How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
Informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
10
---
---
9
Australia
Regular informal meetings between agency staff at different levels (though especially at higher ranks), through a variety of forums, support interministerial cooperation. These activities do not undermine the formal coordination efforts within the bureaucracy or at ministerial level.
Belgium
Apart from official coordination via the PMO, Belgium has a robust unofficial coordination system through two channels: first, ministers’ teams (“ministerial cabinets”) are composed of experts from at least two parties (though most are close to the minister’s party). Second, political parties are very strong and align the actions of all politicians and their teams within the same party. Between formal and informal arrangements, the PMO enforces additional policy coordination across line ministries through meetings with various ministers’ political advisers. The chief of staff within the prime minister’s political cabinet plays a crucial role in policy coordination.
Citations:
Opdrachten | FOD Kanselarij van de Eerste Minister. https://www.kanselarij.belgium.be/nl/opdrachten
https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=19946&langId=en
Opdrachten | FOD Kanselarij van de Eerste Minister. https://www.kanselarij.belgium.be/nl/opdrachten
https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=19946&langId=en
Estonia
Two different forms exist to communicate line ministries’ proposals to the GO. First, all policy initiatives are discussed in the coalition council. Second, the cabinet informally examines all substantial issues at its weekly meetings. No binding decisions are made in these meetings; the main function is to exchange information and prepare for formal government sessions.
Informal coordination, especially considering the small size of the country, plays an important role in ensuring efficient policymaking. In addition to contacts between high-ranking civil servants in ministries, the coalition committee and governing bodies of political parties are crucial in garnering support from coalition partners. However, while the Estonia 2035 long-term development strategy sets strategic goals, including a focus on governance, it lacks implementation plans and targets for government coordination.
Informal coordination, especially considering the small size of the country, plays an important role in ensuring efficient policymaking. In addition to contacts between high-ranking civil servants in ministries, the coalition committee and governing bodies of political parties are crucial in garnering support from coalition partners. However, while the Estonia 2035 long-term development strategy sets strategic goals, including a focus on governance, it lacks implementation plans and targets for government coordination.
Finland
Intersectoral coordination has generally been perceived as an important issue in Finnish politics, but few institutional mechanisms have been introduced. One of these is the Iltakoulu (evening session), an informal weekly meeting between ministers to discuss and prepare key matters for the government’s plenary session the following day. Additionally, there are other informal government meetings, and items can also be referred to informal ministerial working groups. Coordination therefore proceeds effectively through informal mechanisms.
Recent large-scale policy programs have enhanced intersectoral policymaking. Furthermore, Finland’s membership in the European Union has necessitated increased interministerial coordination. Recent research in Finland has focused only tangentially on informal mechanisms, but various case studies suggest that the system of coordination by advisory councils has performed well.
Recent large-scale policy programs have enhanced intersectoral policymaking. Furthermore, Finland’s membership in the European Union has necessitated increased interministerial coordination. Recent research in Finland has focused only tangentially on informal mechanisms, but various case studies suggest that the system of coordination by advisory councils has performed well.
Citations:
Eero Murto. 2016. “Power Relationship Between Ministers and Civil Servants.” In The Changing Balance of Political Power in Finland, eds. Lauri Karvonen, Heikki Paloheimo and Tapio Raunio. Stockholm: Santérus Förlag, 189-208.
Eero Murto. 2016. “Power Relationship Between Ministers and Civil Servants.” In The Changing Balance of Political Power in Finland, eds. Lauri Karvonen, Heikki Paloheimo and Tapio Raunio. Stockholm: Santérus Förlag, 189-208.
Greece
While horizontal coordination in Greece has traditionally been informal, it has become more formalized since the adoption of the 2019 law on government organization. The establishment of the Presidency of the Government and the creation of “Coordination Services” within each ministry have reduced the need for informal coordination, limiting the opportunities for individual ministers to pursue their own policy agendas.
However, during periods of crisis, such as the wildfires in the summer of 2022 and the floods in the summer of 2023, informal coordination did occur. This involved not only the Government Office but also ministers without portfolio who work closely with the prime minister. In 2023–2024, there were three such ministers and three deputy ministers who worked in close coordination with the prime minister and among themselves, taking on various supervisory roles. This team was particularly cohesive, as its members had worked together during the previous term of the New Democracy party (2019–2023).
In summary, informal coordination mechanisms effectively complement formal ones.
However, during periods of crisis, such as the wildfires in the summer of 2022 and the floods in the summer of 2023, informal coordination did occur. This involved not only the Government Office but also ministers without portfolio who work closely with the prime minister. In 2023–2024, there were three such ministers and three deputy ministers who worked in close coordination with the prime minister and among themselves, taking on various supervisory roles. This team was particularly cohesive, as its members had worked together during the previous term of the New Democracy party (2019–2023).
In summary, informal coordination mechanisms effectively complement formal ones.
Citations:
The change in government organization in 2019 took place through Law 4622/2019.
The team of government ministers without portfolio is announced in the official website of the prime minister: https://www.government.gov.gr/kivernisi/
The change in government organization in 2019 took place through Law 4622/2019.
The team of government ministers without portfolio is announced in the official website of the prime minister: https://www.government.gov.gr/kivernisi/
Latvia
In Latvia, the effectiveness of informal coordination mechanisms in complementing formal interministerial coordination depends on the frequency and regularity of informal meetings, as well as their impact on formal coordination efforts.
The political parties forming the government meet in cooperation meetings (previously known as Coalition Council). Cooperation meetings are not regulated by law but are based on a mutual agreement between the political parties. The Coalition Cooperation Agreement, a political agreement, articulates and defines the basic principles of cooperation. Currently, cooperation meetings are held weekly on Mondays. Between the beginning of 2022 and the end of 2023, approximately 130 cooperation meetings have been held (Ministru kabinets, 2023).
The government led by Evika Siliņa has a cooperation agreement emphasizing the need to enhance the functionality and professionalism of the Cabinet of Ministers. This agreement includes the formation of cabinet committees and requires the involvement of ministers or parliamentary secretaries from pertinent ministries in thematic committees organized by the prime minister (14. Saeimas frakciju sadarbības līgums, 2023). This structure ensures practical interministerial cooperation and streamlined decision-making throughout the 14th Saeima. Thus, this applies to the coordination between the GO/PMO and the line ministries, as well as within the ministerial bureaucracy.
In addition, Latvia has a standard practice of organizing formal and informal working groups to discuss issues among ministries.
The political parties forming the government meet in cooperation meetings (previously known as Coalition Council). Cooperation meetings are not regulated by law but are based on a mutual agreement between the political parties. The Coalition Cooperation Agreement, a political agreement, articulates and defines the basic principles of cooperation. Currently, cooperation meetings are held weekly on Mondays. Between the beginning of 2022 and the end of 2023, approximately 130 cooperation meetings have been held (Ministru kabinets, 2023).
The government led by Evika Siliņa has a cooperation agreement emphasizing the need to enhance the functionality and professionalism of the Cabinet of Ministers. This agreement includes the formation of cabinet committees and requires the involvement of ministers or parliamentary secretaries from pertinent ministries in thematic committees organized by the prime minister (14. Saeimas frakciju sadarbības līgums, 2023). This structure ensures practical interministerial cooperation and streamlined decision-making throughout the 14th Saeima. Thus, this applies to the coordination between the GO/PMO and the line ministries, as well as within the ministerial bureaucracy.
In addition, Latvia has a standard practice of organizing formal and informal working groups to discuss issues among ministries.
Citations:
Ministru kabinets. 2023. “Notikumu kalendārs.” https://www.mk.gov.lv/lv/notikumu-kalendars?title=Vald%C4%ABbu%20veidojo%C5%A1o%20partiju%20Sadarb%C4%ABbas%20san%C4%81ksme&page=13
Latvijas Republikas Ministru kabineta veidojošo 14. Saeimas frakciju sadarbības līgums. 2023. https://static.lsm.lv/documents/1sq.pdf
Ministru kabinets. 2023. “Notikumu kalendārs.” https://www.mk.gov.lv/lv/notikumu-kalendars?title=Vald%C4%ABbu%20veidojo%C5%A1o%20partiju%20Sadarb%C4%ABbas%20san%C4%81ksme&page=13
Latvijas Republikas Ministru kabineta veidojošo 14. Saeimas frakciju sadarbības līgums. 2023. https://static.lsm.lv/documents/1sq.pdf
Norway
Norwegian politics is best characterized as consensus-driven rather than partisan and confrontational. A symbolic expression of this is the seating arrangement in parliament, where members are seated by geography rather than by party affiliation. The political system’s capacity to forge broad policy compromises on important issues is significant. Examples include a radical pension reform, the system of value-added and income taxes, foreign policy, and the decision to accumulate state income from the oil and gas sector into one of the world’s largest sovereign wealth funds. Another example is the response to the COVID-19 pandemic, where there was broad consensus across the political spectrum to provide sufficient economic support for both corporations and unemployed citizens during the crisis.
Informal meetings between party leaders from different ideological backgrounds are not formalized but still occur frequently when national compromises are needed.
Meetings between ministers largely take place in formal settings, particularly during the weekly government conferences.
Informal meetings between party leaders from different ideological backgrounds are not formalized but still occur frequently when national compromises are needed.
Meetings between ministers largely take place in formal settings, particularly during the weekly government conferences.
Citations:
OECD. 2022. “Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions in Norway.” Building Trust in Public Institutions. OECD Publishing, Paris. https://doi.org/10.1787/81b01318-en
Regjeringen.no. 2014. “Regjeringen i arbeid.” https://www.regjeringen.no/no/om-regjeringa/slik-blir-norge-styrt/regjeringen-i-arbeid-2/id2001100/
OECD. 2022. “Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions in Norway.” Building Trust in Public Institutions. OECD Publishing, Paris. https://doi.org/10.1787/81b01318-en
Regjeringen.no. 2014. “Regjeringen i arbeid.” https://www.regjeringen.no/no/om-regjeringa/slik-blir-norge-styrt/regjeringen-i-arbeid-2/id2001100/
Switzerland
The Swiss political system, being a consensus democracy with characteristics of consociationalism, involves a complex interplay of formal and informal coordination mechanisms. This implies the presence of deliberative processes in which compromises are made between interest groups, political parties and other stakeholders. This in turn suggests that informal mechanisms play a significant role in the decision-making process. Such informal mechanisms involve less formalized but still significant processes such as ad hoc meetings, personal networks and behind-the-scenes negotiations, all of which complement the formal structures. As the Swiss system includes strong neocorporatist features, informal governance processes also involve key players that are historically strongly integrated into Switzerland’s policymaking processes – especially in the pre-parliamentary phase – such as umbrella associations representing the business sector (Mach et al. 2019). This raises questions regarding the equality of access by various interest and citizen groups to the decision-making system.
Indeed, given the small size of the federal administration and the country’s tradition of informal coordination, strong and effective informal coordination continues to take place. Political coordination among the high ranks of the administration can be rather intense, although the limited capacity and time of the Federal Council members, as well as their diverging interests, create practical bottlenecks.
Indeed, given the small size of the federal administration and the country’s tradition of informal coordination, strong and effective informal coordination continues to take place. Political coordination among the high ranks of the administration can be rather intense, although the limited capacity and time of the Federal Council members, as well as their diverging interests, create practical bottlenecks.
Citations:
Ali, A., Sager, F., and Trein, P. Forthcoming. “Coordination in a Loosely Coupled Core: Insights from Switzerland.” In Coordination at the Core? Executive Decision-Making in International Organizations and the EU, eds. J-M. Eymeri-Douzans, M. Goransson, and H. Kassim.
Mach, A., Varone, F., and Eichenberger, S. 2020. “Transformations of Swiss Neo-Corporatism: From Pre-Parliamentary Negotiations Toward Privileged Pluralism in the Parliamentary Venue.” In The European Social Model under Pressure, eds. Careja, R., Emmenegger, P., and Giger, N. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-27043-8_4
Mavrot, Céline, and Fritz Sager. 2018. “Vertical Epistemic Communities in Multilevel Governance.” Policy & Politics 46 (3): 391-407.
Ali, A., Sager, F., and Trein, P. Forthcoming. “Coordination in a Loosely Coupled Core: Insights from Switzerland.” In Coordination at the Core? Executive Decision-Making in International Organizations and the EU, eds. J-M. Eymeri-Douzans, M. Goransson, and H. Kassim.
Mach, A., Varone, F., and Eichenberger, S. 2020. “Transformations of Swiss Neo-Corporatism: From Pre-Parliamentary Negotiations Toward Privileged Pluralism in the Parliamentary Venue.” In The European Social Model under Pressure, eds. Careja, R., Emmenegger, P., and Giger, N. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-27043-8_4
Mavrot, Céline, and Fritz Sager. 2018. “Vertical Epistemic Communities in Multilevel Governance.” Policy & Politics 46 (3): 391-407.
In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
8
Austria
Before government bills can be formally considered at cabinet meetings, they need to be agreed upon by the governing coalition parties. These negotiations occur at different levels. Typically, the department primarily responsible for drafting a government bill collaborates with a department under the political control of the coalition partner (Schieder and Schmidt 2023). For example, in the current ÖVP-Green government, the minister of justice, Alma Zadić (Green), often cooperates with the minister for constitutional affairs, Karoline Edtstadler (ÖVP). If no direct counterpart exists for a given department, the department responsible for preparing the bill will coordinate with the coalition partner’s spokesperson for a particular policy field in the Nationalrat.
When most issues have been settled between the coalition parties, bills are forwarded to the coalition’s coordination group, which – as of late 2023 – includes members from the ministerial cabinets of Finance Minister Magnus Brunner (ÖVP) and Vice-Chancellor Werner Kogler (Grüne). As this coordination process proceeds, other “pairs” representing both sides will be involved, such as the press spokespersons, the chiefs of the political cabinets of the chancellor and vice-chancellor, and the parliamentary party group leaders of both governing parties in the Nationalrat. Sometimes, the chancellor or vice-chancellor will personally attend meetings.
The coordination group typically meets on Mondays or Tuesdays. Both governing parties also convene separately for informal discussions behind closed doors immediately before scheduled cabinet meetings.
Overall, the informal elements of this coordination clearly tend to support rather than challenge or undermine the more formal coordination efforts.
When most issues have been settled between the coalition parties, bills are forwarded to the coalition’s coordination group, which – as of late 2023 – includes members from the ministerial cabinets of Finance Minister Magnus Brunner (ÖVP) and Vice-Chancellor Werner Kogler (Grüne). As this coordination process proceeds, other “pairs” representing both sides will be involved, such as the press spokespersons, the chiefs of the political cabinets of the chancellor and vice-chancellor, and the parliamentary party group leaders of both governing parties in the Nationalrat. Sometimes, the chancellor or vice-chancellor will personally attend meetings.
The coordination group typically meets on Mondays or Tuesdays. Both governing parties also convene separately for informal discussions behind closed doors immediately before scheduled cabinet meetings.
Overall, the informal elements of this coordination clearly tend to support rather than challenge or undermine the more formal coordination efforts.
Citations:
Sandra Schieder and Colette M. Schmidt. 2023. “Inside Ministerrat: Ein Blick hinter die Kulissen eines wöchentlichen Regierungsrituals.” https://www.derstandard.at/story/3000000186930/inside-ministerrat-ein-blick-hinter-die-kulissen-eines-woechentlichen-regierungsrituals
Sandra Schieder and Colette M. Schmidt. 2023. “Inside Ministerrat: Ein Blick hinter die Kulissen eines wöchentlichen Regierungsrituals.” https://www.derstandard.at/story/3000000186930/inside-ministerrat-ein-blick-hinter-die-kulissen-eines-woechentlichen-regierungsrituals
Canada
Many informal venues exist. In some cases, these are thought to enhance formal mechanisms; in others, they undermine them. However, very little is known about them, as they escape review through lobbying and other registration systems (Sarpkaya 1988; Hogan et al. 2009).
There are numerous and frequent informal mechanisms for interministerial coordination. Senior officials, managers, and front-line operational personnel regularly engage in bilateral and multilateral meetings and coordination. These interactions are often issue-dependent and typically take place when preparing policy and program changes for Cabinet consideration, but they may also address specific programmatic challenges.
There are numerous and frequent informal mechanisms for interministerial coordination. Senior officials, managers, and front-line operational personnel regularly engage in bilateral and multilateral meetings and coordination. These interactions are often issue-dependent and typically take place when preparing policy and program changes for Cabinet consideration, but they may also address specific programmatic challenges.
Citations:
Hogan, John, Raj S. Chari, and Gary Murphy. 2009. “Lobbying Regulation Across Four Continents: Promoting Transparency?” SSRN eLibrary. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1450816&
Sarpkaya, S. 1988. Lobbying in Canada – Ways and Means. Don Mills: CCH Canadian Ltd.
Hogan, John, Raj S. Chari, and Gary Murphy. 2009. “Lobbying Regulation Across Four Continents: Promoting Transparency?” SSRN eLibrary. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1450816&
Sarpkaya, S. 1988. Lobbying in Canada – Ways and Means. Don Mills: CCH Canadian Ltd.
Denmark
Given that Danish governments are typically either minority or coalition governments (or both), informal contact and coordination are important. The country’s consensus-driven political tradition means this also applies to contacts with opposition parties and interest groups, particularly employer and employee organizations that play an important role in shaping labor market and collective bargaining issues. Tripartite agreements are frequent in this context.
Informal mechanisms can enhance the efficiency of formal meetings; however, crucial decisions must be confirmed in more formal settings. At the political level, informal mechanisms are likely more important than formal ones (Christiansen et al 2022).
Furthermore, there is an exchange of employees between ministries, trade associations and municipalities, ensuring that informal networks are formed (VIVE 2022). However, recent work also suggests that leaders are more likely to change sectors than to change levels of government, for instance by moving from a leadership position in a municipality to taking a job in a ministry.
Informal mechanisms can enhance the efficiency of formal meetings; however, crucial decisions must be confirmed in more formal settings. At the political level, informal mechanisms are likely more important than formal ones (Christiansen et al 2022).
Furthermore, there is an exchange of employees between ministries, trade associations and municipalities, ensuring that informal networks are formed (VIVE 2022). However, recent work also suggests that leaders are more likely to change sectors than to change levels of government, for instance by moving from a leadership position in a municipality to taking a job in a ministry.
Citations:
Christiansen, Peter Munk, Asbjørn Sonne Nørgaard and Rikke Berg. 2022. Politik og forvaltning. København: Hans Reitzel.
VIVE. 2022. “Ledermobilitet. Afdækning af motiver og barrierer.” https://www.vive.dk/da/udgivelser/ledermobilitet-bxqk2qxk
Christiansen, Peter Munk, Asbjørn Sonne Nørgaard and Rikke Berg. 2022. Politik og forvaltning. København: Hans Reitzel.
VIVE. 2022. “Ledermobilitet. Afdækning af motiver og barrierer.” https://www.vive.dk/da/udgivelser/ledermobilitet-bxqk2qxk
France
Informal coordination is generally efficient in achieving coherence in the government’s communication. More than his predecessors, President Macron has used the format of a “government seminar” to prepare for key events, such as the preparation of the new government plan for action in summer 2022. Governments commonly refer to ad hoc committees tasked with providing information on crucial issues. In rare cases, a report is requested from a single person. Committee members are mainly high-level civil servants, former or active politicians, or academics, and are often chosen based on their sympathy for the government in office at the time. Most reports are made public, but a few remain unpublished, particularly when the report’s proposals appear too provocative to be accepted by social partners.
More generally, most decisions with high political stakes lead to informal consultation organized by the president or the prime minister. Recently, the presidential party has generally been considered to be too weak to extend beyond the role of transmitter of the executive’s instructions. Yet the situation of minority government since 2022 has shed new light on informal consultations with other parties – mostly in this case with the Republicans. The pension reform and the bill on immigration demonstrated how complex such negotiations can be.
A crucial factor and essentially an invisible coordination mechanism is the “old-boy network” built by former students from the elitist “grandes écoles” (École Nationale d’Administration (ENA), École Polytechnique, Mines, ParisTech, etc.), or by members of the same “grands corps” (prestigious bureaucracies such as Inspection Générale des Finances, the diplomatic services, the Council of State and so on). Most ministries (except perhaps the least powerful or those considered as marginal) include one or several persons from this high civil servant super-elite who know each other or are bound by informal bonds of solidarity. These high civil servants – especially “énarques” from ENA – also work in the PMO and the president’s office, further strengthening this informal connection. The system is efficient but lacks transparency, from a procedural point of view (Gervais 2022). Reform of the ENA, which has now been transformed into the Institut National du Service Public (INSP), as well as the “grands corps,” leading toward more professional experience before accessing this body, may change the situation in the long run (Gally 2022). In the short term, no visible effect has been perceptible beyond the protests of those directly concerned.
More generally, most decisions with high political stakes lead to informal consultation organized by the president or the prime minister. Recently, the presidential party has generally been considered to be too weak to extend beyond the role of transmitter of the executive’s instructions. Yet the situation of minority government since 2022 has shed new light on informal consultations with other parties – mostly in this case with the Republicans. The pension reform and the bill on immigration demonstrated how complex such negotiations can be.
A crucial factor and essentially an invisible coordination mechanism is the “old-boy network” built by former students from the elitist “grandes écoles” (École Nationale d’Administration (ENA), École Polytechnique, Mines, ParisTech, etc.), or by members of the same “grands corps” (prestigious bureaucracies such as Inspection Générale des Finances, the diplomatic services, the Council of State and so on). Most ministries (except perhaps the least powerful or those considered as marginal) include one or several persons from this high civil servant super-elite who know each other or are bound by informal bonds of solidarity. These high civil servants – especially “énarques” from ENA – also work in the PMO and the president’s office, further strengthening this informal connection. The system is efficient but lacks transparency, from a procedural point of view (Gervais 2022). Reform of the ENA, which has now been transformed into the Institut National du Service Public (INSP), as well as the “grands corps,” leading toward more professional experience before accessing this body, may change the situation in the long run (Gally 2022). In the short term, no visible effect has been perceptible beyond the protests of those directly concerned.
Citations:
Gally, N. 2022. “Le marché des hauts fonctionnaires: de l’ENA à l’INSP.” Esprit 6: 105-113.
Gervais, J. 2022. L’impératif managérial: désirs privés et devoirs publics d’un grand corps d’Etat. Lille: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.
Gally, N. 2022. “Le marché des hauts fonctionnaires: de l’ENA à l’INSP.” Esprit 6: 105-113.
Gervais, J. 2022. L’impératif managérial: désirs privés et devoirs publics d’un grand corps d’Etat. Lille: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.
Lithuania
In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination. Sometimes these informal meetings are organized between representatives of political parties that form the ruling coalition with the goal of aligning positions on sensitive or divisive policy issues, such as tax reform.
The coalition government formed in 2020 relied mostly on informal coordination between the coalition partners until June 2023, when the three ruling parties decided to establish a Coalition Council. This council was subsequently used as a forum for discussing the draft budget for 2024 and other matters important to the coalition parties.
Informal meetings are also used to coordinate positions between the prime minister and the president. Sometimes these meetings occur regularly, but most of the time they depend on the political situation and policy agenda. Approaching elections often affect the routines of such informal coordination, as political competition reduces the incentives for it.
The coalition government formed in 2020 relied mostly on informal coordination between the coalition partners until June 2023, when the three ruling parties decided to establish a Coalition Council. This council was subsequently used as a forum for discussing the draft budget for 2024 and other matters important to the coalition parties.
Informal meetings are also used to coordinate positions between the prime minister and the president. Sometimes these meetings occur regularly, but most of the time they depend on the political situation and policy agenda. Approaching elections often affect the routines of such informal coordination, as political competition reduces the incentives for it.
New Zealand
Informal coordination mechanisms often complement formal interministerial coordination, contributing to the effectiveness of overall government operations. Informal coordination can take various forms, including ad hoc collaboration between ministries, bilateral meetings between high-ranking officials, and consultations between ministers from different coalition parties. The Cabinet Manual – the formal guidelines that govern procedures for government decision-making – explicitly promotes informal coordination by encouraging ministers and government agencies to seek informal advice from the Legislation Design and Advisory Committee during the early stages of the policy drafting process (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2023).
Citations:
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. 2023. “Cabinet Manual.” https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/our-business-units/cabinet-office/supporting-work-cabinet/cabinet-manual
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. 2023. “Cabinet Manual.” https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/our-business-units/cabinet-office/supporting-work-cabinet/cabinet-manual
Spain
When interministerial problems cannot be solved through informal contacts, meetings between officials from the involved ministries are organized, often relying on the fact that senior civil servants belong to the same specialized corps or share a network of former colleagues. To foster informal mechanisms within the coalition cabinet, meetings of the heads of ministers’ private offices were introduced, although their communication flow is limited.
Informal meetings across various levels of government are frequent. Several sectoral conferences have established working groups to foster vertical informal coordination and support formal coordination. In the context of the coalition government, these informal arenas have become very useful, but their effectiveness depends on the ministers’ personality and political status. For example, they could not avoid the internal controversy and cabinet division over the law on sexual abuse, leading to Podemos’ cabinet ministers voting against their own government in parliament.
Informal meetings across various levels of government are frequent. Several sectoral conferences have established working groups to foster vertical informal coordination and support formal coordination. In the context of the coalition government, these informal arenas have become very useful, but their effectiveness depends on the ministers’ personality and political status. For example, they could not avoid the internal controversy and cabinet division over the law on sexual abuse, leading to Podemos’ cabinet ministers voting against their own government in parliament.
UK
Flexibility and informal meetings are key features of the UK government system, allowing it to respond uniquely to different situations. This approach is highly valued and is an essential component of prime ministerial government in the UK. Formally, civil servants take notes on informal meetings between ministers. The ongoing inquiry into the handling of the COVID-19 pandemic has documented coordination issues, highlighting the proliferation of WhatsApp groups and raising questions about how they were monitored and recorded.
Cabinet committees provide opportunities for seeking agreement among relevant ministries and feed into the full cabinet or 10 Downing Street. A distinctive feature of the UK system is that cabinet committees can be radically reconfigured by the prime minister and can change rapidly in response to events and the prime minister’s preferences. For example, during the pandemic, four new committees were established, taking the number under the Johnson administration to 20. Liz Truss, during her brief tenure, reduced the number to six, and under Sunak, it has increased to 11.
The government can also establish interministerial groups, which, according to the Institute for Government, “cannot take binding decisions but can support policy development and decision-making where collective cabinet agreement is not required.” Although not binding on the cabinet, these groups are approved by the prime minister and can be used to shape policy.
Informal coordination also arises from regular monthly meetings of the Civil Service Board (CSB), chaired by the Chief Operating Officer of the Civil Service and comprising selected permanent secretaries (the top civil servant in a ministry). A complementary Civil Service Shadow Board (CSSB), consisting of members from grades below the Senior Civil Service, provides different perspectives on the issues discussed at the CSB. The CSSB reviews papers going to the CSB in advance of each monthly meeting, and its representatives attend the CSB meetings to contribute their views in person.
The UK usually has single-party government, so informal meetings of party groups are not a significant factor. However, factions within the ruling party can meet and attempt to exert influence at full party meetings.
Whether these processes support or undermine formal coordination is context-specific, making a single answer to this question challenging. The UK COVID-19 inquiry has also resurfaced criticisms from devolved governments regarding what they perceive as an excessive reliance on informal mechanisms at the expense of proper use of formal mechanisms for intergovernmental relations, such as the Joint Ministerial Committee (Henderson 2023).
Cabinet committees provide opportunities for seeking agreement among relevant ministries and feed into the full cabinet or 10 Downing Street. A distinctive feature of the UK system is that cabinet committees can be radically reconfigured by the prime minister and can change rapidly in response to events and the prime minister’s preferences. For example, during the pandemic, four new committees were established, taking the number under the Johnson administration to 20. Liz Truss, during her brief tenure, reduced the number to six, and under Sunak, it has increased to 11.
The government can also establish interministerial groups, which, according to the Institute for Government, “cannot take binding decisions but can support policy development and decision-making where collective cabinet agreement is not required.” Although not binding on the cabinet, these groups are approved by the prime minister and can be used to shape policy.
Informal coordination also arises from regular monthly meetings of the Civil Service Board (CSB), chaired by the Chief Operating Officer of the Civil Service and comprising selected permanent secretaries (the top civil servant in a ministry). A complementary Civil Service Shadow Board (CSSB), consisting of members from grades below the Senior Civil Service, provides different perspectives on the issues discussed at the CSB. The CSSB reviews papers going to the CSB in advance of each monthly meeting, and its representatives attend the CSB meetings to contribute their views in person.
The UK usually has single-party government, so informal meetings of party groups are not a significant factor. However, factions within the ruling party can meet and attempt to exert influence at full party meetings.
Whether these processes support or undermine formal coordination is context-specific, making a single answer to this question challenging. The UK COVID-19 inquiry has also resurfaced criticisms from devolved governments regarding what they perceive as an excessive reliance on informal mechanisms at the expense of proper use of formal mechanisms for intergovernmental relations, such as the Joint Ministerial Committee (Henderson 2023).
Citations:
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainer/cabinet-committees#:~:text=How%20Has%20The%20Number%20of%20Cabinet%20Committees%20Changed%20Over%20time?
Henderson, A. 2023. “Expert report to UK Covid-19 Inquiry (INQ000269372).” https://covid19.public-inquiry.uk/documents/inq000269372-expert-report-of-professor-ailsa-henderson-titled-devolution-and-the-uks-response-to-covid-19-dated-07-september-2023/
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainer/cabinet-committees#:~:text=How%20Has%20The%20Number%20of%20Cabinet%20Committees%20Changed%20Over%20time?
Henderson, A. 2023. “Expert report to UK Covid-19 Inquiry (INQ000269372).” https://covid19.public-inquiry.uk/documents/inq000269372-expert-report-of-professor-ailsa-henderson-titled-devolution-and-the-uks-response-to-covid-19-dated-07-september-2023/
7
Germany
Informal coordination mechanisms complement formal interministerial coordination. The most important informal meeting often occurs in the coalition committee, which consists of the chancellor, the vice-chancellor, and the heads of each party in the coalition (“Koalitionsvertrag 2021,” 2021). In general, informal meetings support formal coordination between the chancellery and line ministries.
The informal meetings between the head of the chancellery and the state secretaries reportedly resolve many intergovernmental disagreements before they reach more formal channels (Busse and Hofmann, 2019; Hebestreit and Korte, 2022). These informal coordination processes seem to be less effective in the current coalition than in previous governments (Deutschlandfunk 2023).
The informal meetings between the head of the chancellery and the state secretaries reportedly resolve many intergovernmental disagreements before they reach more formal channels (Busse and Hofmann, 2019; Hebestreit and Korte, 2022). These informal coordination processes seem to be less effective in the current coalition than in previous governments (Deutschlandfunk 2023).
Citations:
Deutschlandfunk. 2023. “Knatsch-Koalition. Warum die Ampel so oft streitet.” https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/koalition-ampel-streit-100.html
Hebestreit, R., and K.-R. Korte. 2022. “The Executive: The German Government and Civil Service.” In The Oxford Handbook of German Politics, eds. K. Larres, H. Moroff, and R. Wittlinger. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Koalitionsvertrag. 2021. www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/koalitionsvertrag-2021-1990800
Deutschlandfunk. 2023. “Knatsch-Koalition. Warum die Ampel so oft streitet.” https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/koalition-ampel-streit-100.html
Hebestreit, R., and K.-R. Korte. 2022. “The Executive: The German Government and Civil Service.” In The Oxford Handbook of German Politics, eds. K. Larres, H. Moroff, and R. Wittlinger. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Koalitionsvertrag. 2021. www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/koalitionsvertrag-2021-1990800
Hungary
The strong top-down formal role of Prime Minister Orbán and his Prime Minister’s Office is complemented by informal coordination mechanisms. As power concentration has increased in the fourth Orbán government, so has the role of informal decision-making. Orbán regularly gathers officials from his larger circle to issue instructions. In effect, formal mechanisms only serve to legalize and implement the prime minister’s improvised and hastily made decisions.
From the bottom-up perspective, civil servants have very limited capacity to influence policymaking either formally or informally. Given the high level of politicization in Hungary and the high levels of patronage and political control over the bureaucracy, any deviation from the core government’s line is perilous. In small groups, mind guards are often present.
As a consequence, self-censorship and groupthink occur regularly. Informal “coordination” exists through top-down channels through which the core government makes it clear to civil servants where the political will is situated, often without issuing formal orders, as such orders might be legally questionable. As a result, much of the fragmentary informal coordination is defunct. It does not improve the quality of policymaking but hinders the implementation of objectively preferable solutions to problems. Information between the political and implementation-oriented spheres of public administration under the Orbán government flows only unidirectionally and through legal texts rather than personal interaction (European Commission 2018). The problem is not that informal communication negatively impacts administrative procedures, but vice versa.
From the bottom-up perspective, civil servants have very limited capacity to influence policymaking either formally or informally. Given the high level of politicization in Hungary and the high levels of patronage and political control over the bureaucracy, any deviation from the core government’s line is perilous. In small groups, mind guards are often present.
As a consequence, self-censorship and groupthink occur regularly. Informal “coordination” exists through top-down channels through which the core government makes it clear to civil servants where the political will is situated, often without issuing formal orders, as such orders might be legally questionable. As a result, much of the fragmentary informal coordination is defunct. It does not improve the quality of policymaking but hinders the implementation of objectively preferable solutions to problems. Information between the political and implementation-oriented spheres of public administration under the Orbán government flows only unidirectionally and through legal texts rather than personal interaction (European Commission 2018). The problem is not that informal communication negatively impacts administrative procedures, but vice versa.
Ireland
McCarthy (2021) suggests that the scope for discretion in Irish policymaking is limited by external opportunities. For example, innovation in Ireland has been closely linked to international opportunities, with successful foreign direct investment becoming the de facto national system of innovation. This reliance on external investment has resulted in a persistently weak national system of innovation, rather than fostering a self-sustaining one. Path dependency further limits innovation and foresight, as previous decisions on the same topic often significantly influence current policy decisions. This dependency can also constrain implementation capacity, as the available institutions and instruments shape policy choices. For instance, confidence in the capacity of the Revenue Commissioners, and a lack of confidence in other potential channels, may determine whether a tax or social welfare mechanism is used, leading to specific (mal)distribution outcomes.
The necessary combination of capacity and opportunity for foresight should be the particular responsibility of the civil service, which serves as the locus of independent policy advice to the government. The civil service needs to foster a diverse and flourishing network of policy analysis. This role requires technical proficiency, creativity, and cultural openness. It also means engaging with officials, analysts and activists who have direct access to the lived experiences of those affected by policy and are fluent in the language of formal policy development.
There is no published data about informal high-level meetings. However, Irish social and political culture is known for a certain level of informality. Government and civil service officials often find it useful to be able to reach out informally to contacts who can help them or refer them to the appropriate person (as noted by Richard Boyle and L. Shannon in public administration and government studies). While no data is available on the extent and nature of informal meetings, this culture of being able to “pick up the phone” is positively viewed among government and civil service staff.
The necessary combination of capacity and opportunity for foresight should be the particular responsibility of the civil service, which serves as the locus of independent policy advice to the government. The civil service needs to foster a diverse and flourishing network of policy analysis. This role requires technical proficiency, creativity, and cultural openness. It also means engaging with officials, analysts and activists who have direct access to the lived experiences of those affected by policy and are fluent in the language of formal policy development.
There is no published data about informal high-level meetings. However, Irish social and political culture is known for a certain level of informality. Government and civil service officials often find it useful to be able to reach out informally to contacts who can help them or refer them to the appropriate person (as noted by Richard Boyle and L. Shannon in public administration and government studies). While no data is available on the extent and nature of informal meetings, this culture of being able to “pick up the phone” is positively viewed among government and civil service staff.
Citations:
McCarthy, D. 2021. “Foreword.” In J. Hogan and M. P. Murphy, eds., Policy Analysis in Ireland, xix-xxii. Bristol: Policy Press.
NESC. September 2023. Is Ireland Thriving? Answers from International Assessments. Report number 32.
McCarthy, D. 2021. “Foreword.” In J. Hogan and M. P. Murphy, eds., Policy Analysis in Ireland, xix-xxii. Bristol: Policy Press.
NESC. September 2023. Is Ireland Thriving? Answers from International Assessments. Report number 32.
Israel
Informal meetings between officials occur frequently. For instance, they happen before and after weekly cabinet meetings, in the Knesset when officials attend committee sessions, and when parties convene. These meetings occur at all levels, among ministers, general directors, and finance directors across various ministries and the Ministry of Finance. Such meetings help coordinate policies. However, informal meetings are typically held to solve problems, complementing rather than replacing formal coordination mechanisms.
Italy
Informal meetings are common in the policymaking process. There are regular meetings between the heads of ministerial cabinets as well as between the political parties that make up the ruling majority. Due to the regionalized nature of the Italian political system, meetings between different levels of government – ministries, regions, and municipalities – are ongoing.
Generally, most of these informal meetings are organized to help coordinate efforts at all levels. These meetings are also believed to eliminate many technical issues that could lead to political problems.
Generally, most of these informal meetings are organized to help coordinate efforts at all levels. These meetings are also believed to eliminate many technical issues that could lead to political problems.
Japan
There is a dense network of informal coordination centered on the ruling party which complements the formal coordination procedures among bureaucrats. Before submission to the Diet, all legislative initiatives are subject to advance screening (jizen shinsa) within the LDP, which has enjoyed almost uninterrupted status as Japan’s dominant party since 1955. The temporary suspension of this system under the rule of the Democratic Party of Japan (2009 – 2012) greatly disturbed interministerial coordination processes, but the LDP returned to the old practices after returning to power in 2012.
Advance screening takes place regularly in LDP’s policy divisions corresponding to different ministries. Bureaucrats explain the contents of bill proposals to LDP backbenchers and promote different projects among the members of the zoku – so-called parliamentary tribes – informal groups of politicians specializing in a given legislative field. The “tribes” represent various interest groups and enjoy considerable veto power in the ruling party, though their influence on the decision-making process weakened under the second Abe administration (2012 – 2020). In theory, decisions of the LDP Policy Research Council and the General Council are made by majority vote, although usually politicians strive for consensus. Under this system, the government would frequently have to make far-reaching concessions to LDP backbenchers. In response, Prime Minister Abe established new intra-party bodies under the LDP president’s direct control to circumvent these constraints. Prime Minister Kishida, however, has been less skillful in using institutional instruments to outmaneuver veto players.
Advance screening takes place regularly in LDP’s policy divisions corresponding to different ministries. Bureaucrats explain the contents of bill proposals to LDP backbenchers and promote different projects among the members of the zoku – so-called parliamentary tribes – informal groups of politicians specializing in a given legislative field. The “tribes” represent various interest groups and enjoy considerable veto power in the ruling party, though their influence on the decision-making process weakened under the second Abe administration (2012 – 2020). In theory, decisions of the LDP Policy Research Council and the General Council are made by majority vote, although usually politicians strive for consensus. Under this system, the government would frequently have to make far-reaching concessions to LDP backbenchers. In response, Prime Minister Abe established new intra-party bodies under the LDP president’s direct control to circumvent these constraints. Prime Minister Kishida, however, has been less skillful in using institutional instruments to outmaneuver veto players.
Citations:
Iio, Jun. 2008. Nihon no Tôchi Kôzô [Structure of Government in Japan]. Tokyo: Chûô Kôron Shinsha.
Zakowski, Karol. 2021. Gradual Institutional Change in Japan: Kantei Leadership under the Abe Administration. London: Routledge.
Iio, Jun. 2008. Nihon no Tôchi Kôzô [Structure of Government in Japan]. Tokyo: Chûô Kôron Shinsha.
Zakowski, Karol. 2021. Gradual Institutional Change in Japan: Kantei Leadership under the Abe Administration. London: Routledge.
Portugal
Informal coordination mechanisms play a pivotal role in the functioning and coordination of the Portuguese government. At the highest levels of government, two primary informal coordination mechanisms are employed:
Regular Coordination Meetings: These meetings take place weekly, typically on Mondays, and involve the prime minister’s inner circle. The composition may vary with changes in government but usually includes the minister of the presidency, the minister of finance, the minister of parliamentary affairs, and two additional ministers chosen by the prime minister for political insights. Additionally, the president of the prime minister’s political party and the leader of the parliamentary group, who sometimes are the same individual, also participate.
Occasional Coordination Meetings: These meetings occur on an as-needed basis, bringing together a sectoral minister with the Office of the Prime Minister or the minister of the presidency. If the policy under consideration has financial implications, the minister of finance is also invited. These bilateral or trilateral discussions do not follow a fixed schedule but take place whenever a line ministry proposes a significant legislative initiative. These informal horizontal connections between ministries serve to compensate for the absence or rigidity of formal horizontal links.
When examining the relationship between top government officials and political parties, the absolute majority government of the Socialist Party (January 2022 – April 2024) has enabled the passage of legislation independently of other political parties. This implies that coordination primarily occurs within the Socialist Party, reducing the significance of informal coordination with other political parties. Nevertheless, even with an absolute majority government, dialogue with minor parties may still be pursued on special and crucial occasions, such as budget discussions and approval in parliament, to broaden support for the budget.
Regular Coordination Meetings: These meetings take place weekly, typically on Mondays, and involve the prime minister’s inner circle. The composition may vary with changes in government but usually includes the minister of the presidency, the minister of finance, the minister of parliamentary affairs, and two additional ministers chosen by the prime minister for political insights. Additionally, the president of the prime minister’s political party and the leader of the parliamentary group, who sometimes are the same individual, also participate.
Occasional Coordination Meetings: These meetings occur on an as-needed basis, bringing together a sectoral minister with the Office of the Prime Minister or the minister of the presidency. If the policy under consideration has financial implications, the minister of finance is also invited. These bilateral or trilateral discussions do not follow a fixed schedule but take place whenever a line ministry proposes a significant legislative initiative. These informal horizontal connections between ministries serve to compensate for the absence or rigidity of formal horizontal links.
When examining the relationship between top government officials and political parties, the absolute majority government of the Socialist Party (January 2022 – April 2024) has enabled the passage of legislation independently of other political parties. This implies that coordination primarily occurs within the Socialist Party, reducing the significance of informal coordination with other political parties. Nevertheless, even with an absolute majority government, dialogue with minor parties may still be pursued on special and crucial occasions, such as budget discussions and approval in parliament, to broaden support for the budget.
Slovenia
Informal communication often occurs away from the public eye, happening daily in person, via emails and telephone conversations, or during various meetings and events. Informal discussions and coffee mornings between party leaders are common practices that influence the dynamics of processes and relationships between participants. The media is informed about such meetings only when a problem arises and a decision is expected from the prime minister.
For instance, during a disagreement within the Social Democratic Party, the party leader met with the prime minister individually, while the minister of justice also met separately with the prime minister. Additionally, a scandal involving the role of the general secretaries of political parties in ministerial duties revealed that the general secretaries of all three coalition parties met weekly to coordinate policy, personnel, and programs.
For instance, during a disagreement within the Social Democratic Party, the party leader met with the prime minister individually, while the minister of justice also met separately with the prime minister. Additionally, a scandal involving the role of the general secretaries of political parties in ministerial duties revealed that the general secretaries of all three coalition parties met weekly to coordinate policy, personnel, and programs.
Citations:
Top news 2024: Matjaž Han: “Od predsednika vlade pričakujem, da jo bo razrešil” – Kaj sledi, če se premier na bo odločil za razrešitev ministrice? https://topnews.si/2024/01/31/video-matjaz-han-od-predsednika-vlade-pricakujem-da-jo-bo-razresil-kaj-sledi-ce-se-premier-na-bo-odlocil-za-razresitev-ministrice/
Alenka Krašovec and Tomaž Krpič. 2024. “Slovenia: Newcomers as Prime Ministers. A New Mode of Coalition Governance?” In Torbjorn Bergman, Gabriella Ilonszki, and Johan Hellstrom, eds., Coalition Politics in Central and Eastern Europe. Abingdon: Routledge.
Top news 2024: Matjaž Han: “Od predsednika vlade pričakujem, da jo bo razrešil” – Kaj sledi, če se premier na bo odločil za razrešitev ministrice? https://topnews.si/2024/01/31/video-matjaz-han-od-predsednika-vlade-pricakujem-da-jo-bo-razresil-kaj-sledi-ce-se-premier-na-bo-odlocil-za-razresitev-ministrice/
Alenka Krašovec and Tomaž Krpič. 2024. “Slovenia: Newcomers as Prime Ministers. A New Mode of Coalition Governance?” In Torbjorn Bergman, Gabriella Ilonszki, and Johan Hellstrom, eds., Coalition Politics in Central and Eastern Europe. Abingdon: Routledge.
Sweden
When the government consists of more than one party, as has often been the case in Sweden’s recent history, mechanisms are in place to address disagreements. Either the political leadership proactively intervenes in the policy-planning process or such disagreements are “lifted” to the political level for a ruling. These mechanisms largely unfold during informal meetings.
Public agencies are often consulted by line ministries in the early stages of the policy process due to the significant policy knowledge that public servants possess (Jacobsson, Pierre, and Sundström, 2015; Premfors and Sundström, 2007).
“Informal mechanisms of coordination among civil servants and politicians are a salient practice (Petridou and Sparf, 2017). However, they may not always be effective. Yet, informal contacts between departments and agencies are believed to be integral to the efficiency of the politico-administrative system. Informal coordination procedures effectively filter many, but not all, policy proposals (de Fine Licht and Pierre, 2017).”
Public agencies are often consulted by line ministries in the early stages of the policy process due to the significant policy knowledge that public servants possess (Jacobsson, Pierre, and Sundström, 2015; Premfors and Sundström, 2007).
“Informal mechanisms of coordination among civil servants and politicians are a salient practice (Petridou and Sparf, 2017). However, they may not always be effective. Yet, informal contacts between departments and agencies are believed to be integral to the efficiency of the politico-administrative system. Informal coordination procedures effectively filter many, but not all, policy proposals (de Fine Licht and Pierre, 2017).”
Citations:
de Fine Licht, J., and Pierre, J. 2017. “Myndighetschefernas Syn på Regeringens Styrning.” Stockholm: Statskontoret.
Jacobsson, B., Pierre, J., and Sundström, G. 2015. Governing the Embedded State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Petridou, E., and J. Sparf. 2017. “For Safety’s Sake: The Strategies of Institutional Entrepreneurs and Bureaucratic Reforms in Swedish Crisis Management, 2001–2009.” Policy and Society 36 (4): 556-574.
Premfors, R. and Sundström, G. 2007. Regeringskansliet. Stockholm: Liber.
de Fine Licht, J., and Pierre, J. 2017. “Myndighetschefernas Syn på Regeringens Styrning.” Stockholm: Statskontoret.
Jacobsson, B., Pierre, J., and Sundström, G. 2015. Governing the Embedded State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Petridou, E., and J. Sparf. 2017. “For Safety’s Sake: The Strategies of Institutional Entrepreneurs and Bureaucratic Reforms in Swedish Crisis Management, 2001–2009.” Policy and Society 36 (4): 556-574.
Premfors, R. and Sundström, G. 2007. Regeringskansliet. Stockholm: Liber.
USA
Informal coordination across departments plays a significant role in cross-departmental coordination (Nou 2016). It relies primarily on personal networks, constituency relationships, and other methods. The nature of this coordination is context-specific and often depends on the issue at hand. For instance, during crisis situations, various government departments may come together to manage the situation by sending representatives to ad hoc cross-agency crisis meetings. Departments and agencies also distribute briefs and other forms of information to relevant agencies to keep them updated on their activities.
Since 1980, the federal government has operated a Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), which brings together various law enforcement agencies from both the federal government and local authorities (Herman 2005). Relevant federal agencies in the JTTF include the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Homeland Security, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The JTTF helps coordinate informal information sharing, allocate resources on an ad hoc basis when necessary, and manage responses during crisis situations. Agencies also share memos with each other using the JTTF as a conduit.
The Trump administration’s lack of experienced personnel in key agency positions led to an increased role for informal coordination. The executive branch under Trump saw calamitous coordination failures. These failures largely reflected general problems of understaffing and a lack of competent leadership in the departments and agencies during the Trump presidency.
The Biden administration is currently addressing these challenges by hiring more staff and appointing competent leaders across departments and agencies. The Biden administration is also adopting a management style reminiscent of the Obama administration’s, which was more orderly than the Trump administration’s chaotic approach.
Since 1980, the federal government has operated a Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), which brings together various law enforcement agencies from both the federal government and local authorities (Herman 2005). Relevant federal agencies in the JTTF include the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Homeland Security, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The JTTF helps coordinate informal information sharing, allocate resources on an ad hoc basis when necessary, and manage responses during crisis situations. Agencies also share memos with each other using the JTTF as a conduit.
The Trump administration’s lack of experienced personnel in key agency positions led to an increased role for informal coordination. The executive branch under Trump saw calamitous coordination failures. These failures largely reflected general problems of understaffing and a lack of competent leadership in the departments and agencies during the Trump presidency.
The Biden administration is currently addressing these challenges by hiring more staff and appointing competent leaders across departments and agencies. The Biden administration is also adopting a management style reminiscent of the Obama administration’s, which was more orderly than the Trump administration’s chaotic approach.
Citations:
Jennifer Nou. 2016. “Intra-Agency Coordination.” Harvard Law Review.
Susan Herman. 2005. “Collapsing Spheres: Joint Terrorism Task Forces, Federalism, and the War on Terror.” Willamette Law Review.
Jennifer Nou. 2016. “Intra-Agency Coordination.” Harvard Law Review.
Susan Herman. 2005. “Collapsing Spheres: Joint Terrorism Task Forces, Federalism, and the War on Terror.” Willamette Law Review.
6
Czechia
The coalition agreement of the Fiala government, which consists of five parties, includes fixed principles of coalition cooperation and coordination. The most crucial body for policy coordination is the coalition council. It consists of the coalition parties’ chairpersons and up to three other representatives from each coalition party. Another body that meets more frequently is the so-called K-five, which includes the chairs of the government parties. Additionally, coalition parties have expert commissions. The expert commissions of the individual coalition parties primarily communicate among themselves in preparing legislative proposals.
There is also informal interministerial cooperation in the form of various joint projects. Informal coordination is also possible through government working and advisory bodies in which different ministries are represented.
There is also informal interministerial cooperation in the form of various joint projects. Informal coordination is also possible through government working and advisory bodies in which different ministries are represented.
Poland
Informal communication, including influencing specific political decisions, was common within the United Right government. This practice arose because Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of PiS, chose not to assume the position of prime minister, preferring instead to influence policies unofficially. Formally, he served as the vice-chair of the Council of Ministers from 2020 to 2022 and 2023, as well as the chair of the Council of Ministers’ Committee on National Security and Defense from 2020 to 2022. Informal meetings between high-ranking government officials or party groups often took place at the PiS headquarters on Nowogrodzka Street. These meetings were organized before strategic decisions or to diffuse ongoing conflicts between Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki and Minister of Justice Zbigniew Ziobro. The decisions made in Nowogrodzka undermined formal coordination efforts within the ministerial bureaucracy and other bodies.
Netherlands
Although informal consultations undoubtedly occur among ministers themselves; between ministers and senior officials; between ministers and legislators (such as the former Tower consultations between core cabinet members and coalition party leaders); among senior officials; between senior officials and legislators; and involving lobbyists, journalists, and scientists, there is little definitive reporting in this area. Informal consultations remain secretive, despite open government campaigns that have increased accessibility to formal documents.
Permanent parliamentary committees, for example, can serve as venues for informal contacts between legislators and senior officials, although the latter are formally constrained by the “Oekaze Kok,” which prohibits such interactions. Recently, a group of administrative scientists and secretary-generals advocated relaxing this rule. The cabinet has also convened ad hoc committees around a “fixer” figure, former minister and legislator Johannes Remkes, to address pressing issues that the cabinet itself could not resolve, such as the nitrogen crisis and safety concerns related to gas drilling in Groningen.
Although there has been some disclosure about ministers’ agendas, the extent of visits by lobbyists remains unclear. The popular “poldering” model also fosters an environment where informal contacts can thrive. For instance, around topics like energy transition or climate policy, formal “tables” are established with invited stakeholders, serving as both formal and informal access points for business and other interest groups. Some, including prominent parliamentarian Pieter Omtzigt, have expressed concerns that this approach could diminish parliamentary oversight of cabinet decision-making.
Permanent parliamentary committees, for example, can serve as venues for informal contacts between legislators and senior officials, although the latter are formally constrained by the “Oekaze Kok,” which prohibits such interactions. Recently, a group of administrative scientists and secretary-generals advocated relaxing this rule. The cabinet has also convened ad hoc committees around a “fixer” figure, former minister and legislator Johannes Remkes, to address pressing issues that the cabinet itself could not resolve, such as the nitrogen crisis and safety concerns related to gas drilling in Groningen.
Although there has been some disclosure about ministers’ agendas, the extent of visits by lobbyists remains unclear. The popular “poldering” model also fosters an environment where informal contacts can thrive. For instance, around topics like energy transition or climate policy, formal “tables” are established with invited stakeholders, serving as both formal and informal access points for business and other interest groups. Some, including prominent parliamentarian Pieter Omtzigt, have expressed concerns that this approach could diminish parliamentary oversight of cabinet decision-making.
Citations:
Boonstra. 2023. “Topambtenaren rijk houden tegenspraak tegen.” Binnenlands Bestuur November 22.
EW, Joosten. 2023. “Onder kabinetten-Rutte explosieve groei adviescolleges.” EW August 22.
De Groene Amsterdammer. 2021. “Achter de minister. Wie is toch de ambtenaar?” June 2.
Omtzigt. 2023. “Thorbeckelezing Zwolle.” April 14.
Boonstra. 2023. “Topambtenaren rijk houden tegenspraak tegen.” Binnenlands Bestuur November 22.
EW, Joosten. 2023. “Onder kabinetten-Rutte explosieve groei adviescolleges.” EW August 22.
De Groene Amsterdammer. 2021. “Achter de minister. Wie is toch de ambtenaar?” June 2.
Omtzigt. 2023. “Thorbeckelezing Zwolle.” April 14.
In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
5
---
---
4
---
---
3
---
---
Informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
2
Slovakia
There is no publicly available information about the organization or contents of any informal meetings among high-ranking government officials or party groups in Slovakia. There are informal Coalition Council meetings, but only leaders of coalition parties can participate. For example, the OĽaNO-led government experienced several coordination crises – due to personal animosities between OĽaNO and SaS leaders – that undermined official efforts to enhance formal interministerial coordination mechanisms through regular meetings of coalition party leaders.
1
---
---