To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?
Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
10
Denmark
Denmark is among the least corrupt countries in the world and ranks first (followed by Finland and New Zealand) on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2023. Norms against corruption are strong and the risk of media exposure is high. In the past, there were occasional cases of a local government official accepting “services” from business in exchange for contracts with the municipality, but such cases are rare. There have also occasionally been cases of criticism against local officials for overspending on hospitality (e.g., meals) and gifts to external contacts. Again, such cases are rare. As an example that corruption can happen in Denmark, Transparency International still refers to a court case in 2017 that led to the conviction of several employees of IT vendor Atea A/S for bribery and embezzlement. The employees had offered electronic devices to government employees, some of whom were convicted for accepting these devices.
Citations:
Transparency International. 2023. “Corruption Perception Index 2023.” www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023
Transparency International. 2023. “Corruption Perception Index 2023.” www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023
Finland
The overall level of corruption in Finland is low, providing a strong example of how the consolidation of advanced democratic institutions can reduce corruption. Transparency International’s 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Finland at second place out of 180 countries.
Several individual mechanisms contribute to Finland’s success, including strict auditing of state spending; new, more efficient regulations on party financing; legal provisions that criminalize the acceptance of bribes; full access for the media and the public to relevant information; public asset declarations; and consistent legal prosecution of corrupt acts.
Despite the various integrity mechanisms in place, there remains potential for abuse. Political appointments processes continue to be used to fill positions in Finland. Although only about 5% of citizens are members of political parties, two-thirds of state and municipal public servants belong to political parties. Recently, several charges of political corruption involving bribery and campaign financing have come to light and attracted media attention.
Public accounting standards help detect corruption. Regulations on party financing set limits on campaign contributions. Parties receive direct public funding. There are also regulations on spending, reporting and oversight of party financing. However, the State Audit Office lacks adequate sanctions to enforce compliance.
There are rules for political officeholders regarding asset declarations, conflict of interest and codes of conduct. Additional regulations aim to enhance the transparency of public procurement procedures. The integrity mechanisms described above are effectively implemented and monitored. Public officeholders who abuse their positions are prosecuted and penalized.
Several individual mechanisms contribute to Finland’s success, including strict auditing of state spending; new, more efficient regulations on party financing; legal provisions that criminalize the acceptance of bribes; full access for the media and the public to relevant information; public asset declarations; and consistent legal prosecution of corrupt acts.
Despite the various integrity mechanisms in place, there remains potential for abuse. Political appointments processes continue to be used to fill positions in Finland. Although only about 5% of citizens are members of political parties, two-thirds of state and municipal public servants belong to political parties. Recently, several charges of political corruption involving bribery and campaign financing have come to light and attracted media attention.
Public accounting standards help detect corruption. Regulations on party financing set limits on campaign contributions. Parties receive direct public funding. There are also regulations on spending, reporting and oversight of party financing. However, the State Audit Office lacks adequate sanctions to enforce compliance.
There are rules for political officeholders regarding asset declarations, conflict of interest and codes of conduct. Additional regulations aim to enhance the transparency of public procurement procedures. The integrity mechanisms described above are effectively implemented and monitored. Public officeholders who abuse their positions are prosecuted and penalized.
Citations:
Hung-En Sung. 2004. “Democracy and Political Corruption: A Cross-National Comparison.” Crime, Law & Social Change 41: 179-194.
Transparency International. 2023. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2023.” https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023
Hung-En Sung. 2004. “Democracy and Political Corruption: A Cross-National Comparison.” Crime, Law & Social Change 41: 179-194.
Transparency International. 2023. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2023.” https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023
9
Canada
Most Canadian governments have conflict-of-interest rules and ethical guidelines that legislatures use to discipline their members and control behavior within the civil service. Members of government do not necessarily have to abide by these rules, except when they receive media coverage and negatively affect a government’s election prospects. However, the rules enforced within the civil service are more binding and can lead to dismissal or, in rare cases, criminal charges.
Conflict-of-interest rules are designed to ensure public officials act impartially and make decisions in the best interest of the public rather than for personal gain. Specific regulations vary among federal, provincial, and municipal levels, but common principles guide conflict-of-interest standards in Canada. Commissioners or ethics officials typically conduct investigations, and penalties for violations can include fines, reprimands, or other measures.
At the federal level, the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner oversees compliance with conflict-of-interest rules for members of Parliament, Senators, and certain public officeholders. Similar roles exist at the provincial and territorial levels, often under the title ethics commissioner or a similar designation.
The federal government operates under the Conflict of Interest Act, which establishes rules and guidelines for public officeholders. The act outlines prohibited activities, disclosure requirements, and measures to prevent and address conflicts of interest. Public officeholders are generally required to recuse themselves from any decision-making process where they have a private interest that could reasonably be seen to conflict with their public duties.
Public officeholders are typically required to publicly disclose their financial interests, including assets, liabilities, and other financial arrangements. This disclosure is intended to provide transparency and allow for scrutiny of potential conflicts of interest. Other rules govern the acceptance of gifts and benefits. In general, these are discouraged, and public officeholders are required to disclose gifts and benefits received in their official capacity. There are often restrictions on accepting gifts that could reasonably be seen as influencing the individual’s decision-making.
To prevent potential conflicts of interest after leaving public office, post-employment restrictions are often imposed. These may include limitations on working for organizations that were subject to the individual’s official responsibilities or lobbying the government for a specified period after leaving office (Parliament of Canada).
Conflict-of-interest rules are designed to ensure public officials act impartially and make decisions in the best interest of the public rather than for personal gain. Specific regulations vary among federal, provincial, and municipal levels, but common principles guide conflict-of-interest standards in Canada. Commissioners or ethics officials typically conduct investigations, and penalties for violations can include fines, reprimands, or other measures.
At the federal level, the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner oversees compliance with conflict-of-interest rules for members of Parliament, Senators, and certain public officeholders. Similar roles exist at the provincial and territorial levels, often under the title ethics commissioner or a similar designation.
The federal government operates under the Conflict of Interest Act, which establishes rules and guidelines for public officeholders. The act outlines prohibited activities, disclosure requirements, and measures to prevent and address conflicts of interest. Public officeholders are generally required to recuse themselves from any decision-making process where they have a private interest that could reasonably be seen to conflict with their public duties.
Public officeholders are typically required to publicly disclose their financial interests, including assets, liabilities, and other financial arrangements. This disclosure is intended to provide transparency and allow for scrutiny of potential conflicts of interest. Other rules govern the acceptance of gifts and benefits. In general, these are discouraged, and public officeholders are required to disclose gifts and benefits received in their official capacity. There are often restrictions on accepting gifts that could reasonably be seen as influencing the individual’s decision-making.
To prevent potential conflicts of interest after leaving public office, post-employment restrictions are often imposed. These may include limitations on working for organizations that were subject to the individual’s official responsibilities or lobbying the government for a specified period after leaving office (Parliament of Canada).
Citations:
Parliament of Canada. “Overview of the Conflict of Interest Act.” https://ciec-ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Pages/CoIA-LCI.aspx
Parliament of Canada. “Overview of the Conflict of Interest Act.” https://ciec-ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Pages/CoIA-LCI.aspx
Estonia
Transparency and corruption have been subjects of substantial governmental and public concern over the years. This focus has led to Estonia’s high international ranking, reflecting low levels of corruption, in various indexes (see, for example, the Corruption Risk index). Estonia has established a robust institutional and legal framework to combat corruption, including the National Audit Office, the parliamentary Anti-Corruption Select Committee, the Anti-Corruption Act, the Public Procurement Act and Anti-corruption Action Plans.
Political party financing is regulated by the Act of Political Parties and monitored by a special body – the Political Parties’ Financing Surveillance Committee (PPFSC). Political parties receive direct funding from the state budget, while private donations form just a minor share of their budgets. Only individuals can make donations to parties. All donations are reported to the PPFSC. There are no limits on the size of donations, which has led to investigations when a low-income individual has made substantial contributions. However, if a wealthy entrepreneur were to donate €500,000 to a party, which might influence its policy positions, there are no legal grounds for an investigation.
Civil servants and political officeholders, including members of parliament (MPs), must annually declare their assets and conflicts of interest. There have been several instances of conflicting interests in funding decisions, resulting in the cancellation of those decisions or the dismissal of the civil servant involved. Since 2021, all ministries and government agencies have been required to register their meetings with lobby groups and publish this information on their websites. In total, more than 2,700 meetings were reported in 2022 – 2023 (Ministry of Justice 2020).
About 98% of public procurement in Estonia is organized electronically, which has increased the transparency of these processes. Yet companies still occasionally perceive the conditions of public procurement as being designed to privilege particular procurers, and steps to improve these procedures are expected (Action Plan 2021 – 25: 5).
Political party financing is regulated by the Act of Political Parties and monitored by a special body – the Political Parties’ Financing Surveillance Committee (PPFSC). Political parties receive direct funding from the state budget, while private donations form just a minor share of their budgets. Only individuals can make donations to parties. All donations are reported to the PPFSC. There are no limits on the size of donations, which has led to investigations when a low-income individual has made substantial contributions. However, if a wealthy entrepreneur were to donate €500,000 to a party, which might influence its policy positions, there are no legal grounds for an investigation.
Civil servants and political officeholders, including members of parliament (MPs), must annually declare their assets and conflicts of interest. There have been several instances of conflicting interests in funding decisions, resulting in the cancellation of those decisions or the dismissal of the civil servant involved. Since 2021, all ministries and government agencies have been required to register their meetings with lobby groups and publish this information on their websites. In total, more than 2,700 meetings were reported in 2022 – 2023 (Ministry of Justice 2020).
About 98% of public procurement in Estonia is organized electronically, which has increased the transparency of these processes. Yet companies still occasionally perceive the conditions of public procurement as being designed to privilege particular procurers, and steps to improve these procedures are expected (Action Plan 2021 – 25: 5).
Citations:
Ministry of Justice. 2020. Anti-Corruption Action Plan, 2021-2025. https://www.korruptsioon.ee/et/korruptsiooni-ennetus/korruptsioonivastased-strateegiad-ja-tegevuskavad
Ministry of Justice. 2020. Anti-Corruption Action Plan, 2021-2025. https://www.korruptsioon.ee/et/korruptsiooni-ennetus/korruptsioonivastased-strateegiad-ja-tegevuskavad
New Zealand
New Zealand’s public sector is considered one of the least corrupt in the world. The 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index, published by Transparency International, ranks New Zealand joint second with Finland in terms of anti-corruption efforts (Transparency International 2022).
Several measures are in place to prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions for private interests. These measures include codes of conduct, conflict of interest rules, transparency mechanisms such as public declarations of assets, specific laws addressing bribery and corruption, and protections for whistleblowers who report misconduct or abuses of power.
There are also regulations and laws regarding party financing aimed at promoting transparency and preventing corruption. Not only are political parties required to disclose their sources of funding and donations, but political finance laws set limits on the amount of money individuals or organizations can donate to political parties.
Independent oversight bodies, such as the Office of the Auditor-General and the Office of the Ombudsman, oversee government activities and investigate complaints related to potential abuses of power. The Electoral Commission has primary responsibility for overseeing compliance with party financing regulations.
However, while these regulations and enforcement capacities significantly promote accountability, the New Zealand political system is not entirely immune to potential loopholes or abuses. For example, concerns exist regarding the lack of transparency in the lobbying industry (Espiner 2023) and the so-called revolving door practices in which individuals shift between government positions and private sector jobs, and vice versa (Kuhner 2020). There are also ongoing concerns about party financing rules.
The Independent Electoral Review was established in 2022 and reported back in November 2023. It recommended that parties forgo access to unlimited donations revenue in exchange for greater state funding; it also proposed a cap on political donations and limiting donors solely to the population of registered voters. It remains to be seen how the new government will respond to this recommendation, which would likely reduce funding for the two major parties and the smaller libertarian right-wing party, but benefit other smaller parties (Independent Electoral Review 2023).
Several measures are in place to prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions for private interests. These measures include codes of conduct, conflict of interest rules, transparency mechanisms such as public declarations of assets, specific laws addressing bribery and corruption, and protections for whistleblowers who report misconduct or abuses of power.
There are also regulations and laws regarding party financing aimed at promoting transparency and preventing corruption. Not only are political parties required to disclose their sources of funding and donations, but political finance laws set limits on the amount of money individuals or organizations can donate to political parties.
Independent oversight bodies, such as the Office of the Auditor-General and the Office of the Ombudsman, oversee government activities and investigate complaints related to potential abuses of power. The Electoral Commission has primary responsibility for overseeing compliance with party financing regulations.
However, while these regulations and enforcement capacities significantly promote accountability, the New Zealand political system is not entirely immune to potential loopholes or abuses. For example, concerns exist regarding the lack of transparency in the lobbying industry (Espiner 2023) and the so-called revolving door practices in which individuals shift between government positions and private sector jobs, and vice versa (Kuhner 2020). There are also ongoing concerns about party financing rules.
The Independent Electoral Review was established in 2022 and reported back in November 2023. It recommended that parties forgo access to unlimited donations revenue in exchange for greater state funding; it also proposed a cap on political donations and limiting donors solely to the population of registered voters. It remains to be seen how the new government will respond to this recommendation, which would likely reduce funding for the two major parties and the smaller libertarian right-wing party, but benefit other smaller parties (Independent Electoral Review 2023).
Citations:
Espiner, G. 2023. “Lobbyists in New Zealand Enjoy Freedoms Unlike Most Other Nations in the Developed World.” RNZ, March 25. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/lobbying/486670/lobbyists-in-new-zealand-enjoy-freedoms-unlike-most-other-nations-in-the-developed-world
Independent Electoral Review. 2023. “He Arotake Pōtitanga Motuhake, Independent Electoral Review, Final Report.” November. https://electoralreview.govt.nz/assets/PDF/Independent-Electoral-Review-Final-Report-Executive-Summary-and-List-of-Recommendations.pdf
Kuhner, T. K. 2020. “Reputation vs reality: how vulnerable is New Zealand to systemic corruption?” The Spinoff, 6 March. https://thespinoff.co.nz/politics/06-03-2020/reputation-vs-reality-how-vulnerable-is-new-zealand-to-systemic-corruption
Transparency International. 2022. “Corruptions Perceptions Index.” https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022
Espiner, G. 2023. “Lobbyists in New Zealand Enjoy Freedoms Unlike Most Other Nations in the Developed World.” RNZ, March 25. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/lobbying/486670/lobbyists-in-new-zealand-enjoy-freedoms-unlike-most-other-nations-in-the-developed-world
Independent Electoral Review. 2023. “He Arotake Pōtitanga Motuhake, Independent Electoral Review, Final Report.” November. https://electoralreview.govt.nz/assets/PDF/Independent-Electoral-Review-Final-Report-Executive-Summary-and-List-of-Recommendations.pdf
Kuhner, T. K. 2020. “Reputation vs reality: how vulnerable is New Zealand to systemic corruption?” The Spinoff, 6 March. https://thespinoff.co.nz/politics/06-03-2020/reputation-vs-reality-how-vulnerable-is-new-zealand-to-systemic-corruption
Transparency International. 2022. “Corruptions Perceptions Index.” https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022
Norway
Norway emphasizes transparency in its civil service to minimize the risk of corruption. This involves providing access to public information and ensuring transparency in decision-making processes. The general public – and hence the media – has access, in principle, to all documents in any case through the Freedom of Information Act. Any party directly involved in a case also normally has extended rights to information. A principle of transparency also regulates public procurement processes.
Government agencies are required to implement internal control systems to prevent and detect corruption. Regular audits of financial transactions and processes are conducted to ensure compliance. Independent oversight bodies, such as Økokrim (the National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime) and the Office of the Auditor General, play a crucial role in monitoring and enforcing laws related to corruption. Whistleblower protection mechanisms are in place, allowing employees to report suspicious activities without fear of retaliation.
The financing of political parties is strictly regulated, and all donations from private individuals must be declared and open. The economic interests of all members of parliament and cabinet members are publicly accessible through a separate register. Political commitment to combating corruption is crucial. Norwegian authorities have consistently expressed their dedication to addressing corruption and have taken steps to strengthen legislation when necessary. Continuous efforts are made to reform and improve public sector practices to minimize corruption risks. This includes streamlining processes, enhancing efficiency, and reducing bureaucratic obstacles. The use of data analytics and technology is increasingly employed to identify irregularities and potential corruption within government operations.
Transparency International, an international civil society organization, has an active Norwegian branch that surveys the situation in Norway and provides training for public sector officials on how to implement anti-corruption measures.
Government agencies are required to implement internal control systems to prevent and detect corruption. Regular audits of financial transactions and processes are conducted to ensure compliance. Independent oversight bodies, such as Økokrim (the National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime) and the Office of the Auditor General, play a crucial role in monitoring and enforcing laws related to corruption. Whistleblower protection mechanisms are in place, allowing employees to report suspicious activities without fear of retaliation.
The financing of political parties is strictly regulated, and all donations from private individuals must be declared and open. The economic interests of all members of parliament and cabinet members are publicly accessible through a separate register. Political commitment to combating corruption is crucial. Norwegian authorities have consistently expressed their dedication to addressing corruption and have taken steps to strengthen legislation when necessary. Continuous efforts are made to reform and improve public sector practices to minimize corruption risks. This includes streamlining processes, enhancing efficiency, and reducing bureaucratic obstacles. The use of data analytics and technology is increasingly employed to identify irregularities and potential corruption within government operations.
Transparency International, an international civil society organization, has an active Norwegian branch that surveys the situation in Norway and provides training for public sector officials on how to implement anti-corruption measures.
Citations:
Stortinget. 2024. “Register of Members’ Appointments and Economic Interests.” https://www.stortinget.no/en/In-English/Members-of-the-Storting/Registered-Interest/
National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime (Økokrim). https://www.okokrim.no/oekokrim-in-english.549343.no.html
Transparency International Norway. https://www.transparency.no/in-english
Stortinget. 2024. “Register of Members’ Appointments and Economic Interests.” https://www.stortinget.no/en/In-English/Members-of-the-Storting/Registered-Interest/
National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime (Økokrim). https://www.okokrim.no/oekokrim-in-english.549343.no.html
Transparency International Norway. https://www.transparency.no/in-english
Sweden
Corruption is addressed by a special unit within the Swedish Prosecution Authority (Åklagarmyndigheten, n.d.). Sweden’s transparency systems, characterized by low power discretion within the administration, high freedom of the press, and an autonomous judiciary, result in the country having one of the lowest levels of corruption globally. It ranks 5th out of 143 countries. The country excels in both de facto and de jure transparency. However, there has been concern in the past decade regarding attempts by Swedish companies conducting transactions abroad to gain a competitive advantage (Corruption Risk, 2023).
The Government Offices issued an action plan to combat corruption in public administration for 2021 – 2023. The strategies include better controls integrated into organizational operations, risk analyses, increased knowledge and ethical practices, routines for handling suspected corruption, and collaboration for experience sharing (Government Offices, 2020). A report evaluating this action plan and the efforts of public agencies against corruption was expected on December 31, 2023, but was not yet available at the time of writing this report.
The Government Offices issued an action plan to combat corruption in public administration for 2021 – 2023. The strategies include better controls integrated into organizational operations, risk analyses, increased knowledge and ethical practices, routines for handling suspected corruption, and collaboration for experience sharing (Government Offices, 2020). A report evaluating this action plan and the efforts of public agencies against corruption was expected on December 31, 2023, but was not yet available at the time of writing this report.
Citations:
Corruption Risk. 2023. “Sweden.” https://www.corruptionrisk.org/country/?country=SWE
Government Offices of Sweden. 2020. “Ett utvecklat arbete mot korruption i den offentliga förvaltningen. Handlingsplan mot korruption 2021-2023.” https://www.regeringen.se/regeringsuppdrag/2020/12/uppdrag-att-framja-arbetet-mot-korruption-i-den-offentliga-forvaltningen/
Åklagarmyndigheten. n.d. “Korruptionsbrott.” https://www.aklagare.se/om-brottsligheten/olika-brottstyper/Korruptionsbrott/
Corruption Risk. 2023. “Sweden.” https://www.corruptionrisk.org/country/?country=SWE
Government Offices of Sweden. 2020. “Ett utvecklat arbete mot korruption i den offentliga förvaltningen. Handlingsplan mot korruption 2021-2023.” https://www.regeringen.se/regeringsuppdrag/2020/12/uppdrag-att-framja-arbetet-mot-korruption-i-den-offentliga-forvaltningen/
Åklagarmyndigheten. n.d. “Korruptionsbrott.” https://www.aklagare.se/om-brottsligheten/olika-brottstyper/Korruptionsbrott/
Switzerland
Corruption in Switzerland is rare according to international rankings. Indeed, Switzerland is consistently rated as being among the most successful countries with respect to corruption prevention. The country is governed by the rule of law, has clear rules on corruption that are implemented effectively, offers high wages to public officials, and is based on a decentralized democracy with parties that efficiently control and audit public officials.
However, there are opportunities and incentives for political and societal elites to abuse their positions for private interests. This is due to the country’s small size and the correspondingly small number of people interacting in elite positions; to the culture of amicable agreement; and to the very pragmatic problem-solving culture. In addition, holders of elite positions know they are highly likely to meet again in the future (and probably in different roles). This creates opportunities for the creation of broad informal networks, a reluctance to engage in close mutual surveillance and incentives for the non-observance of formal rules.
Given the considerable overlap between economic and political elites (Bühlmann et al. 2012), critics have pointed to processes in which politicians’ economic interests may influence their decisions in parliament. Although it is legal, and does not fall within the realm of corruption, Swiss non-professionalized parliamentarians frequently sit on several organizational boards (e.g., of health insurance companies) in addition to their political activities, which leads to conflicts of interest.
There have been recurrent scandals about corruption. However, the overall level of corruption seems to be very low in Switzerland as compared with other countries. If there is evidence of corruption, officeholders are held accountable and face penalties. The problems listed above are clearly minor in international comparison. In contrast, Switzerland is little inclined to sanction domestic companies that engage in corruption or laundering (Transparency International Switzerland 2023).
As of the last national election, transparency rules on the private financing of political parties have been implemented. However, they are less stringent than those of other European democracies. This is due to the lack of public financing provided to political parties and the corresponding notion that the state must not monitor or intervene in the exchanges between citizens and their nonpublic organizations.
The members of the national parliament are required to disclose their links to organizations.
However, there are opportunities and incentives for political and societal elites to abuse their positions for private interests. This is due to the country’s small size and the correspondingly small number of people interacting in elite positions; to the culture of amicable agreement; and to the very pragmatic problem-solving culture. In addition, holders of elite positions know they are highly likely to meet again in the future (and probably in different roles). This creates opportunities for the creation of broad informal networks, a reluctance to engage in close mutual surveillance and incentives for the non-observance of formal rules.
Given the considerable overlap between economic and political elites (Bühlmann et al. 2012), critics have pointed to processes in which politicians’ economic interests may influence their decisions in parliament. Although it is legal, and does not fall within the realm of corruption, Swiss non-professionalized parliamentarians frequently sit on several organizational boards (e.g., of health insurance companies) in addition to their political activities, which leads to conflicts of interest.
There have been recurrent scandals about corruption. However, the overall level of corruption seems to be very low in Switzerland as compared with other countries. If there is evidence of corruption, officeholders are held accountable and face penalties. The problems listed above are clearly minor in international comparison. In contrast, Switzerland is little inclined to sanction domestic companies that engage in corruption or laundering (Transparency International Switzerland 2023).
As of the last national election, transparency rules on the private financing of political parties have been implemented. However, they are less stringent than those of other European democracies. This is due to the lack of public financing provided to political parties and the corresponding notion that the state must not monitor or intervene in the exchanges between citizens and their nonpublic organizations.
The members of the national parliament are required to disclose their links to organizations.
Citations:
Felix Bühlmann, Thomas David, and André Mach. 2012. “Political and Economic Elites in Switzerland.” European Societies 14 (5): 727-754. DOI: 10.1080/14616696.2012.709531
Transparency International Switzerland. 2023. “Rapport Poursuite Penale de l’Entreprise.” https://transparency.ch/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Rapport_Poursuite_penale_de_lentreprise.pdf
https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-90040.html
Felix Bühlmann, Thomas David, and André Mach. 2012. “Political and Economic Elites in Switzerland.” European Societies 14 (5): 727-754. DOI: 10.1080/14616696.2012.709531
Transparency International Switzerland. 2023. “Rapport Poursuite Penale de l’Entreprise.” https://transparency.ch/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Rapport_Poursuite_penale_de_lentreprise.pdf
https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-90040.html
Most integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
8
Germany
It is generally assumed that corruption is relatively rare in Germany. This implies that cases of corruption are nonetheless detected, such as the procurement of masks for the pandemic (Handelsblatt, 2021) or the case of overspending and bribery at the public broadcaster RBB (Tagesschau, 2022).
Germany has robust legal frameworks to combat corruption. Relevant laws include the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch), which criminalizes corruption-related offenses such as bribery, embezzlement, and fraud. Germany is also a signatory of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (Corruption Risk, 2023). Additionally, the Lobbying Register Act, which requires representatives of special interests to register at the Bundestag, came into force in January 2022. Regulatory bodies such as the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority and the Federal Court of Audit oversee financial institutions, auditors, and accounting practices to ensure compliance with regulatory standards.
As for party financing regulations aimed at preventing corruption, parties are required to report their finances annually. However, there are very few limitations on procuring private income. For instance, only donations from corporations and anonymous donations over a certain amount are banned, and income sources such as political foundations are prohibited. Public funding is allocated based on the results of the previous elections, with no specific regulations on how the funds should be distributed. Parties are banned from vote buying, which constitutes the only regulation on party spending. Sanctions for violating the laws include fines or the loss of public funding (EuroPam, 2017).
Regarding the regulations for officeholders, including ministers and members of parliament, they are required to declare interests in a company, gifts, further remunerated activities, and stocks that come with more than 25% of voting rights. Members of parliament must also declare additional income sources and positions on advisory bodies of companies and foundations. Members of parliament only face sanctions for late or non-filing of their declarations with the president of the parliament. The head of state, in contrast, is not bound by the financial disclosure legislation (EuroPam, 2017).
Both the financial reports by political parties and the declarations by officeholders are made public. While Germany receives a full score for its de jure transparency, it has a de facto transparency score of 9.5 out of 14, which is below the regional average. This score results from the fact that some public financial data is only partially accessible or available (Corruption Risk, 2023).
The Council of Europe’s Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) made 14 recommendations, raising various issues regarding the implementation of integrity mechanisms. The 2022 GRECO report considers only one of these recommendations to be implemented satisfactorily: the training on integrity for the Federal Police. Still, GRECO criticizes Germany for not enhancing the monitoring capacities of the Federal Police. The other recommendations have either been only partly implemented or not implemented at all. The report specifically criticizes that many representatives of special interests are not affected by the Lobby Register Act and that further rules should be implemented to disclose more detailed information about lobbyist contacts (GRECO, 2022).
Germany has robust legal frameworks to combat corruption. Relevant laws include the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch), which criminalizes corruption-related offenses such as bribery, embezzlement, and fraud. Germany is also a signatory of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (Corruption Risk, 2023). Additionally, the Lobbying Register Act, which requires representatives of special interests to register at the Bundestag, came into force in January 2022. Regulatory bodies such as the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority and the Federal Court of Audit oversee financial institutions, auditors, and accounting practices to ensure compliance with regulatory standards.
As for party financing regulations aimed at preventing corruption, parties are required to report their finances annually. However, there are very few limitations on procuring private income. For instance, only donations from corporations and anonymous donations over a certain amount are banned, and income sources such as political foundations are prohibited. Public funding is allocated based on the results of the previous elections, with no specific regulations on how the funds should be distributed. Parties are banned from vote buying, which constitutes the only regulation on party spending. Sanctions for violating the laws include fines or the loss of public funding (EuroPam, 2017).
Regarding the regulations for officeholders, including ministers and members of parliament, they are required to declare interests in a company, gifts, further remunerated activities, and stocks that come with more than 25% of voting rights. Members of parliament must also declare additional income sources and positions on advisory bodies of companies and foundations. Members of parliament only face sanctions for late or non-filing of their declarations with the president of the parliament. The head of state, in contrast, is not bound by the financial disclosure legislation (EuroPam, 2017).
Both the financial reports by political parties and the declarations by officeholders are made public. While Germany receives a full score for its de jure transparency, it has a de facto transparency score of 9.5 out of 14, which is below the regional average. This score results from the fact that some public financial data is only partially accessible or available (Corruption Risk, 2023).
The Council of Europe’s Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) made 14 recommendations, raising various issues regarding the implementation of integrity mechanisms. The 2022 GRECO report considers only one of these recommendations to be implemented satisfactorily: the training on integrity for the Federal Police. Still, GRECO criticizes Germany for not enhancing the monitoring capacities of the Federal Police. The other recommendations have either been only partly implemented or not implemented at all. The report specifically criticizes that many representatives of special interests are not affected by the Lobby Register Act and that further rules should be implemented to disclose more detailed information about lobbyist contacts (GRECO, 2022).
Citations:
Corruption Risk. 2023. “Germany.” https://www.corruptionrisk.org/country/?country=DEU#transparency
EuroPam. 2017. “Germany.” https://www.europam.eu/?module=country-profile&country=Germany
GRECO. 2022. “Council of Europe, Group of States against Corruption, Fifth Evaluation Round, Preventing corruption and promoting integrity in central governments (top executive functions) and law enforcement agencies, Compliance Report Germany.” https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/1680aa89ee
Handelsblatt. 2021. “Millionen aus der Maskenaffäre: Das haben die Unions-Politiker mit ihren Corona-Provisionen gemacht.” https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/pandemie-profiteure-millionen-aus-der-maskenaffaere-das-haben-die-unions-politiker-mit-ihren-corona-provisionen-gemacht/27200534.html
Tagesschau. 2022. “Falsche Abrechnungen und fehlerhafte Verträge.” https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/kontraste/rbb-zwischenbericht-101.html
Corruption Risk. 2023. “Germany.” https://www.corruptionrisk.org/country/?country=DEU#transparency
EuroPam. 2017. “Germany.” https://www.europam.eu/?module=country-profile&country=Germany
GRECO. 2022. “Council of Europe, Group of States against Corruption, Fifth Evaluation Round, Preventing corruption and promoting integrity in central governments (top executive functions) and law enforcement agencies, Compliance Report Germany.” https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/1680aa89ee
Handelsblatt. 2021. “Millionen aus der Maskenaffäre: Das haben die Unions-Politiker mit ihren Corona-Provisionen gemacht.” https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/pandemie-profiteure-millionen-aus-der-maskenaffaere-das-haben-die-unions-politiker-mit-ihren-corona-provisionen-gemacht/27200534.html
Tagesschau. 2022. “Falsche Abrechnungen und fehlerhafte Verträge.” https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/kontraste/rbb-zwischenbericht-101.html
Ireland
The history of corruption in Ireland includes several high-profile tribunals concerning land rezoning, planning, media and telephone licenses, construction and the meat industry, involving prominent politicians. Public awareness of corruption is high, leading to high self-assessment scores in GRECO and TPI benchmarking exercises, although these scores can often be attributed to perception and awareness. Nonetheless, there have been genuine instances of planning and policing corruption, particularly in relation to issuing and recording traffic penalties in recent years.
Established public accounting standards facilitate the detection of corruption. The Standards in Public Office Commission (SIPO) regulates and monitors party and political financing, including third-party political financing from abroad. This involves limits on private income, direct public funding of parties, spending regulations, reporting, oversight and sanctions. Rules for officeholders with a certain income or level of function include asset declarations, conflict of interest declarations and associated reporting, sanctions, oversight and enhancing accountability. The system of public procurement procedures, guided by EU directives, is complex but transparent, covering scope, information availability and open competition.
The Regulation of Lobbying Act, passed in 2015, established an extensive web-based register for lobbying, actively used by lobbyists. The database is searchable by lobbyist, target, content and intended outcomes, promoting open and transparent policymaking (Murphy 2018). The Office of Lobbying Regulation, within SIPO, has an enforcement role. Independent of government, industry and other sectional interests, these integrity mechanisms are effectively implemented, with relatively good compliance, prosecutions and penalties, leading to two recent high-profile ministerial resignations.
Surveys of trust in public institutions in 2022 found that 76% of respondents in Ireland had high expectations for the fair processing of applications for government benefits or services (Boyle et al. 2022). However, 39% also believed that a public employee in Ireland was likely to accept a bribe, the fourth highest percentage among countries surveyed. GRECO (2022) found that Ireland had satisfactorily implemented only three of 11 previous GRECO recommendations related to ethics, standards in public office, and judicial appointments, rating the compliance level as “globally unsatisfactory.” While the “non-compliance procedure” was applied, some issues have since been addressed. In July 2023, the government approved orders to transfer responsibility for functions related to ethics legislation and the Standards in Public Office Commission to the Minister for Public Expenditure, NDP Delivery and Reform. These include functions under the Ethics in Public Office Act 1995, the Standards in Public Office Act 2001 (known as the Ethics Acts), the Regulation of Lobbying Act 2015, the Regulation of Lobbying (Amendment) Act 2022, the Ministerial and Parliamentary Offices Act 1938 (as amended), and the Electoral Act 1997 (as amended), addressing one of the outstanding issues in GRECO (2022) compliance.
Established public accounting standards facilitate the detection of corruption. The Standards in Public Office Commission (SIPO) regulates and monitors party and political financing, including third-party political financing from abroad. This involves limits on private income, direct public funding of parties, spending regulations, reporting, oversight and sanctions. Rules for officeholders with a certain income or level of function include asset declarations, conflict of interest declarations and associated reporting, sanctions, oversight and enhancing accountability. The system of public procurement procedures, guided by EU directives, is complex but transparent, covering scope, information availability and open competition.
The Regulation of Lobbying Act, passed in 2015, established an extensive web-based register for lobbying, actively used by lobbyists. The database is searchable by lobbyist, target, content and intended outcomes, promoting open and transparent policymaking (Murphy 2018). The Office of Lobbying Regulation, within SIPO, has an enforcement role. Independent of government, industry and other sectional interests, these integrity mechanisms are effectively implemented, with relatively good compliance, prosecutions and penalties, leading to two recent high-profile ministerial resignations.
Surveys of trust in public institutions in 2022 found that 76% of respondents in Ireland had high expectations for the fair processing of applications for government benefits or services (Boyle et al. 2022). However, 39% also believed that a public employee in Ireland was likely to accept a bribe, the fourth highest percentage among countries surveyed. GRECO (2022) found that Ireland had satisfactorily implemented only three of 11 previous GRECO recommendations related to ethics, standards in public office, and judicial appointments, rating the compliance level as “globally unsatisfactory.” While the “non-compliance procedure” was applied, some issues have since been addressed. In July 2023, the government approved orders to transfer responsibility for functions related to ethics legislation and the Standards in Public Office Commission to the Minister for Public Expenditure, NDP Delivery and Reform. These include functions under the Ethics in Public Office Act 1995, the Standards in Public Office Act 2001 (known as the Ethics Acts), the Regulation of Lobbying Act 2015, the Regulation of Lobbying (Amendment) Act 2022, the Ministerial and Parliamentary Offices Act 1938 (as amended), and the Electoral Act 1997 (as amended), addressing one of the outstanding issues in GRECO (2022) compliance.
Citations:
Boyle, R., O’Leary, F., and O’Neill, J. 2022. Public Sector Trends. Dublin: Institute of Public Administration (IPA).
Murphy, G. 2018. “The Policymaking Process.” In Politics in the Republic of Ireland, eds. J. Coakley and M. Gallagher, 270-294. London: Routledge.
Council of Europe Portal. 2022. “GRECO Ireland - Publication of the Second Compliance Report of the 4th Evaluation Round - Group of States against Corruption.” https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/-/ireland-publication-of-the-second-compliance-report-of-the-4th-evaluation-round
Byrne, E. 2012. Political Corruption in Ireland 1922–2010: A Crooked Harp?. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Boyle, R., O’Leary, F., and O’Neill, J. 2022. Public Sector Trends. Dublin: Institute of Public Administration (IPA).
Murphy, G. 2018. “The Policymaking Process.” In Politics in the Republic of Ireland, eds. J. Coakley and M. Gallagher, 270-294. London: Routledge.
Council of Europe Portal. 2022. “GRECO Ireland - Publication of the Second Compliance Report of the 4th Evaluation Round - Group of States against Corruption.” https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/-/ireland-publication-of-the-second-compliance-report-of-the-4th-evaluation-round
Byrne, E. 2012. Political Corruption in Ireland 1922–2010: A Crooked Harp?. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Latvia
Several mechanisms are in place to prevent public officials from abusing their positions for private interests. Latvia has established public accounting standards to detect corruption. The State Treasury is responsible for developing public sector accounting standards legislation. According to the Latvian Association of Certified Auditors and the Association of Accountants, Latvian public sector accounting standards are based on accrual-based principles (IFAC, CIPFA 2020). The financial statements for central and local governments and government-related entities are broadly International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) compliant, except for accounting for tax revenue, which will continue to be on a cash basis with the ultimate goal of transitioning to an accrual basis for tax accounting.
Regulations concerning party financing aim to prevent corruption and include bans and limits on private income, direct public funding, spending regulations, reporting, oversight, and sanctions. To ensure transparency, legality, and compliance, the Law on Financing of Political Organizations (Political Parties) requires parties to submit key data to the Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau. This information is then published online and includes details on donations, membership fees, election revenue and expenditure declarations, and annual reports.
Officials are subject to rules such as asset declarations, conflict of interest regulations, and codes of conduct; these include income and asset reporting, incompatibilities, sanctions, and oversight. Rules have been established to enhance the transparency of public procurement procedures, covering scope, information availability, and open competition. The National Audit Office has also assessed procurement conducted during COVID-19.
Regulations concerning party financing aim to prevent corruption and include bans and limits on private income, direct public funding, spending regulations, reporting, oversight, and sanctions. To ensure transparency, legality, and compliance, the Law on Financing of Political Organizations (Political Parties) requires parties to submit key data to the Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau. This information is then published online and includes details on donations, membership fees, election revenue and expenditure declarations, and annual reports.
Officials are subject to rules such as asset declarations, conflict of interest regulations, and codes of conduct; these include income and asset reporting, incompatibilities, sanctions, and oversight. Rules have been established to enhance the transparency of public procurement procedures, covering scope, information availability, and open competition. The National Audit Office has also assessed procurement conducted during COVID-19.
Citations:
1. The Cabinet of Ministers. 2018. “Cabinet Regulation No. 87 Accounting Procedures for Budget Institutions.” https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/297134-accounting-procedures-for-budget-institutions
2. Korupcijas novēršanas un apkarošanas birojs. Partiju finansēšana. (In Latvian) https://www.knab.gov.lv/lv/partiju-finansesana (accessed: 01.12.2023).
Saeima. 1995. Law on Financing of Political Organisations (Parties). https://likumi.lv/ta/id/36189-politisko-organizaciju-partiju-finansesanas-likums
Saeima. 2002. “On Prevention of Conflict of Interest in Activities of Public Officials.” https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/61913-on-prevention-of-conflict-of-interest-in-activities-of-public-officials
Saeima. 2016. Public Procurement Law. https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/287760-public-procurement-law
Latvijas Republikas Valsts kontrole. “Noslēgtas revīzijas.” https://www.lrvk.gov.lv/lv/revizijas/revizijas/noslegtas-revizijas?area=&type=&municipality=&department=&published=1&search=iepirkumi&resor=&start_date=&end_date=
1. The Cabinet of Ministers. 2018. “Cabinet Regulation No. 87 Accounting Procedures for Budget Institutions.” https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/297134-accounting-procedures-for-budget-institutions
2. Korupcijas novēršanas un apkarošanas birojs. Partiju finansēšana. (In Latvian) https://www.knab.gov.lv/lv/partiju-finansesana (accessed: 01.12.2023).
Saeima. 1995. Law on Financing of Political Organisations (Parties). https://likumi.lv/ta/id/36189-politisko-organizaciju-partiju-finansesanas-likums
Saeima. 2002. “On Prevention of Conflict of Interest in Activities of Public Officials.” https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/61913-on-prevention-of-conflict-of-interest-in-activities-of-public-officials
Saeima. 2016. Public Procurement Law. https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/287760-public-procurement-law
Latvijas Republikas Valsts kontrole. “Noslēgtas revīzijas.” https://www.lrvk.gov.lv/lv/revizijas/revizijas/noslegtas-revizijas?area=&type=&municipality=&department=&published=1&search=iepirkumi&resor=&start_date=&end_date=
UK
The United Kingdom is relatively free of explicit corruption, such as bribery or fraud, and there is little evidence that such corruption influences decision-making at the national level. Anti-corruption regulations were consolidated in the 2004 Corruption Bill, and the UK consistently scores well on most international comparisons of corruption.
Occasional episodes of limited and small-scale corruption do arise at the local level, usually related to property development. Parliamentarians are subject to strict rules regarding declarations of payments. Those found in breach, even on a minor scale, are subject to punishment by their peers based on investigations by the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards. A common penalty is suspension from the House of Commons. If the suspension exceeds 10 days, it can trigger a recall petition from voters. If more than 10% of the constituency electorate signs the petition, the member of Parliament must resign.
Although cases of corruption are infrequent, the fact that some (often obscure) politicians fail to adhere to the rules highlights a gap between politicians’ behavior and public expectations, a lingering effect of the 2009 expenses scandal. A more subtle form of corruption occurs when politicians leave office and subsequently lobby for specific interests, exploiting their connections. For example, former Prime Minister David Cameron was implicated in the lobbying scandal involving Greensill, a financial services company that collapsed with huge debts in 2021. Allegations resurfaced when Cameron was appointed foreign secretary in November 2023.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, contracts awarded to firms associated with Conservative parliamentarians led to an inquiry by the National Audit Office. The inquiry criticized the suspension of normal procurement rules, which resulted in highly profitable contracts, such as those involving Conservative member of the Lords, Baroness Mone. These actions have been widely condemned in the media and public debate. The most plausible explanation is that the government, in its desperation to secure necessary supplies, failed to exercise due diligence, rather than deliberate corruption. The public inquiry into the handling of the pandemic, conducted by Baroness Hallett, has shed some light on these matters, but her final report is not expected until 2025 or later.
Occasional episodes of limited and small-scale corruption do arise at the local level, usually related to property development. Parliamentarians are subject to strict rules regarding declarations of payments. Those found in breach, even on a minor scale, are subject to punishment by their peers based on investigations by the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards. A common penalty is suspension from the House of Commons. If the suspension exceeds 10 days, it can trigger a recall petition from voters. If more than 10% of the constituency electorate signs the petition, the member of Parliament must resign.
Although cases of corruption are infrequent, the fact that some (often obscure) politicians fail to adhere to the rules highlights a gap between politicians’ behavior and public expectations, a lingering effect of the 2009 expenses scandal. A more subtle form of corruption occurs when politicians leave office and subsequently lobby for specific interests, exploiting their connections. For example, former Prime Minister David Cameron was implicated in the lobbying scandal involving Greensill, a financial services company that collapsed with huge debts in 2021. Allegations resurfaced when Cameron was appointed foreign secretary in November 2023.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, contracts awarded to firms associated with Conservative parliamentarians led to an inquiry by the National Audit Office. The inquiry criticized the suspension of normal procurement rules, which resulted in highly profitable contracts, such as those involving Conservative member of the Lords, Baroness Mone. These actions have been widely condemned in the media and public debate. The most plausible explanation is that the government, in its desperation to secure necessary supplies, failed to exercise due diligence, rather than deliberate corruption. The public inquiry into the handling of the pandemic, conducted by Baroness Hallett, has shed some light on these matters, but her final report is not expected until 2025 or later.
7
Australia
Australia is a low-corruption country with evidence suggesting that instances of explicit corruption, such as bribery, are extremely rare. However, there is a widespread perception of corruption in public life, partly due to a lack of transparency or practices not conducive to the public interest. Political financing practices and government contract awarding processes raise concerns about favorable treatment and inappropriate personal gain.
Questions of propriety are also occasionally raised with respect to the awarding of government contracts. Tender processes are not always open, and “commercial-in-confidence” is often cited as the reason for non-disclosure of contracts with private sector firms, raising concerns of favorable treatment extended to friends or favored constituents. Questions of inappropriate personal gain have also been raised when ministers leave parliament to immediately take up positions in companies they had been responsible for regulating – most recently occurring after the 2022 election.
In the past year, the federal government has established a new National Anticorruption Commission (NACC) with broad powers to investigate corruption across the Commonwealth public sector (Knaus 2023). ll states and territories have operated with integrity agencies for several decades, so the creation of this new body addresses a major gap in the country’s integrity framework. It remains to be seen whether the new organization will have a positive impact not only on actual corruption, but also on perceptions of corruption in the community. Despite the new institution, there remain concerns that whistleblowers, who expose corruption, are inadequately protected across Australian jurisdictions (Transparency International 2023).
Questions of propriety are also occasionally raised with respect to the awarding of government contracts. Tender processes are not always open, and “commercial-in-confidence” is often cited as the reason for non-disclosure of contracts with private sector firms, raising concerns of favorable treatment extended to friends or favored constituents. Questions of inappropriate personal gain have also been raised when ministers leave parliament to immediately take up positions in companies they had been responsible for regulating – most recently occurring after the 2022 election.
In the past year, the federal government has established a new National Anticorruption Commission (NACC) with broad powers to investigate corruption across the Commonwealth public sector (Knaus 2023). ll states and territories have operated with integrity agencies for several decades, so the creation of this new body addresses a major gap in the country’s integrity framework. It remains to be seen whether the new organization will have a positive impact not only on actual corruption, but also on perceptions of corruption in the community. Despite the new institution, there remain concerns that whistleblowers, who expose corruption, are inadequately protected across Australian jurisdictions (Transparency International 2023).
Citations:
Transparency International. 2023. “Stronger Whistleblower Protections Key to Holding ‘Big Four’ Accountable, Hears Parliamentary Inquiry.” Transparency International Australia. https://transparency.org.au/whistleblower-protections-key/
Knaus, Christopher. 2023. “Australia Lifts Ranking on Global Anti-Corruption Index After Hitting Record Low.” The Guardian January 31. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/jan/31/australia-lifts-ranking-on-global-anti-corruption-index-after-hitting-record-low
Transparency International. 2023. “Stronger Whistleblower Protections Key to Holding ‘Big Four’ Accountable, Hears Parliamentary Inquiry.” Transparency International Australia. https://transparency.org.au/whistleblower-protections-key/
Knaus, Christopher. 2023. “Australia Lifts Ranking on Global Anti-Corruption Index After Hitting Record Low.” The Guardian January 31. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/jan/31/australia-lifts-ranking-on-global-anti-corruption-index-after-hitting-record-low
Austria
The 2021 Index for Public Integrity (Subcategory: Corruption Risk Forecast Report) ranks Austria 13th in the world for public integrity, showing significant change over the past 12 years: “Its good control of corruption showed in recent years when a new generation of politicians broke the established integrity norms, but they were eventually brought to account for their acts. Although in the past the country managed to control corruption despite low transparency and high reliance on networking, the limits of these past arrangements seem to have been reached. To prevent further abuse of office as seen in recent scandals, Austria needs more fiscal transparency, access to information and transparent monitoring of assets and interests of public officials.”
Other sources have drawn a considerably less favorable picture. In 2023, Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) criticized the state of affairs in Austria harshly, pointing to severe deficiencies regarding transparency and noting political influence exerted on staffing top positions within the police (Graber and Schmid 2023). Further, the same source criticized a notable lack of transparency, integrity, and quality standards at the level of cabinet ministers, cabinet staff, and general secretaries. It was even suggested to disclose the financial circumstances not only of the officeholders themselves but also of their spouses and other close relatives.
The branch of special prosecutors dedicated to combating political corruption (WKStA), established in 2011 and currently featuring about 40 prosecutors, is partially independent from the Ministry of Justice. However, the WKStA’s independence is limited to certain aspects of its activities, leading some observers to argue that the possibility of political influence remains. GRECO inspectors also criticized that the established reporting duties to the Ministry of Justice are extremely time-consuming and may keep prosecutors away from other tasks (Graber and Schmid 2023). These reports were also seen as a potential gateway to indiscretions and interventions in ongoing inquiries. The WKStA continues to suffer from attacks by the executive branch.
A final fact worth noting is the alarming state of public views on Austrian authorities concerning corruption: In 2023, no less than 62% of the electorate considered Austria a “corrupt” or “very corrupt” country (Seidl 2023). The three major parties (ÖVP, SPÖ, and FPÖ), the ORF, and the building authorities were considered the most corrupt organizations, while the Austrian army (Bundesheer) was viewed as the least corrupt among 21 possible choices. Several recent corruption scandals involved local politicians who have considerable leeway in deciding on construction projects.
Other sources have drawn a considerably less favorable picture. In 2023, Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) criticized the state of affairs in Austria harshly, pointing to severe deficiencies regarding transparency and noting political influence exerted on staffing top positions within the police (Graber and Schmid 2023). Further, the same source criticized a notable lack of transparency, integrity, and quality standards at the level of cabinet ministers, cabinet staff, and general secretaries. It was even suggested to disclose the financial circumstances not only of the officeholders themselves but also of their spouses and other close relatives.
The branch of special prosecutors dedicated to combating political corruption (WKStA), established in 2011 and currently featuring about 40 prosecutors, is partially independent from the Ministry of Justice. However, the WKStA’s independence is limited to certain aspects of its activities, leading some observers to argue that the possibility of political influence remains. GRECO inspectors also criticized that the established reporting duties to the Ministry of Justice are extremely time-consuming and may keep prosecutors away from other tasks (Graber and Schmid 2023). These reports were also seen as a potential gateway to indiscretions and interventions in ongoing inquiries. The WKStA continues to suffer from attacks by the executive branch.
A final fact worth noting is the alarming state of public views on Austrian authorities concerning corruption: In 2023, no less than 62% of the electorate considered Austria a “corrupt” or “very corrupt” country (Seidl 2023). The three major parties (ÖVP, SPÖ, and FPÖ), the ORF, and the building authorities were considered the most corrupt organizations, while the Austrian army (Bundesheer) was viewed as the least corrupt among 21 possible choices. Several recent corruption scandals involved local politicians who have considerable leeway in deciding on construction projects.
Citations:
Graber, Renate, and Fabian Schmid. 2023. “Europarat stellt Österreich ein schlechtes Zeugnis bei der Korruptionsbekämpfung aus.” https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000142546440/europarat-stellt-oesterreich-schlechtes-zeugnis-bei-korruptionsbekaempfung-aus
Seidl, Conrad. 2023. “Jeder Vierte hält Österreich für ein sehr korruptes Land.” https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000145265188/jeder-vierte-haelt-oesterreich-fuer-ein-sehr-korruptes-land
https://www.corruptionrisk.org/transparency/
Graber, Renate, and Fabian Schmid. 2023. “Europarat stellt Österreich ein schlechtes Zeugnis bei der Korruptionsbekämpfung aus.” https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000142546440/europarat-stellt-oesterreich-schlechtes-zeugnis-bei-korruptionsbekaempfung-aus
Seidl, Conrad. 2023. “Jeder Vierte hält Österreich für ein sehr korruptes Land.” https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000145265188/jeder-vierte-haelt-oesterreich-fuer-ein-sehr-korruptes-land
https://www.corruptionrisk.org/transparency/
Belgium
Belgium has extensive financial disclosure legislation to prevent officials from entering situations of conflict of interest. However, these regulations have limited effectiveness due to a lack of control, fines, and transparency in reporting.
In 2013, the OECD published a report on bribery, expressing disappointment at Belgium’s lack of priority in combating bribery. The report highlighted the lack of resources for investigations, prosecutions, and sentencing. The EuroPAM database reveals that the situation remains largely unchanged. In practice, this translates into repeated situations that do not qualify as explicit corruption but are morally unacceptable to the public. A recurrent issue is the creation of semi-public entities run by political appointees who get involved in payment or procurement situations that test the limits of the law. While legal provisions to reinforce transparency and prevention remain lacking, public scandals and proactive actions by the judiciary are progressively addressing these issues. Recently, the risk of outright corruption has increased due to the global expansion of criminal organizations and shifts in political balances, such as Middle Eastern countries seeking political support in European parliaments. Belgium is particularly exposed to these risks. The Port of Antwerp is one entry point exploited by drug traffickers, and the presence of international institutions in Brussels makes it tempting to lobby politicians. The absence of a well-funded anti-corruption agency in Belgium reinforces these risks.
In 2013, the OECD published a report on bribery, expressing disappointment at Belgium’s lack of priority in combating bribery. The report highlighted the lack of resources for investigations, prosecutions, and sentencing. The EuroPAM database reveals that the situation remains largely unchanged. In practice, this translates into repeated situations that do not qualify as explicit corruption but are morally unacceptable to the public. A recurrent issue is the creation of semi-public entities run by political appointees who get involved in payment or procurement situations that test the limits of the law. While legal provisions to reinforce transparency and prevention remain lacking, public scandals and proactive actions by the judiciary are progressively addressing these issues. Recently, the risk of outright corruption has increased due to the global expansion of criminal organizations and shifts in political balances, such as Middle Eastern countries seeking political support in European parliaments. Belgium is particularly exposed to these risks. The Port of Antwerp is one entry point exploited by drug traffickers, and the presence of international institutions in Brussels makes it tempting to lobby politicians. The absence of a well-funded anti-corruption agency in Belgium reinforces these risks.
Citations:
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_d%27affaires_politico-financi%C3%A8res_belges
https://www.lesoir.be/537086/article/2023-09-14/qatargate-les-suspects-devant-la-chambre-des-mises-en-accusation-ce-mardi
https://www.lesoir.be/art/d-20230119-407MPX
https://www.lesoir.be/art/d-20230213-40TMU1
https://www.lecho.be/opinions/canal-nord-sud/chronique-canal-nord-sud-le-retour-des-affaires-et-des-raccourcis/10434606.html
https://www.lesoir.be/354149/article/2021-02-09/scandale-en-flandre-rutten-vld-justifie-loctroi-de-50000-euros-la-societe-dune
Europese anticorruptiewaakhond geeft België minder dan 2 op 10 | De Standaard : https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20220124_98043706
Onderbemand en geen leiding: strijd tegen corruptie is zwalpende scheepstanker | De Standaard: https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20190514_04400141
Regering voert strijd op tegen corruptie bij politie en cipiers | De Standaard: https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20220807_97544880
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_d%27affaires_politico-financi%C3%A8res_belges
https://www.lesoir.be/537086/article/2023-09-14/qatargate-les-suspects-devant-la-chambre-des-mises-en-accusation-ce-mardi
https://www.lesoir.be/art/d-20230119-407MPX
https://www.lesoir.be/art/d-20230213-40TMU1
https://www.lecho.be/opinions/canal-nord-sud/chronique-canal-nord-sud-le-retour-des-affaires-et-des-raccourcis/10434606.html
https://www.lesoir.be/354149/article/2021-02-09/scandale-en-flandre-rutten-vld-justifie-loctroi-de-50000-euros-la-societe-dune
Europese anticorruptiewaakhond geeft België minder dan 2 op 10 | De Standaard : https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20220124_98043706
Onderbemand en geen leiding: strijd tegen corruptie is zwalpende scheepstanker | De Standaard: https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20190514_04400141
Regering voert strijd op tegen corruptie bij politie en cipiers | De Standaard: https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20220807_97544880
France
Corruption has historically been an issue in French politics, associated especially with low levels of campaign financing. Throughout the 1990s, a series of scandals led to lawsuits and sometimes to the conviction of leading politicians. Things have improved, but scandals continue to play a role in French politics. Most importantly, the leading candidate of the conservative camp in 2017, François Fillon, would probably have had a serious chance at winning the presidential election had it not been for two parallel scandals that clearly alienated a nontrivial share of his voters.
The first bill introduced by Emmanuel Macron’s government after the 2017 election dealt with the “moralization of politics,” barring parliamentarians from employing family members, and increasing oversight of their travel and representation budgets. This has apparently led to new and more in-depth monitoring of candidates to government positions.
There are nonetheless several ongoing issues. Former President Nicolas Sarkozy received guilty verdicts in two different cases in 2021, one concerning campaign finance and the other corruption. He has appealed both decisions, and new rulings were expected in the first quarter of 2024.
The Macron government has not been free of scandals, and Macron put an end to the traditional convention that indicted ministers would be expected to step down from government. Two ministers have recently faced trial. Minister of Labor Olivier Dussopt stood trial in November 2023 due to irregularities in public contracting when he was mayor of the city of Annonay. Minister of Justice Eric Dupond-Moretti was recently acquitted of charges of conflict of interest.
Overall, the situation appears to have improved over the long term, but the government has provided sometimes contradictory signals. A study by French Anti-corruption Agency (AFA), a state agency attached to the Ministry of Justice, shows an increase in recorded abuses between 2016 and 2020. At the same time, this recently created agency (December 2016) certainly has had a beneficial effect.
However, the failure to renew the public service status of Anticor (Le Monde 2023), the reference anti-corruption NGO in France, sent a contradictory sign. Thanks to this status, the NGO could easily intervene in civil lawsuits and force national prosecutors to take action.
The first bill introduced by Emmanuel Macron’s government after the 2017 election dealt with the “moralization of politics,” barring parliamentarians from employing family members, and increasing oversight of their travel and representation budgets. This has apparently led to new and more in-depth monitoring of candidates to government positions.
There are nonetheless several ongoing issues. Former President Nicolas Sarkozy received guilty verdicts in two different cases in 2021, one concerning campaign finance and the other corruption. He has appealed both decisions, and new rulings were expected in the first quarter of 2024.
The Macron government has not been free of scandals, and Macron put an end to the traditional convention that indicted ministers would be expected to step down from government. Two ministers have recently faced trial. Minister of Labor Olivier Dussopt stood trial in November 2023 due to irregularities in public contracting when he was mayor of the city of Annonay. Minister of Justice Eric Dupond-Moretti was recently acquitted of charges of conflict of interest.
Overall, the situation appears to have improved over the long term, but the government has provided sometimes contradictory signals. A study by French Anti-corruption Agency (AFA), a state agency attached to the Ministry of Justice, shows an increase in recorded abuses between 2016 and 2020. At the same time, this recently created agency (December 2016) certainly has had a beneficial effect.
However, the failure to renew the public service status of Anticor (Le Monde 2023), the reference anti-corruption NGO in France, sent a contradictory sign. Thanks to this status, the NGO could easily intervene in civil lawsuits and force national prosecutors to take action.
Citations:
Le Monde. 2023. “Anticor: comprendre les raisons du non-renouvellement de l’agrément et ses conséquences.” December 28. https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2023/12/28/anticor-comprendre-les-raisons-du-non-renouvellement-de-l-agrement-et-ses-consequences_6208149_4355770.html
Le Monde. 2023. “Anticor: comprendre les raisons du non-renouvellement de l’agrément et ses conséquences.” December 28. https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2023/12/28/anticor-comprendre-les-raisons-du-non-renouvellement-de-l-agrement-et-ses-consequences_6208149_4355770.html
Israel
The Department of the Accountant General in the Ministry of Finance is responsible for budget execution and government contracting. This department ensures that all government communications comply with the law. It has the authority to withhold funds or halt communications if it deems them illegal or problematic. Each ministry has a permanent employee from the general accounting office. The department is regarded as very powerful, and the accountant in each ministry often succeeds in preventing corruption or misuse of power.
The law on party funding limits private donations to political parties and candidates. Individual candidates can receive donations of ILS 1,000–2,000 from each donor, while a political party can receive donations of no more than ILS 5,000 from each donor. Parties represented in the Knesset receive funding from the state.
Each officeholder must submit a conflict of interest statement as well as a statement of assets. In practice, many ministers and members of the Knesset do not comply, and enforcement is very weak. Each party or candidate is required by law to publish all sources of donations received, including the donor’s identity and the amount. This regulation is followed.
The state comptroller is responsible for overseeing party donation rules. After each election, the state comptroller issues a report detailing violations of the Party Funding Law. However, the comptroller lacks sanctioning powers and, as a result, parties often disregard the imposed fines.
The law on party funding limits private donations to political parties and candidates. Individual candidates can receive donations of ILS 1,000–2,000 from each donor, while a political party can receive donations of no more than ILS 5,000 from each donor. Parties represented in the Knesset receive funding from the state.
Each officeholder must submit a conflict of interest statement as well as a statement of assets. In practice, many ministers and members of the Knesset do not comply, and enforcement is very weak. Each party or candidate is required by law to publish all sources of donations received, including the donor’s identity and the amount. This regulation is followed.
The state comptroller is responsible for overseeing party donation rules. After each election, the state comptroller issues a report detailing violations of the Party Funding Law. However, the comptroller lacks sanctioning powers and, as a result, parties often disregard the imposed fines.
Lithuania
Over the years, Lithuanian institutions have adopted a legal framework that disincentivizes public officeholders from abusing their positions. The new amendments to the Law on the Prevention of Corruption, which took effect at the beginning of 2022, were welcomed by the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption. In its most recent report of 2022, the group stated that “if each institution can and does effectively design, implement and oversee its own anti-corruption policy within the framework of the law and with the supporting role of the Special Investigation Service and the Chief Official Ethics Commission, it can lead to an efficient and mature system of anti-corruption prevention, but there are several conditions for such a system to work in practice.” It made particular reference in this regard to additional efforts at raising awareness and the provision of practical guidance for officials on integrity standards.
In addition to this law, there are norms aimed at increasing the transparency of political decisions, limits on party funding, requirements that officeholders declare their assets and conflicts of interests, and rules governing public procurement. Lithuanian authorities have also increased penalties for corruption-related crimes, linking these to the damage caused or benefits obtained from the illegal activities. According to EuroPam data based on 2020, Lithuania’s regulatory index score was higher than the European average in the areas of financial disclosure, political financing and conflict of interest.
One of Lithuania’s key corruption prevention measures is an anti-corruption assessment of draft legislation, which grants the Special Investigation Service the authority to carry out corruption tests. According to the Lithuanian Corruption Map of 2022 – 2023, measured by the Special Investigation Service based on surveys, the institutions viewed as most corrupt were hospitals, the courts, the parliament and municipalities. Favors to party members, nepotism and the adoption of laws that favored particular interest groups were considered to be among the most widespread forms of corruption.
Thirty-four percent of the general population considered corruption to be a very serious problem (fifth most serious issue), 24% of business executives viewed it as a very serious problem (seventh most serious issue) and 32% of civil servants considered it a serious problem (fifth most serious issue). However, the assessed dynamics continued to show a positive trend, with the shares in all three groups – especially civil servants – stating that corruption had decreased in the last five years larger than those stating it had increased.
In 2023, several events attracted significant publicity in the area of corruption control. One was the “Skaidrinam” (“Making it transparent”) initiative by activist Andrius Tapinas, who collected information on the potential manipulation of rules governing expense compensation for municipal council members. The evidence of suspected fraud led the Special Investigation Service to initiate pretrial investigations into members of 19 municipal councils.
Another high-profile political corruption case involved allegations of corruption within Lithuania’s Liberal Movement and Labor Party, which prompted the Special Investigation Service to start an investigation in 2017. The parties were suspected of accepting bribes and trading political influence. For instance, two Liberal Movement members allegedly accepted bribes of more than €135,000 on behalf of the party from a vice president of a major business group in exchange for political decisions that benefited the corporation.
In April 2022, the court of first instance acquitted all the suspects in this case. However, in November 2023, the Court of Appeal of Lithuania convicted individuals who were previously acquitted, including businessman Raimondas Kurlianskis, then-Seimas members Eligijus Masiulis, Vytautas Gapšys, Šarūnas Gustainis and Gintaras Steponavičius. Charges included “bribery, trading in influence and abuse of power.” Additionally, the legal entities UAB concern “MG Baltic” (now UAB “MG grupė”), the Liberals’ Movement of the Republic of Lithuania political party (now the Liberal Movement), and the Labor Party were found guilty.
The improvement in the control of corruption in Lithuania has also been noted by Corruption Risk assessments. This organization stated that “Lithuania has managed to construct good constraints to corruption both on the side of government and civil society/freedom of the press, with a dense network of public accountability mechanisms and good access to information. Lithuania was fifth in the world on transparency but lagged in digitalization of the commerce register, land register and tracking current public expenditures. Nevertheless, the country has been on a positive trend for the past decade.”
Similar assessments on recent positive trends were provided by the European Commission in its 2023 Rule of Law report on Lithuania. The report stated that “the implementation of the anti-corruption agenda in 2022 – 2033 advanced well with the adoption of the first implementation action plan. Investigations and prosecutions of corruption-related offenses continue to be carried out efficiently while shortcomings in relation to investigation and prosecution of foreign bribery cases were raised. Public procurement remains a high-risk area for corruption. Laws such as the Law on Corruption Prevention, the Law on the Adjustment of Public and Private Interests, and the whistleblower legislation are being efficiently implemented. Further efforts were taken in view of the efficient implementation of the integrity rules.”
In the World Bank’s 2022 Worldwide Governance Indicators, Lithuania scored 76.42 out of 100 on the issue of corruption control, with its score having fluctuated in the 80th percentile over the last several years.
In addition to this law, there are norms aimed at increasing the transparency of political decisions, limits on party funding, requirements that officeholders declare their assets and conflicts of interests, and rules governing public procurement. Lithuanian authorities have also increased penalties for corruption-related crimes, linking these to the damage caused or benefits obtained from the illegal activities. According to EuroPam data based on 2020, Lithuania’s regulatory index score was higher than the European average in the areas of financial disclosure, political financing and conflict of interest.
One of Lithuania’s key corruption prevention measures is an anti-corruption assessment of draft legislation, which grants the Special Investigation Service the authority to carry out corruption tests. According to the Lithuanian Corruption Map of 2022 – 2023, measured by the Special Investigation Service based on surveys, the institutions viewed as most corrupt were hospitals, the courts, the parliament and municipalities. Favors to party members, nepotism and the adoption of laws that favored particular interest groups were considered to be among the most widespread forms of corruption.
Thirty-four percent of the general population considered corruption to be a very serious problem (fifth most serious issue), 24% of business executives viewed it as a very serious problem (seventh most serious issue) and 32% of civil servants considered it a serious problem (fifth most serious issue). However, the assessed dynamics continued to show a positive trend, with the shares in all three groups – especially civil servants – stating that corruption had decreased in the last five years larger than those stating it had increased.
In 2023, several events attracted significant publicity in the area of corruption control. One was the “Skaidrinam” (“Making it transparent”) initiative by activist Andrius Tapinas, who collected information on the potential manipulation of rules governing expense compensation for municipal council members. The evidence of suspected fraud led the Special Investigation Service to initiate pretrial investigations into members of 19 municipal councils.
Another high-profile political corruption case involved allegations of corruption within Lithuania’s Liberal Movement and Labor Party, which prompted the Special Investigation Service to start an investigation in 2017. The parties were suspected of accepting bribes and trading political influence. For instance, two Liberal Movement members allegedly accepted bribes of more than €135,000 on behalf of the party from a vice president of a major business group in exchange for political decisions that benefited the corporation.
In April 2022, the court of first instance acquitted all the suspects in this case. However, in November 2023, the Court of Appeal of Lithuania convicted individuals who were previously acquitted, including businessman Raimondas Kurlianskis, then-Seimas members Eligijus Masiulis, Vytautas Gapšys, Šarūnas Gustainis and Gintaras Steponavičius. Charges included “bribery, trading in influence and abuse of power.” Additionally, the legal entities UAB concern “MG Baltic” (now UAB “MG grupė”), the Liberals’ Movement of the Republic of Lithuania political party (now the Liberal Movement), and the Labor Party were found guilty.
The improvement in the control of corruption in Lithuania has also been noted by Corruption Risk assessments. This organization stated that “Lithuania has managed to construct good constraints to corruption both on the side of government and civil society/freedom of the press, with a dense network of public accountability mechanisms and good access to information. Lithuania was fifth in the world on transparency but lagged in digitalization of the commerce register, land register and tracking current public expenditures. Nevertheless, the country has been on a positive trend for the past decade.”
Similar assessments on recent positive trends were provided by the European Commission in its 2023 Rule of Law report on Lithuania. The report stated that “the implementation of the anti-corruption agenda in 2022 – 2033 advanced well with the adoption of the first implementation action plan. Investigations and prosecutions of corruption-related offenses continue to be carried out efficiently while shortcomings in relation to investigation and prosecution of foreign bribery cases were raised. Public procurement remains a high-risk area for corruption. Laws such as the Law on Corruption Prevention, the Law on the Adjustment of Public and Private Interests, and the whistleblower legislation are being efficiently implemented. Further efforts were taken in view of the efficient implementation of the integrity rules.”
In the World Bank’s 2022 Worldwide Governance Indicators, Lithuania scored 76.42 out of 100 on the issue of corruption control, with its score having fluctuated in the 80th percentile over the last several years.
Citations:
European Commission. 2023. “Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the Rule of Law in Lithuania, Brussels.” July 5. SWD (2023) 815 final. https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2023-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_en
Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay. 2023. “Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2023 Update.” www.govindicators.org
Special Investigation Service. 2022-2023. “Corruption map survey” (in Lithuanian). https://www.stt.lt/analitine-antikorupcine-zvalgyba/lietuvos-korupcijos-zemelapis/7437
The Corruption Risk Forecast, Lithuania, https://www.corruptionrisk.org/country/?country=LTU#forecast
EuroPam. 2023. “European Public Accountability Mechanisms, Lithuania.” https://www.europam.eu/?module=country-profile&country=Lithuania
Council of Europe, Group of States against Corruption. 2022. “Lithuania Evaluation Report.” https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/evaluations/lithuania
Andrius Tapinas. 2023. “Skaidrinam” https://tapinas.substack.com/s/skaidrinam-2023
Court of Appeal of Lithuania. https://www.apeliacinis.lt/en/news/court-of-appeal-of-lithuania-all-acquitted-in-mg-baltic-political-corruption-case-are-guilty/1520
European Commission. 2023. “Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the Rule of Law in Lithuania, Brussels.” July 5. SWD (2023) 815 final. https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2023-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_en
Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay. 2023. “Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2023 Update.” www.govindicators.org
Special Investigation Service. 2022-2023. “Corruption map survey” (in Lithuanian). https://www.stt.lt/analitine-antikorupcine-zvalgyba/lietuvos-korupcijos-zemelapis/7437
The Corruption Risk Forecast, Lithuania, https://www.corruptionrisk.org/country/?country=LTU#forecast
EuroPam. 2023. “European Public Accountability Mechanisms, Lithuania.” https://www.europam.eu/?module=country-profile&country=Lithuania
Council of Europe, Group of States against Corruption. 2022. “Lithuania Evaluation Report.” https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/evaluations/lithuania
Andrius Tapinas. 2023. “Skaidrinam” https://tapinas.substack.com/s/skaidrinam-2023
Court of Appeal of Lithuania. https://www.apeliacinis.lt/en/news/court-of-appeal-of-lithuania-all-acquitted-in-mg-baltic-political-corruption-case-are-guilty/1520
Slovenia
In general, officeholders who break the law or engage in corruption are investigated. However, the relatively poor performance of various oversight institutions is evident, likely due to certain legal and procedural loopholes in prosecuting abuse of office. In 2023, Eurobarometer found that 38% of respondents in Slovenia believe those caught committing minor corruption offenses are adequately punished, while only 18% believe the same for those caught bribing senior officials. Despite the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption being quite active, it is not as respected today as it was ten years ago. The commission’s powers remain relatively limited, with GRECO (Group of States Against Corruption) calling for adequate financial and human resources in 2023. The commission’s reports and findings often face public criticism, including from politicians, and are not always respected. The president of the commission believes systemic changes and education in integrity, accountability, and transparency are necessary.
Overall, while there are mechanisms to investigate and address corruption among officeholders, the effectiveness of these efforts is hindered by institutional weaknesses and insufficient resources. The public perception reflects a lack of confidence in the adequacy of punishments for corruption, particularly for higher-level offenses.
The commission’s online app, ERAR, continues to provide transparency into transactions of public and state-owned companies but is generally considered inferior to its predecessor, Supervizor. In 2023, a Eurobarometer survey found that 83% of Slovenians believe corruption is widespread, although this is 4% less than in 2022. The Corruption Perception Index shows no progress in the fight against corruption in Slovenia, with the index score at 56 in 2023. The score has fallen below 60 for the previous two years, whereas it was 60 or above from 2015 to 2020. For a decade, the public has viewed corruption as one of Slovenia’s biggest problems, especially systemic corruption.
In 2023, the OECD raised concerns about the lack of enforcement of foreign bribery offenses, noting that Slovenia has not prosecuted any foreign bribery cases since joining the Anti-Bribery Convention in 1999. GRECO was also dissatisfied with Slovenia’s progress in 2023, finding that only five of the 15 recommendations from the Fifth Round Evaluation Report had been satisfactorily implemented or addressed. Key recommendations, such as developing an integrity plan for the government and promoting awareness of integrity issues, had not been fully implemented.
In 2023, the Slovenian Commission for the Prevention of Corruption addressed high-profile issues, including alleged corruption in the healthcare sector and cases involving politicians, such as an member of parliament, a minister, and Prime Minister Robert Golob. The commission investigated alleged unauthorized pressure from Prime Minister Golob on former Interior Minister Tatjana Bobnar and other Interior Ministry employees. The Law on Whistleblower Protection also came into force in 2023.
The 2013 Law on Political Parties prohibits donations from companies to political parties, while foreign funding has been banned for decades. Annual financial reports submitted by parties to the Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Public Law and Related Services show that parties rely heavily on public funds. Parties receiving at least 1% of votes in the previous parliamentary elections are entitled to state budget funds.
In 2023, the law was amended to allocate 10% of the total party funding budget equally among all eligible parties, with the remaining 90% distributed according to their vote share. This distribution was in place from 2000 – 2013; in the past ten years, the shares were 25% and 75%, respectively. Indirect public party funding includes additional funds for organizational and administrative support. The Court of Audit is required to audit parties’ financial reports, but sanctions for breaches of the law are rarely implemented.
Overall, while there are mechanisms to investigate and address corruption among officeholders, the effectiveness of these efforts is hindered by institutional weaknesses and insufficient resources. The public perception reflects a lack of confidence in the adequacy of punishments for corruption, particularly for higher-level offenses.
The commission’s online app, ERAR, continues to provide transparency into transactions of public and state-owned companies but is generally considered inferior to its predecessor, Supervizor. In 2023, a Eurobarometer survey found that 83% of Slovenians believe corruption is widespread, although this is 4% less than in 2022. The Corruption Perception Index shows no progress in the fight against corruption in Slovenia, with the index score at 56 in 2023. The score has fallen below 60 for the previous two years, whereas it was 60 or above from 2015 to 2020. For a decade, the public has viewed corruption as one of Slovenia’s biggest problems, especially systemic corruption.
In 2023, the OECD raised concerns about the lack of enforcement of foreign bribery offenses, noting that Slovenia has not prosecuted any foreign bribery cases since joining the Anti-Bribery Convention in 1999. GRECO was also dissatisfied with Slovenia’s progress in 2023, finding that only five of the 15 recommendations from the Fifth Round Evaluation Report had been satisfactorily implemented or addressed. Key recommendations, such as developing an integrity plan for the government and promoting awareness of integrity issues, had not been fully implemented.
In 2023, the Slovenian Commission for the Prevention of Corruption addressed high-profile issues, including alleged corruption in the healthcare sector and cases involving politicians, such as an member of parliament, a minister, and Prime Minister Robert Golob. The commission investigated alleged unauthorized pressure from Prime Minister Golob on former Interior Minister Tatjana Bobnar and other Interior Ministry employees. The Law on Whistleblower Protection also came into force in 2023.
The 2013 Law on Political Parties prohibits donations from companies to political parties, while foreign funding has been banned for decades. Annual financial reports submitted by parties to the Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Public Law and Related Services show that parties rely heavily on public funds. Parties receiving at least 1% of votes in the previous parliamentary elections are entitled to state budget funds.
In 2023, the law was amended to allocate 10% of the total party funding budget equally among all eligible parties, with the remaining 90% distributed according to their vote share. This distribution was in place from 2000 – 2013; in the past ten years, the shares were 25% and 75%, respectively. Indirect public party funding includes additional funds for organizational and administrative support. The Court of Audit is required to audit parties’ financial reports, but sanctions for breaches of the law are rarely implemented.
Citations:
Group of States Against Corruption. 2023. “Fifth Evaluation Round: Slovenia.” https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/1680aa9f5d
OECD. 2023. Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Phase 4 Two-Year Follow-Up Report: Slovenia. https://web-archive.oecd.org/2023-03-13/653088-slovenia-phase-4-follow-up-report.pdf
Transparency International. 2023. “Corruption Perception Index.” https://www.transparency.org/en
Tranparency International Slovenia. 2023. “Julijski barometer o zaznavi korupcije.” https://www.transparency.si/novica/julijski-eurobarometer-o-zaznavi-korupcije/
Group of States Against Corruption. 2023. “Fifth Evaluation Round: Slovenia.” https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/1680aa9f5d
OECD. 2023. Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Phase 4 Two-Year Follow-Up Report: Slovenia. https://web-archive.oecd.org/2023-03-13/653088-slovenia-phase-4-follow-up-report.pdf
Transparency International. 2023. “Corruption Perception Index.” https://www.transparency.org/en
Tranparency International Slovenia. 2023. “Julijski barometer o zaznavi korupcije.” https://www.transparency.si/novica/julijski-eurobarometer-o-zaznavi-korupcije/
Spain
Corruption levels in Spain have declined since the real estate bubble burst in the wake of the economic crisis, partly due to the criminal, political, and social prosecution of corrupt politicians and officials. Spanish courts have a solid record of investigating and prosecuting corruption cases, but the system is often overburdened and cases move slowly. According to the WJP Rule of Law Index, Spain is ranked 23rd in the absence of government corruption. However, in 2023, Spain’s score in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index fell slightly, although Spain continues to rank comparatively highly at 35th place out of 180 countries (2019: 30 out of 180 countries). The 2023 Special Eurobarometer on Corruption shows that 89% of respondents consider corruption widespread in their country (EU average 70%) and 41% feel personally affected by corruption in their daily lives (EU average 24%).
On February 16, 2023, parliament adopted the whistleblower protection law. The law stipulates that, within a maximum period of 18 months from its enactment, the government must endorse an Anti-Corruption Strategy. This strategy is intended to assess the objectives outlined in the law and address the requisite measures to cover potential loopholes.
In December 2022, the Independent Office for Regulation and Supervision of Procurement sanctioned the National Public Procurement Strategy, aiming to prevent corruption and irregularities in implementing public procurement legislation. The effectiveness of the Council of Transparency and Good Governance has improved. In 2022, the General Intervention of the State Administration (IGAE) strengthened its assessments of fraud risks in public grants and subsidies.
In implementing the RRG, other administrative levels have established mechanisms for preventing corruption. For example, all implementing entities must have an anti-fraud plan. Public procurement procedures have also been improved to enhance transparency. As mentioned earlier, the audit office is responsible for auditing party accounts. The law governing party financing was reformulated in 2015 and remains unchanged, despite a request from the Court of Auditors.
In 2020, the Congress of Deputies agreed on a code of conduct for members of parliament. This document represents a further step in improving the transparency of members’ activities. Additionally, a Conflict of Interest Office of the Congress has been created to monitor compliance with integrity rules. According to the 2022 annual report, most members of parliament follow the code. However, the rules of procedure of the Congress do not contain any sanctions for noncompliance (Oficina de Conflicto de Intereses de las Cortes Generales 2023).
The electoral law establishes that the function of deputy is “incompatible” with “any other profession or remunerated activity.” However, the Congressional Statute Commission grants a number of exceptions.
On February 16, 2023, parliament adopted the whistleblower protection law. The law stipulates that, within a maximum period of 18 months from its enactment, the government must endorse an Anti-Corruption Strategy. This strategy is intended to assess the objectives outlined in the law and address the requisite measures to cover potential loopholes.
In December 2022, the Independent Office for Regulation and Supervision of Procurement sanctioned the National Public Procurement Strategy, aiming to prevent corruption and irregularities in implementing public procurement legislation. The effectiveness of the Council of Transparency and Good Governance has improved. In 2022, the General Intervention of the State Administration (IGAE) strengthened its assessments of fraud risks in public grants and subsidies.
In implementing the RRG, other administrative levels have established mechanisms for preventing corruption. For example, all implementing entities must have an anti-fraud plan. Public procurement procedures have also been improved to enhance transparency. As mentioned earlier, the audit office is responsible for auditing party accounts. The law governing party financing was reformulated in 2015 and remains unchanged, despite a request from the Court of Auditors.
In 2020, the Congress of Deputies agreed on a code of conduct for members of parliament. This document represents a further step in improving the transparency of members’ activities. Additionally, a Conflict of Interest Office of the Congress has been created to monitor compliance with integrity rules. According to the 2022 annual report, most members of parliament follow the code. However, the rules of procedure of the Congress do not contain any sanctions for noncompliance (Oficina de Conflicto de Intereses de las Cortes Generales 2023).
The electoral law establishes that the function of deputy is “incompatible” with “any other profession or remunerated activity.” However, the Congressional Statute Commission grants a number of exceptions.
Citations:
Oficina de Conflicto de Intereses de las Cortes Generales. 2023. “Informe anual correspondiente al año 2022.” https://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L14/CORT/BOCG/A/BOCG-14-CG-A-311.PDF
Eurobarometer. 2023. Eurobarometer 534.
Oficina de Conflicto de Intereses de las Cortes Generales. 2023. “Informe anual correspondiente al año 2022.” https://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L14/CORT/BOCG/A/BOCG-14-CG-A-311.PDF
Eurobarometer. 2023. Eurobarometer 534.
USA
The U.S. Constitution has few explicit rules limiting corrupt activities by members of Congress. The Ineligibility Clause bans members of Congress who vote for an executive branch pay increase from subsequently being appointed to that office (Mayer and Sulkowski 2018). However, this restriction can be easily circumvented. For example, when Barack Obama appointed Senator Hillary Clinton as his Secretary of State, she was constitutionally ineligible because she had voted for a pay increase for the Secretary of State position as a senator. Clinton circumvented this by accepting a voluntary pay decrease. The Twenty-Seventh Amendment, the final amendment to the U.S. Constitution, prohibits members of Congress from voting for their own pay increase without another election intervening (Tillman 2018).
Beyond this, the Constitution leaves each chamber of Congress with the responsibility to regulate its own internal affairs (Thompson 2000). This means that the House and the Senate can set their own rules to guard against corruption. As a result, certain practices that may be banned in one chamber can be permissible in the other. For example, House members are not allowed to sit on corporate boards, but senators are allowed to do so.
Over the years, various ethics laws have been passed to limit members’ activities.
There are many loopholes in the existing arrangements. For example, members of Congress and their families are permitted to hold financial interests in businesses they oversee in Congress.
Enforcement is left to each chamber of Congress, which each have their own ethics committees. These committees enforce the rules inconsistently. It is rare for a member to be ejected from Congress for violating ethics rules, but it is not unheard of. In December 2023, the Republican-controlled House of Representatives voted to expel Republican Congressman George Santos after the House Ethics Committee accused him of misusing his campaign funds for personal gain (Martin 2023).
The problem of self-regulation also applies to the Supreme Court. Some members of the Court claim that Congress cannot regulate them, but this is inconsistent with long-standing practices in other areas. In 1922, Congress created the Judicial Conference of the United States, which sets administrative standards for the federal court. Although the body consists of judges and is currently self-regulating, Congress could establish more stringent ethics standards (Gephardt 2023).
Beyond this, the Constitution leaves each chamber of Congress with the responsibility to regulate its own internal affairs (Thompson 2000). This means that the House and the Senate can set their own rules to guard against corruption. As a result, certain practices that may be banned in one chamber can be permissible in the other. For example, House members are not allowed to sit on corporate boards, but senators are allowed to do so.
Over the years, various ethics laws have been passed to limit members’ activities.
There are many loopholes in the existing arrangements. For example, members of Congress and their families are permitted to hold financial interests in businesses they oversee in Congress.
Enforcement is left to each chamber of Congress, which each have their own ethics committees. These committees enforce the rules inconsistently. It is rare for a member to be ejected from Congress for violating ethics rules, but it is not unheard of. In December 2023, the Republican-controlled House of Representatives voted to expel Republican Congressman George Santos after the House Ethics Committee accused him of misusing his campaign funds for personal gain (Martin 2023).
The problem of self-regulation also applies to the Supreme Court. Some members of the Court claim that Congress cannot regulate them, but this is inconsistent with long-standing practices in other areas. In 1922, Congress created the Judicial Conference of the United States, which sets administrative standards for the federal court. Although the body consists of judges and is currently self-regulating, Congress could establish more stringent ethics standards (Gephardt 2023).
Citations:
Michael Gephardt. 2023. “Supreme Myth Busting.” Wisconsin Law Review.
John Martin. 2023. “A Congressional Incapacity Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Stanford Law Review.
Dennis Thompson. 2000. Ethics in Congress. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Seth Tillman. 2016. “Who Can Be President of the United States?” British Journal of American Legal Studies.
Don Mayer and Adam Sulkowski. 2018. “The US Constitution’s Emoluments Clauses.” British Journal of American Legal Studies.
Michael Gephardt. 2023. “Supreme Myth Busting.” Wisconsin Law Review.
John Martin. 2023. “A Congressional Incapacity Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Stanford Law Review.
Dennis Thompson. 2000. Ethics in Congress. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Seth Tillman. 2016. “Who Can Be President of the United States?” British Journal of American Legal Studies.
Don Mayer and Adam Sulkowski. 2018. “The US Constitution’s Emoluments Clauses.” British Journal of American Legal Studies.
6
Czechia
Corruption and clientelism are widespread. All governments pledge to fight corruption, but none have adequately addressed the issue. There are no public statistics on the number of successfully prosecuted public officials. Problems with politicians have started from the very top. Former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, leader of the opposition ANO party, built his business empire, the Agrofert conglomerate, with initial funding from unclear sources; his activities have frequently provoked controversy. The largest concern involves the use of EU funds to finance a business temporarily separated from his main business and quietly put under the ownership of family members. It was returned to his control after receiving the subsidy. In January 2023 a court dismissed the case against Babiš and criticized the prosecution’s work.
In the fall of 2022, French prosecutors opened a case against Andrej Babiš for money laundering connected to the purchase of real estate in Southern France, which came to light in the Panama Papers. The EU has continued to regard the “blind trust” in which Agrofert Holding was placed as unsatisfactory for Babiš’s claim to avoid conflicts of interest, as he has always been the clear beneficiary of his firms’ activities. The use of EU subsidies, which depend on Czech government decisions, therefore remains problematic. The government has so far made no steps toward requesting the return of any subsidies from Agrofert.
The current government parties used Babiš’s alleged corruption to campaign against him. However, they were slow to introduce promised changes to the law on conflict of interests. Although they complained of ANO’s obstruction of the parliamentary process, with a clear parliamentary majority they could have overruled this.
The legal amendments, as finally passed, ensured that an owner of a firm could not escape accusations of conflict of interest by claiming to have transferred control to a trust. This forced Babiš to sell his print media empire, but he could still own online media. Another loophole, supported also by the ODS and two other government parties, would still allow a firm owned by a minister to bid for public contracts.
The rules for party and campaign financing and their enforcement are a contested political issue. In April 2015, the Ministry of Interior submitted an amendment to the law on political parties to parliament. The proposal was based on the Group of States against Corruption of the Council of Europe (GRECO) recommendations to Czechia issued in 2011 and came into force in January 2017. The law introduced financial limits for party financing and electoral campaigns, the mandatory establishment of transparent accounts, and greater revenue regulation of political parties and movements.
The first scandal for the Fiala government, elected in 2021, revolved around campaign financing. The STAN party accepted donations from an anonymous account in Cyprus. During the January 2022 parliamentary debate, the chairman of STAN and the minister of interior expressed a commitment to return any irregular donation.
The Office for the Oversight of the Political Parties and Political Movements (Úřad pro dohled nad hospodařením politických stran a politických hnutí, ÚHHPSH) reported that one-third of political parties did not submit their 2022 annual financial reports. This noncompliance violates the law, and the office noted that it represents a 25% increase in noncompliance. However, all 37 parties, movements, and political subjects eligible for state subsidies complied with the law.
In the fall of 2022, French prosecutors opened a case against Andrej Babiš for money laundering connected to the purchase of real estate in Southern France, which came to light in the Panama Papers. The EU has continued to regard the “blind trust” in which Agrofert Holding was placed as unsatisfactory for Babiš’s claim to avoid conflicts of interest, as he has always been the clear beneficiary of his firms’ activities. The use of EU subsidies, which depend on Czech government decisions, therefore remains problematic. The government has so far made no steps toward requesting the return of any subsidies from Agrofert.
The current government parties used Babiš’s alleged corruption to campaign against him. However, they were slow to introduce promised changes to the law on conflict of interests. Although they complained of ANO’s obstruction of the parliamentary process, with a clear parliamentary majority they could have overruled this.
The legal amendments, as finally passed, ensured that an owner of a firm could not escape accusations of conflict of interest by claiming to have transferred control to a trust. This forced Babiš to sell his print media empire, but he could still own online media. Another loophole, supported also by the ODS and two other government parties, would still allow a firm owned by a minister to bid for public contracts.
The rules for party and campaign financing and their enforcement are a contested political issue. In April 2015, the Ministry of Interior submitted an amendment to the law on political parties to parliament. The proposal was based on the Group of States against Corruption of the Council of Europe (GRECO) recommendations to Czechia issued in 2011 and came into force in January 2017. The law introduced financial limits for party financing and electoral campaigns, the mandatory establishment of transparent accounts, and greater revenue regulation of political parties and movements.
The first scandal for the Fiala government, elected in 2021, revolved around campaign financing. The STAN party accepted donations from an anonymous account in Cyprus. During the January 2022 parliamentary debate, the chairman of STAN and the minister of interior expressed a commitment to return any irregular donation.
The Office for the Oversight of the Political Parties and Political Movements (Úřad pro dohled nad hospodařením politických stran a politických hnutí, ÚHHPSH) reported that one-third of political parties did not submit their 2022 annual financial reports. This noncompliance violates the law, and the office noted that it represents a 25% increase in noncompliance. However, all 37 parties, movements, and political subjects eligible for state subsidies complied with the law.
Citations:
The Office for the Oversight of the Political Parties and Political Movements. https://www.udhpsh.cz/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/TZ2023-04-11_VFZ.pdf
https://www.transparency.cz/vlada-slibila-zakrocit-proti-stretu-zajmu-zatim-se-odvazila-jen-k-dilcim-krokum/
The Office for the Oversight of the Political Parties and Political Movements. https://www.udhpsh.cz/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/TZ2023-04-11_VFZ.pdf
https://www.transparency.cz/vlada-slibila-zakrocit-proti-stretu-zajmu-zatim-se-odvazila-jen-k-dilcim-krokum/
Greece
Greece has implemented a comprehensive legal framework to prevent and sanction the abuse of public office. The constitution outlines procedures for holding government ministers accountable for criminal acts committed during their tenure (Article 86). Legislation adopted in 2003 details ministerial criminal liability, and the Criminal Code, amended in 2019, penalizes corrupt acts by public officials, including civil servants (Article 235). Additionally, laws passed in 2001 and 2014 enhanced protections for whistleblowers.
In 2019, Greece consolidated its anti-corruption efforts under a new independent public authority, the National Transparency Authority (EAD), responsible for formulating and monitoring the National Anti-Corruption Plan, such as the plan for 2022–2025 (National Transparency Authority, 2023).
New legislation in 2021 aligned with the European Directive of 2018 on anti-money laundering. In 2023, a law empowered public entities to identify and manage integrity risks and anticipated the operation of a central repository of corruption risks within the public administration. Another 2023 law established a common framework for recovering and managing frozen and confiscated assets derived from criminal activities.
Further, in 2022, Greece introduced a new code of conduct for public employees and codified past legislation on political party financing. In 2023, new laws streamlined asset declaration requirements for public officeholders and improved regulations on public procurement.
Despite these robust frameworks, implementation gaps persist, particularly delays in investigating and prosecuting public officeholders. These challenges stem from a complex regulatory environment, inadequate administrative personnel in courts, and sluggish procedures exacerbated by backlogs of other civil and criminal cases.
Nevertheless, barring the inefficiencies of the justice system, most integrity mechanisms are effective, providing significant disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
In 2019, Greece consolidated its anti-corruption efforts under a new independent public authority, the National Transparency Authority (EAD), responsible for formulating and monitoring the National Anti-Corruption Plan, such as the plan for 2022–2025 (National Transparency Authority, 2023).
New legislation in 2021 aligned with the European Directive of 2018 on anti-money laundering. In 2023, a law empowered public entities to identify and manage integrity risks and anticipated the operation of a central repository of corruption risks within the public administration. Another 2023 law established a common framework for recovering and managing frozen and confiscated assets derived from criminal activities.
Further, in 2022, Greece introduced a new code of conduct for public employees and codified past legislation on political party financing. In 2023, new laws streamlined asset declaration requirements for public officeholders and improved regulations on public procurement.
Despite these robust frameworks, implementation gaps persist, particularly delays in investigating and prosecuting public officeholders. These challenges stem from a complex regulatory environment, inadequate administrative personnel in courts, and sluggish procedures exacerbated by backlogs of other civil and criminal cases.
Nevertheless, barring the inefficiencies of the justice system, most integrity mechanisms are effective, providing significant disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
Citations:
Council of Europe. 2022. “Fourth Evaluation Round – Corruption Prevention in Respect to Members of parliament, Judges, and Prosecutors.” https://aead.gr/images/manuals/esskd/2022-2025/NACAP__S1_2023_Final.pdf
Ministry of Interior. 2022. “Code of Moral and Professional Conduct of Public Sector Employees.” https://www.ypes.gr/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Code_final-1.pdf
National Transparency Authority. 2023. “NACAP 202-2025, Implementation Report, 1st semester of 2023.” https://aead.gr/images/manuals/esskd/2022-2025/NACAP__S1_2023_Final.pdf
Public procurement: Laws 4412/2016 and 5079/2023
Criminal liability of government ministers: Law 3126/2003
Anti-money laundering: Law 4816. 2021. Source. Volume, section. Page OR URL
Protection of whistleblowers: Laws 4254/2014 and 4990/2022
Establishment of the EAD authority. 2019. Law 4622/2019.
Political party financing: Presidential Decree 15/2022
Asset declaration. 2023. Laws 5026/2023 and 5072/2023.
Management of integrity risks of public entities – repository of corruption risks in public administration: Law 5013/2023.
Management of frozen, including seized and confiscated assets derived from
criminal activities: Law 5042/2023
Council of Europe. 2022. “Fourth Evaluation Round – Corruption Prevention in Respect to Members of parliament, Judges, and Prosecutors.” https://aead.gr/images/manuals/esskd/2022-2025/NACAP__S1_2023_Final.pdf
Ministry of Interior. 2022. “Code of Moral and Professional Conduct of Public Sector Employees.” https://www.ypes.gr/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Code_final-1.pdf
National Transparency Authority. 2023. “NACAP 202-2025, Implementation Report, 1st semester of 2023.” https://aead.gr/images/manuals/esskd/2022-2025/NACAP__S1_2023_Final.pdf
Public procurement: Laws 4412/2016 and 5079/2023
Criminal liability of government ministers: Law 3126/2003
Anti-money laundering: Law 4816. 2021. Source. Volume, section. Page OR URL
Protection of whistleblowers: Laws 4254/2014 and 4990/2022
Establishment of the EAD authority. 2019. Law 4622/2019.
Political party financing: Presidential Decree 15/2022
Asset declaration. 2023. Laws 5026/2023 and 5072/2023.
Management of integrity risks of public entities – repository of corruption risks in public administration: Law 5013/2023.
Management of frozen, including seized and confiscated assets derived from
criminal activities: Law 5042/2023
Italy
Corruption remains a pervasive problem within the Italian administration, as evidenced by numerous cases brought to light by the judiciary and the media and by Italy’s relatively low ranking compared to other European countries on the main indices of perceived (Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, CPI 2022; World Bank Control of Corruption Index, Kaufmann and Aart Kraay 2023) and objective corruption (Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer; University of Goteborg Quality of Government Indicators, Charron et al. 2022).
Given the detrimental impact of corruption on public trust, the efficiency and effectiveness of public administration, and the nation’s ability to deliver essential public goods, the Draghi government (February 2021 – July 2022) made combating this pervasive phenomenon a central pillar of its agenda. This commitment was particularly evident in the implementation of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR), which presented a unique opportunity to streamline governance processes and enhance transparency. In line with this commitment, the Anti-Corruption Authority (ANAC) was granted significant enhancements, especially regarding its oversight role in public contracts.
The regulations governing public procurement were amended in accordance with the objectives of PNRR. First, Delegated Law 78/2022 (under the Draghi government) instituted changes, followed by Legislative Decree 26/2023 (under the Meloni government), which introduced further modifications to the Public Procurement Code. These changes have strengthened the oversight functions of the ANAC (ANAC, Annual Report 2023).
These revised regulations mark the latest advancement in Italy’s ongoing anti-corruption efforts, which have resulted in a noticeable improvement in the country’s standing on various corruption indices. From 2014 to 2023, Italy’s ranking in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index has risen from 69th to 53rd, demonstrating the nation’s progress in combating corruption. However, problems remain, particularly in the regulation of interest groups and party financing.
The Meloni government has implemented a series of measures aimed at streamlining the operations of public administrations in the execution of the PNRR. While these measures aim to expedite the process and reduce bureaucratic hurdles, they also raise concerns about potential ambiguities that could be exploited for corrupt practices.
Given the detrimental impact of corruption on public trust, the efficiency and effectiveness of public administration, and the nation’s ability to deliver essential public goods, the Draghi government (February 2021 – July 2022) made combating this pervasive phenomenon a central pillar of its agenda. This commitment was particularly evident in the implementation of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR), which presented a unique opportunity to streamline governance processes and enhance transparency. In line with this commitment, the Anti-Corruption Authority (ANAC) was granted significant enhancements, especially regarding its oversight role in public contracts.
The regulations governing public procurement were amended in accordance with the objectives of PNRR. First, Delegated Law 78/2022 (under the Draghi government) instituted changes, followed by Legislative Decree 26/2023 (under the Meloni government), which introduced further modifications to the Public Procurement Code. These changes have strengthened the oversight functions of the ANAC (ANAC, Annual Report 2023).
These revised regulations mark the latest advancement in Italy’s ongoing anti-corruption efforts, which have resulted in a noticeable improvement in the country’s standing on various corruption indices. From 2014 to 2023, Italy’s ranking in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index has risen from 69th to 53rd, demonstrating the nation’s progress in combating corruption. However, problems remain, particularly in the regulation of interest groups and party financing.
The Meloni government has implemented a series of measures aimed at streamlining the operations of public administrations in the execution of the PNRR. While these measures aim to expedite the process and reduce bureaucratic hurdles, they also raise concerns about potential ambiguities that could be exploited for corrupt practices.
Citations:
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index: https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022/index/ita
CPI 2022: https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/Report_CPI2022_English.pdf
Kaufmann, Daniel, and Aart Kraay. 2023. “Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2023 Update.” www.govindicators.org
Charron, Nicholas, Victor Lapuente, Monika Bauhr, and Paola Annoni. 2022. “Change and Continuity in Quality of Government: Trends in Subnational Quality of Government in EU Member States.” Investigaciones Regionales-Journal of Regional Research 2022 (53): 5-23. DOI: 10.38191/iirr-jorr.22.008.
ANAC Annual Report 2023: https://www.anticorruzione.it/documents/91439/134902762/Anac+-+Relazione+annuale+2023+su+attività+2022+-+Relazione.pdf/93d500fd-4002-5433-a151-77ecbc45464e?t=1686150360020
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index: https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022/index/ita
CPI 2022: https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/Report_CPI2022_English.pdf
Kaufmann, Daniel, and Aart Kraay. 2023. “Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2023 Update.” www.govindicators.org
Charron, Nicholas, Victor Lapuente, Monika Bauhr, and Paola Annoni. 2022. “Change and Continuity in Quality of Government: Trends in Subnational Quality of Government in EU Member States.” Investigaciones Regionales-Journal of Regional Research 2022 (53): 5-23. DOI: 10.38191/iirr-jorr.22.008.
ANAC Annual Report 2023: https://www.anticorruzione.it/documents/91439/134902762/Anac+-+Relazione+annuale+2023+su+attività+2022+-+Relazione.pdf/93d500fd-4002-5433-a151-77ecbc45464e?t=1686150360020
Portugal
From a legal standpoint, the Portuguese Penal Code directly addresses the criminalization of power abuse and corruption in Articles 372º to 374º-B. Moreover, the implementation of public accounting standards, as per Annex II of the Accounting Standardization System for Public Administrations (SNC-AP), outlined in Decree-Law No. 192/2015, Article 6, aims to ensure financial oversight of public expenditure. This framework theoretically facilitates corruption detection. Additionally, the Law on the Financing of Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns, outlined in Law No. 19/2003, sets limits on private income for political parties while also providing public funds for election expenses and annual subsidies. Public officeholders convicted of power abuse face penalties, including imprisonment for up to three years or fines, as stated in Decree-Law No. 48/95, Article 382. The enforcement of these regulations – encompassing reporting, oversight, and sanctions – is the responsibility of the Political Accounts and Financing Entity (ECFP), which, however, encounters significant operational challenges.
Despite these legal frameworks, three crucial issues arise. First, regarding party financing regulation, scholars note that political financing in Portugal was largely unregulated until a 2003 law (Law No. 19/2003, of June 20). This law, amended eight times, most recently in 2018, attempted to address these issues. Despite a 2000 ban on corporate donations, challenges remain due to companies disguising illegal contributions. The current framework lacks stringent penalties for those circumventing the law by indirectly covering campaign costs. While the law provides a functional regulatory structure, the primary issue lies in its implementation and adoption by parties and candidates.
The ECFP, tasked with monitoring financial information, faces legal and practical challenges. The 2018 amendment expanded its responsibilities without increasing resources, as highlighted by the ECFP’s chairperson. The ECFP tends to focus more on formal account reporting than on substantive oversight. Additionally, the National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2020 – 2024 (ENAC) has emphasized the need for the publication of political parties’ accounts to be more efficient, uniform, and accessible. However, these proposed measures lack specific details, such as deadlines, methodologies, or clear guidelines on their implementation.
Second, concerning gifts and hospitality, the codes of conduct for parliament and the executive suffer from low compliance, unclear hospitality limits, and a lack of oversight and sanctions. Access to gift and hospitality registers is problematic, with the parliamentary register difficult to access online and the ministerial register available only onsite.
Portugal’s 2019 Transparency package reforms have introduced some improvements. For example, the regime governing the functions of political office holders and high public officials mandates that all such individuals, including judges, prosecutors, and senior public officials, must submit declarations of their interests and assets (Law No. 52/2019 of 31 July). However, these improvements are limited by inadequate enforcement mechanisms, oversight gaps, and insufficient regulation of post-office employment and gift acceptance.
Despite advancements, the system primarily serves as an initial vetting procedure and lacks mechanisms for ongoing supervision or enforcement. Verification of declarations, overseen by the Constitutional Court and the Transparency Entity (ET), faces issues like legal uncertainties, limited resources, and superficial examination processes. No effective internal body within the parliament is responsible for verifying MPs’ declarations or addressing potential conflicts of interest.
Third, regarding the transparency of public procurement procedures, Portugal has seen significant progress, particularly with the development of the Portal BASE, a public procurement platform. This platform is designed to provide details on all contracts formed under the Public Procurement Code (CCP) and is further supported by the Observatory of Public Works, which offers statistical analysis of public procurement activities. Despite these advancements, the transparency level in Portugal’s public procurement processes still does not meet expectations.
The Portal BASE, although aimed at increasing transparency, encounters several challenges. The platform is not particularly user-friendly for various stakeholders and falls short in ensuring the complete publication of all procedures and their associated information. In addition, many public bodies have not fully or properly adhered to their obligation to disclose information. Moreover, the enforcement of regulations and the application of sanctions related to public procurement transparency remains notably weak.
Corruption remains a significant issue in Portugal, affecting both the private and public sectors. The 2022 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index report indicates minimal progress in combating corruption, with 41% of surveyed individuals believing corruption had increased in the previous 12 months. The report criticizes the Portuguese government’s National Anti-Corruption Strategy (ENAC) 2020 – 2024 for ineffective implementation and lack of progress. The European Commission’s rule of law report also highlights issues such as insufficient resources for preventing, investigating, and prosecuting corruption cases in Portugal, along with a lack of effective implementation and monitoring of integrity mechanisms and regulations (EC, 2023).
Portugal’s lack of investment in these areas is also evident in the 2022 GRECO Report from the Group of States Against Corruption. This report assesses the implementation of recommendations from the Fourth Evaluation Round and found that the majority of the recommendations (twelve out of fifteen) remain only partially implemented. Only three of the fifteen recommendations were satisfactorily implemented, labeling the overall compliance as “globally unsatisfactory.” For example, regarding members of parliament, the report highlights the absence of rules or mechanisms to assess interactions between deputies and third parties, establish appropriate sanctions for improper actions, and evaluate the effectiveness of the conflict of interest prevention system (GRECO, 2022).
Finally, it is essential to acknowledge that Portugal experiences significant delays in the prosecution of corruption cases. These delays are particularly pronounced in the legal proceedings against prominent public figures and business leaders. Notably, the legal cases against former Prime Minister José Sócrates (2005 – 2011) and Ricardo Salgado, ex-head of Banco Espírito Santo (BES), are in danger of exceeding the statute of limitations for various crimes within the forthcoming two years (Expresso, 2023; Observador, 2022). These postponements not only impede the legal process but also amplify the challenges in combating corruption effectively.
Moreover, recent developments regarding the investment in human resources dedicated to fighting corruption within the Judiciary Police (Polícia Judiciária, PJ) are noteworthy. The national director has emphasized that “The PJ now possesses unprecedented resources. These personnel are expected to serve for many years,” signaling a substantial step forward in Portugal’s commitment to addressing this widespread issue (DN/Lusa, 2023).
Despite these legal frameworks, three crucial issues arise. First, regarding party financing regulation, scholars note that political financing in Portugal was largely unregulated until a 2003 law (Law No. 19/2003, of June 20). This law, amended eight times, most recently in 2018, attempted to address these issues. Despite a 2000 ban on corporate donations, challenges remain due to companies disguising illegal contributions. The current framework lacks stringent penalties for those circumventing the law by indirectly covering campaign costs. While the law provides a functional regulatory structure, the primary issue lies in its implementation and adoption by parties and candidates.
The ECFP, tasked with monitoring financial information, faces legal and practical challenges. The 2018 amendment expanded its responsibilities without increasing resources, as highlighted by the ECFP’s chairperson. The ECFP tends to focus more on formal account reporting than on substantive oversight. Additionally, the National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2020 – 2024 (ENAC) has emphasized the need for the publication of political parties’ accounts to be more efficient, uniform, and accessible. However, these proposed measures lack specific details, such as deadlines, methodologies, or clear guidelines on their implementation.
Second, concerning gifts and hospitality, the codes of conduct for parliament and the executive suffer from low compliance, unclear hospitality limits, and a lack of oversight and sanctions. Access to gift and hospitality registers is problematic, with the parliamentary register difficult to access online and the ministerial register available only onsite.
Portugal’s 2019 Transparency package reforms have introduced some improvements. For example, the regime governing the functions of political office holders and high public officials mandates that all such individuals, including judges, prosecutors, and senior public officials, must submit declarations of their interests and assets (Law No. 52/2019 of 31 July). However, these improvements are limited by inadequate enforcement mechanisms, oversight gaps, and insufficient regulation of post-office employment and gift acceptance.
Despite advancements, the system primarily serves as an initial vetting procedure and lacks mechanisms for ongoing supervision or enforcement. Verification of declarations, overseen by the Constitutional Court and the Transparency Entity (ET), faces issues like legal uncertainties, limited resources, and superficial examination processes. No effective internal body within the parliament is responsible for verifying MPs’ declarations or addressing potential conflicts of interest.
Third, regarding the transparency of public procurement procedures, Portugal has seen significant progress, particularly with the development of the Portal BASE, a public procurement platform. This platform is designed to provide details on all contracts formed under the Public Procurement Code (CCP) and is further supported by the Observatory of Public Works, which offers statistical analysis of public procurement activities. Despite these advancements, the transparency level in Portugal’s public procurement processes still does not meet expectations.
The Portal BASE, although aimed at increasing transparency, encounters several challenges. The platform is not particularly user-friendly for various stakeholders and falls short in ensuring the complete publication of all procedures and their associated information. In addition, many public bodies have not fully or properly adhered to their obligation to disclose information. Moreover, the enforcement of regulations and the application of sanctions related to public procurement transparency remains notably weak.
Corruption remains a significant issue in Portugal, affecting both the private and public sectors. The 2022 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index report indicates minimal progress in combating corruption, with 41% of surveyed individuals believing corruption had increased in the previous 12 months. The report criticizes the Portuguese government’s National Anti-Corruption Strategy (ENAC) 2020 – 2024 for ineffective implementation and lack of progress. The European Commission’s rule of law report also highlights issues such as insufficient resources for preventing, investigating, and prosecuting corruption cases in Portugal, along with a lack of effective implementation and monitoring of integrity mechanisms and regulations (EC, 2023).
Portugal’s lack of investment in these areas is also evident in the 2022 GRECO Report from the Group of States Against Corruption. This report assesses the implementation of recommendations from the Fourth Evaluation Round and found that the majority of the recommendations (twelve out of fifteen) remain only partially implemented. Only three of the fifteen recommendations were satisfactorily implemented, labeling the overall compliance as “globally unsatisfactory.” For example, regarding members of parliament, the report highlights the absence of rules or mechanisms to assess interactions between deputies and third parties, establish appropriate sanctions for improper actions, and evaluate the effectiveness of the conflict of interest prevention system (GRECO, 2022).
Finally, it is essential to acknowledge that Portugal experiences significant delays in the prosecution of corruption cases. These delays are particularly pronounced in the legal proceedings against prominent public figures and business leaders. Notably, the legal cases against former Prime Minister José Sócrates (2005 – 2011) and Ricardo Salgado, ex-head of Banco Espírito Santo (BES), are in danger of exceeding the statute of limitations for various crimes within the forthcoming two years (Expresso, 2023; Observador, 2022). These postponements not only impede the legal process but also amplify the challenges in combating corruption effectively.
Moreover, recent developments regarding the investment in human resources dedicated to fighting corruption within the Judiciary Police (Polícia Judiciária, PJ) are noteworthy. The national director has emphasized that “The PJ now possesses unprecedented resources. These personnel are expected to serve for many years,” signaling a substantial step forward in Portugal’s commitment to addressing this widespread issue (DN/Lusa, 2023).
Citations:
Código Penal. 1995. DL n.º 48/95, de 15 de Março. https://www.pgdlisboa.pt/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?artigo_id=109A0373&nid=109&tabela=leis&pagina=1&ficha=1&so_miolo=&nversao=#artigo
Law No. 19/2003. June 20. https://www.pgdlisboa.pt/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?nid=747&tabela=leis&so_miolo=
Law No. 52/2019 of 31 July. https://diariodarepublica.pt/dr/detalhe/lei/52-2019-123610180
GRECO. 2022. “Fourth Evaluation Round – Second Compliance Report 2022.” https://rm.coe.int/fourth-evaluation-round-corruption-prevention-in-respect-of-members-of/1680a7d87a
EC. 2023. “2023 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Portugal.” https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-07/50_1_52628_coun_chap_portugal_en.pdf
Oliveira, H. 2021. “A Estratégia Nacional de Combate à Corrupção poderia e deveria ir muito mais longe.” https://ver.pt/a-estrategia-nacional-de-combate-a-corrupcao-poderia-e-deveria-ir-muito-mais-longe
Transparência Internacional. 2022. “Índice de Perceção da Corrupção 2022.” https://transparencia.pt/indice-de-percecao-da-corrupcao-2022/
2020-2024 National Anticorruption Strategy. https://justica.gov.pt/Estrategia-Nacional-Anticorrupcao-2020-2024#:~:text=O%20programa%20do%20XXII%20Governo,e%20fomentando%20o%20crescimento%20económico
Council of Ministers Resolution No. 143/2021. Available at https://files.dre.pt/1s/2021/11/21300/0002300024.pdf
Expresso. 2023. “Operação Marquês: Sócrates já não será julgado por crimes de falsificação.” https://expresso.pt/sociedade/justica/2023-04-20-Operacao-Marques-Socrates-ja-nao-sera-julgado-por-crimes-de-falsificacao-82675944
DN/Lusa. 2023. “Diretor da PJ diz que nunca esta polícia teve tantos meios para combater a corrupção.” https://www.dn.pt/sociedade/diretor-da-pj-diz-que-nunca-esta-policia-teve-tantos-meios-para-combater-a-corrupcao-17240260.html
Observador. 2022. “Cerca de 40 crimes do megaprocesso BES/GES em risco de prescrever. Ricardo Salgado pode ver cair 15 dos 65 crimes de que está acusado.” https://observador.pt/especiais/cerca-de-40-crimes-do-megaprocesso-bes-ges-em-risco-de-prescrever-ricardo-salgado-pode-ver-cair-15-dos-65-crimes-de-que-esta-acusado/
Código Penal. 1995. DL n.º 48/95, de 15 de Março. https://www.pgdlisboa.pt/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?artigo_id=109A0373&nid=109&tabela=leis&pagina=1&ficha=1&so_miolo=&nversao=#artigo
Law No. 19/2003. June 20. https://www.pgdlisboa.pt/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?nid=747&tabela=leis&so_miolo=
Law No. 52/2019 of 31 July. https://diariodarepublica.pt/dr/detalhe/lei/52-2019-123610180
GRECO. 2022. “Fourth Evaluation Round – Second Compliance Report 2022.” https://rm.coe.int/fourth-evaluation-round-corruption-prevention-in-respect-of-members-of/1680a7d87a
EC. 2023. “2023 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Portugal.” https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-07/50_1_52628_coun_chap_portugal_en.pdf
Oliveira, H. 2021. “A Estratégia Nacional de Combate à Corrupção poderia e deveria ir muito mais longe.” https://ver.pt/a-estrategia-nacional-de-combate-a-corrupcao-poderia-e-deveria-ir-muito-mais-longe
Transparência Internacional. 2022. “Índice de Perceção da Corrupção 2022.” https://transparencia.pt/indice-de-percecao-da-corrupcao-2022/
2020-2024 National Anticorruption Strategy. https://justica.gov.pt/Estrategia-Nacional-Anticorrupcao-2020-2024#:~:text=O%20programa%20do%20XXII%20Governo,e%20fomentando%20o%20crescimento%20económico
Council of Ministers Resolution No. 143/2021. Available at https://files.dre.pt/1s/2021/11/21300/0002300024.pdf
Expresso. 2023. “Operação Marquês: Sócrates já não será julgado por crimes de falsificação.” https://expresso.pt/sociedade/justica/2023-04-20-Operacao-Marques-Socrates-ja-nao-sera-julgado-por-crimes-de-falsificacao-82675944
DN/Lusa. 2023. “Diretor da PJ diz que nunca esta polícia teve tantos meios para combater a corrupção.” https://www.dn.pt/sociedade/diretor-da-pj-diz-que-nunca-esta-policia-teve-tantos-meios-para-combater-a-corrupcao-17240260.html
Observador. 2022. “Cerca de 40 crimes do megaprocesso BES/GES em risco de prescrever. Ricardo Salgado pode ver cair 15 dos 65 crimes de que está acusado.” https://observador.pt/especiais/cerca-de-40-crimes-do-megaprocesso-bes-ges-em-risco-de-prescrever-ricardo-salgado-pode-ver-cair-15-dos-65-crimes-de-que-esta-acusado/
Netherlands
In the public eye, corruption is not perceived as a significant problem in the Netherlands. However, in Transparency International’s 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index, the Netherlands dropped two points to ninth place internationally – its lowest ranking ever. This decline can be attributed to two major causes. First, the structural influence of organized crime, particularly around the mass-scale production and distribution of drugs, has compromised the integrity of the public administration and political officials at all levels of government. This influence is evident in the significant rise in street violence, bombings, and assassinations in larger cities such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam, which are linked to conflicts within organized crime gangs. Second, Dutch politics has failed to respond adequately to past calls by GRECO and the Council of Europe for stricter self-regulation. There have been delays is passing regulations on political integrity, poor control of political party funding and insufficient monitoring of lobbyists’ influence. Recently, three top-level Dutch politicians quickly transitioned to lobbying roles for the gambling, weapons and energy industries. Previously, three former prime ministers moved to consultancy or corporate board positions. Additionally, protections for whistleblowers and regulation and oversight of political party finances remain weak or nonexistent. For example, members of parliament and even part-time university professors are formally obliged to register their paid secondary functions but frequently fail to do so without facing significant sanctions.
Organized drug-related crime is significantly undermining democracy and public safety in the Netherlands. Evidence shows that most serious episodes of violence, including bombings and assassinations against journalists, whistleblowers, lawyers and rival individuals within criminal networks, is drug-related. More concerning is the undermining of local and regional politics and the corruption of civil servants within the police and judiciary. Criminal information brokers corrupt officials to sell sensitive information or obtain passports and other valuable documents for significant sums of money in the underworld. Certain sectors of the Dutch economy, including farming, transport and hospitality, are particularly vulnerable to deep penetration by organized crime.
Of particular concern is the high level of corruption in the Caribbean part of the kingdom, particularly Bonaire. The proximity to large-scale drug production activities and the weakness of local institutions have undermined political, governmental and social structures on the islands.
Organized drug-related crime is significantly undermining democracy and public safety in the Netherlands. Evidence shows that most serious episodes of violence, including bombings and assassinations against journalists, whistleblowers, lawyers and rival individuals within criminal networks, is drug-related. More concerning is the undermining of local and regional politics and the corruption of civil servants within the police and judiciary. Criminal information brokers corrupt officials to sell sensitive information or obtain passports and other valuable documents for significant sums of money in the underworld. Certain sectors of the Dutch economy, including farming, transport and hospitality, are particularly vulnerable to deep penetration by organized crime.
Of particular concern is the high level of corruption in the Caribbean part of the kingdom, particularly Bonaire. The proximity to large-scale drug production activities and the weakness of local institutions have undermined political, governmental and social structures on the islands.
Citations:
NRC-H. 2023. “Omkoping in het buitenland? Vinden we in Nederland geen probleem.” September 14.
NRC-H. 2023. “Nederland scoorde nog nooit zo laag op internationale corruptie-ranglijst.” Jos Verlaan, January 31.
Corruptie Nederland hoort nog tot de landen met weinig corruptiegevoeligheid in de publieke sector, maar de achtste plaats is de laagste sinds Transparency International deze ranglijst publiceert.
Clingendael. 2021. “De Nederlandse sleutelrol in de geglobaliseerde drugshandel en productie.”
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2023/05/08/een-integere-overheid-is-geen-vanzelfsprekendheid-zegt-de-baas-van-de-rijksrecherche-a4164146
https://research.vu.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/287061918/JV_2023_49_03_H5_Kleemans_2023_gepubliceerdeversie.pdf
https://repository.wodc.nl/bitstream/handle/20.500.12832/3326/3374-ambtelijk-bestuurlijke-integriteit-caribisch-nederland-volledige-tekst.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
NRC-H. 2023. “Omkoping in het buitenland? Vinden we in Nederland geen probleem.” September 14.
NRC-H. 2023. “Nederland scoorde nog nooit zo laag op internationale corruptie-ranglijst.” Jos Verlaan, January 31.
Corruptie Nederland hoort nog tot de landen met weinig corruptiegevoeligheid in de publieke sector, maar de achtste plaats is de laagste sinds Transparency International deze ranglijst publiceert.
Clingendael. 2021. “De Nederlandse sleutelrol in de geglobaliseerde drugshandel en productie.”
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2023/05/08/een-integere-overheid-is-geen-vanzelfsprekendheid-zegt-de-baas-van-de-rijksrecherche-a4164146
https://research.vu.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/287061918/JV_2023_49_03_H5_Kleemans_2023_gepubliceerdeversie.pdf
https://repository.wodc.nl/bitstream/handle/20.500.12832/3326/3374-ambtelijk-bestuurlijke-integriteit-caribisch-nederland-volledige-tekst.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
Few integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
5
Japan
Corruption in Japanese politics has been fueled by patron-client relationships between politicians and voters. The introduction of state subsidies for political parties in 1994 aimed to eliminate such practices. At the same time, total donations to a particular party or political funding entity were limited to JPY 20 million per year from an individual, and to between JPY 7.5 million and JPY 100 million per year from a company, depending on the company size. Moreover, a maximum annual donation ceiling of JPY 1.5 million per person to an individual candidate was introduced. Both political parties and politicians are required to disclose their expenditures and the sources of their revenues, though such reports are not fully transparent.
The new rules have only partially weakened clientelistic practices, however. Corruption scandals are still relatively frequent in Japanese politics. For instance, in September 2023, former Parliamentary Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Akimoto Masatoshi was arrested under on allegations he had received a bribe from a company that promoted the construction of offshore wind power plants.
Collusive and corrupt ties between bureaucrats and businesspersons have been connected with the practice of amakudari – assuming highly paid jobs in public institutions or private companies after retiring from a ministerial position. While amakudari is officially prohibited, bureaucrats still find ways to bypass the law.
Japan is a signatory to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, the UN Convention Against Corruption, and the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. In the 2020 Corruption Risk Forecast, Japan was evaluated relatively well in terms of social integrity but below average in terms of transparency. In its 2019 report, the OECD recommended Japan be more proactive in detecting foreign bribery.
The new rules have only partially weakened clientelistic practices, however. Corruption scandals are still relatively frequent in Japanese politics. For instance, in September 2023, former Parliamentary Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Akimoto Masatoshi was arrested under on allegations he had received a bribe from a company that promoted the construction of offshore wind power plants.
Collusive and corrupt ties between bureaucrats and businesspersons have been connected with the practice of amakudari – assuming highly paid jobs in public institutions or private companies after retiring from a ministerial position. While amakudari is officially prohibited, bureaucrats still find ways to bypass the law.
Japan is a signatory to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, the UN Convention Against Corruption, and the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. In the 2020 Corruption Risk Forecast, Japan was evaluated relatively well in terms of social integrity but below average in terms of transparency. In its 2019 report, the OECD recommended Japan be more proactive in detecting foreign bribery.
Citations:
Corruption Risk Forecast. 2020. “Japan’s Corruption Forecast.” https://www.corruptionrisk.org/country/?country=JPN#forecast
Kyodo News. 2023. “Japan lawmaker arrested in suspected clean energy bribery.” https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2023/09/df088276e042-update1-japans-ex-vice-foreign-minister-arrested-over-suspected-bribery.html
Nishigaki, Kengo, and Muto, Yoshiaki. “Anti-Corruption in Japan.” https://www.globalcompliancenews.com/anti-corruption/anti-corruption-in-japan
OECD. 2019. “Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Phase 4 Report: Japan.” https://www.oecd.org/corruption/anti-bribery/OECD-Japan-Phase-4-Report-ENG.pdf
Corruption Risk Forecast. 2020. “Japan’s Corruption Forecast.” https://www.corruptionrisk.org/country/?country=JPN#forecast
Kyodo News. 2023. “Japan lawmaker arrested in suspected clean energy bribery.” https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2023/09/df088276e042-update1-japans-ex-vice-foreign-minister-arrested-over-suspected-bribery.html
Nishigaki, Kengo, and Muto, Yoshiaki. “Anti-Corruption in Japan.” https://www.globalcompliancenews.com/anti-corruption/anti-corruption-in-japan
OECD. 2019. “Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Phase 4 Report: Japan.” https://www.oecd.org/corruption/anti-bribery/OECD-Japan-Phase-4-Report-ENG.pdf
4
Hungary
Corruption is one of Hungary’s central problems (European Commission 2021: 10-14), and the level of corruption perceptions in Hungary is very high. The country ranks 77th out of 180 countries in the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2022, behind neighbors such as Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia and Romania. Widespread corruption has been a systemic feature of the Orbán government, with benefits and influence growing through Fidesz informal political-business networks. Members of the Fidesz elite have been involved in several large-scale corruption scandals, with many people accumulating substantial wealth in a short period. Such individuals have enjoyed protection from portions of the judiciary. Hungary has for some time led OLAF’s list of member states in which irregularities in the use of EU funding have been identified, and has conspicuously failed to cooperate with the European Union’s anti-fraud agency. In 2021, the legal anti-corruption framework was further weakened by a narrowing of the scope of application for public procurement rules. The government implemented no specific measures to limit corruption during the COVID-19 pandemic, and special procurement rules have been applied. Only after the strong intervention of the European Union (Article 7 procedure) and the freezing of EU assets did the government engage in procedural and institutional changes. An investigatory report by the Budgetary Control Commission of the European Parliament labeled these reforms as a kind of Potemkin Village, whereby the reforms as officially described do not translate into sustainable reform. What is missing is the political will to fight corruption. The fact that Hungary still refuses to join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office shows where the government stands. Joining the Office would make many expensive institutional reforms completely unnecessary. In 2022, bowing to pressure from the European Commission, the government set up a new institution called the Integrity Authority. However, this has a weak mandate, and little power beyond issuing periodic reports on its observations. Nevertheless, the Integrity Authority has been critical of the lack of transparency in public procurement, and has flagged several issues related to businesspeople with close ties to the government. The system of asset declarations has been reformed several times in recent years and is relatively stringent on paper. However, there is no associated oversight mechanism, so false statements or underreporting may not be detected, rendering the system almost useless (K-Monitor 2023).
Citations:
Citations:
European Commission. 2021. “2021 Rule of Law Report. Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Hungary.” SWD (2021) 714 final, Brussels. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:5201SC0714&from=
ENK-Monitor. 2023. “Hungarian MP’s Assets: Less Declared And Still Not Monitored.” 15 February. https://k.blog.hu/2023/02/15/hungarian_mp_s_assets_less_declared_and_still_not_monitored?layout=5
Transparency International. 2024. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2022.” https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022
Citations:
European Commission. 2021. “2021 Rule of Law Report. Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Hungary.” SWD (2021) 714 final, Brussels. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:5201SC0714&from=
ENK-Monitor. 2023. “Hungarian MP’s Assets: Less Declared And Still Not Monitored.” 15 February. https://k.blog.hu/2023/02/15/hungarian_mp_s_assets_less_declared_and_still_not_monitored?layout=5
Transparency International. 2024. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2022.” https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022
Slovakia
The Registry of Public Contracts and Public Sector Partners significantly facilitates corruption detection. These tools ensure that public procurement processes are more transparent, with all details of tenders publicly accessible. Anti-corruption legislation also includes rules on conflicts of interest and asset declarations for high public officials. However, enforcement and investigation based on these regulations are reportedly inadequate.
For instance, in late 2023, Prime Minister Robert Fico purchased a luxury flat in a prestigious area of Bratislava but did not disclose the price or details of the transaction despite media pressure (Hajčáková 2024). Many other public officials face similar unresolved questions regarding their assets. While major anti-corruption stakeholders emphasize transparency, it alone is insufficient. There is a lack of coordination, enforcement, and accountability within the anti-corruption framework. Thus, while transparency raises public awareness, it does not guarantee effective investigation, prosecution, and justice. Slovakia experiences a mismatch between high perceived corruption and a low rate of investigated high-level corruption cases.
Rules governing the financing of political parties are established under Law 85/2005 on Political Parties and Political Movements. This law outlines regulations on private income, direct public funding, spending limits, reporting, oversight, and sanctions (see Law 85/2005). The Ethical Codex of the Civil Servant, effective from Jan. 1, 2020, under government regulation 400/2019, governs civil service ethics.
Despite these anti-corruption safeguards, their impact on the scope and scale of corruption in Slovakia is limited, with some describing the situation as “transparent corruption.” Like other countries in the region (see Langr, 2018), systemic corruption persists in Slovakia. The Group of States Against Corruption reports that Slovakia has made minimal progress in preventing corruption and promoting integrity within the central government (based on data from previous administrations).
During the 2020 – 2023 term under the OĽANO-led governments, combating corruption was a primary focus. Notable results include establishing the Office for the Protection of Whistleblowers and significantly increasing the number of investigated cases. High-ranking civil servants and judges were among those under criminal investigation, with some already sentenced. Nonetheless, there is ongoing debate about the legality of certain investigations. The Prosecutor General’s Office invoked Article 363 of the Penal Code to halt investigations in nearly 30 cases, including some where higher-level courts had upheld the legality of the charges. Notably, high-level politicians from the anti-corruption governments have been included in investigations. For example, in August 2023, the National Criminal Investigation Agency began investigating the director of the Slovak Secret Service, the previous director (appointed in 2020), and the director of the National Security Office (based on research for the EUPACK project).
Additionally, the caretaker government led by Eduard Heger was dismissed in May 2023 amid a corruption scandal involving Agriculture Minister Vlčan. Vlčan’s firm received a €1.4 million subsidy from the Environment Ministry’s competitive call. Despite other applications, the company won, and Vlčan refused to return the subsidy, opting to step down instead (see Benediktovičová, 2023).
For instance, in late 2023, Prime Minister Robert Fico purchased a luxury flat in a prestigious area of Bratislava but did not disclose the price or details of the transaction despite media pressure (Hajčáková 2024). Many other public officials face similar unresolved questions regarding their assets. While major anti-corruption stakeholders emphasize transparency, it alone is insufficient. There is a lack of coordination, enforcement, and accountability within the anti-corruption framework. Thus, while transparency raises public awareness, it does not guarantee effective investigation, prosecution, and justice. Slovakia experiences a mismatch between high perceived corruption and a low rate of investigated high-level corruption cases.
Rules governing the financing of political parties are established under Law 85/2005 on Political Parties and Political Movements. This law outlines regulations on private income, direct public funding, spending limits, reporting, oversight, and sanctions (see Law 85/2005). The Ethical Codex of the Civil Servant, effective from Jan. 1, 2020, under government regulation 400/2019, governs civil service ethics.
Despite these anti-corruption safeguards, their impact on the scope and scale of corruption in Slovakia is limited, with some describing the situation as “transparent corruption.” Like other countries in the region (see Langr, 2018), systemic corruption persists in Slovakia. The Group of States Against Corruption reports that Slovakia has made minimal progress in preventing corruption and promoting integrity within the central government (based on data from previous administrations).
During the 2020 – 2023 term under the OĽANO-led governments, combating corruption was a primary focus. Notable results include establishing the Office for the Protection of Whistleblowers and significantly increasing the number of investigated cases. High-ranking civil servants and judges were among those under criminal investigation, with some already sentenced. Nonetheless, there is ongoing debate about the legality of certain investigations. The Prosecutor General’s Office invoked Article 363 of the Penal Code to halt investigations in nearly 30 cases, including some where higher-level courts had upheld the legality of the charges. Notably, high-level politicians from the anti-corruption governments have been included in investigations. For example, in August 2023, the National Criminal Investigation Agency began investigating the director of the Slovak Secret Service, the previous director (appointed in 2020), and the director of the National Security Office (based on research for the EUPACK project).
Additionally, the caretaker government led by Eduard Heger was dismissed in May 2023 amid a corruption scandal involving Agriculture Minister Vlčan. Vlčan’s firm received a €1.4 million subsidy from the Environment Ministry’s competitive call. Despite other applications, the company won, and Vlčan refused to return the subsidy, opting to step down instead (see Benediktovičová, 2023).
Citations:
Zákon 85/2005 o politických stranách a politických hnutiach. 2005. https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2005/85/
Etický kódex štátneho zamestnanca. ” https://radaprestatnusluzbu.vlada.gov.sk/eticky-kodex-statneho-zamestnanca/”
Langr, I. 2018. “Public Procurement in the Systemic Corruption Environment: Evidence from the Czech Republic.” NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy 11 (2): 53–79.
Benediktovičová, M. 2023. “Budaj bol za zotrvanie Vlčana a chcel na detektor lži. Ako skládka pri prírodnom unikáte pritiahla Fica a odrovnala Hegera.” Denník N, June 14. https://dennikn.sk/3406008/budaj-bol-za-zotrvanie-vlcana-a-chcel-na-detektor-lzi-ako-skladka-pri-prirodnom-unikate-pritiahla-fica-a-odrovnala-hegera/?ref=list
GRECO. 2022. “Slovakia: Compliance Report.” https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/evaluations/slovakia
Hajčáková, D. 2024. “Fico o kúpenom byte mlčí. Otázky o bývaní ho dráždili dlhodobo.” Daily Sme https://domov.sme.sk/c/23264477/fico-byt-sokolska-munko.html
Zákon 85/2005 o politických stranách a politických hnutiach. 2005. https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2005/85/
Etický kódex štátneho zamestnanca. ” https://radaprestatnusluzbu.vlada.gov.sk/eticky-kodex-statneho-zamestnanca/”
Langr, I. 2018. “Public Procurement in the Systemic Corruption Environment: Evidence from the Czech Republic.” NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy 11 (2): 53–79.
Benediktovičová, M. 2023. “Budaj bol za zotrvanie Vlčana a chcel na detektor lži. Ako skládka pri prírodnom unikáte pritiahla Fica a odrovnala Hegera.” Denník N, June 14. https://dennikn.sk/3406008/budaj-bol-za-zotrvanie-vlcana-a-chcel-na-detektor-lzi-ako-skladka-pri-prirodnom-unikate-pritiahla-fica-a-odrovnala-hegera/?ref=list
GRECO. 2022. “Slovakia: Compliance Report.” https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/evaluations/slovakia
Hajčáková, D. 2024. “Fico o kúpenom byte mlčí. Otázky o bývaní ho dráždili dlhodobo.” Daily Sme https://domov.sme.sk/c/23264477/fico-byt-sokolska-munko.html
3
Poland
Poland has developed many institutions to fight corruption, including the Internal Security Agency, the National Revenue Administration, the Ministry of National Defense, the Supreme Audit Office, the police and the Border Guard. There are also rules for officeholders intended to ensure transparency, prevent conflicts of interest and promote ethical conduct, such as asset declarations and incompatibility regulations. A sound framework for public procurement debarment is also in place. However, Poland has fallen short in the area of combating foreign bribery.
In 2022, Poland received its lowest score since 2012 on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), with 55 points and a ranking of 45th place. The main reasons for this decline included disruptions to the rule of law, such as the politicization of the Constitutional Tribunal and the prosecutor’s office, pressure on courts and individual judges, and the dismissal of charges against high-ranking officials. A significant erosion with regard to fundamental financial principles was also evident. Negative shifts in the public finance system were caused by substantial spending outside the state budget. This situation undermined the effectiveness of the budget law – particularly the state budget – as the primary tool for managing state finances. Additionally, the government had employed mechanisms to understate the state budget deficit and circumvent the stabilizing expenditure rule (Dudek and Kotecki 2023).
The PiS government lacked an effective anti-corruption policy. A damning report by the Supreme Audit Office in December 2022 revealed that the Government Anti-Corruption Program for 2018 – 2020 had failed in most of its planned tasks. The program’s implementation was chaotic and poorly coordinated, with limited success in areas such as training. No subsequent document outlining priorities and tasks for anti-corruption policy had been introduced since the program’s conclusion in 2020 (NIK 2022).
In 2022, Poland received its lowest score since 2012 on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), with 55 points and a ranking of 45th place. The main reasons for this decline included disruptions to the rule of law, such as the politicization of the Constitutional Tribunal and the prosecutor’s office, pressure on courts and individual judges, and the dismissal of charges against high-ranking officials. A significant erosion with regard to fundamental financial principles was also evident. Negative shifts in the public finance system were caused by substantial spending outside the state budget. This situation undermined the effectiveness of the budget law – particularly the state budget – as the primary tool for managing state finances. Additionally, the government had employed mechanisms to understate the state budget deficit and circumvent the stabilizing expenditure rule (Dudek and Kotecki 2023).
The PiS government lacked an effective anti-corruption policy. A damning report by the Supreme Audit Office in December 2022 revealed that the Government Anti-Corruption Program for 2018 – 2020 had failed in most of its planned tasks. The program’s implementation was chaotic and poorly coordinated, with limited success in areas such as training. No subsequent document outlining priorities and tasks for anti-corruption policy had been introduced since the program’s conclusion in 2020 (NIK 2022).
Citations:
Dudek, S., and L. Kotecki. 2023. Stabilny i przejrzysty budżet pod kontrolą obywateli. Warszawa. https://www.efcongress.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Stabilny_i_przejrzysty_budżet.pdf
Najwyższa Izba Kontroli. 2023. “Słabe efekty rządowego programu antykorupcyjnego. Polska nadal daleko w rankingu Transparency International.” https://www.nik.gov.pl/plik/id,27852.pdf
https://www.batory.org.pl/blog_wpis/czy-to-ostatni-rok-spadkow-polski-w-indeksie-percepcji-korupcji/
Materska-Sosnowska, Anna, et al. 2023. Ocena odporności państwa na nadużycia władzy. Edycja 2023. Warszawa: Fundacja Batorego.
Dudek, S., and L. Kotecki. 2023. Stabilny i przejrzysty budżet pod kontrolą obywateli. Warszawa. https://www.efcongress.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Stabilny_i_przejrzysty_budżet.pdf
Najwyższa Izba Kontroli. 2023. “Słabe efekty rządowego programu antykorupcyjnego. Polska nadal daleko w rankingu Transparency International.” https://www.nik.gov.pl/plik/id,27852.pdf
https://www.batory.org.pl/blog_wpis/czy-to-ostatni-rok-spadkow-polski-w-indeksie-percepcji-korupcji/
Materska-Sosnowska, Anna, et al. 2023. Ocena odporności państwa na nadużycia władzy. Edycja 2023. Warszawa: Fundacja Batorego.
Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.
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