is weaker than before and dependent on the specific political circumstances (Bondy and Maggor 2023). Moreover, public support for major labor unions is decreasing because they are perceived as representing more powerful and organized interests.
In many cases, different organizations form coalitions and work together on various issues.
When major organizations put forward policy proposals, the government responds to them. This is evident in many pieces of legislation initiated by civil society organizations. These organizations also receive media attention and can voice their demands publicly. Although they influence policy design, the power of labor unions, as a key actor in policy design, has been decreasing since 1985. The primary institutions involved in formulating macroeconomic policy are the Ministry of Finance and Israel’s central bank. Thus, although the organizations still have some veto power, their power is weaker than before and dependent on the specific political circumstances (Bondy and Maggor 2023). Moreover, public support for major labor unions is decreasing because they are perceived as representing more powerful and organized interests.
Citations:
OECD. 2017. “Main Indicators and Characteristics of Collective Bargaining: Israel.” https://www.oecd.org/employment/collective-bargaining-database-israel.pdf
Bondy, A. S., and E. Maggor. 2023. “Balancing the Scales: Labour Incorporation and the Politics of Growth Model Transformation.” New Political Economy 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2023.2217770
OECD. 2017. “Main Indicators and Characteristics of Collective Bargaining: Israel.” https://www.oecd.org/employment/collective-bargaining-database-israel.pdf
Bondy, A. S., and E. Maggor. 2023. “Balancing the Scales: Labour Incorporation and the Politics of Growth Model Transformation.” New Political Economy 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2023.2217770
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
Italy
Italy boasts a wide variety of trade unions, with the CGIL, CISL, and UIL being the most prominent organizations. According to the most recent OECD estimate (2019), approximately 32.5% of wage and salary earners belong to a trade union. However, recent research suggests that this figure significantly overestimates union membership (Batut et al. 2023). This overestimation occurs because the data relies solely on self-reported information from the largest trade unions, lacking independent verification. A more realistic assessment suggests that only 25% or even 20% of workers are union members. The most influential employers’ association is Confindustria.
In policy formulation, trade unions generally favor maintaining the status quo. They hold a relatively conservative stance and are hesitant to embrace innovative policies in labor relations or pensions. However, there are notable distinctions among the three major trade unions, with CISL and UIL demonstrating a greater willingness to negotiate with the government and employers’ associations on measures to enhance labor market flexibility.
In contrast, employers’ associations tend to lean toward policy change, typically adopting a more forward-thinking approach. Despite their continued importance as policy players, trade unions and employers’ associations have seen their influence on the decision-making process gradually erode due to the strengthening of the executive branch in Italy and an ongoing process of political disintermediation. While their involvement remains a constant feature in the policymaking and policy implementation processes, their participation is informal and unregulated compared to other countries (Lizzi and Pritoni 2019).
The current Meloni government has shown little interest in promoting consultations with trade unions on labor and fiscal law reforms. This attitude has probably been encouraged by divisions between CGIL and UIL on one side and CISL on the other regarding the minimum wage proposal advanced by the opposition.
Both trade unions and employers’ associations have established research departments that frequently collaborate with experts and draw on scholarly knowledge. Their policy proposals are often comprehensive and grounded in substantial policy expertise.
In policy formulation, trade unions generally favor maintaining the status quo. They hold a relatively conservative stance and are hesitant to embrace innovative policies in labor relations or pensions. However, there are notable distinctions among the three major trade unions, with CISL and UIL demonstrating a greater willingness to negotiate with the government and employers’ associations on measures to enhance labor market flexibility.
In contrast, employers’ associations tend to lean toward policy change, typically adopting a more forward-thinking approach. Despite their continued importance as policy players, trade unions and employers’ associations have seen their influence on the decision-making process gradually erode due to the strengthening of the executive branch in Italy and an ongoing process of political disintermediation. While their involvement remains a constant feature in the policymaking and policy implementation processes, their participation is informal and unregulated compared to other countries (Lizzi and Pritoni 2019).
The current Meloni government has shown little interest in promoting consultations with trade unions on labor and fiscal law reforms. This attitude has probably been encouraged by divisions between CGIL and UIL on one side and CISL on the other regarding the minimum wage proposal advanced by the opposition.
Both trade unions and employers’ associations have established research departments that frequently collaborate with experts and draw on scholarly knowledge. Their policy proposals are often comprehensive and grounded in substantial policy expertise.
Citations:
Batut, C., Lojkine, U., and Santini, P. 2023. “Which Side Are You On? A Historical Study of Union Membership Composition in Seven Western Countries.” Industrial Relations (January): 1–83.
Lizzi, R., and Pritoni, A. 2019. “Lobbying in Hard Times. Interest Groups and Italian Policy-Making at the Season of Unmediated Democracy.” Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche 14(2): 157–179.
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/data/trade-unions/trade-union-density_data-00371-en
Batut, C., Lojkine, U., and Santini, P. 2023. “Which Side Are You On? A Historical Study of Union Membership Composition in Seven Western Countries.” Industrial Relations (January): 1–83.
Lizzi, R., and Pritoni, A. 2019. “Lobbying in Hard Times. Interest Groups and Italian Policy-Making at the Season of Unmediated Democracy.” Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche 14(2): 157–179.
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/data/trade-unions/trade-union-density_data-00371-en
Portugal
The capacity of CSOs to actively participate in shaping relevant policies in Portugal depends on a combination of legal, organizational, governmental, and societal factors.
Legally, prominent CSOs in social welfare and labor engage in the policymaking process through the Economic and Social Council (CES), particularly within the Permanent Commission for Social Concertation (CPCS). This constitutional body serves as a platform for negotiation and dialogue among sovereign bodies, economic entities, and social agents, contributing to policy formulation and decision-making.
In Portugal, civil society is primarily dominated by organizations advocating for specific group interests, such as those representing labor and capital, including trade unions, professional associations, pensioners’ groups, as well as business and financial organizations. In practice, these organizations often react to government measures rather than taking a proactive role in shaping policy debates.
While labor CSOs have recently garnered media attention for advocating the interests of both teaching and non-teaching staff, as well as healthcare professionals, through prominent protests and strikes in 2022 and 2023, the number of citizens reporting membership in organizations like trade unions has steadily decreased over time. This decline has been substantial, plummeting from 15% in 2002 to the lowest level documented in the post-election study conducted in 2022 (Serra-Silva & Oliveira, 2023). As a result, the overall influence and impact of major CSOs continue to be constrained and insufficient in Portugal.
Membership fees in CSOs, such as union dues, are tax-deductible. Similarly, citizens can choose to allocate 0.5% of their income tax to civil society organizations.
Legally, prominent CSOs in social welfare and labor engage in the policymaking process through the Economic and Social Council (CES), particularly within the Permanent Commission for Social Concertation (CPCS). This constitutional body serves as a platform for negotiation and dialogue among sovereign bodies, economic entities, and social agents, contributing to policy formulation and decision-making.
In Portugal, civil society is primarily dominated by organizations advocating for specific group interests, such as those representing labor and capital, including trade unions, professional associations, pensioners’ groups, as well as business and financial organizations. In practice, these organizations often react to government measures rather than taking a proactive role in shaping policy debates.
While labor CSOs have recently garnered media attention for advocating the interests of both teaching and non-teaching staff, as well as healthcare professionals, through prominent protests and strikes in 2022 and 2023, the number of citizens reporting membership in organizations like trade unions has steadily decreased over time. This decline has been substantial, plummeting from 15% in 2002 to the lowest level documented in the post-election study conducted in 2022 (Serra-Silva & Oliveira, 2023). As a result, the overall influence and impact of major CSOs continue to be constrained and insufficient in Portugal.
Membership fees in CSOs, such as union dues, are tax-deductible. Similarly, citizens can choose to allocate 0.5% of their income tax to civil society organizations.
Citations:
Conselho Económico e Social. n.d. ” https://ces.pt/concertacao-social/”
Serra-Silva, S. and Oliveira, R. 2023. “Associational Involvement and Political Participation in Portugal: Insights from a Longitudinal and Comparative Study.” In Lisi, M., ed. Interest Groups and Political Representation in Portugal and Beyond. London: Routledge, 47-88.
Conselho Económico e Social. n.d. ” https://ces.pt/concertacao-social/”
Serra-Silva, S. and Oliveira, R. 2023. “Associational Involvement and Political Participation in Portugal: Insights from a Longitudinal and Comparative Study.” In Lisi, M., ed. Interest Groups and Political Representation in Portugal and Beyond. London: Routledge, 47-88.
UK
Falling trade union membership and its concentration in areas of public services are key characteristics of labor-related CSOs, while employer representation is split between different organizations. Neither side has a formal role in the policy formulation process, so their capacity to participate in the creation of policy is through pressure politics, as indicated in the question description. Institutions of corporatism had been introduced in the 1960s but were largely abandoned during Margaret Thatcher’s time as prime minister (from 1979) and were not revived by her successors. From 1999, devolved Scottish and Welsh governments signaled a greater willingness to consult or work closely with unions, professional groups, and third sector representatives (Greer and Jarman 2008).
Although unions and employer organizations have some capacity for generating policy papers and ideas, their influence is not great, nor do they attract active support from a significant share of the population. However, in financial services, bodies such as UK Finance can exert considerable influence on changes in financial regulation and related aspects of policy formulation, based on having relevant expertise.
Beyond the term “social partners” (a phrase not commonly used in UK politics) implied in the expression “major CSOs,” there exists a diverse array of other organizations – think tanks, lobby groups, and NGOs focused on specific policy areas. These organizations have substantial capacities for influencing UK government policy formulation, though there is less think tank capacity around devolved governments. Their influence varies depending on the government in power.
For example, newer organizations like the Resolution Foundation have been able to connect with the current government, while the Institute of Economic Affairs was closely aligned with the short-lived Liz Truss government in 2022. Previously, the Institute for Public Policy Research contributed to New Labour’s policy development. The Tony Blair Institute is another well-resourced entity that generates policy ideas likely to influence the government following the general election expected within the next year.
Although unions and employer organizations have some capacity for generating policy papers and ideas, their influence is not great, nor do they attract active support from a significant share of the population. However, in financial services, bodies such as UK Finance can exert considerable influence on changes in financial regulation and related aspects of policy formulation, based on having relevant expertise.
Beyond the term “social partners” (a phrase not commonly used in UK politics) implied in the expression “major CSOs,” there exists a diverse array of other organizations – think tanks, lobby groups, and NGOs focused on specific policy areas. These organizations have substantial capacities for influencing UK government policy formulation, though there is less think tank capacity around devolved governments. Their influence varies depending on the government in power.
For example, newer organizations like the Resolution Foundation have been able to connect with the current government, while the Institute of Economic Affairs was closely aligned with the short-lived Liz Truss government in 2022. Previously, the Institute for Public Policy Research contributed to New Labour’s policy development. The Tony Blair Institute is another well-resourced entity that generates policy ideas likely to influence the government following the general election expected within the next year.
Citations:
Greer, S. and Jarman, H. 2008. “Devolution and Policy Styles.” In Trench, A., eds.
Exeter. 2008. The State of the Nations 2008. Exeter: Imprint Academic.
Greer, S. and Jarman, H. 2008. “Devolution and Policy Styles.” In Trench, A., eds.
Exeter. 2008. The State of the Nations 2008. Exeter: Imprint Academic.
USA
Unions underwrote the affluence of the American working class in the twentieth century. They secured higher wages, limited working hours, improved working conditions, and a range of “fringe benefits,” including health insurance and pensions for their members (Moody 2014).
Trade union membership in the United States is still largely governed by the framework established in the National Labor Relations Act, known popularly as the Wagner Act, passed in 1935 during the New Deal Era. The legislation created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), a federal agency that enforces labor law in the U.S. The NLRB regulates union activity, including ballots and strikes. It also has a quasi-judicial function, issuing rules on the application of labor law, some of which can be quite consequential. The board comprises five individuals, each appointed by the president for five-year terms. The chairperson is chosen from among them by the president and serves at the president’s pleasure (Milkman 2019).
The peak density of the unionized workforce occurred in 1954, when 35% of non-farm workers were unionized. The peak number of total union members was in 1983, with 17.7 million workers in a union, or about 20% of the workforce. Today, only about 10% of workers are in a union. This decline has been driven by the collapse of private sector unions. In 1970, 30% of private sector workers were in a union. Forty years later, that figure had dropped to just 6%. In contrast, 34% of public sector workers are currently unionized, a level equivalent to the peak of the unionized private sector workforce in the 1950s (Walker 2014).
There is a significant disparity in unionization across industries. In local government, including public safety, 40% of workers belong to a union. In education, the figure is 34%. However, in retail, only 3% are union members, and in food and drink services, it is just 1%. Women make up 46% of union members. One in three union members are non-white. African Americans have the highest union density at about 13%; Asian Americans have the lowest at about 8% (Frymer and Grumbach 2020).
In the United States, the labor movement has a comparatively limited impact on policymaking in most areas. Low unionization rates in the private sector limit the social and political influence of labor unions, and the absence of a stand-alone labor party helps explain this relatively limited impact (Maioni 1998).
Trade union membership in the United States is still largely governed by the framework established in the National Labor Relations Act, known popularly as the Wagner Act, passed in 1935 during the New Deal Era. The legislation created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), a federal agency that enforces labor law in the U.S. The NLRB regulates union activity, including ballots and strikes. It also has a quasi-judicial function, issuing rules on the application of labor law, some of which can be quite consequential. The board comprises five individuals, each appointed by the president for five-year terms. The chairperson is chosen from among them by the president and serves at the president’s pleasure (Milkman 2019).
The peak density of the unionized workforce occurred in 1954, when 35% of non-farm workers were unionized. The peak number of total union members was in 1983, with 17.7 million workers in a union, or about 20% of the workforce. Today, only about 10% of workers are in a union. This decline has been driven by the collapse of private sector unions. In 1970, 30% of private sector workers were in a union. Forty years later, that figure had dropped to just 6%. In contrast, 34% of public sector workers are currently unionized, a level equivalent to the peak of the unionized private sector workforce in the 1950s (Walker 2014).
There is a significant disparity in unionization across industries. In local government, including public safety, 40% of workers belong to a union. In education, the figure is 34%. However, in retail, only 3% are union members, and in food and drink services, it is just 1%. Women make up 46% of union members. One in three union members are non-white. African Americans have the highest union density at about 13%; Asian Americans have the lowest at about 8% (Frymer and Grumbach 2020).
In the United States, the labor movement has a comparatively limited impact on policymaking in most areas. Low unionization rates in the private sector limit the social and political influence of labor unions, and the absence of a stand-alone labor party helps explain this relatively limited impact (Maioni 1998).
Citations:
Antonia Maioni. 1998. Parting at the Crossroads: The Emergence of Health Insurance in the United States and Canada. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kim Moody. 2014. In Solidarity. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
Alexis Walker. 2014. “Labor’s Enduring Divide: The Distinct Path of Public Sector Unions in the United States.” Studies in American Political Development.
Michael Brown. 1997/98. “Bargaining for Social Rights: Unions and the Re-emergence of Welfare Capitalism.” Political Science Quarterly.
Paul Frymer and Jacob Grumbach. 2020. “Labor Unions and White Racial Politics.” American Journal of Political Science.
Ruth Milkman. 2019. “The World We Have Lost: US Labor in the Obama Years.” In Looking Back on President Barack Obama’s Legacy, ed. W. Rich. Palgrave.
Antonia Maioni. 1998. Parting at the Crossroads: The Emergence of Health Insurance in the United States and Canada. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kim Moody. 2014. In Solidarity. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
Alexis Walker. 2014. “Labor’s Enduring Divide: The Distinct Path of Public Sector Unions in the United States.” Studies in American Political Development.
Michael Brown. 1997/98. “Bargaining for Social Rights: Unions and the Re-emergence of Welfare Capitalism.” Political Science Quarterly.
Paul Frymer and Jacob Grumbach. 2020. “Labor Unions and White Racial Politics.” American Journal of Political Science.
Ruth Milkman. 2019. “The World We Have Lost: US Labor in the Obama Years.” In Looking Back on President Barack Obama’s Legacy, ed. W. Rich. Palgrave.
4
France
Business associations can formulate policy proposals and contribute to agenda setting. They have their own research capabilities and can successfully lobby government and parliamentarians. Two organizations have significant influence. The major employers union, the Mouvement des Entreprises de France (MEDEF), is a peak association federating sector-level associations. It represents 750,000 major firms. The other major organization is the Confédération Générale des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises (CGPME), whose membership base includes around 1.7 million small- and medium-size firms. This association often complains that the specific interests of small businesses are marginalized by larger national groups and the government.
Trade unions suffer from various shortcomings. First, membership rates are among the lowest in the circle of Western democracies, encompassing only about 8% of the workforce (5% in the private sector). A second problem is that the relatively small membership is split between several different and rival trade unions. The split within the trade union movement is political but also concerns different approaches to the role of trade unions in policymaking. Two corporatist and “conservative” unions – the CGT and FO – have taken advantage of their footing in the civil service and public sector, and tend to resist or reject any serious change. They have relied upon mass mobilization to block reforms, even if their ability to mobilize is diminishing except in a few sectors such as public transport. Whereas these organizations refuse negotiations and compromises with the government, two other trade unions – CFDT and UNSA – have adopted more moderate positions, and try to balance advocacy for workers’ interests with a constructive role in negotiating reforms.
Nonetheless, this lack of representativeness is somewhat compensated for by the support they get in the “professional elections” that take place every five years. The turnout rate for the last “professional elections” reached 43.7% in the public sector and 38.2% in the private sector in 2022. This explains why these elections are so crucial. For the past two elections, the CFDT has led the polls, tightly followed by the more radical CGT. Furthermore, the government regularly validates partial agreements for entire economic sectors, with the result that collective bargaining agreements cover 98% of workers in France.
In general, the unions seek to compensate for their membership weakness at the company level by negotiating at the sectoral level or even at the national level, as well as through their capacity for social mobilization, quite frequently organizing mass protests in the streets. In so doing, they rarely manage to overcome their political split and rivalries; however, the opposition to pension reform in 2023 created a rare united front across the eight major trade unions. Despite the massive rejection by voters and trade unions and the absence of a legislative majority, President Macron signed the reform into law on April 15, 2023. The unions’ campaign thus ultimately failed, but the unitary approach improved their image, and a slight increase in membership was evident in the wake of the debates.
Government attitudes toward CSO proposals have not been constant. Over the last 20 years, governments have called for more involvement of social partner CSOs in the field of social and labor policies. and have been willing to take into account their proposals. Governments have also endorsed new rules enhancing the role of social negotiation and concertation. However, governmental practice has not always been in line with this rhetorical commitment. Moreover, since 2017, President Macron has tended to drastically reduce the role of economic and social CSOs in the policymaking process, stressing the monopoly of the political institutions – government, parliament – in policymaking.
Trade unions suffer from various shortcomings. First, membership rates are among the lowest in the circle of Western democracies, encompassing only about 8% of the workforce (5% in the private sector). A second problem is that the relatively small membership is split between several different and rival trade unions. The split within the trade union movement is political but also concerns different approaches to the role of trade unions in policymaking. Two corporatist and “conservative” unions – the CGT and FO – have taken advantage of their footing in the civil service and public sector, and tend to resist or reject any serious change. They have relied upon mass mobilization to block reforms, even if their ability to mobilize is diminishing except in a few sectors such as public transport. Whereas these organizations refuse negotiations and compromises with the government, two other trade unions – CFDT and UNSA – have adopted more moderate positions, and try to balance advocacy for workers’ interests with a constructive role in negotiating reforms.
Nonetheless, this lack of representativeness is somewhat compensated for by the support they get in the “professional elections” that take place every five years. The turnout rate for the last “professional elections” reached 43.7% in the public sector and 38.2% in the private sector in 2022. This explains why these elections are so crucial. For the past two elections, the CFDT has led the polls, tightly followed by the more radical CGT. Furthermore, the government regularly validates partial agreements for entire economic sectors, with the result that collective bargaining agreements cover 98% of workers in France.
In general, the unions seek to compensate for their membership weakness at the company level by negotiating at the sectoral level or even at the national level, as well as through their capacity for social mobilization, quite frequently organizing mass protests in the streets. In so doing, they rarely manage to overcome their political split and rivalries; however, the opposition to pension reform in 2023 created a rare united front across the eight major trade unions. Despite the massive rejection by voters and trade unions and the absence of a legislative majority, President Macron signed the reform into law on April 15, 2023. The unions’ campaign thus ultimately failed, but the unitary approach improved their image, and a slight increase in membership was evident in the wake of the debates.
Government attitudes toward CSO proposals have not been constant. Over the last 20 years, governments have called for more involvement of social partner CSOs in the field of social and labor policies. and have been willing to take into account their proposals. Governments have also endorsed new rules enhancing the role of social negotiation and concertation. However, governmental practice has not always been in line with this rhetorical commitment. Moreover, since 2017, President Macron has tended to drastically reduce the role of economic and social CSOs in the policymaking process, stressing the monopoly of the political institutions – government, parliament – in policymaking.
Citations:
Tristan Haute. 2020. “Les logiques plurielles d’une très faible participation : retour sur les scrutins auprès des salariés des très petites entreprises.” La Revue de l’Ires 2020/2-3 (101-102): 3-27.
Woll, Cornelia. 2006. “La réforme du Medef: chronique des difficultés de l’action collective patronale.” Revue française de science politique 56 (2): 255-279.
Tristan Haute. 2020. “Les logiques plurielles d’une très faible participation : retour sur les scrutins auprès des salariés des très petites entreprises.” La Revue de l’Ires 2020/2-3 (101-102): 3-27.
Woll, Cornelia. 2006. “La réforme du Medef: chronique des difficultés de l’action collective patronale.” Revue française de science politique 56 (2): 255-279.
Hungary
After the systemic change in 1990, civil society in Hungary developed quickly, fueled by the internationalization of Hungarian society and the introduction of tax deductions for civil society organizations. This development was steady until 2010, when Fidesz and Orbán retook power, after which the number of CSOs stagnated and dropped slightly. At the same time, NGOs’ income and employees’ earnings grew significantly (KSH 2024). The number of employees remained relatively stable. Since 2016, civil society organizations engaged with the political system in the broadest sense have operated in an increasingly hostile environment. The background is the so-called Lex NGO of 2017, which aimed to bring CSOs under government control. The infighting between civil society and the government has forced CSOs to divert resources from their original tasks to ensure proper operation.
The government has entered this battle by creating numerous government-organized NGOs (GONGOs) to further its illiberal and nationalist narrative. As a result, “only organizations friendly and close to the government can effectively engage in lobbying” (United States Agency for International Development 2022: 5). Many of these organizations are involved in the distribution of financial resources from government and EU funds and are vulnerable to corruption. Instruments for managing state support for CSOs include the National Cooperation Fund and the Village and Town Civil Funds. The operation of these funds is rather opaque and benefits the Fidesz nomenclature (Civic Forum 2023: 12).
The politicization of civil society has had negative consequences for NGOs, as bridging the ideological rift between the illiberal and liberal camps is nearly impossible without losing the support of the home camp. The weakness of organized interests in the labor sector is not new. Attempts by former left-wing governments to organize tripartite consultations were unsuccessful, and trade unions and employee associations remain fragmented. Not surprisingly, Hungary ranks extremely low within the EU in terms of the number of strikes (European Trade Union Institute 2024).
Teachers’ strikes directed at the government’s educational policies were made impossible by a government decree issued in February 2022. Combined with the employer-oriented economic policy of the Orbán governments, trade unions, which are weak in membership and organizational capacity, fail to exert relevant influence. Overall, the ability of major civil society organizations to shape public policies in their fields is relatively low. This holds even for the most significant employers’ association, the MGYOSZ. Anti-corruption NGOs Transparency International Hungary and K-Monitor have been involved in the Anti-Corruption Task Force of the Integrity Authority, a state agency created in 2022 under pressure from the European Commission (Telex 2022). However, they have failed to exert significant influence with regard to improving the transparency of public procurement or politicians’ wealth declarations.
The government has entered this battle by creating numerous government-organized NGOs (GONGOs) to further its illiberal and nationalist narrative. As a result, “only organizations friendly and close to the government can effectively engage in lobbying” (United States Agency for International Development 2022: 5). Many of these organizations are involved in the distribution of financial resources from government and EU funds and are vulnerable to corruption. Instruments for managing state support for CSOs include the National Cooperation Fund and the Village and Town Civil Funds. The operation of these funds is rather opaque and benefits the Fidesz nomenclature (Civic Forum 2023: 12).
The politicization of civil society has had negative consequences for NGOs, as bridging the ideological rift between the illiberal and liberal camps is nearly impossible without losing the support of the home camp. The weakness of organized interests in the labor sector is not new. Attempts by former left-wing governments to organize tripartite consultations were unsuccessful, and trade unions and employee associations remain fragmented. Not surprisingly, Hungary ranks extremely low within the EU in terms of the number of strikes (European Trade Union Institute 2024).
Teachers’ strikes directed at the government’s educational policies were made impossible by a government decree issued in February 2022. Combined with the employer-oriented economic policy of the Orbán governments, trade unions, which are weak in membership and organizational capacity, fail to exert relevant influence. Overall, the ability of major civil society organizations to shape public policies in their fields is relatively low. This holds even for the most significant employers’ association, the MGYOSZ. Anti-corruption NGOs Transparency International Hungary and K-Monitor have been involved in the Anti-Corruption Task Force of the Integrity Authority, a state agency created in 2022 under pressure from the European Commission (Telex 2022). However, they have failed to exert significant influence with regard to improving the transparency of public procurement or politicians’ wealth declarations.
Citations:
KSH. 2022. https://www.ksh.hu/s/helyzetkep-2022/#/kiadvany/nonprofit-szektor
European Trade Union Institute. 2024. “Strike Map.” https://www.etui.org/strikes-map
Civic Forum. 2023. “Civic Space Report 2023, Hungary.” https://civic-forum.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Civic-Space-Report-2023-HUNGARY-European-Civic-Forum.pdf
United States Agency for International Development. 2022. “2021 Civil Society Organization Index Hungary, October.” https://okotars.hu/sites/default/files/downloads/hungary_2021.pdf
Telex.hu. 2022. “Transparency International willing to join Anti-Corruption Task Force under certain conditions.” October 6. https://telex.hu/english/2022/10/06/transparency-international-willing-to-join-anti-corruption-task-force-under-certain-conditions
KSH. 2022. https://www.ksh.hu/s/helyzetkep-2022/#/kiadvany/nonprofit-szektor
European Trade Union Institute. 2024. “Strike Map.” https://www.etui.org/strikes-map
Civic Forum. 2023. “Civic Space Report 2023, Hungary.” https://civic-forum.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Civic-Space-Report-2023-HUNGARY-European-Civic-Forum.pdf
United States Agency for International Development. 2022. “2021 Civil Society Organization Index Hungary, October.” https://okotars.hu/sites/default/files/downloads/hungary_2021.pdf
Telex.hu. 2022. “Transparency International willing to join Anti-Corruption Task Force under certain conditions.” October 6. https://telex.hu/english/2022/10/06/transparency-international-willing-to-join-anti-corruption-task-force-under-certain-conditions
Poland
In Poland, trade unions play a pivotal role in the relationship between capital and labor, a distinction enshrined in the constitution, which guarantees the freedom to form and operate trade unions. The three major umbrella organizations are Niezależny Samorządny Związek Zawodowy “Solidarność” (NSZZ “Solidarność”), Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych (OPZZ) and Forum Związków Zawodowych (FZZ). These unions participate in the Social Dialogue Council with employer representatives and the government.
Beyond these primary organizations, there are roughly 300 federations, 273 national trade unions and approximately 24,000 local trade union entities. Around 7,000 workplace-based unions operate independently at the regional level, separate from the larger umbrella groups. Farmers’ trade unions in Poland hold a distinct legal status. Major trade union organizations often utilize specialists or foundations, particularly in employers’ associations, but rarely establish independent think tank institutions.
As of 2022, the country had 1.4 million members across 11,656 trade unions and 353 active employers’ organizations with 21,600 members. The education sector employed the highest percentage of trade union members at 19.3%, while health and social care dominated the membership of employers’ organizations at 16.6%. Most trade unions included plant, sub-plant and branch-level organizations (76.4%), followed by intercompany unions (20.8%). Additionally, there were federations, confederations, regional or sectoral structures, and 310 so-called unified trade unions (2.7%). From 2014 to 2022, trade union membership declined by 9.6%, whereas employers’ organizations saw a 28.8% increase in membership (GUS 2023).
Furthermore, organizations and professional self-governments representing specific sectors, such as the judges’ association Iustitia and the Supreme Medical Chamber, have gained prominence by opposing government policies. Generally, the PiS government paid little attention to proposals from the broader civil sector, with notable exceptions made for Solidarność, which was led by pro-government figures.
Beyond these primary organizations, there are roughly 300 federations, 273 national trade unions and approximately 24,000 local trade union entities. Around 7,000 workplace-based unions operate independently at the regional level, separate from the larger umbrella groups. Farmers’ trade unions in Poland hold a distinct legal status. Major trade union organizations often utilize specialists or foundations, particularly in employers’ associations, but rarely establish independent think tank institutions.
As of 2022, the country had 1.4 million members across 11,656 trade unions and 353 active employers’ organizations with 21,600 members. The education sector employed the highest percentage of trade union members at 19.3%, while health and social care dominated the membership of employers’ organizations at 16.6%. Most trade unions included plant, sub-plant and branch-level organizations (76.4%), followed by intercompany unions (20.8%). Additionally, there were federations, confederations, regional or sectoral structures, and 310 so-called unified trade unions (2.7%). From 2014 to 2022, trade union membership declined by 9.6%, whereas employers’ organizations saw a 28.8% increase in membership (GUS 2023).
Furthermore, organizations and professional self-governments representing specific sectors, such as the judges’ association Iustitia and the Supreme Medical Chamber, have gained prominence by opposing government policies. Generally, the PiS government paid little attention to proposals from the broader civil sector, with notable exceptions made for Solidarność, which was led by pro-government figures.
Citations:
GUS. 2023. “Partnerzy dialogu społecznego – organizacje pracodawców i związki zawodowe w 2022 r.” https://stat.gov.pl/download/gfx/portalinformacyjny/pl/defaultaktualnosci/5490/16/2/1/partnerzy_dialogu_spolecznego_-_organizacje_pracodawcow_i_zwiazki_zawodowe_w_2022_r.pdf
GUS. 2023. “Partnerzy dialogu społecznego – organizacje pracodawców i związki zawodowe w 2022 r.” https://stat.gov.pl/download/gfx/portalinformacyjny/pl/defaultaktualnosci/5490/16/2/1/partnerzy_dialogu_spolecznego_-_organizacje_pracodawcow_i_zwiazki_zawodowe_w_2022_r.pdf
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None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
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