To what extent do political parties retain their ability to enable cross-party cooperation in policymaking and implementation?
There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
10
Norway
Rule of law, democracy, and human rights are the foundation of all political parties. On the extreme left, the Red Party – historically inspired by Mao’s China – abandoned its program of armed revolution two decades ago. On the extreme right, the populist Progress Party has significantly modified its anti-immigrant rhetoric and entered into a coalition government (2013 – 2020) with the Conservative and Liberal parties. This suggests that, in a comparative perspective and although parties are easily positioned on a left-to-right dimension, the degree of polarization is modest. Center-left and center-right coalitions are the norm at the national government level. In local authorities, all combinations of coalitions and alliances are found. The solid commitment to liberal democratic values by all parties also reflects the opinions found in the electorate. Anti-democratic and extreme populist sentiments are rare, and if voiced at all, are met with massive condemnation by all political parties.
9
Denmark
Denmark’s democracy is very stable and enjoys strong legitimacy among all parties. Anti-democratic movements remain on the fringe in Denmark. Thus, all major parties support the constitution, and there have been no signs that political parties are willing to change the fundamentals of liberal democracy.
Polarization is on the rise in Denmark, as in most European countries. This does not affect the levels of cooperation in the Danish parliament, where legislation is still passed with overwhelming majorities, a trend observed since the introduction of the 1953 constitution. Denmark is typically governed by minority governments, which requires cross-party cooperation to reach compromises (Green-Pedersen and Sjæveland 2020, Hansen 2003). Surprisingly, the current majority government has passed most of its significant legislation using supermajorities, as has been the norm in the Danish parliament.
While the system is stable and there is a strong consensus tradition in Danish politics, members of parliament frequently shift parties, and new parties are often formed. In the recent general election in 2023, three new parties with roots in other parties were on the ballot: the Independent Greens (Frie Grønne), formed by legislators who had left the Alternative (Alternativet); The Moderates (Moderaterne), headed by the former prime minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen (then representing the Liberals (Venstre)); and the Danish Democrats (Danmarksdemokraterne), headed by Inger Støjberg, a former minister (then representing the Liberals (Venstre)).
Since anti-democratic forces are only a tiny fringe group, democracy has not come under threat.
Polarization is on the rise in Denmark, as in most European countries. This does not affect the levels of cooperation in the Danish parliament, where legislation is still passed with overwhelming majorities, a trend observed since the introduction of the 1953 constitution. Denmark is typically governed by minority governments, which requires cross-party cooperation to reach compromises (Green-Pedersen and Sjæveland 2020, Hansen 2003). Surprisingly, the current majority government has passed most of its significant legislation using supermajorities, as has been the norm in the Danish parliament.
While the system is stable and there is a strong consensus tradition in Danish politics, members of parliament frequently shift parties, and new parties are often formed. In the recent general election in 2023, three new parties with roots in other parties were on the ballot: the Independent Greens (Frie Grønne), formed by legislators who had left the Alternative (Alternativet); The Moderates (Moderaterne), headed by the former prime minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen (then representing the Liberals (Venstre)); and the Danish Democrats (Danmarksdemokraterne), headed by Inger Støjberg, a former minister (then representing the Liberals (Venstre)).
Since anti-democratic forces are only a tiny fringe group, democracy has not come under threat.
Citations:
Green-Pedersen, C., and A. Skjæveland. 2020. “Blokpolitik og nye politiske emner. Hvordan går det med samarbejdsmønstrene i Folketinget?” Politica: Tidsskrift for Politisk Videnskab 52 (3).
Hansen, ME. 2003. Parlamentsafstemninger og partiprogrammer: En analyse af de politiske partiers placering 1953-2003. Århus: University of Århus Department of Political Science.
Green-Pedersen, C., and A. Skjæveland. 2020. “Blokpolitik og nye politiske emner. Hvordan går det med samarbejdsmønstrene i Folketinget?” Politica: Tidsskrift for Politisk Videnskab 52 (3).
Hansen, ME. 2003. Parlamentsafstemninger og partiprogrammer: En analyse af de politiske partiers placering 1953-2003. Århus: University of Århus Department of Political Science.
Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose no significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
8
Austria
With the FPÖ, the Austrian Nationalrat includes a major party that many consider problematic concerning some liberal democratic values, particularly respect for minorities and migrants living in Austria. In the most recent parliamentary election in 2019, the FPÖ won 16.2% of the total vote and secured 31 seats. Since late 2021, the party has consistently been identified as the largest party in public surveys. In those surveys, the FPÖ’s support has hovered around 30%, with many supporters reportedly coming from the pool of former Sebastian Kurz backers.
The political rhetoric in Austria reflects the strong position of a party with limited respect for different minorities. However, the polarization at the programmatic-ideological level has not hindered the effective execution of public policies. Both the two governing parties – ÖVP and Greens – and the majority of opposition parties in the current Nationalrat (i.e., SPÖ and NEOS) are clearly democratic parties. The FPÖ’s support is rarely, if ever, needed, even for constitutional amendments, which require a two-thirds majority.
Arguably even more importantly, a detailed analysis of voting patterns in the Nationalrat suggests that the FPÖ is not structurally isolated. Rather, depending on the issue, it usually aligns with one or several of the other parties (see Kontrast 2023).
A particular issue that has emerged since the FPÖ became the largest party in popular opinion surveys concerns the possible role of the FPÖ and its leader, Herbert Kickl, in a future Austrian federal government. Kickl, through his rhetoric, is considered one of the most extreme right-wing leaders of the FPÖ since the war. The FPÖ and Kickl have repeatedly cited Hungary’s FIDESZ as a leading example, including its illiberal course.
While the largest party in a governing coalition is conventionally considered to have the right to fill the position of chancellor, a scenario with Kickl as chancellor has long been ruled out by all other major players. However, more recently there have been signs that the ÖVP, which formed a governing coalition with the FPÖ from 2019 – 2021 (and between 2000 – 2005), has started to warm up to the idea of forging another coalition with a Kickl-led FPÖ. In this context, it is also worth noting that in 2023 two ÖVP-FPÖ coalition governments were formed at the state level in Salzburg and Lower Austria.
The political rhetoric in Austria reflects the strong position of a party with limited respect for different minorities. However, the polarization at the programmatic-ideological level has not hindered the effective execution of public policies. Both the two governing parties – ÖVP and Greens – and the majority of opposition parties in the current Nationalrat (i.e., SPÖ and NEOS) are clearly democratic parties. The FPÖ’s support is rarely, if ever, needed, even for constitutional amendments, which require a two-thirds majority.
Arguably even more importantly, a detailed analysis of voting patterns in the Nationalrat suggests that the FPÖ is not structurally isolated. Rather, depending on the issue, it usually aligns with one or several of the other parties (see Kontrast 2023).
A particular issue that has emerged since the FPÖ became the largest party in popular opinion surveys concerns the possible role of the FPÖ and its leader, Herbert Kickl, in a future Austrian federal government. Kickl, through his rhetoric, is considered one of the most extreme right-wing leaders of the FPÖ since the war. The FPÖ and Kickl have repeatedly cited Hungary’s FIDESZ as a leading example, including its illiberal course.
While the largest party in a governing coalition is conventionally considered to have the right to fill the position of chancellor, a scenario with Kickl as chancellor has long been ruled out by all other major players. However, more recently there have been signs that the ÖVP, which formed a governing coalition with the FPÖ from 2019 – 2021 (and between 2000 – 2005), has started to warm up to the idea of forging another coalition with a Kickl-led FPÖ. In this context, it is also worth noting that in 2023 two ÖVP-FPÖ coalition governments were formed at the state level in Salzburg and Lower Austria.
Citations:
https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000143901321/kanzler-oder-pragmatisierter-oppositionsfuehrer-was-plant-herbert-kickl
https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000146452385/bereitschaft-zu-koalition-mit-der-kickl-fpoe-waechst-in-der
https://kontrast.at/abstimmungen-im-nationalrat/
https://www.derstandard.at/story/3000000203911/systemparteien-volksverrat-ketten-brechen-kickl-und-die-sprache-der-nazis
https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000143901321/kanzler-oder-pragmatisierter-oppositionsfuehrer-was-plant-herbert-kickl
https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000146452385/bereitschaft-zu-koalition-mit-der-kickl-fpoe-waechst-in-der
https://kontrast.at/abstimmungen-im-nationalrat/
https://www.derstandard.at/story/3000000203911/systemparteien-volksverrat-ketten-brechen-kickl-und-die-sprache-der-nazis
Belgium
Belgium is a textbook example of consociational parliamentary democracy, characterized by a grand coalition, proportionality, mutual veto rights, segmental autonomy, and cultural public passivity (Caluwaerts & Reuchamps, 2020). The proportional representation system implies that no party has held a majority since WWI. A de facto constraint is the decentralization trend since the 1960s, which delegates increasing powers to the country’s regions, serving different communities: mainly the Flemish-speaking north and the French-speaking south, both represented in Brussels. It is de facto impossible for a French-speaking party to profitably run for election in the north, and vice versa. The increasing fractionalization of the electoral landscape has induced some parties to run together to reach a critical mass, notably the Flemish and French-speaking Greens, the far-left PTB-PVDA, and the Christian Democrats in Brussels.
A self-imposed constraint on cross-party cooperation is the “cordon sanitaire” meant to exclude extreme-right parties since the 1980s (Biard, 2020). This results in lower access to traditional media platforms and exclusion from potential coalitions. Conversely, some right-wing parties want to impose the same “cordon sanitaire” around extreme-left parties, with less success. Over the last decade, the main extreme-right party in Belgium, the Flemish Vlaams Belang (previously Vlaams Blok), has worked to portray itself as less anti-Semitic and distanced from former WWII Nazi collaborators. This “mainstreaming” strategy (Hjorth et al. 2024) adapts challenger parties’ rhetoric and political style to the norms and policy positions of dominant parties to be considered credible coalition partners. This has led some “democratic” parties to be less openly reluctant to cooperate with the extreme right.
Like in almost all democracies, the last decades have seen some degree of polarization and personalization of politics. In Belgium, this mainly takes the form of individual politicians overcommunicating on social media and taking ostentatious positions on minor issues. This makes coalition governance harder and has induced many “old school” politicians to retire, claiming they can no longer “work for the population” as they did in the past.
A self-imposed constraint on cross-party cooperation is the “cordon sanitaire” meant to exclude extreme-right parties since the 1980s (Biard, 2020). This results in lower access to traditional media platforms and exclusion from potential coalitions. Conversely, some right-wing parties want to impose the same “cordon sanitaire” around extreme-left parties, with less success. Over the last decade, the main extreme-right party in Belgium, the Flemish Vlaams Belang (previously Vlaams Blok), has worked to portray itself as less anti-Semitic and distanced from former WWII Nazi collaborators. This “mainstreaming” strategy (Hjorth et al. 2024) adapts challenger parties’ rhetoric and political style to the norms and policy positions of dominant parties to be considered credible coalition partners. This has led some “democratic” parties to be less openly reluctant to cooperate with the extreme right.
Like in almost all democracies, the last decades have seen some degree of polarization and personalization of politics. In Belgium, this mainly takes the form of individual politicians overcommunicating on social media and taking ostentatious positions on minor issues. This makes coalition governance harder and has induced many “old school” politicians to retire, claiming they can no longer “work for the population” as they did in the past.
Citations:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_elections_in_Belgium
Biard, B. 2021. “La lutte contre l’extrême droite en Belgique: I. Moyens légaux et cordon sanitaire politique.” Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP 38: 5-114.
Delwit, Pascal. 2019. “Radical Right-Wing Parties Facing the Wall of the Local? The Vlaams Belang and Local Elections (1982-2018).” Open Journal of Political Science 9: 631-651. DOI: 10.4236/ojps.2019.94039
Erk, Jan. 2007. “From Vlaams Blok to Vlaams Belang: The Belgian Far-Right Renames Itself.” West European Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380500085681
Larsen, M. V., Nyrup, J., and Hjorth, F. 2024. “Reining in the Rascals: Challenger Parties’ Path to Power.” The Journal of Politics.
https://www.lesoir.be/528414/article/2023-07-30/catherine-fonck-par-degout-des-jeux-politiques
Kristof Calvo stopt in 2024 met nationale politiek, ondanks vrees voor ‘pikzwarte zondag’ | De Standaard
‘Bouchez moet stoppen met N-VA-ambassadeur te spelen binnen Vivaldi’ | De Standaard: https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20211210_97902349
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_elections_in_Belgium
Biard, B. 2021. “La lutte contre l’extrême droite en Belgique: I. Moyens légaux et cordon sanitaire politique.” Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP 38: 5-114.
Delwit, Pascal. 2019. “Radical Right-Wing Parties Facing the Wall of the Local? The Vlaams Belang and Local Elections (1982-2018).” Open Journal of Political Science 9: 631-651. DOI: 10.4236/ojps.2019.94039
Erk, Jan. 2007. “From Vlaams Blok to Vlaams Belang: The Belgian Far-Right Renames Itself.” West European Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380500085681
Larsen, M. V., Nyrup, J., and Hjorth, F. 2024. “Reining in the Rascals: Challenger Parties’ Path to Power.” The Journal of Politics.
https://www.lesoir.be/528414/article/2023-07-30/catherine-fonck-par-degout-des-jeux-politiques
Kristof Calvo stopt in 2024 met nationale politiek, ondanks vrees voor ‘pikzwarte zondag’ | De Standaard
‘Bouchez moet stoppen met N-VA-ambassadeur te spelen binnen Vivaldi’ | De Standaard: https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20211210_97902349
Finland
Finland is known for coalition governments. This means all parties aiming to enter the cabinet need to maintain their ability to enable cross-party cooperation in policymaking and implementation.
In comparative terms, the level of party polarization in Finland is low. Generally, Finnish governments are coalition governments, often comprising parties from both the left and right. The Sanna Marin government and the current Petteri Orpo government fit well into this tradition. The most extreme example of a broad coalition in recent decades occurred in 2011 when Jyrki Katainen formed a cabinet consisting of six parties, including the far-left Left Alliance, the Green Party and Katainen’s conservative National Coalition Party.
The Sipilä government (2015 – 2019), however, was an exception to this rule, as it was composed of only three center-right parties.
As with many other European countries, Finland has experienced polarization between political elites and nationalistic populist elements.
As of this writing, the ruling cabinet in Finland consists of a coalition of four major parties, which together command a majority in parliament. There are essentially four parties in the opposition.
Party polarization did not undermine the ability to engage in cross-party cooperation for crisis management during the pandemic in Finland or during the application for NATO membership.
There is widespread acceptance of liberal democratic values and institutions among major political parties. However, it is somewhat doubtful whether all parties – especially the populist True Finns party – are truly committed to advancing them. The most serious crisis erupted in the summer of 2023 when it was revealed that the True Finns party chair had expressed racist comments in a blog written in 2008. So far, the Orpo government has been able to work together within the coalition to control and neutralize the influence of anti-democratic actors.
In comparative terms, the level of party polarization in Finland is low. Generally, Finnish governments are coalition governments, often comprising parties from both the left and right. The Sanna Marin government and the current Petteri Orpo government fit well into this tradition. The most extreme example of a broad coalition in recent decades occurred in 2011 when Jyrki Katainen formed a cabinet consisting of six parties, including the far-left Left Alliance, the Green Party and Katainen’s conservative National Coalition Party.
The Sipilä government (2015 – 2019), however, was an exception to this rule, as it was composed of only three center-right parties.
As with many other European countries, Finland has experienced polarization between political elites and nationalistic populist elements.
As of this writing, the ruling cabinet in Finland consists of a coalition of four major parties, which together command a majority in parliament. There are essentially four parties in the opposition.
Party polarization did not undermine the ability to engage in cross-party cooperation for crisis management during the pandemic in Finland or during the application for NATO membership.
There is widespread acceptance of liberal democratic values and institutions among major political parties. However, it is somewhat doubtful whether all parties – especially the populist True Finns party – are truly committed to advancing them. The most serious crisis erupted in the summer of 2023 when it was revealed that the True Finns party chair had expressed racist comments in a blog written in 2008. So far, the Orpo government has been able to work together within the coalition to control and neutralize the influence of anti-democratic actors.
Citations:
https://www.politico.eu/article/finish-finance-minister-riikka-purra-racism-xenophobia-racist-comments-hallaaho-scripta-immigration/
https://www.politico.eu/article/finish-finance-minister-riikka-purra-racism-xenophobia-racist-comments-hallaaho-scripta-immigration/
Germany
The Liberal Democracy Index, based on the Varieties of Democracy Project, allocated Germany a score of 0.81 for 2022 on a scale from 0 to 1 (Our World in Data, 2023). Further, according to the Manifesto Project, which analyzes the manifestos of the major political parties in a country, all major parties in Germany make favorable statements about the necessity of democracy. The Greens (5.241) and the Left (5.084) receive the highest scores, suggesting the highest number of positive mentions of democracy in their manifestos. In contrast, the AfD (2.033) receives the lowest score, followed by the CDU with a score of 2.559. Additionally, while the AfD has a relatively low score of 0.064, it is the only major party for which statements against the idea of democracy can be observed, either in general or within its manifesto (Manifesto Project, 2023). Hence, liberal democratic values are widely accepted and supported within the major political parties apart from parts of the AfD. In Saxony, Thuringia, and Saxony-Anhalt, for instance, the AfD was classified as a secured right-wing extremist party by the states’ domestic intelligence services based on the justification that the AfD pursues anti-constitutional goals in these states (Tagesschau, 2023).
The cooperation of two or three parties to form a majority and thereby govern is standard in Germany at all federal levels. This cooperation in developing and executing policies is a crucial aspect of German politics. Various coalition combinations exist, and there are no barriers to coalitions between democratic parties with one exception: The CDU currently excludes coalitions with the Left. However, this position is under discussion due to the need to form stable democratic governments amid the rising share of AfD votes, particularly in East Germany (Zeit Online, 2023b).
The major political parties regularly criticize and distance themselves from the AfD, and there are demands, for instance from the Greens in Berlin, to examine the possibility of prohibiting the AfD (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2024). Additionally, the domestic intelligence service classified the AfD as a suspected right-wing extremist case in 2022, which allows it to observe the party as a whole (Tagesschau, 2022).
However, according to the “Politbarometer” by the news outlet ZDF, the AfD would receive 22% of the votes in a federal election as of January 12, 2024 (Politbarometer 2024). Therefore, it is not clear how effective efforts to neutralize the AfD are. While other parties distance themselves from cooperation at the state or federal level, the newspaper “Die Zeit” showed in July 2023 that cooperation on a communal level has already taken place in several instances. This includes collaborations in Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia where the AfD is classified as a secured right-wing extremist organization (Zeit Online, 2023a).
Existing obstacles in the party system, both by law and in practice, pose no significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation among democratic parties. However, the strength of the AfD necessitates coalitions across the left and right camps, which find it very difficult to agree on and jointly defend reforms. This situation is likely to increase support for the AfD.
The cooperation of two or three parties to form a majority and thereby govern is standard in Germany at all federal levels. This cooperation in developing and executing policies is a crucial aspect of German politics. Various coalition combinations exist, and there are no barriers to coalitions between democratic parties with one exception: The CDU currently excludes coalitions with the Left. However, this position is under discussion due to the need to form stable democratic governments amid the rising share of AfD votes, particularly in East Germany (Zeit Online, 2023b).
The major political parties regularly criticize and distance themselves from the AfD, and there are demands, for instance from the Greens in Berlin, to examine the possibility of prohibiting the AfD (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2024). Additionally, the domestic intelligence service classified the AfD as a suspected right-wing extremist case in 2022, which allows it to observe the party as a whole (Tagesschau, 2022).
However, according to the “Politbarometer” by the news outlet ZDF, the AfD would receive 22% of the votes in a federal election as of January 12, 2024 (Politbarometer 2024). Therefore, it is not clear how effective efforts to neutralize the AfD are. While other parties distance themselves from cooperation at the state or federal level, the newspaper “Die Zeit” showed in July 2023 that cooperation on a communal level has already taken place in several instances. This includes collaborations in Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia where the AfD is classified as a secured right-wing extremist organization (Zeit Online, 2023a).
Existing obstacles in the party system, both by law and in practice, pose no significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation among democratic parties. However, the strength of the AfD necessitates coalitions across the left and right camps, which find it very difficult to agree on and jointly defend reforms. This situation is likely to increase support for the AfD.
Citations:
Manifesto Project. 2023. “Manifesto Project Data Dashboard.” https://visuals.manifesto-project.wzb.eu/mpdb-shiny/cmp_dashboard_dataset/
Our World in Data. 2023. “Liberal Democracy Index, Germany, 1789 to 2022.” https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/liberal-democracy-index?tab=chart&yScale=log&country=~DEU
Politbarometer. 2024. “Politbarometer vom 12. Januar 2024.” https://www.zdf.de/politik/politbarometer/240112-politbarometer-video-100.html
Süddeutsche Zeitung. 2024. “Berliner Grüne fordern Prüfung eines AfD-Verbots.” https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/parteien-berlin-berliner-gruene-fordern-pruefung-eines-afd-verbots-dpa.urn-newsml-dpa-com-20090101-240112-99-585917
Tagesschau. 2023. “AfD in Sachsen ‘gesichert rechtsextremistisch.’” https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/verfassungsschutz-afd-sachsen-rechtsextremistisch-100.html
Tagesschau. 2022. “Ein Urteil und seine möglichen Folgen.” https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/afd-beobachtung-verfassungsschutz-101.html
Zeit Online. 2023. “Wo es bereits eine Zusammenarbeit mit der AfD gab.” https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2023-07/afd-zusammenarbeit-kommunaler-ebene-uebersicht#sachsen-anhalt
Zeit Online. 2023. “CDU-Vorstand Mike Mohring ist offen für Gespräche mit der Linken.” https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2023-07/thueringen-afd-cdu-mike-mohring-linke-koalition-landtag
Manifesto Project. 2023. “Manifesto Project Data Dashboard.” https://visuals.manifesto-project.wzb.eu/mpdb-shiny/cmp_dashboard_dataset/
Our World in Data. 2023. “Liberal Democracy Index, Germany, 1789 to 2022.” https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/liberal-democracy-index?tab=chart&yScale=log&country=~DEU
Politbarometer. 2024. “Politbarometer vom 12. Januar 2024.” https://www.zdf.de/politik/politbarometer/240112-politbarometer-video-100.html
Süddeutsche Zeitung. 2024. “Berliner Grüne fordern Prüfung eines AfD-Verbots.” https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/parteien-berlin-berliner-gruene-fordern-pruefung-eines-afd-verbots-dpa.urn-newsml-dpa-com-20090101-240112-99-585917
Tagesschau. 2023. “AfD in Sachsen ‘gesichert rechtsextremistisch.’” https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/verfassungsschutz-afd-sachsen-rechtsextremistisch-100.html
Tagesschau. 2022. “Ein Urteil und seine möglichen Folgen.” https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/afd-beobachtung-verfassungsschutz-101.html
Zeit Online. 2023. “Wo es bereits eine Zusammenarbeit mit der AfD gab.” https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2023-07/afd-zusammenarbeit-kommunaler-ebene-uebersicht#sachsen-anhalt
Zeit Online. 2023. “CDU-Vorstand Mike Mohring ist offen für Gespräche mit der Linken.” https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2023-07/thueringen-afd-cdu-mike-mohring-linke-koalition-landtag
Ireland
Acceptance of liberal democratic values and institutions is widespread among major political parties in Ireland, which appear committed to advancing these principles. However, new small far-right parties are emerging, and are beginning to have electoral impact. These parties do not share the same values, signaling a breakdown in the relative absence of hard-right populism or significant overt anti-immigrant sentiment in party politics. The May 2024 local and European elections were targets for these newly established far-right parties, for which there is tacit demand from some Irish voters (Costello 2021). Adshead and Scully (2021) observe that long-established parties are now joined by an increasing number of smaller parties in the Dáil. This raises the potential to shift the balance of power away from the larger parties, with possible consequences for the style and capacity for policy analysis. The next general election, speculated to be in late 2024 or early 2025, is expected to further dissolve traditional politics, overlapping with political dynamics in Northern Ireland. Impacts on equality and sustainability may be mixed. Sinn Féin, the main contender for government, may question the legitimacy of Ireland’s current Climate Action Plan 2020-2030 and carbon tax regime, which could be incompatible with the Green Party, a potential smaller coalition partner. While it is unclear who will form the next government, it is likely to be a coalition, and finding durable coalitions may become more challenging in the future. This realignment of Irish politics will be influenced by international factors, including the ongoing implications of Brexit, the housing crisis, inflation and the cost of living and the emergence of the far right.
Trust in government in Ireland was at 46% in 2022, a relatively high level compared to other European countries, although low in absolute terms, with trust in national government at 51% and local government at 45%. Mainstream actors have been relatively effective in working together to control or neutralize the influence of anti-democratic actors. However, the experiences of 2023, such as the Dublin riots on November 7th and numerous arson attacks on asylum seeker accommodations, suggest that anti-democratic actors have established a base and influence.
Trust in government in Ireland was at 46% in 2022, a relatively high level compared to other European countries, although low in absolute terms, with trust in national government at 51% and local government at 45%. Mainstream actors have been relatively effective in working together to control or neutralize the influence of anti-democratic actors. However, the experiences of 2023, such as the Dublin riots on November 7th and numerous arson attacks on asylum seeker accommodations, suggest that anti-democratic actors have established a base and influence.
Citations:
Adshead, M., and Scully, D. 2021. Political Parties and the Policy Process. Bristol: Policy Press.
OECD. 2021. Government at a Glance 2021. Paris: OECD.
Costello, Rory. 2021. “Issue Congruence Between Voters and Parties: Examining the Democratic Party Mandate in Ireland.” Irish Political Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/07907184.2021.1973318
Little, C., and D. Farrell. 2021. “The Party System at a Critical Juncture.” In The Oxford Handbook of Irish Politics, eds. D. M. Farrell and N. Hardiman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 521-538.
HCC. 2023. Hate not Fear. Dublin: Hope and Courage Collective.
Adshead, M., and Scully, D. 2021. Political Parties and the Policy Process. Bristol: Policy Press.
OECD. 2021. Government at a Glance 2021. Paris: OECD.
Costello, Rory. 2021. “Issue Congruence Between Voters and Parties: Examining the Democratic Party Mandate in Ireland.” Irish Political Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/07907184.2021.1973318
Little, C., and D. Farrell. 2021. “The Party System at a Critical Juncture.” In The Oxford Handbook of Irish Politics, eds. D. M. Farrell and N. Hardiman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 521-538.
HCC. 2023. Hate not Fear. Dublin: Hope and Courage Collective.
Japan
None of the major parties question liberal democracy outright, and Japan stands out internationally for its lack of a major populist movement. In the past, Japan’s democracy has been criticized for its sometimes opaque decision-making processes, with many decisions taken informally by ministerial bureaucrats rather than elected politicians. A number of reforms in the 1990s and 2000s have led to administrative changes, centralized decision-making and strengthened the position of prime minister. However, the fact that constitutional reform is very difficult politically – as any change must be approved by popular vote – has given rise to concerns that governments may undermine the constitution by changing its official interpretation and application. Prime Minister Abe, for example, used a reinterpretation of Article 9 issued by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau to justify participation in collective self-defense pacts. This was considered to be a constitutional breach by most experts.
Prime Minister Abe Shinzô’s (2012 – 2020) efforts to take greater control of the public broadcaster NHK – such as installing a government loyalist as governor – contributed to the Economist Democracy Index downgrading Japan’s democracy to flawed democracy. Under his successors Suga Yoshihide (2020 – 2021) and Kishida Fumio (2021 – present), Japan has regained the status of full democracy, however.
Ideological polarization seems to have declined in recent years. For example, the issue of a close security partnership with the United States used to be highly controversial, contributing to a split in the Socialist Party. Today, most opposition parties do not question the alliance, with the exception of the JCP. Party cooperation in elections has increased in recent years.
However, the Japanese political scene is not fully coherent in its stance on actors who violate the rules of liberal democracy. In 2016, the Hate Speech Elimination Law was enacted against extreme right-wing groups, but it failed to criminalize discriminatory behavior based on race or ethnicity, despite an appeal from left-wing parties. In addition, some members of the LDP, other conservative parties as well as members of the rising Sansei party have repeatedly made xenophobic and in the latter case even antisemitic statements without significant public repercussion. Though such sentiment does not seem widespread, they appeal to Japan’s small but well-funded and organized right-wing and nationalistic organizations (Gill 2018).
Prime Minister Abe Shinzô’s (2012 – 2020) efforts to take greater control of the public broadcaster NHK – such as installing a government loyalist as governor – contributed to the Economist Democracy Index downgrading Japan’s democracy to flawed democracy. Under his successors Suga Yoshihide (2020 – 2021) and Kishida Fumio (2021 – present), Japan has regained the status of full democracy, however.
Ideological polarization seems to have declined in recent years. For example, the issue of a close security partnership with the United States used to be highly controversial, contributing to a split in the Socialist Party. Today, most opposition parties do not question the alliance, with the exception of the JCP. Party cooperation in elections has increased in recent years.
However, the Japanese political scene is not fully coherent in its stance on actors who violate the rules of liberal democracy. In 2016, the Hate Speech Elimination Law was enacted against extreme right-wing groups, but it failed to criminalize discriminatory behavior based on race or ethnicity, despite an appeal from left-wing parties. In addition, some members of the LDP, other conservative parties as well as members of the rising Sansei party have repeatedly made xenophobic and in the latter case even antisemitic statements without significant public repercussion. Though such sentiment does not seem widespread, they appeal to Japan’s small but well-funded and organized right-wing and nationalistic organizations (Gill 2018).
Citations:
Gill, Tom, ed. 2018. “Special Issue: Japan’s New Wave Rightists: Addressing the Action Conservative Movement.” Social Science Japan Journal 21 (2): 157-166.
Economist Intelligence. 2023. “Democracy Index 2022.” https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2022/
Kotani, Junko. 2018. “Proceed with Caution: Hate Speech Regulation in Japan.” Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 45 (3): 603-622.
Gill, Tom, ed. 2018. “Special Issue: Japan’s New Wave Rightists: Addressing the Action Conservative Movement.” Social Science Japan Journal 21 (2): 157-166.
Economist Intelligence. 2023. “Democracy Index 2022.” https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2022/
Kotani, Junko. 2018. “Proceed with Caution: Hate Speech Regulation in Japan.” Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 45 (3): 603-622.
Lithuania
Although political conflicts are common in the decision-making process, they often stem from the division between the ruling coalition and the opposition. Typically, these conflicts concern policy issues that do not affect the liberal democratic values and institutions established by the constitution. Moreover, cross-party agreements have been reached on matters of strategic importance, such as the country’s membership in the EU and NATO.
Most recently, a cross-party agreement among most parliamentary parties was signed in mid-2022. This was the fourth such agreement on defense policy since 2012, and aimed to further increase funding for the country’s defense following Russia’s large-scale war against Ukraine. In 2021, parliamentary parties signed a national agreement on education policy for 2021 – 2030. This agreement was initiated by the ruling center-right coalition of conservative and liberal parties and set out policy priorities and funding commitments for the period up to 2030. With new elections approaching in 2024, some opposition parties declared they were leaving some of these cross-party agreements.
Most recently, a cross-party agreement among most parliamentary parties was signed in mid-2022. This was the fourth such agreement on defense policy since 2012, and aimed to further increase funding for the country’s defense following Russia’s large-scale war against Ukraine. In 2021, parliamentary parties signed a national agreement on education policy for 2021 – 2030. This agreement was initiated by the ruling center-right coalition of conservative and liberal parties and set out policy priorities and funding commitments for the period up to 2030. With new elections approaching in 2024, some opposition parties declared they were leaving some of these cross-party agreements.
New Zealand
The acceptance of liberal democratic values is widespread among the political parties that regularly win representation in Parliament, including Labour, the National Party and minor parties. While there may be differences in policy priorities among these parties, they operate within the framework of liberal democracy and accept its core principles and institutions.
New Zealand does not have a significant presence of anti-democratic actors at the mainstream level; there have only been isolated instances of small extremist groups or individuals expressing anti-democratic ideologies. The most infamous example dates back to 2019, when a far-right extremist fatally shot 51 people in two mosques in Christchurch.
New Zealand has also been spared by the wave of populism that has swept across developed democracies in the last two decades (Curtin and Vowles 2020). Although there have been instances where politicians such as David Seymour and Winston Peters, or political movements like Groundswell, have used populist rhetoric or tactics, the impacts of populism have been felt much less than in other countries.
Generally speaking, the political spectrum in New Zealand is not as deeply divided as in some other democratic systems. Ideological differences do exist among the major political parties, but the level of polarization is relatively low (Ford 2021; Miller 2015: 166-177). New Zealand has a tradition of consensus-oriented politics that fosters cooperation across party lines, despite ideological differences. However, some political commentators have warned that the three-party coalition that assumed power after the 2023 election – formed by National, ACT and NZ First – will, due to its policy differences and lack of conflict-management arrangements, have an unpredictable internal dynamic (Shaw 2023).
New Zealand does not have a significant presence of anti-democratic actors at the mainstream level; there have only been isolated instances of small extremist groups or individuals expressing anti-democratic ideologies. The most infamous example dates back to 2019, when a far-right extremist fatally shot 51 people in two mosques in Christchurch.
New Zealand has also been spared by the wave of populism that has swept across developed democracies in the last two decades (Curtin and Vowles 2020). Although there have been instances where politicians such as David Seymour and Winston Peters, or political movements like Groundswell, have used populist rhetoric or tactics, the impacts of populism have been felt much less than in other countries.
Generally speaking, the political spectrum in New Zealand is not as deeply divided as in some other democratic systems. Ideological differences do exist among the major political parties, but the level of polarization is relatively low (Ford 2021; Miller 2015: 166-177). New Zealand has a tradition of consensus-oriented politics that fosters cooperation across party lines, despite ideological differences. However, some political commentators have warned that the three-party coalition that assumed power after the 2023 election – formed by National, ACT and NZ First – will, due to its policy differences and lack of conflict-management arrangements, have an unpredictable internal dynamic (Shaw 2023).
Citations:
Curtin, J. and Vowles, J. 2020. “New Zealand Populism in the 2017 Election and Beyond.” In J. Vowles and J. Curtin, eds., A Populist Exception? The 2017 New Zealand General Election. Canberra: ANU Press.
Ford, G. 2021. “Political Parties.” In Government and Politics in Aotearoa New Zealand, 7th edition, J. Hayward et al. Oxford University Press.
Miller, R. 2015. Democracy in New Zealand. Auckland: Auckland University Press.
Shaw, R. 2023. “Three parties, two deals, one government: the stress points within New Zealand’s ‘coalition of many colours’.” The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/three-parties-two-deals-one-government-the-stress-points-within-new-zealands-coalition-of-many-colours-217673
Curtin, J. and Vowles, J. 2020. “New Zealand Populism in the 2017 Election and Beyond.” In J. Vowles and J. Curtin, eds., A Populist Exception? The 2017 New Zealand General Election. Canberra: ANU Press.
Ford, G. 2021. “Political Parties.” In Government and Politics in Aotearoa New Zealand, 7th edition, J. Hayward et al. Oxford University Press.
Miller, R. 2015. Democracy in New Zealand. Auckland: Auckland University Press.
Shaw, R. 2023. “Three parties, two deals, one government: the stress points within New Zealand’s ‘coalition of many colours’.” The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/three-parties-two-deals-one-government-the-stress-points-within-new-zealands-coalition-of-many-colours-217673
Portugal
The Portuguese constitution guarantees political and civic liberties, as well as democratic values, through political parties that promote widely agreed-upon fundamental liberties, rights, and the development of democratic institutions.
Despite the stability of the Portuguese party system since democratization – mainly characterized by the alternating rule between the two major parties, PSD and PS, and the dominance of the same five parties in parliament from 1999 to 2015 (Jalali, 2019) – Portuguese politics has recently undergone substantial transformations.
First, the unexpected government solution known as Geringonça (“contraption”) in 2015, which saw cross-party cooperation between the PS and left-wing parties for the first time, marked a significant shift in cross-party collaboration in Portuguese politics (Fernandes et al., 2018).
Second, the 2019 general elections witnessed the emergence of three new parties: Iniciativa Liberal (Liberal Initiative), focused on economic and social liberalization; the left-wing LIVRE (FREE); and Chega (Enough), the first Portuguese populist radical right party to win parliamentary representation.
Third, the 2022 general elections saw a significant increase in Chega’s and IL’s vote share in a short period, contributing to higher party polarization (Serra-Silva & Santos, 2023: 136).
The rise of these new parties has heightened conflicts in parliament, impacting cross-party cooperation and consensus-building on legislative approvals, as observed in recent research (e.g., Serra-Silva & Santos, 2023: 145). Scholars have concluded that there are clear signs of increased polarization, especially between 2015 and 2022 (Serra-Silva & Santos, 2023). While Portugal didn’t have prominent anti-democratic forces until recently, the emergence of Chega has sparked discussions about whether this political force deviates from the values of liberal democracy. The legal existence of Chega has been questioned by several parties, and there have been formal requests, such as the one made by Ana Gomes, a former diplomat and Eurodeputy, to outlaw the Chega party, though without effect (Rádio Renascença, 2021).
Despite the stability of the Portuguese party system since democratization – mainly characterized by the alternating rule between the two major parties, PSD and PS, and the dominance of the same five parties in parliament from 1999 to 2015 (Jalali, 2019) – Portuguese politics has recently undergone substantial transformations.
First, the unexpected government solution known as Geringonça (“contraption”) in 2015, which saw cross-party cooperation between the PS and left-wing parties for the first time, marked a significant shift in cross-party collaboration in Portuguese politics (Fernandes et al., 2018).
Second, the 2019 general elections witnessed the emergence of three new parties: Iniciativa Liberal (Liberal Initiative), focused on economic and social liberalization; the left-wing LIVRE (FREE); and Chega (Enough), the first Portuguese populist radical right party to win parliamentary representation.
Third, the 2022 general elections saw a significant increase in Chega’s and IL’s vote share in a short period, contributing to higher party polarization (Serra-Silva & Santos, 2023: 136).
The rise of these new parties has heightened conflicts in parliament, impacting cross-party cooperation and consensus-building on legislative approvals, as observed in recent research (e.g., Serra-Silva & Santos, 2023: 145). Scholars have concluded that there are clear signs of increased polarization, especially between 2015 and 2022 (Serra-Silva & Santos, 2023). While Portugal didn’t have prominent anti-democratic forces until recently, the emergence of Chega has sparked discussions about whether this political force deviates from the values of liberal democracy. The legal existence of Chega has been questioned by several parties, and there have been formal requests, such as the one made by Ana Gomes, a former diplomat and Eurodeputy, to outlaw the Chega party, though without effect (Rádio Renascença, 2021).
Citations:
Serra-Silva, João, and Pedro Santos. 2023. “Continuity and Change in Portuguese Politics: Towards a More Polarized Party System?” In Portugal Since the 2008 Economic Crisis: Resilience and Change, eds. António Costa Pinto. 1st ed. 129-155. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351046916
Fernandes, J., Magalhães, P., and Santana-Pereira, J. 2018. “Portugal’s Leftist Government: From Sick Man to Poster Boy?” South European Society and Politics 23 (4): 503-524. DOI: 10.1080/13608746.2018.1525914.
Jalali, C. 2019. “The Portuguese Party System: Evolution in Continuity?” In Costa Pinto, A. and Teixeira, C. P., eds. Political Institutions and Democracy in Portugal. London: Palgrave.
Rádio Renascença. 2021. “Ana Gomes avança com participação para ilegalização do Chega.” https://rr.sapo.pt/noticia/politica/2021/02/04/ana-gomes-avanca-com-participacao-para-ilegalizacao-do-chega/225347
Serra-Silva, João, and Pedro Santos. 2023. “Continuity and Change in Portuguese Politics: Towards a More Polarized Party System?” In Portugal Since the 2008 Economic Crisis: Resilience and Change, eds. António Costa Pinto. 1st ed. 129-155. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351046916
Fernandes, J., Magalhães, P., and Santana-Pereira, J. 2018. “Portugal’s Leftist Government: From Sick Man to Poster Boy?” South European Society and Politics 23 (4): 503-524. DOI: 10.1080/13608746.2018.1525914.
Jalali, C. 2019. “The Portuguese Party System: Evolution in Continuity?” In Costa Pinto, A. and Teixeira, C. P., eds. Political Institutions and Democracy in Portugal. London: Palgrave.
Rádio Renascença. 2021. “Ana Gomes avança com participação para ilegalização do Chega.” https://rr.sapo.pt/noticia/politica/2021/02/04/ana-gomes-avanca-com-participacao-para-ilegalizacao-do-chega/225347
7
Czechia
No current parliamentary party is formally opposed to parliamentary democracy. However, differences in style and policy make cooperation across all parties impossible. The SPD, with 9.6% of the vote in 2021, is often characterized as extreme right and allied with similar parties across Europe. The SPD campaigns against immigration, Islam, NATO, and the EU. Despite this, it cooperated with ANO in parliament from 2017 to 2021, and talks of further cooperation have continued. The biggest problem for ANO is the SPD’s advocacy for referendums on leaving the EU and NATO.
The current coalition consists of five political entities that demonstrated their ability to cooperate by coming together in 2021 to oppose ANO. They successfully mobilized their supporters in coordinated efforts in the Senate and municipal elections in 2022. Although the current president, Petr Pavel, was an independent candidate, Andrej Babiš, the leader of ANO, tried to portray him as the leader of the governing parties and painted him as partisan. However, the ruling coalition is fragmented with disparate policy preferences, weakening it. Opinion polls show the ODS enjoying only one-third of the popular support of ANO.
Doubts over public support for the government as a whole could encourage smaller parties to oppose ODS policies in European Parliament elections and more clearly in parliamentary elections, as all parties will want to be confident of passing the 5% threshold. The five governing political entities have different views on European integration. Some support early affiliation with the eurozone, while the ODS has traditionally been opposed. Some are more concerned about environmental issues, while the ODS has traditionally been more skeptical.
On identity and cultural issues, the governing parties span both liberal and conservative views. Some support same-sex marriage and gender equality, while others oppose them. However, consensus and cooperation within the government around its adopted program appear possible on many issues, particularly since many policy initiatives are initiated and partially funded by the EU.
The current coalition consists of five political entities that demonstrated their ability to cooperate by coming together in 2021 to oppose ANO. They successfully mobilized their supporters in coordinated efforts in the Senate and municipal elections in 2022. Although the current president, Petr Pavel, was an independent candidate, Andrej Babiš, the leader of ANO, tried to portray him as the leader of the governing parties and painted him as partisan. However, the ruling coalition is fragmented with disparate policy preferences, weakening it. Opinion polls show the ODS enjoying only one-third of the popular support of ANO.
Doubts over public support for the government as a whole could encourage smaller parties to oppose ODS policies in European Parliament elections and more clearly in parliamentary elections, as all parties will want to be confident of passing the 5% threshold. The five governing political entities have different views on European integration. Some support early affiliation with the eurozone, while the ODS has traditionally been opposed. Some are more concerned about environmental issues, while the ODS has traditionally been more skeptical.
On identity and cultural issues, the governing parties span both liberal and conservative views. Some support same-sex marriage and gender equality, while others oppose them. However, consensus and cooperation within the government around its adopted program appear possible on many issues, particularly since many policy initiatives are initiated and partially funded by the EU.
Estonia
In the first decades of the 21st century, the political landscape in Estonia could be characterized as modestly polarized, with principles of liberal democracy and parliamentarism generally adhered to. This situation changed radically in 2019, when the populist far-right Conservative People’s Party (EKRE) entered parliament and was included in the ruling coalition for almost two years. After performing worse than expected in the 2023 elections, EKRE adopted a completely obstructive position with regard to legislative work. EKRE’s obstructions included taking frequent unnecessary breaks during sessions and submitting hundreds of irrelevant correction proposals to bills. These tactics, used persistently by EKRE and occasionally by other opposition parties, led the government to bind many votes with a vote of confidence. In such cases, the executive has considerable power over the legislature (Act on the Rules of Procedure of the Riigikogu).
In the fall of 2023, the speaker of the Riigikogu convened a special commission of experts to determine a way out of the parliamentary stalemate. The country’s president additionally held consultations with political parties, but neither initiative led to a positive outcome.
Cross-party cooperation within the executive is much smoother. Disputes are resolved through informal negotiations among coalition partners, and policy development or implementation is not significantly hampered. However, some disagreements can drag on in public, such as the dispute between the minister of education (Estonia 200) and the minister of finance (Reform Party) over teacher salaries in 2023 during a nationwide teacher strike in early 2024.
In the fall of 2023, the speaker of the Riigikogu convened a special commission of experts to determine a way out of the parliamentary stalemate. The country’s president additionally held consultations with political parties, but neither initiative led to a positive outcome.
Cross-party cooperation within the executive is much smoother. Disputes are resolved through informal negotiations among coalition partners, and policy development or implementation is not significantly hampered. However, some disagreements can drag on in public, such as the dispute between the minister of education (Estonia 200) and the minister of finance (Reform Party) over teacher salaries in 2023 during a nationwide teacher strike in early 2024.
Citations:
Riigikogu kodukorra seadus. 2003. https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/833705
Riigikogu kodukorra seadus. 2003. https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/833705
Greece
There is nothing in the institutional design of Greece’s party system that prevents effective cross-party cooperation. However, in practice, the Greek party system has experienced significant political polarization. From 1974 to 2010, the two largest parties – the center-right New Democracy and the center-left Pasok – alternated in government and engaged in fierce electoral battles. Polarization continued during the Greek economic crisis in the 2010s, with New Democracy and the radical left Syriza competing for power (Andreadis and Stavrakakis 2020).
This polarization is not only a reflection of political party competition but also a legacy of the historical conflict between the Right and the Left, dating back to the Greek Civil War of the 1940s. The electoral system, which facilitates the formation of single-party majority governments, has also contributed to this polarization.
Particularly during pre-electoral periods, both major parties and the media, including nationally circulated newspapers, exacerbate polarization, further hindering cross-party cooperation (Exadactylos, 2020).
After 2015, as all parties converged on austerity measures and fiscal restraint, polarization became less pronounced. Recent research indicates that despite ongoing tensions, there was significant cross-party cooperation in parliament during 2019–2024 (VouliWatch, 2023). For instance, opposition parties such as Pasok and Syriza frequently voted alongside the ruling New Democracy party, with Pasok aligning on 69% of all parliamentary votes and Syriza on 45%.
This polarization is not only a reflection of political party competition but also a legacy of the historical conflict between the Right and the Left, dating back to the Greek Civil War of the 1940s. The electoral system, which facilitates the formation of single-party majority governments, has also contributed to this polarization.
Particularly during pre-electoral periods, both major parties and the media, including nationally circulated newspapers, exacerbate polarization, further hindering cross-party cooperation (Exadactylos, 2020).
After 2015, as all parties converged on austerity measures and fiscal restraint, polarization became less pronounced. Recent research indicates that despite ongoing tensions, there was significant cross-party cooperation in parliament during 2019–2024 (VouliWatch, 2023). For instance, opposition parties such as Pasok and Syriza frequently voted alongside the ruling New Democracy party, with Pasok aligning on 69% of all parliamentary votes and Syriza on 45%.
Citations:
Andreadis, Ioannis, and Yannis Stavrakakis. 2020. “Dynamics of Polarization in the Greek Case.” ANNALS, AAPSS 681 (January): 157-172.
Exadaktylos, Theofanis. 2020. “Them and Us: The Politics of Exclusion in Greece in Times of Polarization.” The Emerald Handbook of Digital Media in Greece, 275-288.
VouliWatch. 2023. “Voting together – the extent of consensus among political parties in parliament.” https://twitter.com/vouliwatch/status/1656634387599970310
Andreadis, Ioannis, and Yannis Stavrakakis. 2020. “Dynamics of Polarization in the Greek Case.” ANNALS, AAPSS 681 (January): 157-172.
Exadaktylos, Theofanis. 2020. “Them and Us: The Politics of Exclusion in Greece in Times of Polarization.” The Emerald Handbook of Digital Media in Greece, 275-288.
VouliWatch. 2023. “Voting together – the extent of consensus among political parties in parliament.” https://twitter.com/vouliwatch/status/1656634387599970310
Latvia
Political parties elected to parliament or local councils typically reach a consensus during the coalition formation process.
There is a noticeable tendency for political parties to strive for inclusion in the ruling coalition. To achieve this, some parties engage with ideologically different partners, leading to a rapid shift in their ideological positions. This strategy often confuses the electorate (Ikstens, 2023).
A strong division exists between the coalition and the opposition, particularly evident in budgetary processes where the coalition routinely rejects opposition proposals. This pattern was observed during the extended period when the political party Harmony was in opposition and continues with current opposition parties like For Stability! (elected to parliament in 2022) (LSM, 2023).
While cross-party polarization generally does not hinder policy implementation, ideological polarization has occasionally delayed certain policies, such as the use of the Latvian language in education and the ratification of the Istanbul Convention.
Latvian governing coalitions represent liberal, pro-European, and democratic values, enabling them to neutralize anti-democratic trends and influences.
There is a noticeable tendency for political parties to strive for inclusion in the ruling coalition. To achieve this, some parties engage with ideologically different partners, leading to a rapid shift in their ideological positions. This strategy often confuses the electorate (Ikstens, 2023).
A strong division exists between the coalition and the opposition, particularly evident in budgetary processes where the coalition routinely rejects opposition proposals. This pattern was observed during the extended period when the political party Harmony was in opposition and continues with current opposition parties like For Stability! (elected to parliament in 2022) (LSM, 2023).
While cross-party polarization generally does not hinder policy implementation, ideological polarization has occasionally delayed certain policies, such as the use of the Latvian language in education and the ratification of the Istanbul Convention.
Latvian governing coalitions represent liberal, pro-European, and democratic values, enabling them to neutralize anti-democratic trends and influences.
Citations:
OSCE. 2023. Latvia, Parliamentary Elections, 1 October 2022: Final Report. ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final Report. https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/latvia/541053
Ikstens, J. 2023. “Politiskās partijas Latvijā.” https://enciklopedija.lv/skirklis/25856
LSM. 2023. “Budžets 2024: Saeimas komisijā atbalstu gūst tikai retais opozīcijas priekšlikums.” https://www.lsm.lv/raksts/zinas/ekonomika/04.12.2023-budzets-2024-saeimas-komisija-atbalstu-gust-tikai-retais-opozicijas-priekslikums.a534130/
OSCE. 2023. Latvia, Parliamentary Elections, 1 October 2022: Final Report. ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final Report. https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/latvia/541053
Ikstens, J. 2023. “Politiskās partijas Latvijā.” https://enciklopedija.lv/skirklis/25856
LSM. 2023. “Budžets 2024: Saeimas komisijā atbalstu gūst tikai retais opozīcijas priekšlikums.” https://www.lsm.lv/raksts/zinas/ekonomika/04.12.2023-budzets-2024-saeimas-komisija-atbalstu-gust-tikai-retais-opozicijas-priekslikums.a534130/
Slovenia
Since the 1990s, the ideological profiling between parties and within society in Slovenia has been clear; this also applies to the period before World War II. However, this divergence has increased more recently, partly because certain cleavages continue to overlap. Although the libertarian-authoritarian cleavage was particularly evident in the 1990s, since the first decade of the 21st century, the economic cleavage has also become more significant. This change was mainly a consequence of the disintegration of the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) party, which had long been in office and occupied the center. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Drnovšek, the LDS was able to form ideologically mixed coalitions aimed at maintaining political stability.
The Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS), initially founded at the end of the 1980s as a center-left social democratic party, transformed into a conservative party at the turn of the 21st century. Since 1993, the party has been led by Janez Janša, a particularly polarizing figure in Slovenian politics. This has been demonstrated several times over the last two decades, as center-left voters have focused on defeating Janez Janša. A considerable part of the electoral success of new center-left parties is based on this strategy to attract voters.
Despite ideological polarization, there have been instances in the past where decision-makers have managed to overcome these divides. Examples include the declaration of Slovenia’s independence, the country’s accession to the EU and NATO, and the tough decisions made during the financial and economic crisis, as well as early in the COVID-19 pandemic. However, in the later phases of the pandemic, cooperation became untenable, primarily due to the democratic backsliding under the Janša government (which several democratic watchdog organizations had warned about). More recently, effective cross-party cooperation in addressing the consequences of the catastrophic floods in August 2023 has demonstrated, at least temporarily, that collaboration on critical issues is still possible.
The Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS), initially founded at the end of the 1980s as a center-left social democratic party, transformed into a conservative party at the turn of the 21st century. Since 1993, the party has been led by Janez Janša, a particularly polarizing figure in Slovenian politics. This has been demonstrated several times over the last two decades, as center-left voters have focused on defeating Janez Janša. A considerable part of the electoral success of new center-left parties is based on this strategy to attract voters.
Despite ideological polarization, there have been instances in the past where decision-makers have managed to overcome these divides. Examples include the declaration of Slovenia’s independence, the country’s accession to the EU and NATO, and the tough decisions made during the financial and economic crisis, as well as early in the COVID-19 pandemic. However, in the later phases of the pandemic, cooperation became untenable, primarily due to the democratic backsliding under the Janša government (which several democratic watchdog organizations had warned about). More recently, effective cross-party cooperation in addressing the consequences of the catastrophic floods in August 2023 has demonstrated, at least temporarily, that collaboration on critical issues is still possible.
Citations:
Fink-Hafner, Danica. 2020. “Destabilizacija slovenskega strankarskega sistema po letu 2000.” In Krašovec, A. & Deželan, T., eds., Volilno leto, 5-35. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede.
Haughton, T., and A. Krašovec. 2022. “Slovenia Voted Against an Illiberal Leader and For an Untested Party: Why Did a Brand-New Party Win the Parliamentary Election?” The Washington Post April 26.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/04/26/slovenia-jansa-golob-backsliding-democracy/
Malčič, Matevž. 2023. “Political Polarisation in Slovenia and Its Effects on Liberal Democracy.” Teorija in praksa 60 (1): 24-47.
Fink-Hafner, Danica. 2020. “Destabilizacija slovenskega strankarskega sistema po letu 2000.” In Krašovec, A. & Deželan, T., eds., Volilno leto, 5-35. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede.
Haughton, T., and A. Krašovec. 2022. “Slovenia Voted Against an Illiberal Leader and For an Untested Party: Why Did a Brand-New Party Win the Parliamentary Election?” The Washington Post April 26.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/04/26/slovenia-jansa-golob-backsliding-democracy/
Malčič, Matevž. 2023. “Political Polarisation in Slovenia and Its Effects on Liberal Democracy.” Teorija in praksa 60 (1): 24-47.
Sweden
Party polarization has been increasing in Sweden, even though for a long time it was the exception. While radical right-wing populist parties were growing in countries such as Austria, Denmark and France, such a party did not enter the Swedish parliament until 2010. By the 2022 elections, the radical right-wing populist Sweden Democrats had become the second-largest party after the Social Democrats and ahead of the Moderate Party. The left-right divide, where redistributive policies were at the center of ideological differentiation, has given way to a cultural divide, with a focus on diversity (or lack thereof), identity, globalization and migration (Wikforss, 2022).
More specifically, the GAL-TAN divide (GAL: green, alternative, libertarian and TAN: traditional, authoritarian, nationalist), which refers to the political cleavages associated with values and lifestyles, has emerged as a new feature of the party system. Parties that traditionally occupied different places on the left-right spectrum may adopt similar positions within the GAL-TAN scale. For example, on issues such as migration, the Social Democrats and Conservatives share a similar policy position, while left-wing, green, and center parties tend to share a different policy position (Lindvall, 2017). There has been a polarization trend since 2010 that could mark the start of a steep polarization era. At the same time, this cleavage is not ahistorical in the Swedish context (Oscarsson et al., 2021).
Cross-party collaboration has been difficult and short-lived. The Tidöavtalet, the compromise that allowed for the formation of the minority coalition government after the 2022 elections, illustrated this. Even though the Sweden Democrats and the Liberals promised to be tough on crime, they have different ideas on how to tackle it. While the former hold a punitive stance, the latter prefer measures that maintain the integrity of the individual (Blombäck, 2023). Although the Sweden Democrats are not represented in the governing coalition – they are a supporting party – they are clearly imprinting their programmatic stamp on government policy.
In summary, there are no legal barriers to collaboration; in fact, it is an integral part of Swedish politics. Recently, it has been more difficult for parties to find common ground due to the strategically favorable position of the Sweden Democrats as the pivotal party between the political blocs.
More specifically, the GAL-TAN divide (GAL: green, alternative, libertarian and TAN: traditional, authoritarian, nationalist), which refers to the political cleavages associated with values and lifestyles, has emerged as a new feature of the party system. Parties that traditionally occupied different places on the left-right spectrum may adopt similar positions within the GAL-TAN scale. For example, on issues such as migration, the Social Democrats and Conservatives share a similar policy position, while left-wing, green, and center parties tend to share a different policy position (Lindvall, 2017). There has been a polarization trend since 2010 that could mark the start of a steep polarization era. At the same time, this cleavage is not ahistorical in the Swedish context (Oscarsson et al., 2021).
Cross-party collaboration has been difficult and short-lived. The Tidöavtalet, the compromise that allowed for the formation of the minority coalition government after the 2022 elections, illustrated this. Even though the Sweden Democrats and the Liberals promised to be tough on crime, they have different ideas on how to tackle it. While the former hold a punitive stance, the latter prefer measures that maintain the integrity of the individual (Blombäck, 2023). Although the Sweden Democrats are not represented in the governing coalition – they are a supporting party – they are clearly imprinting their programmatic stamp on government policy.
In summary, there are no legal barriers to collaboration; in fact, it is an integral part of Swedish politics. Recently, it has been more difficult for parties to find common ground due to the strategically favorable position of the Sweden Democrats as the pivotal party between the political blocs.
Citations:
Blombäck, S. 2023. “Statsvetaren: Här står Sverigedemokraterna och Liberalerna långt ifrån varandra.” https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/statsvetaren-har-star-sverigedemokraterna-och-liberalerna-langt-ifran-varandra
Lindvall, J., Bäck, H., Dahlström, C., Naurin, E., and Teorell, J. 2017. “Samverkan och Strid i den Parlamentariska Demokratin.” SNS Demokratirapport 2017. https://snsse.cdn.triggerfish.cloud/uploads/2020/02/samverkan-och-strid-i-den-parlamentariska-demokratin.pdf
Oscarsson, H., Bergmann, T., Bergström, A., and Hellström, J. 2021. “Demokratirådets rapport 2021: Polarisering i Sverige.” https://snsse.cdn.triggerfish.cloud/uploads/2021/03/demokratiradets-rapport-2021-polarisering-i-sverige.pdf
Wikforss, Å. 2022. “Demokratins grindvakter.” In Snabbtänkt: 2.022. Reflektioner från valet 2022 av ledande forskare, eds. N. Bolin, K. Falasca, M. Grusell, and Lars Nord. https://www.miun.se/globalassets/forskning/center-och-institut/demicom/snabbtankt_2022_12okt.pdf
Blombäck, S. 2023. “Statsvetaren: Här står Sverigedemokraterna och Liberalerna långt ifrån varandra.” https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/statsvetaren-har-star-sverigedemokraterna-och-liberalerna-langt-ifran-varandra
Lindvall, J., Bäck, H., Dahlström, C., Naurin, E., and Teorell, J. 2017. “Samverkan och Strid i den Parlamentariska Demokratin.” SNS Demokratirapport 2017. https://snsse.cdn.triggerfish.cloud/uploads/2020/02/samverkan-och-strid-i-den-parlamentariska-demokratin.pdf
Oscarsson, H., Bergmann, T., Bergström, A., and Hellström, J. 2021. “Demokratirådets rapport 2021: Polarisering i Sverige.” https://snsse.cdn.triggerfish.cloud/uploads/2021/03/demokratiradets-rapport-2021-polarisering-i-sverige.pdf
Wikforss, Å. 2022. “Demokratins grindvakter.” In Snabbtänkt: 2.022. Reflektioner från valet 2022 av ledande forskare, eds. N. Bolin, K. Falasca, M. Grusell, and Lars Nord. https://www.miun.se/globalassets/forskning/center-och-institut/demicom/snabbtankt_2022_12okt.pdf
Netherlands
In 2015, Ombudsman Alex Brenninkmeijer issued what he called a “stress test” for the Netherlands’ rule of law, in which he wrote that “…(i)n many areas, fundamental rights are violated in the formation and implementation of policies.” Since that time, the number of lawyers in parliament has shrunk considerably. Their number has been steadily decreasing: from 26 in 2017 and 25 in 2021 to 22 today. They have had to cede space to parliamentarians trained as economists, public administration experts or political scientists – all disciplines that consider laws and legal rules as policy instruments, not as institutional devices for the rule of law and democratic government.
In November 2023, eight years later, a few days after election results in which the extreme-right-wing PVV party had made a formidable gain of 20 seats (to a total of 37 in a 150-seat parliament), four parties (PVV, NSC, BBB and VVD) started coalition formation talks. One topic addressed was the parties’ preliminary positions on respecting and advancing the constitution and the rule of law. This was not surprising, because a panel of the professional association of legal scholars had previously found that 11 out of 18 political parties likely to win seats featured positions in their party platforms that clearly violated the constitution and rule of law practices.
For example, the PVV, which at the time of writing was leading the coalition formation talks, has advocated banning the Koran and Islamic schools. Such a ban would violate the freedom of religion and belief, and therefore also go against the constitution. An asylum freeze, as strongly advocated by the PVV, and which was arguably their winning political argument in the November 2023 elections, would not be allowed under either the UN Refugee Convention or the European Convention on Human Rights. And a position such as setting up a digital pillory for criminals is also difficult to reconcile with the law. Quite a few PVV legislators have criminals record of petty crimes and other integrity problems, and have thus been shown not to hold the law in high respect. The brand-new party New Social Contract, which otherwise strongly advocates “decent government” and respect for the rule of law, nevertheless received a low rating from the legal scholars for its proposal to introduce a migration quota of no more than 50,000 individuals, because of the proposal’s conflict with international laws and regulations. The VVD, which at the time was still the largest party, was criticized for proposing minimum sentences for certain crimes and a ban on community service, while also seeking to reduce legal aid for underprivileged asylum-seekers.
At the time of writing, political tension between advocates of an open society (GL/PvdA, D66, Christina Union, Volt, SP, Party of the Animals) and right-wing political parties advocating a (more) closed society (PVV: “Dutch at #1 again!”) was reaching new heights. Rather than being due to ideological polarization by radicalized flank parties away from a political “middle,” this stemmed from the radicalization of voters tied to formerly mainstream parties (mainly CDA and VVD) around anti-migration issues and a closed society. Neutralizing radicalizing and/or anti-democratic tendencies through cooptation is a tried-and-tested strategy in Dutch politics. This makes cross-party cooperation almost a given, reinforced by the Dutch maximally proportional representative electoral system. The VVD’s exclusion of the PVV as coalition partner after the fall of the Rutte I government functioned as a de facto “cordon sanitaire.” However, this exclusion has now been lifted, and may actually have aided the PVV win. Yet, it is not beyond reasonable doubt that the PVV will be the leading party in a next majority coalition government. At the time of writing, the NSC was still raising the possibility of a minority coalition (as seen in Scandinavian countries), governing through shifting support by varying political parties depending on the content of government bills and policy proposals. As further historical precedent, Labor was excluded from governing in 1983 by a blocking coalition led by the CDA and VVD in spite of a huge electoral victory.
In November 2023, eight years later, a few days after election results in which the extreme-right-wing PVV party had made a formidable gain of 20 seats (to a total of 37 in a 150-seat parliament), four parties (PVV, NSC, BBB and VVD) started coalition formation talks. One topic addressed was the parties’ preliminary positions on respecting and advancing the constitution and the rule of law. This was not surprising, because a panel of the professional association of legal scholars had previously found that 11 out of 18 political parties likely to win seats featured positions in their party platforms that clearly violated the constitution and rule of law practices.
For example, the PVV, which at the time of writing was leading the coalition formation talks, has advocated banning the Koran and Islamic schools. Such a ban would violate the freedom of religion and belief, and therefore also go against the constitution. An asylum freeze, as strongly advocated by the PVV, and which was arguably their winning political argument in the November 2023 elections, would not be allowed under either the UN Refugee Convention or the European Convention on Human Rights. And a position such as setting up a digital pillory for criminals is also difficult to reconcile with the law. Quite a few PVV legislators have criminals record of petty crimes and other integrity problems, and have thus been shown not to hold the law in high respect. The brand-new party New Social Contract, which otherwise strongly advocates “decent government” and respect for the rule of law, nevertheless received a low rating from the legal scholars for its proposal to introduce a migration quota of no more than 50,000 individuals, because of the proposal’s conflict with international laws and regulations. The VVD, which at the time was still the largest party, was criticized for proposing minimum sentences for certain crimes and a ban on community service, while also seeking to reduce legal aid for underprivileged asylum-seekers.
At the time of writing, political tension between advocates of an open society (GL/PvdA, D66, Christina Union, Volt, SP, Party of the Animals) and right-wing political parties advocating a (more) closed society (PVV: “Dutch at #1 again!”) was reaching new heights. Rather than being due to ideological polarization by radicalized flank parties away from a political “middle,” this stemmed from the radicalization of voters tied to formerly mainstream parties (mainly CDA and VVD) around anti-migration issues and a closed society. Neutralizing radicalizing and/or anti-democratic tendencies through cooptation is a tried-and-tested strategy in Dutch politics. This makes cross-party cooperation almost a given, reinforced by the Dutch maximally proportional representative electoral system. The VVD’s exclusion of the PVV as coalition partner after the fall of the Rutte I government functioned as a de facto “cordon sanitaire.” However, this exclusion has now been lifted, and may actually have aided the PVV win. Yet, it is not beyond reasonable doubt that the PVV will be the leading party in a next majority coalition government. At the time of writing, the NSC was still raising the possibility of a minority coalition (as seen in Scandinavian countries), governing through shifting support by varying political parties depending on the content of government bills and policy proposals. As further historical precedent, Labor was excluded from governing in 1983 by a blocking coalition led by the CDA and VVD in spite of a huge electoral victory.
Citations:
Brenninkmeijer, A. 2015. “Stresstest Rechtsstaat Nederland.” Nederlands Juristenblad 16: 1046-1055.
Mr. OnlineJuridisch. 2023. “Aantal juristen in Tweede Kamer neemt verder af: van 25 naar 22.” 27 November.
Mr. OnlineJuridisch. 2023. “Nieuws, 6 November NOvA: tien verkiezingsprogramma’s bevatten onrechtsstatelijke voorstellen.”
De Dijn, Annelien. 2023. “‘Polarisatie’ is een frame waar vooral de VVD van profiteert.” NRC-H, June 9.
Pieter Immerzaal. 2023. “Criminele en foute PVV-toppers (update).” Welingelichte Kringen November 27.
M. Lubbers et al. 2023. “Ook de ‘nieuwe’ PVV-stemmer stemde vooral tegen migratie en uit politiek protest.” Stuk Rood Vlees, December 21.
NOS Nieuws. 2023. “Omtzigt: nog niet onderhandelen over meerderheid- of minderheidskabinet.” November 29.
Brenninkmeijer, A. 2015. “Stresstest Rechtsstaat Nederland.” Nederlands Juristenblad 16: 1046-1055.
Mr. OnlineJuridisch. 2023. “Aantal juristen in Tweede Kamer neemt verder af: van 25 naar 22.” 27 November.
Mr. OnlineJuridisch. 2023. “Nieuws, 6 November NOvA: tien verkiezingsprogramma’s bevatten onrechtsstatelijke voorstellen.”
De Dijn, Annelien. 2023. “‘Polarisatie’ is een frame waar vooral de VVD van profiteert.” NRC-H, June 9.
Pieter Immerzaal. 2023. “Criminele en foute PVV-toppers (update).” Welingelichte Kringen November 27.
M. Lubbers et al. 2023. “Ook de ‘nieuwe’ PVV-stemmer stemde vooral tegen migratie en uit politiek protest.” Stuk Rood Vlees, December 21.
NOS Nieuws. 2023. “Omtzigt: nog niet onderhandelen over meerderheid- of minderheidskabinet.” November 29.
UK
The main UK political parties seek to uphold liberal democratic values, but Brexit (and its implications) has prompted some contestation regarding which institutions should be most supported, such as when asserting the sovereignty of Parliament in relation to legal rulings. More generally, in Westminster, aggregation is done within parties more than by cross-party cooperation, and whipping is used regularly to push through legislation proposed by the party of government rather than seek routine cross-party support. The opposition, for the most part, seeks to oppose.
However, cooperation can happen on bills that lack a strong ideological base, and cooperation does arise in the various stages of passing legislation, including through opposition amendments being accepted or in parliamentary committees. In addition, the second chamber – the House of Lords, which has a sizable number of cross-bench members who are not affiliated with a particular party – will often propose and have accepted amendments that are the result of cross-party deals or a form of bargaining with the House of Commons, even though the latter has the final say.
In key respects, the encouragement of cross-party cooperation is more institutionalized in devolved systems, such as via the committee systems in Scottish and Welsh parliaments and the requirement for coalition government in Northern Ireland (Birrell et al. 2023).
However, cooperation can happen on bills that lack a strong ideological base, and cooperation does arise in the various stages of passing legislation, including through opposition amendments being accepted or in parliamentary committees. In addition, the second chamber – the House of Lords, which has a sizable number of cross-bench members who are not affiliated with a particular party – will often propose and have accepted amendments that are the result of cross-party deals or a form of bargaining with the House of Commons, even though the latter has the final say.
In key respects, the encouragement of cross-party cooperation is more institutionalized in devolved systems, such as via the committee systems in Scottish and Welsh parliaments and the requirement for coalition government in Northern Ireland (Birrell et al. 2023).
Citations:
Birrell, D., Carmichael, P., and Heenan, D. 2023. Devolution in the UK. London:
Bloomsbury
Birrell, D., Carmichael, P., and Heenan, D. 2023. Devolution in the UK. London:
Bloomsbury
6
Italy
Italy was governed until July 2022 by a national unity government headed by Mario Draghi. Following the prime minister’s resignation, the president of the republic dissolved the parliament and called early elections for September 2022. The Draghi government took office at the beginning of the second year of the COVID-19 pandemic with a mandate to address two interconnected challenges: effectively managing the pandemic and utilizing the resources provided by the Recovery Fund.
Except for the Brothers of Italy (FdI), which opted to stay in opposition, all parties represented in parliament joined the government. In this new political landscape, parties that were competitors until recently faced the challenge of working together as partners in government. This required them to put aside their differences and find common ground on several issues centered on the health crisis and its economic repercussions, temporarily freezing the competition on the ideological left-right dimension.
At the same time, the parties had to distinguish themselves from their competitors to avoid losing votes, marking their differences mainly on cultural issues or their stance toward the Ukrainian war. In the end, conflict prevailed, bringing down the government (Russo and Valbruzzi 2022).
With the end of the pandemic and the Draghi government, the competition has reconfigured along traditional dividing lines between opposing coalitions. This bipolar structure is characterized by two main parties on the left − the Democratic Party (PD) and the Five Star Movement (M5S) − failing to coordinate electorally by competing separately in the September 2022 elections. On the right side of the left-right divide, there is a rather ideologically compact coalition formed by FdI, the League, and Go Italy (FI). In this bipolar context, moderate-liberal actors are essentially excluded from competition. On paper, these divisions suggest a highly polarized political environment. However, since 2019, the FdI has moderated its stance on a number of issues, including its Euroscepticism. This moderate turn on the part of FdI calls into question the notion that the party’s victory in the recent elections necessarily signifies an increase in the polarization of the Italian party system (Chiaramonte 2023). Despite Meloni’s effort to move the party toward the center of the policy space, the positions of party members and grassroots voters remain rather extreme on many issues, thus contributing to an overall polarized environment.
The right-wing pre-electoral coalition won an absolute majority of seats after the September 2022 elections. A month later, Giorgia Meloni, the leader of FdI, was appointed prime minister. According to PopuList, the Meloni government is considered to be the first post-World War II radical right-wing government in Western Europe, consisting of two parties − FdI and the League − almost unanimously coded as far-right, Eurosceptic and populist, plus a relatively moderate partner like FI.
Despite similarities in their ideological profiles, the governing parties are divided on specific issues such as civil liberties, immigration, the economy, and their stance toward the European Union (EU). These differences have occasionally led to conflicts between the governing parties. However, the institutional context incentivizes parties to compromise in coalition policymaking.
On one hand, the electoral system forces parties to form pre-election coalitions to win elections, both at the national and local levels. On the other hand, the Italian parliament has strong internal institutions that make it easier for parties to control and change government policies. Therefore, to implement its program, the governing coalition must necessarily compromise.
Compromises and agreements between the majority coalition and the opposition have proven difficult on matters of constitutional reform, such as the proposed reform of the government formation process, which might have required a non-majoritarian approach.
In the most recent election (September 2022), left- and right-wing parties that can be categorized as populist collected more than 50% of the popular vote. Two populist parties – FdI and the League – are currently in power. According to most observers, these parties are characterized by a Manichean view of politics, anti-elitism, and people-centrism (see Populism and Political Parties Expert Survey data). Whether these attitudes represent a rhetorical strategy or may translate into specific policies to undermine the liberal-democratic order is still debatable. In the latter case, however, there may be consequences for the quality of democracy, as observed in countries such as Hungary or Poland.
Except for the Brothers of Italy (FdI), which opted to stay in opposition, all parties represented in parliament joined the government. In this new political landscape, parties that were competitors until recently faced the challenge of working together as partners in government. This required them to put aside their differences and find common ground on several issues centered on the health crisis and its economic repercussions, temporarily freezing the competition on the ideological left-right dimension.
At the same time, the parties had to distinguish themselves from their competitors to avoid losing votes, marking their differences mainly on cultural issues or their stance toward the Ukrainian war. In the end, conflict prevailed, bringing down the government (Russo and Valbruzzi 2022).
With the end of the pandemic and the Draghi government, the competition has reconfigured along traditional dividing lines between opposing coalitions. This bipolar structure is characterized by two main parties on the left − the Democratic Party (PD) and the Five Star Movement (M5S) − failing to coordinate electorally by competing separately in the September 2022 elections. On the right side of the left-right divide, there is a rather ideologically compact coalition formed by FdI, the League, and Go Italy (FI). In this bipolar context, moderate-liberal actors are essentially excluded from competition. On paper, these divisions suggest a highly polarized political environment. However, since 2019, the FdI has moderated its stance on a number of issues, including its Euroscepticism. This moderate turn on the part of FdI calls into question the notion that the party’s victory in the recent elections necessarily signifies an increase in the polarization of the Italian party system (Chiaramonte 2023). Despite Meloni’s effort to move the party toward the center of the policy space, the positions of party members and grassroots voters remain rather extreme on many issues, thus contributing to an overall polarized environment.
The right-wing pre-electoral coalition won an absolute majority of seats after the September 2022 elections. A month later, Giorgia Meloni, the leader of FdI, was appointed prime minister. According to PopuList, the Meloni government is considered to be the first post-World War II radical right-wing government in Western Europe, consisting of two parties − FdI and the League − almost unanimously coded as far-right, Eurosceptic and populist, plus a relatively moderate partner like FI.
Despite similarities in their ideological profiles, the governing parties are divided on specific issues such as civil liberties, immigration, the economy, and their stance toward the European Union (EU). These differences have occasionally led to conflicts between the governing parties. However, the institutional context incentivizes parties to compromise in coalition policymaking.
On one hand, the electoral system forces parties to form pre-election coalitions to win elections, both at the national and local levels. On the other hand, the Italian parliament has strong internal institutions that make it easier for parties to control and change government policies. Therefore, to implement its program, the governing coalition must necessarily compromise.
Compromises and agreements between the majority coalition and the opposition have proven difficult on matters of constitutional reform, such as the proposed reform of the government formation process, which might have required a non-majoritarian approach.
In the most recent election (September 2022), left- and right-wing parties that can be categorized as populist collected more than 50% of the popular vote. Two populist parties – FdI and the League – are currently in power. According to most observers, these parties are characterized by a Manichean view of politics, anti-elitism, and people-centrism (see Populism and Political Parties Expert Survey data). Whether these attitudes represent a rhetorical strategy or may translate into specific policies to undermine the liberal-democratic order is still debatable. In the latter case, however, there may be consequences for the quality of democracy, as observed in countries such as Hungary or Poland.
Citations:
PopuList: https://popu-list.org/
Populism and Political Parties Expert Survey: http://poppa-data.eu
Russo, L., and M. Valbruzzi. 2022. “The Impact of the Pandemic on the Italian Party System. The Draghi Government and the ‘New’ Polarisation.” Contemporary Italian Politics 14 (2): 172–190.
Chiaramonte, A. 2023. “Italy at the Polls. Four Lessons to Learn from the 2022 General Election.” Contemporary Italian Politics 15(1): 75–87.
PopuList: https://popu-list.org/
Populism and Political Parties Expert Survey: http://poppa-data.eu
Russo, L., and M. Valbruzzi. 2022. “The Impact of the Pandemic on the Italian Party System. The Draghi Government and the ‘New’ Polarisation.” Contemporary Italian Politics 14 (2): 172–190.
Chiaramonte, A. 2023. “Italy at the Polls. Four Lessons to Learn from the 2022 General Election.” Contemporary Italian Politics 15(1): 75–87.
Spain
All major political parties in Spain are committed to liberal democratic values and institutions. However, the rise of populist movements, including the ideologically radical but not extreme Vox, has intensified rhetoric around representative institutions. Vox advocates for some policies that counter several basic principles of liberal democracy, such as gender equality and minority rights (Santana et al., 2023). Among the main Spanish parties, Vox has the highest proportion of supporters who are dissatisfied with democracy and do not support it at all. Additionally, pro-independence political parties campaign against Spain’s constitutional order.
Polarization significantly hinders cross-party agreements and the formation of parliamentary majorities. This polarization and fragmentation within the Congress of Deputies have severely affected the parliament’s legislative function in recent years. Despite this, the first coalition government was in power from 2020 to 2023, and in 2023, a new minority coalition government was formed. Major political parties generally lack a cooperative attitude toward one another.
During the period under review, the General Council of the Judiciary – an autonomous body composed of judges and other jurists that exercises government functions within the judiciary to guarantee judicial independence – could not be renewed due to political deadlock. At the regional level, the financing scheme for regional governments has been pending an update since 2014, primarily due to significant disagreements among political parties.
Major political parties also struggle to cooperate in controlling the influence of anti-democratic actors. In contrast, the coalition government experienced few but notable policy dissonances between some members. Despite these challenges, the PSOE managed to form a majority for the investiture of Pedro Sanchez in November 2023 with ideologically divergent parties.
The ability to compromise and cooperate will continue to be crucial for governance and policy execution in the coming years. At the regional level, interparty cooperation in policymaking and implementation has a long tradition, with most regional governments formed by two or more parties.
Polarization significantly hinders cross-party agreements and the formation of parliamentary majorities. This polarization and fragmentation within the Congress of Deputies have severely affected the parliament’s legislative function in recent years. Despite this, the first coalition government was in power from 2020 to 2023, and in 2023, a new minority coalition government was formed. Major political parties generally lack a cooperative attitude toward one another.
During the period under review, the General Council of the Judiciary – an autonomous body composed of judges and other jurists that exercises government functions within the judiciary to guarantee judicial independence – could not be renewed due to political deadlock. At the regional level, the financing scheme for regional governments has been pending an update since 2014, primarily due to significant disagreements among political parties.
Major political parties also struggle to cooperate in controlling the influence of anti-democratic actors. In contrast, the coalition government experienced few but notable policy dissonances between some members. Despite these challenges, the PSOE managed to form a majority for the investiture of Pedro Sanchez in November 2023 with ideologically divergent parties.
The ability to compromise and cooperate will continue to be crucial for governance and policy execution in the coming years. At the regional level, interparty cooperation in policymaking and implementation has a long tradition, with most regional governments formed by two or more parties.
Citations:
Santana, A. et al. 2023. “The Radical Right Populist Vox and the End of Spain’s Exceptionalism.” https://theloop.ecpr.eu/the-radical-right-populist-vox-and-the-end-of-spains-exceptionalism
Santana, A. et al. 2023. “The Radical Right Populist Vox and the End of Spain’s Exceptionalism.” https://theloop.ecpr.eu/the-radical-right-populist-vox-and-the-end-of-spains-exceptionalism
Switzerland
On the one hand, the Swiss consensus democracy ensures strong cross-party cooperation, with representatives of the main parties seated together in federal and cantonal governments. On the other hand, the Swiss party system has become programmatically polarized over the past three decades. The three polar parties are very far apart by international comparison: The Swiss People’s Party (Schweizerischen Volkspartei, SVP) occupies the particularistic-right quadrant, while the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party are in the universalistic-left quadrant of the ideological space (Zollinger 2022; Zollinger and Traber 2023; Häusermann and Bornschier 2023).
Even within the major right-wing party (Swiss People’s Party), the core values of democracy are broadly accepted, if with two major qualifications. First, democracy is understood as decision-making by the people. The people are considered to be the ultimate sovereign, and their power is not viewed as something that should be limited by international law, membership in international organizations, human rights or domestic veto actors such as constitutional courts. This reflects a narrow Schumpeterian view of democracy that was prominently challenged by de Tocqueville, and which is today contested by a broader understanding of an embedded democracy (Merkel 2004).
The second qualification concerns populism and xenophobia. The Swiss People’s Party is a radical right national-populist party (Mazzoleni 2008) based on nativism and populism, with a strong dose of authoritarianism (Mudde 2007: 22). The dichotomy between “them” and “us” and the staunch opposition to universalism, international openness and European integration is the electoral winning formula of the Swiss People’s Party. The polarizing political program of the SVP is also evident in direct democracy votes, as the party regularly launches xenophobic initiatives, such as the ban on the construction of minarets that was accepted by the Swiss population in 2009, and the initiative against mass immigration that was accepted in 2014.
The increasing programmatic polarization has become a main hindrance to cooperation between political elites, particularly on issues relating to migration and international openness. The failure to reach a sustainable relationship with the EU is a major example of this polarization. The effectiveness of the other political parties in neutralizing the isolationist and xenophobic-nativist stance of the country’s major party is limited by electoral constraints: A considerable share of voters of the two other major bourgeois parties (the center and liberal parties) and even of the Social Democratic party shares the isolationist-nativist views of the populist right.
Even within the major right-wing party (Swiss People’s Party), the core values of democracy are broadly accepted, if with two major qualifications. First, democracy is understood as decision-making by the people. The people are considered to be the ultimate sovereign, and their power is not viewed as something that should be limited by international law, membership in international organizations, human rights or domestic veto actors such as constitutional courts. This reflects a narrow Schumpeterian view of democracy that was prominently challenged by de Tocqueville, and which is today contested by a broader understanding of an embedded democracy (Merkel 2004).
The second qualification concerns populism and xenophobia. The Swiss People’s Party is a radical right national-populist party (Mazzoleni 2008) based on nativism and populism, with a strong dose of authoritarianism (Mudde 2007: 22). The dichotomy between “them” and “us” and the staunch opposition to universalism, international openness and European integration is the electoral winning formula of the Swiss People’s Party. The polarizing political program of the SVP is also evident in direct democracy votes, as the party regularly launches xenophobic initiatives, such as the ban on the construction of minarets that was accepted by the Swiss population in 2009, and the initiative against mass immigration that was accepted in 2014.
The increasing programmatic polarization has become a main hindrance to cooperation between political elites, particularly on issues relating to migration and international openness. The failure to reach a sustainable relationship with the EU is a major example of this polarization. The effectiveness of the other political parties in neutralizing the isolationist and xenophobic-nativist stance of the country’s major party is limited by electoral constraints: A considerable share of voters of the two other major bourgeois parties (the center and liberal parties) and even of the Social Democratic party shares the isolationist-nativist views of the populist right.
Citations:
Häusermann, Silja, and Simon Bornschier. 2023. Democratic Conflict and Polarization: Healthy or Harmful? Zürich: UBS Center for Economics in Society.
Mazzoleni, Oscar. 2008 [2003]. Nationalisme et populisme en Suisse. La radicalisation de la “nouvelle” UDC. Lausanne: Presses Polytechniques et Universitaires Romandes.
Merkel, Wolfgang. 2004. “Embedded and Defective Democracies.” Democratization 11: 33-58. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340412331304598
Mudde, Cas. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zollinger, Delia. 2022. “Cleavage Identities in Voters’ Own Words: Harnessing Open-Ended Survey Responses.” American Journal of Political Science. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ajps.12743
Zollinger, Delia, and Denise Traber. 2023. “The Ideological Space in Swiss Politics: Voters, Parties, and Realignment.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 116-136. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.1
Häusermann, Silja, and Simon Bornschier. 2023. Democratic Conflict and Polarization: Healthy or Harmful? Zürich: UBS Center for Economics in Society.
Mazzoleni, Oscar. 2008 [2003]. Nationalisme et populisme en Suisse. La radicalisation de la “nouvelle” UDC. Lausanne: Presses Polytechniques et Universitaires Romandes.
Merkel, Wolfgang. 2004. “Embedded and Defective Democracies.” Democratization 11: 33-58. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340412331304598
Mudde, Cas. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zollinger, Delia. 2022. “Cleavage Identities in Voters’ Own Words: Harnessing Open-Ended Survey Responses.” American Journal of Political Science. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ajps.12743
Zollinger, Delia, and Denise Traber. 2023. “The Ideological Space in Swiss Politics: Voters, Parties, and Realignment.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 116-136. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.1
Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose some significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
5
USA
Bipartisanship, or cross-party cooperation, was once a hallmark of the U.S. political system. Until the party realignment in the South in the late 1960s, cross-party cooperation was more the norm than the exception in Congress. National unity scores were quite low at that time – lower than 60%.
When the parties were ideologically heterogeneous, bipartisan cooperation between elected officials on a range of significant policies was common. However, since the party realignment in the South, the U.S. parties have become nationalized – they have adopted ideologically coherent and nationally consistent policy platforms. Consequently, they are much less likely to engage in bipartisan cooperation in a context of increasing partisan polarization, a major source of gridlock. Party unity scores in Congress have grown to over 90%.
This trend aligns the United States more closely with oppositional parliamentary systems, such as in Westminster parliaments, where parties tend to take on “government” and “opposition” functions (Pierson and Schickler 2020). This parliamentarization in the presidential system is one reason for legislative gridlock in Congress.
When the parties were ideologically heterogeneous, bipartisan cooperation between elected officials on a range of significant policies was common. However, since the party realignment in the South, the U.S. parties have become nationalized – they have adopted ideologically coherent and nationally consistent policy platforms. Consequently, they are much less likely to engage in bipartisan cooperation in a context of increasing partisan polarization, a major source of gridlock. Party unity scores in Congress have grown to over 90%.
This trend aligns the United States more closely with oppositional parliamentary systems, such as in Westminster parliaments, where parties tend to take on “government” and “opposition” functions (Pierson and Schickler 2020). This parliamentarization in the presidential system is one reason for legislative gridlock in Congress.
Citations:
Ari Berman. 2015. Give Us the Ballot. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Paul Pierson and Eric Schickler. 2020. “Madison’s Constitution Under Stress.” Annual Review of Political Science.
Richard Johnson. 2019. “Racial Policy Under Trump.” In The Trump Presidency: From Campaign Trail to World Stage, eds. M. Oliva and M. Shanahan. Palgrave.
Richard Johnson. 2020. The End of the Second Reconstruction. Cambridge: Polity.
Ari Berman. 2015. Give Us the Ballot. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Paul Pierson and Eric Schickler. 2020. “Madison’s Constitution Under Stress.” Annual Review of Political Science.
Richard Johnson. 2019. “Racial Policy Under Trump.” In The Trump Presidency: From Campaign Trail to World Stage, eds. M. Oliva and M. Shanahan. Palgrave.
Richard Johnson. 2020. The End of the Second Reconstruction. Cambridge: Polity.
4
Australia
There is general acceptance of liberal democratic values and institutions among the major political parties, with significant evidence of their commitment to sustaining these values. Major-party leaders and candidates typically frame critiques of political institutions around improving democratic integrity. However, commitment to democratic values is weaker among some minor parties, as evidenced by their willingness to transgress parliamentary conventions and other norms.
The major parties’ competitiveness can produce tribalism, hindering cooperation on important policy matters. However, the majoritarian nature of the Australian political system means that cross-party cooperation is generally less crucial than in proportional representation systems. The ruling party typically has a majority in the lower house and requires only a handful of votes from independents or minor parties to pass legislation through the upper house..
The major parties’ competitiveness can produce tribalism, hindering cooperation on important policy matters. However, the majoritarian nature of the Australian political system means that cross-party cooperation is generally less crucial than in proportional representation systems. The ruling party typically has a majority in the lower house and requires only a handful of votes from independents or minor parties to pass legislation through the upper house..
Canada
Parties in Canada rarely cooperate. This is inherent in the adversarial nature – government and opposition – found in Westminster-style systems. Formal cooperation is uncommon and occurs only when minority governments are elected, typically lasting only for a short period until a new election is held. This is considered normal and proper (Lindquist and Eichbaum 2016).
In a Westminster system, the government is typically formed by the party that holds the majority of seats in the lower house of Parliament (e.g., the House of Commons in the UK). This majority is achieved by winning the most seats in general elections. Party cooperation is only required when the winning party holds a minority or plurality of seats in the legislature, not a majority.
The opposition exists to hold the government accountable for its actions and decisions and is expected to challenge the government party whenever possible. In the Westminster system, the opposition often forms a “shadow cabinet” that mirrors the structure of the government cabinet. Members of the shadow cabinet are assigned specific portfolios and are responsible for critiquing and developing alternative policies to those proposed by the government. Members of the opposition scrutinize government policies, challenge decisions, and provide an alternative viewpoint on legislation and policy to the public and media.
In a parliamentary democracy, if the government loses the confidence of the majority in the lower house, it may be replaced by the opposition. This can happen through a vote of no confidence or if the government fails to pass key legislation. The opposition thus serves as a potential alternative government if the existing government fails.
The first-past-the-post electoral system undermines cross-party cooperation by creating reasonable expectations of parliamentary majorities. When these majorities frequently occur, the governing party has no incentive to seek input from opposition parties.
In a Westminster system, the government is typically formed by the party that holds the majority of seats in the lower house of Parliament (e.g., the House of Commons in the UK). This majority is achieved by winning the most seats in general elections. Party cooperation is only required when the winning party holds a minority or plurality of seats in the legislature, not a majority.
The opposition exists to hold the government accountable for its actions and decisions and is expected to challenge the government party whenever possible. In the Westminster system, the opposition often forms a “shadow cabinet” that mirrors the structure of the government cabinet. Members of the shadow cabinet are assigned specific portfolios and are responsible for critiquing and developing alternative policies to those proposed by the government. Members of the opposition scrutinize government policies, challenge decisions, and provide an alternative viewpoint on legislation and policy to the public and media.
In a parliamentary democracy, if the government loses the confidence of the majority in the lower house, it may be replaced by the opposition. This can happen through a vote of no confidence or if the government fails to pass key legislation. The opposition thus serves as a potential alternative government if the existing government fails.
The first-past-the-post electoral system undermines cross-party cooperation by creating reasonable expectations of parliamentary majorities. When these majorities frequently occur, the governing party has no incentive to seek input from opposition parties.
Citations:
Lindquist, Evert A., and Chris Eichbaum. 2016. “Remaking Government in Canada: Dares, Resilience, and Civility in Westminster Systems.” Governance 29 (4): 553–71.
Lindquist, Evert A., and Chris Eichbaum. 2016. “Remaking Government in Canada: Dares, Resilience, and Civility in Westminster Systems.” Governance 29 (4): 553–71.
Hungary
There are significant differences between government and opposition parties regarding liberal democratic values. Hungary exhibits many features of an autocracy. Explicitly and outspokenly, Prime Minister Orbán advocates what he calls illiberal democracy – a contradiction in terms. By changing the rules of the democratic game with the help of a two-thirds majority in parliament, frequent constitutional amendments and a continuously maintained state of emergency, the government secures an unchallenged advantage over the opposition. The government is not advancing democratic values, but is threatening them. In a highly polarized environment, the opposition – with the possible exception of the newly formed rightist party Mi Hazánk Mozgalom (Our Homeland), which has an undemocratic core and pushes a strongly nationalistic and othering discourse – aims to restore democracy. Against this background, cooperation between the camps is technically unnecessary due to the overwhelming Fidesz majority, and is not sought by the government. Consensual voting and cross-camp consultations are extremely rare.
Parliamentary committees in Hungary operate with a substantial Fidesz majority, rendering the efforts of opposition legislators almost meaningless. Calls to boycott parliament routinely emerge among opposition parties and intellectuals, but no large-scale abstention has occurred so far. The government majority pushes illiberal and anti-democratic policies, and the intense fusion of government and parliamentary majority results in state capture, severely limiting the ability to fight undemocratic tendencies.
The role of the opposition parties is to highlight disruptions of democracy and present policy alternatives. However, they cannot advance their agenda through parliament, as the government majority controls agenda-setting and voting procedures. Consequently, the opposition is relegated to civil society and street-level activism, where it faces face severe government countermeasures and suffers from organizational shortcomings. Cooperation within the opposition has improved over the past decade despite substantial ideological differences ranging from the left to the right. The electoral system, with strong majoritarian components, enforces this cooperation. Only candidates supported by a united opposition can successfully challenge Fidesz-KDNP candidates, particularly in urban centers like Budapest and Szeged. The process of opposition primaries, established during the run-up to the 2022 elections, fostered cooperation and made the movement more visible to the public. The somewhat surprising election of a conservative candidate, Péter Márky-Zay, as the prime ministerial candidate highlighted this cooperation. However, this did not translate into electoral success; even Márky-Zay lost his constituency to a Fidesz grandee.
The electoral defeat of the broad opposition coalition in 2022 has brought this strategy into question, making cooperation between opposition parties and the organization of primaries increasingly unlikely and difficult ahead of the 2024 municipal and European Parliament elections.
Parliamentary committees in Hungary operate with a substantial Fidesz majority, rendering the efforts of opposition legislators almost meaningless. Calls to boycott parliament routinely emerge among opposition parties and intellectuals, but no large-scale abstention has occurred so far. The government majority pushes illiberal and anti-democratic policies, and the intense fusion of government and parliamentary majority results in state capture, severely limiting the ability to fight undemocratic tendencies.
The role of the opposition parties is to highlight disruptions of democracy and present policy alternatives. However, they cannot advance their agenda through parliament, as the government majority controls agenda-setting and voting procedures. Consequently, the opposition is relegated to civil society and street-level activism, where it faces face severe government countermeasures and suffers from organizational shortcomings. Cooperation within the opposition has improved over the past decade despite substantial ideological differences ranging from the left to the right. The electoral system, with strong majoritarian components, enforces this cooperation. Only candidates supported by a united opposition can successfully challenge Fidesz-KDNP candidates, particularly in urban centers like Budapest and Szeged. The process of opposition primaries, established during the run-up to the 2022 elections, fostered cooperation and made the movement more visible to the public. The somewhat surprising election of a conservative candidate, Péter Márky-Zay, as the prime ministerial candidate highlighted this cooperation. However, this did not translate into electoral success; even Márky-Zay lost his constituency to a Fidesz grandee.
The electoral defeat of the broad opposition coalition in 2022 has brought this strategy into question, making cooperation between opposition parties and the organization of primaries increasingly unlikely and difficult ahead of the 2024 municipal and European Parliament elections.
Israel
The effective polarization between parties has increased over the last two governments, leading to a decline in inter-party collaboration. The opposition to the previous administration, the so-called Change Government (2021 – 2022), refused to cooperate on all issues, resulting in highly polarized Knesset votes. This trend persisted even when the proposed legislation came from opposition members in the preceding Knesset. Furthermore, upon assuming power, the current government eliminated most policy changes made by the earlier administration through coalition agreements. This rollback applied not only to ideologically contentious issues but also to non-partisan matters, such as transportation.
The present government shows little commitment to liberal democratic values, as evidenced by its attempts to overhaul judicial legislation, eliminate checks and balances between the three branches of government, and weaken the judiciary. According to the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, the formateur party, Likud, is extremely populist (Gidron 2023). Other parties in the coalition are likewise not committed to liberal democratic values, with some even explicitly opposing them.
The ultraorthodox parties are illiberal, rejecting the supremacy of the rule of law and not allowing women to run for office within the parties. The other two parties are extremely right-wing, advocate for Jewish supremacy and discriminate against minorities (Chapel Hill Expert Survey). This is also reflected in the coalition agreements, which state that the government will support a ban on discrimination against minorities in providing services.
The parties supporting liberal democracy are currently in opposition. During the attempt to reform the judiciary, opposition parties united against the government’s moves. However, since the beginning of the war with Hamas on October 7, opposition to the government has decreased. One opposition party has even entered the government, while the remaining opposition parties are ideologically distinct from one another, which makes it difficult for them to collaborate. As a result, the government’s anti-democratic activities face little organized opposition from elected politicians.
The present government shows little commitment to liberal democratic values, as evidenced by its attempts to overhaul judicial legislation, eliminate checks and balances between the three branches of government, and weaken the judiciary. According to the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, the formateur party, Likud, is extremely populist (Gidron 2023). Other parties in the coalition are likewise not committed to liberal democratic values, with some even explicitly opposing them.
The ultraorthodox parties are illiberal, rejecting the supremacy of the rule of law and not allowing women to run for office within the parties. The other two parties are extremely right-wing, advocate for Jewish supremacy and discriminate against minorities (Chapel Hill Expert Survey). This is also reflected in the coalition agreements, which state that the government will support a ban on discrimination against minorities in providing services.
The parties supporting liberal democracy are currently in opposition. During the attempt to reform the judiciary, opposition parties united against the government’s moves. However, since the beginning of the war with Hamas on October 7, opposition to the government has decreased. One opposition party has even entered the government, while the remaining opposition parties are ideologically distinct from one another, which makes it difficult for them to collaborate. As a result, the government’s anti-democratic activities face little organized opposition from elected politicians.
Citations:
Chapel Hill Expert Survey https://www.chesdata.eu/
Gidron, N. 2023. “Why Israeli Democracy Is in Crisis.” Journal of Democracy 34 (3): 33–45. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2023.a900431
Chapel Hill Expert Survey https://www.chesdata.eu/
Gidron, N. 2023. “Why Israeli Democracy Is in Crisis.” Journal of Democracy 34 (3): 33–45. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2023.a900431
Slovakia
The majority of political parties in Slovakia support democratic values. However, during the 2023 election campaign, several mainstream political parties, such as Smer-SSD, distanced themselves from liberal values. Alongside “systemic” parties that support liberal democratic values (like SaS), there are several “anti-system” parties (for more, see Gyarfášová, 2018; Rybář and Spáč, 2020; Rossi, 2020; Malý and Nemec, 2023).
Slovakia has several far-right movements that support the country’s fascist past, such as Slovenská pospolitosť (Slovak Togetherness, SP). Since the mid-1990s, SP has advocated for the abolition of democracy in favor of a corporatist regime. The Supreme Court dissolved the party in 2006. Leaders, including Marián Kotleba, formed a new party, Kotlebovci – Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko, recognized as ultra-right and neofascist (Gyarfášová, 2018). This party was elected to parliament in 2016 and 2020. In 2021, some members of parliament left to form Republika, which also used moderate rhetoric. In the 2023 elections, both parties failed to pass the 5% threshold, although Republika reached 4.75%. The Slovak National Party (SNS) gained 5.62% and 10 MPs, mainly due to popular figures from conspiracy circles with radical conservative and pro-Russian attitudes. Paradoxically, due to preferential votes, only SNS chair Andrej Danko was elected as a party member, with the rest being radical independents, several of whom became ministers or state secretaries.
The political spectrum in the Slovak parliament after the 2023 elections includes:
Smer: A formerly social-democratic party led by Robert Fico that is criticized for weak anti-corruption efforts and its shift toward nationalism and extremist rhetoric.
Progresívne Slovensko: A left-wing liberal, pro-European movement, elected to parliament for the first time.
Hlas: A social-democratic party formed after splitting from Smer in 2020, formally pro-European.
SaS: Freedom and Solidarity, a liberal, mostly pro-European party.
SNS: Slovak National Party, nationalist with limited acceptance of liberal democratic values and a reserved stance on EU membership.
KDH: Christian Democratic Movement, center-right, conservative on gender and family issues, pro-European.
OĽaNO: Now rebranded as “Slovakia,” a center-right movement supporting traditional Christian and family values.
The ruling coalition consists of Smer, Hlas, and SNS. There is ongoing debate about whether this coalition structure poses risks to EU and NATO memberships, though analysts note Fico’s experience and pragmatism (see Karnitschnig, 2023). However, his election rhetoric regarding the war in Ukraine and amendments to the Criminal Code have raised concerns domestically and internationally.
Ruling coalitions prepare and sign agreements to manage different ideological positions, though adherence can vary. The 2020–2022 coalition led by OĽaNO often ignored its agreement, leading to Prime Minister Matovič’s resignation in 2021 and the coalition’s collapse in 2022 (see Malý and Nemec, 2023).
Officially, all liberal democratic parties reject cooperation with anti-democratic entities. However, there were instances in 2022–23 where the ruling coalition relied on support from Republika to pass legal proposals (see Jabůrková, 2022). Matovič’s chaotic pandemic governance and past collaboration with the radical right are key reasons why the three 2023 post-election opposition parties (PS, SaS, and KDH) do not cooperate with his “Slovensko” movement.
Overall, the post-2023 election developments have blurred the boundaries between parties’ normative attitudes. The current Smer-SD-led coalition operates pragmatically, focusing on office-seeking and power interests.
Slovakia has several far-right movements that support the country’s fascist past, such as Slovenská pospolitosť (Slovak Togetherness, SP). Since the mid-1990s, SP has advocated for the abolition of democracy in favor of a corporatist regime. The Supreme Court dissolved the party in 2006. Leaders, including Marián Kotleba, formed a new party, Kotlebovci – Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko, recognized as ultra-right and neofascist (Gyarfášová, 2018). This party was elected to parliament in 2016 and 2020. In 2021, some members of parliament left to form Republika, which also used moderate rhetoric. In the 2023 elections, both parties failed to pass the 5% threshold, although Republika reached 4.75%. The Slovak National Party (SNS) gained 5.62% and 10 MPs, mainly due to popular figures from conspiracy circles with radical conservative and pro-Russian attitudes. Paradoxically, due to preferential votes, only SNS chair Andrej Danko was elected as a party member, with the rest being radical independents, several of whom became ministers or state secretaries.
The political spectrum in the Slovak parliament after the 2023 elections includes:
Smer: A formerly social-democratic party led by Robert Fico that is criticized for weak anti-corruption efforts and its shift toward nationalism and extremist rhetoric.
Progresívne Slovensko: A left-wing liberal, pro-European movement, elected to parliament for the first time.
Hlas: A social-democratic party formed after splitting from Smer in 2020, formally pro-European.
SaS: Freedom and Solidarity, a liberal, mostly pro-European party.
SNS: Slovak National Party, nationalist with limited acceptance of liberal democratic values and a reserved stance on EU membership.
KDH: Christian Democratic Movement, center-right, conservative on gender and family issues, pro-European.
OĽaNO: Now rebranded as “Slovakia,” a center-right movement supporting traditional Christian and family values.
The ruling coalition consists of Smer, Hlas, and SNS. There is ongoing debate about whether this coalition structure poses risks to EU and NATO memberships, though analysts note Fico’s experience and pragmatism (see Karnitschnig, 2023). However, his election rhetoric regarding the war in Ukraine and amendments to the Criminal Code have raised concerns domestically and internationally.
Ruling coalitions prepare and sign agreements to manage different ideological positions, though adherence can vary. The 2020–2022 coalition led by OĽaNO often ignored its agreement, leading to Prime Minister Matovič’s resignation in 2021 and the coalition’s collapse in 2022 (see Malý and Nemec, 2023).
Officially, all liberal democratic parties reject cooperation with anti-democratic entities. However, there were instances in 2022–23 where the ruling coalition relied on support from Republika to pass legal proposals (see Jabůrková, 2022). Matovič’s chaotic pandemic governance and past collaboration with the radical right are key reasons why the three 2023 post-election opposition parties (PS, SaS, and KDH) do not cooperate with his “Slovensko” movement.
Overall, the post-2023 election developments have blurred the boundaries between parties’ normative attitudes. The current Smer-SD-led coalition operates pragmatically, focusing on office-seeking and power interests.
Citations:
Oľga Gyárfášová. 2018. “The fourth generation: from anti-establishment to anti-system parties in Slovakia.” New Perspectives. Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East European Politics and International Relations 1: 109-133.
Rybář, M., and P. Spáč. 2020. “Social Origin Is No Destiny: Background, Institutionalization, and Electoral Performance of New Political Parties in Slovakia.” East European Politics and Societies 34 (3): 637-662.
Michael Rossi. 2020. “Slovakia after Fico: Systemic Change or More of the Same?” Czech Journal of Political Science 27 (3): 235-258.
Malý, I., and Nemec, J. 2023. “‘Non-Standard’ Political Parties and The Capacity to Govern in Turbulent Times: Slovakia 2020-2022.” Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences. Special issue: 101-117.
Karnitschnig, M. 2023. “Why Slovakia’s Election Doesn’t Really Matter.” https://www.politico.eu/article/why-the-slovak-election-doesnt-really-matter/
Jabůrková, N. 2022. “Za čo vymenili liberáli z OĽaNO svoje hlasy? Matovič prišiel so spiknutím SaS so Smerom a fašistami z Republiky.” https://plus.noviny.sk/archiv/690347-za-co-vymenili-liberali-z-olano-svoje-hlasy-matovic-prisiel-so-spiknutim-sas-so-smerom-a-fasistami-z-republiky
Oľga Gyárfášová. 2018. “The fourth generation: from anti-establishment to anti-system parties in Slovakia.” New Perspectives. Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East European Politics and International Relations 1: 109-133.
Rybář, M., and P. Spáč. 2020. “Social Origin Is No Destiny: Background, Institutionalization, and Electoral Performance of New Political Parties in Slovakia.” East European Politics and Societies 34 (3): 637-662.
Michael Rossi. 2020. “Slovakia after Fico: Systemic Change or More of the Same?” Czech Journal of Political Science 27 (3): 235-258.
Malý, I., and Nemec, J. 2023. “‘Non-Standard’ Political Parties and The Capacity to Govern in Turbulent Times: Slovakia 2020-2022.” Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences. Special issue: 101-117.
Karnitschnig, M. 2023. “Why Slovakia’s Election Doesn’t Really Matter.” https://www.politico.eu/article/why-the-slovak-election-doesnt-really-matter/
Jabůrková, N. 2022. “Za čo vymenili liberáli z OĽaNO svoje hlasy? Matovič prišiel so spiknutím SaS so Smerom a fašistami z Republiky.” https://plus.noviny.sk/archiv/690347-za-co-vymenili-liberali-z-olano-svoje-hlasy-matovic-prisiel-so-spiknutim-sas-so-smerom-a-fasistami-z-republiky
3
France
With France’s diverse party system, it is no surprise that several parties can be considered as challenging the existing institutional order. While almost no party directly contests liberal democratic principles, France is home to populist and radical parties on both the left and the right of the political spectrum. Populist parties received about half of the votes in the legislative elections of 2022. This results from both the continuing progress of the radical right and the new dominance of La France Insoumise on the left, working through the NUPES alliance. What is more surprising is that almost all parties have contested the established order in one way or another. Macron’s success was built on denouncing the incumbent elite’s incapacity. Both the Socialist Party and the Republicans, once the dominant governmental parties, have not only lost most of their influence, but are also now under the influence of the more radical parties. PS has happily participated in the NUPES alliance. The Republicans have increasingly considered not only coming closer to the position of the National Rally, but even directly collaborating with it.
Since the elections of 2022, France has been governed by a minority government. This is the result both of the mediocre performance of the presidential party in the legislative elections and the incapacity to forge a governmental coalition that extends beyond the president’s supporters. Despite several attempts to negotiate a more structured and durable agreement with the Republicans, both during the formation of the government and during the pension reform process, these efforts have failed. The government has considered no alternative to this coalition.
This more generally reflects the workings of a polarized party system. France has a long tradition of polarization. The divide between left and right has been a constant feature of French politics, reflecting ideological and social tensions as well as tensions between the center and periphery. All this has contributed to the country’s antagonistic political and social structure. Consensual collaboration has been the exception rather than the rule.
Things may have changed following the 2017 presidential election, since the new president managed to form a coalition with elements from the center-right and center-left, pushing the remaining parties to the extremes of the political spectrum. But the idea of overcoming the sterile left-right polarization for the benefit of more consensual progressive policymaking seems to have failed. Macron’s strategy has even increased polarization between his movement and the extreme right, marginalizing all other parties as he has tried to force moderates to rally around his flag. The result is that moderates have been split between rallying to Macron and rallying to more radical alternatives. This, in turn, weakens one of the constraining rules of the game in French politics – the so-called cordon sanitaire around the far right.
Zemmour’s surge has helped in this regard, but it reflects more generally the evolution toward a three-bloc politics, not unlike the situation of the Fourth Republic, with centrist parties opposed to radicals on both extremes.
In the end, this process has failed in several respects. On one hand, reform has proved to be increasingly difficult. The pension reform and the bill on immigration have shown that the only ways to act have been either through the so-called 49.3 procedure – which allows measures to be passed though the National Assembly without a vote – or with a drift in bill content toward the positions of the radical right. On the other hand, it has also contributed to the “normalization” of the hard-right National Rally, and has created the option of explicit collaborations if not coalitions with it.
Since the elections of 2022, France has been governed by a minority government. This is the result both of the mediocre performance of the presidential party in the legislative elections and the incapacity to forge a governmental coalition that extends beyond the president’s supporters. Despite several attempts to negotiate a more structured and durable agreement with the Republicans, both during the formation of the government and during the pension reform process, these efforts have failed. The government has considered no alternative to this coalition.
This more generally reflects the workings of a polarized party system. France has a long tradition of polarization. The divide between left and right has been a constant feature of French politics, reflecting ideological and social tensions as well as tensions between the center and periphery. All this has contributed to the country’s antagonistic political and social structure. Consensual collaboration has been the exception rather than the rule.
Things may have changed following the 2017 presidential election, since the new president managed to form a coalition with elements from the center-right and center-left, pushing the remaining parties to the extremes of the political spectrum. But the idea of overcoming the sterile left-right polarization for the benefit of more consensual progressive policymaking seems to have failed. Macron’s strategy has even increased polarization between his movement and the extreme right, marginalizing all other parties as he has tried to force moderates to rally around his flag. The result is that moderates have been split between rallying to Macron and rallying to more radical alternatives. This, in turn, weakens one of the constraining rules of the game in French politics – the so-called cordon sanitaire around the far right.
Zemmour’s surge has helped in this regard, but it reflects more generally the evolution toward a three-bloc politics, not unlike the situation of the Fourth Republic, with centrist parties opposed to radicals on both extremes.
In the end, this process has failed in several respects. On one hand, reform has proved to be increasingly difficult. The pension reform and the bill on immigration have shown that the only ways to act have been either through the so-called 49.3 procedure – which allows measures to be passed though the National Assembly without a vote – or with a drift in bill content toward the positions of the radical right. On the other hand, it has also contributed to the “normalization” of the hard-right National Rally, and has created the option of explicit collaborations if not coalitions with it.
Poland
The Polish political landscape was highly divided along ideological lines and split into two blocs: populists and anti-populists. The first bloc dominated from 2015 until the October 2023 elections and represented right-wing populism and national conservatism in the United Right (Zjednoczona Prawica), with the dominant Law and Justice (PiS) party led by Jarosław Kaczyński.
Due to the lack of a stable majority in the parliament (227 out of 460 seats), the government depended heavily on internal discipline and the support of minor parliamentary circles like Kukiz’15 – Direct Democracy (Kukiz15). The conservative spectrum concluded with the far-right Confederation (Konfederacja), which, although not aligned with or supportive of the United Right, called for anti-immigrant regulations, strong opposition to further integration of the European Union and highly liberal economic policies.
In 2022 and 2023, internal divisions within the United Right led to constant intragovernmental conflict between Justice Minister Zbigniew Ziobro and Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki. Ziobro, head of a junior ally of the Law and Justice party (PiS), Sovereign Poland, controlled 20 out of 228 seats in the coalition parliamentary club. His small but critical group played a decisive role in passing governmental proposals. The main arena for conflict was on issues relating to the European Union, as the prime minister was a realist, while the justice minister voiced a hard euroskepticism, including support for Polexit. Ziobro’s 2019 judicial reform violated EU law, and led to the introduction of a mechanism linking the disbursement of EU funds with adherence to the rule of law. Despite the intense and open political conflict, Morawiecki supported Ziobro during a vote of no confidence put forward by the opposition.
The anti-populist bloc gathered various parties from the center-right to the left. The strongest in terms of public support was the liberal-centrist Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO), which led the government from 2007 to 2015. The party evolved from a Christian-liberal to a more catchall party with a strong commitment to individual liberties. In the 2023 elections, it focused on building a so-called wealth-care state, further Europeanization, empowerment of local communities and strong anti-PiS rhetoric.
As an alternative to Law and Justice and the Civic Platform, smaller parties formed a political alliance, the Third Way (Trzecia Droga), on 27 April 2023. This coalition included the centrist Poland 2050 (Polska 2050) led by Szymon Hołownia and the agrarian Polish People’s Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL) led by Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz. Leftist voters could support the New Left (Nowa Lewica), which was formed in 2021 by a merger of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and Spring (Wiosna). In February 2023, the New Left created an electoral alliance with Together (Razem), the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), and the Labor Union (Unia Pracy).
In the months leading up to the 2023 parliamentary campaign, Donald Tusk, PO’s leader and a former European Council president, advocated for the creation of a unified list of opposition parties in order to win the “unity premium.” However, in the elections to the lower chamber of parliament, the Sejm, the opposition ran for victory divided into three blocks: the Civic Coalition, the Third Way and the New Left. Despite this division, the opposition successfully formed a united government.
The final count gave PiS 35.4% of the vote, followed by the Civic Coalition at 30.7%, the Third Way at 14.4%, the Left at 8.6% and the far-right Confederation at 7.2% (Euronews 2023). Despite winning the elections, PiS was unable to form a majority government as its potential coalition partner, the Polish People’s Party, declined to cooperate.
The coalition agreement’s main priorities included restoring the rule of law, addressing the climate crisis and improving Poland’s track record on women’s rights. The document also focused on education and healthcare, depoliticizing the public media and combating hate speech. Issues that created a political fracture included LGBTQ+ rights and energy policy, but the most pressing one was opposition to the Third Way’s plan to liberalize Poland’s strict abortion laws.
As a result of dropping the abortion issue from the coalition agreement, a small faction of the Left, the Razem (Together), decided to leave the coalition but support it in the parliament. In the elections to the upper chamber of the parliament, the Senate Pact between the KO, Polska 2050, PSL and Nowa Lewica, along with independent candidates, resulted in a stable majority of 66 seats out of 100.
Due to the lack of a stable majority in the parliament (227 out of 460 seats), the government depended heavily on internal discipline and the support of minor parliamentary circles like Kukiz’15 – Direct Democracy (Kukiz15). The conservative spectrum concluded with the far-right Confederation (Konfederacja), which, although not aligned with or supportive of the United Right, called for anti-immigrant regulations, strong opposition to further integration of the European Union and highly liberal economic policies.
In 2022 and 2023, internal divisions within the United Right led to constant intragovernmental conflict between Justice Minister Zbigniew Ziobro and Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki. Ziobro, head of a junior ally of the Law and Justice party (PiS), Sovereign Poland, controlled 20 out of 228 seats in the coalition parliamentary club. His small but critical group played a decisive role in passing governmental proposals. The main arena for conflict was on issues relating to the European Union, as the prime minister was a realist, while the justice minister voiced a hard euroskepticism, including support for Polexit. Ziobro’s 2019 judicial reform violated EU law, and led to the introduction of a mechanism linking the disbursement of EU funds with adherence to the rule of law. Despite the intense and open political conflict, Morawiecki supported Ziobro during a vote of no confidence put forward by the opposition.
The anti-populist bloc gathered various parties from the center-right to the left. The strongest in terms of public support was the liberal-centrist Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO), which led the government from 2007 to 2015. The party evolved from a Christian-liberal to a more catchall party with a strong commitment to individual liberties. In the 2023 elections, it focused on building a so-called wealth-care state, further Europeanization, empowerment of local communities and strong anti-PiS rhetoric.
As an alternative to Law and Justice and the Civic Platform, smaller parties formed a political alliance, the Third Way (Trzecia Droga), on 27 April 2023. This coalition included the centrist Poland 2050 (Polska 2050) led by Szymon Hołownia and the agrarian Polish People’s Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL) led by Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz. Leftist voters could support the New Left (Nowa Lewica), which was formed in 2021 by a merger of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and Spring (Wiosna). In February 2023, the New Left created an electoral alliance with Together (Razem), the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), and the Labor Union (Unia Pracy).
In the months leading up to the 2023 parliamentary campaign, Donald Tusk, PO’s leader and a former European Council president, advocated for the creation of a unified list of opposition parties in order to win the “unity premium.” However, in the elections to the lower chamber of parliament, the Sejm, the opposition ran for victory divided into three blocks: the Civic Coalition, the Third Way and the New Left. Despite this division, the opposition successfully formed a united government.
The final count gave PiS 35.4% of the vote, followed by the Civic Coalition at 30.7%, the Third Way at 14.4%, the Left at 8.6% and the far-right Confederation at 7.2% (Euronews 2023). Despite winning the elections, PiS was unable to form a majority government as its potential coalition partner, the Polish People’s Party, declined to cooperate.
The coalition agreement’s main priorities included restoring the rule of law, addressing the climate crisis and improving Poland’s track record on women’s rights. The document also focused on education and healthcare, depoliticizing the public media and combating hate speech. Issues that created a political fracture included LGBTQ+ rights and energy policy, but the most pressing one was opposition to the Third Way’s plan to liberalize Poland’s strict abortion laws.
As a result of dropping the abortion issue from the coalition agreement, a small faction of the Left, the Razem (Together), decided to leave the coalition but support it in the parliament. In the elections to the upper chamber of the parliament, the Senate Pact between the KO, Polska 2050, PSL and Nowa Lewica, along with independent candidates, resulted in a stable majority of 66 seats out of 100.
Citations:
Euronews. 2023. “Final results show scale of pro-EU opposition victory in Poland.” https://www.euronews.com/2023/10/17/final-results-show-scale-of-pro-eu-opposition-victory-in-poland
Stambulski, Michał. 2022. “Constitutional Populism and the Rule of Law in Poland.” In Anti-Constitutional Populism, eds. Krygier, M., Czarnota, A., and Sadurski, W. Cambridge Studies in Law and Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 336-365.
Euronews. 2023. “Final results show scale of pro-EU opposition victory in Poland.” https://www.euronews.com/2023/10/17/final-results-show-scale-of-pro-eu-opposition-victory-in-poland
Stambulski, Michał. 2022. “Constitutional Populism and the Rule of Law in Poland.” In Anti-Constitutional Populism, eds. Krygier, M., Czarnota, A., and Sadurski, W. Cambridge Studies in Law and Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 336-365.
Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose various significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
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