To what extent do national policymakers effectively collaborate with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services?
National policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
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9
New Zealand
Because the government is highly centralized, effective collaboration between national policymakers and regional or local governments is less critical in New Zealand than in other democratic countries. In particular, New Zealand operates under a governance system that combines centralized policy direction and decentralized service delivery.
Nevertheless, formal coordination and consultation mechanisms are in place to facilitate engagement between subnational self-governments – such as local councils or regional authorities – and the central government regarding policy initiatives that directly affect them. Most importantly, Local Government New Zealand (LGNZ), the peak body representing local government interests, engages with the central government on behalf of local councils, advocating for their interests and participating in policy discussions. Moreover, during the development of legislation or policy reforms that affect local government, formal consultation processes allow subnational governments to submit feedback, concerns and suggestions.
There is also the National Iwi Chairs Forum, founded in 2005, which comprises the chairs of 71 iwi groups (Māori tribes). The Forum facilitates the sharing of information among iwi leaders through meetings held four times a year throughout the country. Additionally, the National Party government under Prime Minister John Key regularly met with the Iwi Chairs Forum from 2008 – 2017, and the Labour government continued this process.
Moreover, in 1999, Helen Clark’s government created the position of “minister assisting the prime minister on Auckland issues,” which was upgraded to a standalone position in 2002. Auckland is New Zealand’s largest city, with a population of around 1.5 million people. It contributes 38% of the nation’s GDP and is home to many of the service industries that support the country’s exporters and importers. The ministerial role lapsed under both the Key and Ardern governments between 2008 – 2022, but it was renewed under the Hipkins Labour government in 2023. The new National government reappointed a minister for Auckland in November 2023. This position is considered necessary to manage the various policy challenges facing the Auckland region post-COVID-19 (Auckland had longer and more lockdowns than the rest of the country), given its critical infrastructure issues and recent flooding.
Nevertheless, formal coordination and consultation mechanisms are in place to facilitate engagement between subnational self-governments – such as local councils or regional authorities – and the central government regarding policy initiatives that directly affect them. Most importantly, Local Government New Zealand (LGNZ), the peak body representing local government interests, engages with the central government on behalf of local councils, advocating for their interests and participating in policy discussions. Moreover, during the development of legislation or policy reforms that affect local government, formal consultation processes allow subnational governments to submit feedback, concerns and suggestions.
There is also the National Iwi Chairs Forum, founded in 2005, which comprises the chairs of 71 iwi groups (Māori tribes). The Forum facilitates the sharing of information among iwi leaders through meetings held four times a year throughout the country. Additionally, the National Party government under Prime Minister John Key regularly met with the Iwi Chairs Forum from 2008 – 2017, and the Labour government continued this process.
Moreover, in 1999, Helen Clark’s government created the position of “minister assisting the prime minister on Auckland issues,” which was upgraded to a standalone position in 2002. Auckland is New Zealand’s largest city, with a population of around 1.5 million people. It contributes 38% of the nation’s GDP and is home to many of the service industries that support the country’s exporters and importers. The ministerial role lapsed under both the Key and Ardern governments between 2008 – 2022, but it was renewed under the Hipkins Labour government in 2023. The new National government reappointed a minister for Auckland in November 2023. This position is considered necessary to manage the various policy challenges facing the Auckland region post-COVID-19 (Auckland had longer and more lockdowns than the rest of the country), given its critical infrastructure issues and recent flooding.
In general, national policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
8
Denmark
Cooperation between the state, regions and municipalities has been highly institutionalized since the 1970s, and two budgetary mechanisms ensure that regions and municipalities can deliver the services required. Reforms have also reduced the number of municipalities and counties/regions.
As part of preparing the fiscal bill, representatives from the Ministry of Finance meet each spring with representatives from municipalities in the Association of Municipalities (Kommunernes Landsforening) and representatives of the Danish regions (Danske Region). In these negotiations, target service levels are set in accordance with the law. The negotiations also cover taxation levels in the municipalities. Finally, the negotiations are used to signal to regions and municipalities which issues should be given political priority (Finansministeriet n.d.).
Second, a balancing principle ensures that transfers are adjusted when new legislation is passed. The idea is that lower levels of government should be compensated when service portfolios change. Hence, if new services are added, lower levels of government receive a greater volume of transfers, while a reduction in services results in transfer cuts (Finansministeriet, 2007).
While these budgetary mechanisms have proven robust, there is nevertheless a predictable and observed blame game between municipalities and the state whenever problems arise in the delivery of services. Very often, the press reports that mayors blame the state for not providing sufficient funds for the services that must be delivered. Thus, there is an inherent tension and potential conflict between mayors from the opposition party and the prime minister and, by extension, the government.
As part of preparing the fiscal bill, representatives from the Ministry of Finance meet each spring with representatives from municipalities in the Association of Municipalities (Kommunernes Landsforening) and representatives of the Danish regions (Danske Region). In these negotiations, target service levels are set in accordance with the law. The negotiations also cover taxation levels in the municipalities. Finally, the negotiations are used to signal to regions and municipalities which issues should be given political priority (Finansministeriet n.d.).
Second, a balancing principle ensures that transfers are adjusted when new legislation is passed. The idea is that lower levels of government should be compensated when service portfolios change. Hence, if new services are added, lower levels of government receive a greater volume of transfers, while a reduction in services results in transfer cuts (Finansministeriet, 2007).
While these budgetary mechanisms have proven robust, there is nevertheless a predictable and observed blame game between municipalities and the state whenever problems arise in the delivery of services. Very often, the press reports that mayors blame the state for not providing sufficient funds for the services that must be delivered. Thus, there is an inherent tension and potential conflict between mayors from the opposition party and the prime minister and, by extension, the government.
Citations:
Finansministeriet. n.d. “Aftalesystemet.” https://fm.dk/arbejdsomraader/kommuner-og-regioner/aftalesystemet/
Finansministeriet. 2007. Vejledning om Det Udvidede Totalbalanceprincip (DUT). https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/mt/2007/63
Finansministeriet. n.d. “Aftalesystemet.” https://fm.dk/arbejdsomraader/kommuner-og-regioner/aftalesystemet/
Finansministeriet. 2007. Vejledning om Det Udvidede Totalbalanceprincip (DUT). https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/mt/2007/63
Finland
Before the social and healthcare reform took effect in 2023, the government confirmed the national objectives for organizing healthcare and social welfare for the years 2023 – 2026 in December 2022 (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, 2022). These objectives are strategic in nature and apply to healthcare and social welfare activities throughout Finland. They are an essential part of the national guidance and direction of healthcare and social welfare, supporting the current need to reform and further develop services.
The national objectives for healthcare and social welfare are the primary goals under the Act on Organizing Healthcare and Social Welfare Services. The government confirms these objectives every four years. The preparation of the objectives is based on monitoring information regarding the population’s health and well-being, as well as the activities and finances of healthcare and social welfare.
The national objectives include promoting equal access to healthcare and social welfare services, integrating these services, fostering cooperation between well-being service counties, advancing information management in healthcare and social welfare, and implementing both regional and national preparedness and contingency planning.
Similar consultation mechanisms are in place for other areas of public services. These formal mechanisms of coordination and consultation also include local self-governments. It is fair to say that national policymakers effectively collaborate with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services in Finland.
Intergovernmental fora meet regularly. However, in both formal and informal settings, these interactions are more hierarchical than cooperative. Subnational entities are almost entirely dependent on government funding, which dictates the character of power relationships. Municipalities, which are responsible for services including education, environmental management and city planning, have the mandate to collect municipal taxes. However, state grants are crucial for smaller municipalities, especially to fund education. Due to their reliance on state funding, civil servants at the subnational self-government level rarely express dissatisfaction with being given token opportunities to participate in decision-making processes at the central government level.
The national objectives for healthcare and social welfare are the primary goals under the Act on Organizing Healthcare and Social Welfare Services. The government confirms these objectives every four years. The preparation of the objectives is based on monitoring information regarding the population’s health and well-being, as well as the activities and finances of healthcare and social welfare.
The national objectives include promoting equal access to healthcare and social welfare services, integrating these services, fostering cooperation between well-being service counties, advancing information management in healthcare and social welfare, and implementing both regional and national preparedness and contingency planning.
Similar consultation mechanisms are in place for other areas of public services. These formal mechanisms of coordination and consultation also include local self-governments. It is fair to say that national policymakers effectively collaborate with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services in Finland.
Intergovernmental fora meet regularly. However, in both formal and informal settings, these interactions are more hierarchical than cooperative. Subnational entities are almost entirely dependent on government funding, which dictates the character of power relationships. Municipalities, which are responsible for services including education, environmental management and city planning, have the mandate to collect municipal taxes. However, state grants are crucial for smaller municipalities, especially to fund education. Due to their reliance on state funding, civil servants at the subnational self-government level rarely express dissatisfaction with being given token opportunities to participate in decision-making processes at the central government level.
Citations:
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. 2022. “Government Confirms National Objectives for Healthcare and Social Welfare.” https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/-//1271139/government-confirms-national-objectives-%20for-healthcare-and-social-welfare
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. 2022. “Government Confirms National Objectives for Healthcare and Social Welfare.” https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/-//1271139/government-confirms-national-objectives-%20for-healthcare-and-social-welfare
Germany
Cooperation between the Bund and the Länder is integral to the German federal system and generally functions well to ensure the provision of public goods and public services. Subnational governments are represented at the national level in the Bundesrat, and weekly meetings are held – both formally and informally – between members of parliament and members of the Bundesrat. This frequent exchange is supported by formal structures. Due to the relatively high independence and power of subnational governments in Germany, the Länder often serve as checks and balances for national policymaking. They also enjoy more power than the national government in areas such as education and other domains that primarily affect the state level.
All states have representatives in Berlin, and both state and national governments have expanded institutions for horizontal and vertical coordination.
State prime ministers meet quarterly in the “Ministerpräsidentenkonferenz,” where state-level issues are discussed among states, and foundational political questions regarding the states are discussed among ministers. Twice a year, this is followed by talks with the chancellor. The “Fachministerkonferenzen” – conferences of area ministers – consolidate and support coordination within departments. Additionally, many smaller working units focused on specialized issues facilitate coordination among ministerial and administrative bodies.
Local governments also enjoy relatively high power over their jurisdictions. They are integrated into a tightly woven system of constituencies and are responsible for providing some public goods themselves.
One aspect where German horizontal coordination struggles is digitalization. This is often criticized at all levels (“Digitalcheck,” 2023). Backlogs and a lack of technology and expertise at the local level often prevent advances in information and coordination between levels of government.
All states have representatives in Berlin, and both state and national governments have expanded institutions for horizontal and vertical coordination.
State prime ministers meet quarterly in the “Ministerpräsidentenkonferenz,” where state-level issues are discussed among states, and foundational political questions regarding the states are discussed among ministers. Twice a year, this is followed by talks with the chancellor. The “Fachministerkonferenzen” – conferences of area ministers – consolidate and support coordination within departments. Additionally, many smaller working units focused on specialized issues facilitate coordination among ministerial and administrative bodies.
Local governments also enjoy relatively high power over their jurisdictions. They are integrated into a tightly woven system of constituencies and are responsible for providing some public goods themselves.
One aspect where German horizontal coordination struggles is digitalization. This is often criticized at all levels (“Digitalcheck,” 2023). Backlogs and a lack of technology and expertise at the local level often prevent advances in information and coordination between levels of government.
Citations:
Digitalcheck. 2023. “Bundesministerium der Justiz.” www.normenkontrollrat.bund.de/Webs/NKR/DE/weniger-buerokratie-und-besseres-recht/digitalcheck/digitalcheck.html
(Unfortunately, the URL is not operational anymore)
Digitalcheck. 2023. “Bundesministerium der Justiz.” www.normenkontrollrat.bund.de/Webs/NKR/DE/weniger-buerokratie-und-besseres-recht/digitalcheck/digitalcheck.html
(Unfortunately, the URL is not operational anymore)
Lithuania
According to the constitution and the Law on Self-Government, Lithuanian municipalities are responsible for a wide range of state-delegated and autonomous functions. The Law on Local Self-Government regulates and approves the list of municipal tasks. Autonomous functions regulated by the constitution and related legislation include municipal budget drafting; the management, use and disposal of land and other property; the organization of general education; public transportation; the provision of social services; social housing; territorial planning; and infrastructure. State-delegated tasks encompass various fields, from state land management to social protection and active labor market programs.
In general, national policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services. Municipalities use different channels to participate in higher-level decision-making processes through formal consultations and other procedures. In terms of formal representation structure, the Association of Local Authorities of Lithuania is the main actor in political deliberation and consultation processes such as governmental working groups, legislative amendment suggestions and processes of municipal interest representation. Representatives of the association have criticized the government for the lack of fiscal flexibility allowed to municipalities seeking to borrow capital to fund investments.
In March 2021, the prime minister and the president of the Association of Local Authorities of Lithuania signed an agreement to establish a permanent Bilateral Commission. This commission, chaired by the prime minister, will include representatives from the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economy and Innovations and the Ministry of Interior, the president, and three representatives from the Association of Local Authorities. The commission aims to better coordinate decisions important to local governments, contribute to the economic and social development of regions, foster economic convergence, and reduce disparities in public services provided by different municipalities. The prime minister also has an adviser on local government and regional policy.
The National Regional Development Council is an advisory body established by the government and the Ministry of Interior. It includes representatives from other ministries and state institutions; heads of regional development councils; a representative of the Association of Local Authorities of Lithuania; and representatives of business associations, trade unions and NGOs. The council plans and coordinates the implementation of national regional policy and promotes social and economic development. According to the Ministry of Interior, the council met twice in 2022 – February and May – and once in 2023, in October.
In general, national policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services. Municipalities use different channels to participate in higher-level decision-making processes through formal consultations and other procedures. In terms of formal representation structure, the Association of Local Authorities of Lithuania is the main actor in political deliberation and consultation processes such as governmental working groups, legislative amendment suggestions and processes of municipal interest representation. Representatives of the association have criticized the government for the lack of fiscal flexibility allowed to municipalities seeking to borrow capital to fund investments.
In March 2021, the prime minister and the president of the Association of Local Authorities of Lithuania signed an agreement to establish a permanent Bilateral Commission. This commission, chaired by the prime minister, will include representatives from the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economy and Innovations and the Ministry of Interior, the president, and three representatives from the Association of Local Authorities. The commission aims to better coordinate decisions important to local governments, contribute to the economic and social development of regions, foster economic convergence, and reduce disparities in public services provided by different municipalities. The prime minister also has an adviser on local government and regional policy.
The National Regional Development Council is an advisory body established by the government and the Ministry of Interior. It includes representatives from other ministries and state institutions; heads of regional development councils; a representative of the Association of Local Authorities of Lithuania; and representatives of business associations, trade unions and NGOs. The council plans and coordinates the implementation of national regional policy and promotes social and economic development. According to the Ministry of Interior, the council met twice in 2022 – February and May – and once in 2023, in October.
Citations:
Jurga Bučaitė-Vilkė. 2015-2020. “Local Autonomy Index 2.0: Lithuania.” https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/information/publications/studies/2021/self-rule-index-for-local-authorities-in-the-eu-council-of-europe-and-oecd-countries-1990-2020
National Regional Development Council (in Lithuanian), https://vrm.lrv.lt/lt/veiklos-sritys/regionu-pletra/nacionaline-regionines-pletros-taryba/
Jurga Bučaitė-Vilkė. 2015-2020. “Local Autonomy Index 2.0: Lithuania.” https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/information/publications/studies/2021/self-rule-index-for-local-authorities-in-the-eu-council-of-europe-and-oecd-countries-1990-2020
National Regional Development Council (in Lithuanian), https://vrm.lrv.lt/lt/veiklos-sritys/regionu-pletra/nacionaline-regionines-pletros-taryba/
Norway
There is a well-established link between the national and local levels in Norway. Municipalities are independent legal entities and do not form part of the state hierarchy. Consequently, the central government does not have instructional authority over the municipalities and can only intervene based on legislation or budgets adopted by the parliament (Storting).
The line of responsibility from national policymaking to service delivery starts at the ministry and its corresponding directorate, while local authorities are legally responsible for service provision. Political objectives and priorities are set by the government. The directorate has a dual function: it produces the knowledge base and provides scientific advice to national policymakers, and it monitors all professional aspects of service production at the local level. This includes offering professional advice, setting standards, certifying professional staff and production units, and planning for crisis management.
Local authorities are organized as an interest group called the Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities (KS). Hospitals, organized as state enterprises, have their own interest organization, Spekter.
The primary pattern of interaction between the local and national levels involves these interest organizations and the respective ministries. The provision of welfare services is labor-intensive, with wages constituting 70-80% of expenditures. In Norway, wages are set through national negotiations, making it necessary for the central state to compensate the local level for rising labor costs. Additionally, the changing needs of target groups for national welfare policy are expressed in this interaction.
The agenda is relatively consistent: local authorities assert their need for increased state transfers to meet national standards, while the central government remains restrictive, focusing on maintaining growth in public expenditures and keeping inflation at acceptable levels.
The line of responsibility from national policymaking to service delivery starts at the ministry and its corresponding directorate, while local authorities are legally responsible for service provision. Political objectives and priorities are set by the government. The directorate has a dual function: it produces the knowledge base and provides scientific advice to national policymakers, and it monitors all professional aspects of service production at the local level. This includes offering professional advice, setting standards, certifying professional staff and production units, and planning for crisis management.
Local authorities are organized as an interest group called the Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities (KS). Hospitals, organized as state enterprises, have their own interest organization, Spekter.
The primary pattern of interaction between the local and national levels involves these interest organizations and the respective ministries. The provision of welfare services is labor-intensive, with wages constituting 70-80% of expenditures. In Norway, wages are set through national negotiations, making it necessary for the central state to compensate the local level for rising labor costs. Additionally, the changing needs of target groups for national welfare policy are expressed in this interaction.
The agenda is relatively consistent: local authorities assert their need for increased state transfers to meet national standards, while the central government remains restrictive, focusing on maintaining growth in public expenditures and keeping inflation at acceptable levels.
Citations:
Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities. https://www.ks.no/om-ks/ks-in-english/
https://www.spekter.no/om-spekter/english/
Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities. https://www.ks.no/om-ks/ks-in-english/
https://www.spekter.no/om-spekter/english/
Sweden
In the context of municipal autonomy, the main vehicle for collaboration between the national and subnational governments is the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (Sveriges kommuner och regioner, SKR) (SKR n.d.).
SKR is a membership organization that encompasses all municipalities and regions in the country. Its purpose is to support its members with knowledge and expertise. SKR is the largest employer organization in Sweden and conducts salary negotiations for employees of regions and municipalities. SKR enjoys legitimacy and is a key player in intergovernmental relations.
There are several formalized networks to connect public servants from different parts of the country who work in sectors such as education and health (SKR, 2024a). They meet regularly.
While the government announced an increase of SEK 6 billion in funding for regions and municipalities in 2022, budget cuts are expected in 2024 (Government Offices of Sweden 2022; SKR, 2024b). Recently, sectors such as healthcare have been chronically underfunded, resulting in serious consequences, especially for post-COVID treatment.
SKR is a membership organization that encompasses all municipalities and regions in the country. Its purpose is to support its members with knowledge and expertise. SKR is the largest employer organization in Sweden and conducts salary negotiations for employees of regions and municipalities. SKR enjoys legitimacy and is a key player in intergovernmental relations.
There are several formalized networks to connect public servants from different parts of the country who work in sectors such as education and health (SKR, 2024a). They meet regularly.
While the government announced an increase of SEK 6 billion in funding for regions and municipalities in 2022, budget cuts are expected in 2024 (Government Offices of Sweden 2022; SKR, 2024b). Recently, sectors such as healthcare have been chronically underfunded, resulting in serious consequences, especially for post-COVID treatment.
Citations:
Government Offices of Sweden. 2024. “Förstärkning av det generella statsbidrag till kommuner och regioner.” https://www.regeringen.se/pressmeddelanden/2022/11/forstarkning-av-det-generella-statsbidraget-till-kommuner-och-regioner/
SKR. n.d. “Om SKR.” https://skr.se/skr/omskr.409.html
SKR. 2024a. “Nationella nätverk med regionala representater.” https://skr.se/skr/integrationsocialomsorg/socialomsorg/nationellkunskapsstyrningsocialtjanst/styrningochsamverkan/nationellanatverkmedregionalarepresentanter.27216.html
SKR. 2024b. “Viktig besked om pengar till regionerna.” https://skr.se/skr/tjanster/pressrum/nyheter/nyhetsarkiv/viktigtbeskedompengartillregionerna.79344.html
Government Offices of Sweden. 2024. “Förstärkning av det generella statsbidrag till kommuner och regioner.” https://www.regeringen.se/pressmeddelanden/2022/11/forstarkning-av-det-generella-statsbidraget-till-kommuner-och-regioner/
SKR. n.d. “Om SKR.” https://skr.se/skr/omskr.409.html
SKR. 2024a. “Nationella nätverk med regionala representater.” https://skr.se/skr/integrationsocialomsorg/socialomsorg/nationellkunskapsstyrningsocialtjanst/styrningochsamverkan/nationellanatverkmedregionalarepresentanter.27216.html
SKR. 2024b. “Viktig besked om pengar till regionerna.” https://skr.se/skr/tjanster/pressrum/nyheter/nyhetsarkiv/viktigtbeskedompengartillregionerna.79344.html
7
Australia
The National Cabinet, an elite body that serves as a forum for ministerial-level discussion, integrates different governments but does not directly represent local issues. Various state-level working groups include local governments, and the Australian Local Government Association (ALGA) represents local governments at the national level, engaging in advocacy on issues like road infrastructure, aviation, airport construction, and renewable energy (ALGA 2023). Local government civil servants often have more grievances with state governments, which constrain their revenue-raising capacity and sometimes impose decisions over local objections. Nonetheless, there is significant cooperation between actors across different levels of government.
Citations:
ALGA. 2023. “ALGA Advocacy.” Australian Local Government Association. https://alga.com.au/category/alga-advocacy/
ALGA. 2023. “ALGA Advocacy.” Australian Local Government Association. https://alga.com.au/category/alga-advocacy/
Austria
Austria’s federal fiscal constitution is heavily centralized, yet a consensus-driven political system serves as a counterweight. While the national parliament has overwhelming taxing authority and decides on tax sharing, cost-bearing rules, and transfers, legislation is usually drafted on a consensual basis across government levels and amended every four to six years. Within this framework, each state (Land) or local government is responsible for its own budget. To coordinate budgetary policies, the Internal Austrian Stability Pact sets well-defined budgetary goals for each government and ensures compliance through potential sanctions. The intergovernmental framework does provide tax leveraging autonomy for state governments and municipalities; however, this is hardly ever used. States are traditionally financed mostly via federal tax-sharing and transfers.
The lack of accountability to taxpayers, as well as a lack of fiscal transparency due to federal co-financing, reduces efficiency, and the considerable political clout of the Länder leads to soft-budget constraints. In practice, the national government’s power over the states is conspicuously limited; specifically, there are no sanctions against states that do not comply with the political and policy agendas of the central government (see Bußjäger 2015).
In stark contrast to the situation in Germany, the Austrian Bundesrat (the second chamber of the Austrian parliament representing the states at the federal level) plays a noticeably limited role in cross-level political cooperation. Coordination between the individual states occurs in the “Landeshauptleute-Konferenz,” an informal yet firmly institutionalized gathering of state governors (“Landeshauptleute”) held twice a year (see Bußjäger 2018). These conferences have become events where senior representatives of the federal government, up to the chancellor, participate to resolve cross-level issues.
The Austrian system of local governance is characterized by an exceptionally high degree of homogeneity and notable limits on central government power. The constitution provides for a uniform model of municipalities and allows for substantial material influence from the federation on the municipalities, at least in areas of federal competence. More recently, the national government has launched the “Gemeindepakete” – financial resources dedicated to triggering infrastructure investments at the local level.
Ultimately, states rather than the central government are the key actors in local governance. The states’ close relationships with municipalities are structurally favored by the Austrian system of “indirect” federal administration. The mix of constitutional, administrative, and political factors has resulted in a considerable diversity of local government regimes within the federation (see Haller 2023).
The lack of accountability to taxpayers, as well as a lack of fiscal transparency due to federal co-financing, reduces efficiency, and the considerable political clout of the Länder leads to soft-budget constraints. In practice, the national government’s power over the states is conspicuously limited; specifically, there are no sanctions against states that do not comply with the political and policy agendas of the central government (see Bußjäger 2015).
In stark contrast to the situation in Germany, the Austrian Bundesrat (the second chamber of the Austrian parliament representing the states at the federal level) plays a noticeably limited role in cross-level political cooperation. Coordination between the individual states occurs in the “Landeshauptleute-Konferenz,” an informal yet firmly institutionalized gathering of state governors (“Landeshauptleute”) held twice a year (see Bußjäger 2018). These conferences have become events where senior representatives of the federal government, up to the chancellor, participate to resolve cross-level issues.
The Austrian system of local governance is characterized by an exceptionally high degree of homogeneity and notable limits on central government power. The constitution provides for a uniform model of municipalities and allows for substantial material influence from the federation on the municipalities, at least in areas of federal competence. More recently, the national government has launched the “Gemeindepakete” – financial resources dedicated to triggering infrastructure investments at the local level.
Ultimately, states rather than the central government are the key actors in local governance. The states’ close relationships with municipalities are structurally favored by the Austrian system of “indirect” federal administration. The mix of constitutional, administrative, and political factors has resulted in a considerable diversity of local government regimes within the federation (see Haller 2023).
Citations:
Bußjäger, Peter, eds. 2010. Kooperativer Föderalismus in Österreich: Beiträge zur Verflechtung von Bund und Ländern. Braumüller.
https://www.bmf.gv.at/presse/pressemeldungen/2023/juli/kig.html
Bußjäger, Peter. 2015. “Austria’s Cooperative Federalism.” Austrian Federalism in Comparative Perspective: 11-33.
Bußjäger, P. 2018. “The Austrian Bundesrat–Imperfect and Unreformed.” Perspectives on Federalism 10 (2): 182-197. http://archive.sciendo.com/POF/pof.2018.10.issue-2/pof-2018-0022/pof-2018-0022.pdf
Haller, Matthias. 2023. “Local Governance in Austria: Diversity in Homogeneity.” Local Governance in Multi-Layered Systems: A Comparative Legal Study in the Federal-Local Connection. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 139-166.
Bußjäger, Peter, eds. 2010. Kooperativer Föderalismus in Österreich: Beiträge zur Verflechtung von Bund und Ländern. Braumüller.
https://www.bmf.gv.at/presse/pressemeldungen/2023/juli/kig.html
Bußjäger, Peter. 2015. “Austria’s Cooperative Federalism.” Austrian Federalism in Comparative Perspective: 11-33.
Bußjäger, P. 2018. “The Austrian Bundesrat–Imperfect and Unreformed.” Perspectives on Federalism 10 (2): 182-197. http://archive.sciendo.com/POF/pof.2018.10.issue-2/pof-2018-0022/pof-2018-0022.pdf
Haller, Matthias. 2023. “Local Governance in Austria: Diversity in Homogeneity.” Local Governance in Multi-Layered Systems: A Comparative Legal Study in the Federal-Local Connection. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 139-166.
Czechia
The Competency Law regulates the powers and competencies of ministries and central government bodies. Czechia has gradually introduced a “joint model” of public administration, allowing local self-government units to exercise both independent and delegated powers transferred from the central state administration. This has resulted in a largely decentralized administrative model where regions and municipalities manage their own competencies and delegate state administration tasks (Mugglin et al. 2022: 21). However, there are no indicators to further assess and monitor differences in service delivery at regional and municipal levels (Obinger 2023: 795).
Formal structures for consultation between different levels of government exist through councils attached to the Government Office or individual ministries. These councils include representatives from various levels of government and outside interests. For instance, the Council for Public Administration, chaired by the Minister of the Interior, includes 28 members from various ministries, central bodies, and lower levels of public administration. Coordination between government levels is essential to ensure financing and co-financing of projects under EU programs and to facilitate consultation on strategic themes. In 2022, the council held four meetings discussing the modernization of public administration, administrative efficiency, human resources policy, and e-Government. Previous discussions have included building regulations, pay relations between central and regional government, and election methods at lower government levels.
In 2020–2021, the Secretariat of the Government Council for Non-Governmental Nonprofit Organizations worked on developing a strategy to enhance cooperation between public administration and non-public entities, particularly the nonprofit sector. This strategy aims to make nonprofit entities stable and crucial partners of public administration in addressing Czech society’s needs. Subsequent discussions have focused on criteria for financial support for NGOs.
Formal structures for consultation between different levels of government exist through councils attached to the Government Office or individual ministries. These councils include representatives from various levels of government and outside interests. For instance, the Council for Public Administration, chaired by the Minister of the Interior, includes 28 members from various ministries, central bodies, and lower levels of public administration. Coordination between government levels is essential to ensure financing and co-financing of projects under EU programs and to facilitate consultation on strategic themes. In 2022, the council held four meetings discussing the modernization of public administration, administrative efficiency, human resources policy, and e-Government. Previous discussions have included building regulations, pay relations between central and regional government, and election methods at lower government levels.
In 2020–2021, the Secretariat of the Government Council for Non-Governmental Nonprofit Organizations worked on developing a strategy to enhance cooperation between public administration and non-public entities, particularly the nonprofit sector. This strategy aims to make nonprofit entities stable and crucial partners of public administration in addressing Czech society’s needs. Subsequent discussions have focused on criteria for financial support for NGOs.
Citations:
Přehled o stavu veřejné správy: Česká Republika. 2023. “Česká republika na cestě k modernější a efektivnější veřejné správě / OECD Public Governance Reviews: Czech Republic Towards a More Modern and Effective Public Administration.” https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/2651546f-cs/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/2651546f-cs
OECD. 2020. OECD Economic Surveys: Czech Republic 2020. Paris: OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/1b180a5a-en
Přehled o stavu veřejné správy: Česká Republika. 2023. “Česká republika na cestě k modernější a efektivnější veřejné správě / OECD Public Governance Reviews: Czech Republic Towards a More Modern and Effective Public Administration.” https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/2651546f-cs/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/2651546f-cs
OECD. 2020. OECD Economic Surveys: Czech Republic 2020. Paris: OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/1b180a5a-en
Estonia
Estonian local governance is established only at the municipal level, not at the intermediate tier. There are neither self-governing nor central government autonomous tiers at the intermediate level. Regional government was abolished in a previous administrative reform, and the central government’s main interface for the new regional development policy consists of county development agencies. These agencies are mostly NGOs that aggregate municipalities within their counties. In developing the new regional development policy, the Ministry of Finance compiled the guidelines for counties’ development strategies to serve as inputs to national policies. However, the integration of those strategies into the development and implementation of national policy has been limited (ESPON 2022).
Central government ministries typically have regional offices in four major centers, with each ministry defining their regional areas as they see fit (Ladner et al. 2021). Formally, municipalities are autonomous, but in practice, their revenues are entirely dependent on the central budget. Thus, addressing the quality of public services in the face of shrinking populations and revenues in most municipalities involves somewhat countervailing trends (Lander et al. 2021). On the one hand, municipalities tend to limit their general competencies, citing a lack of direct responsibility. On the other hand, particularly in the fields of education and social services, the central government has – often through capacity-building projects funded by EU structural funds – taken over selected core tasks, which require the concentration of professional resources.
Central government ministries typically have regional offices in four major centers, with each ministry defining their regional areas as they see fit (Ladner et al. 2021). Formally, municipalities are autonomous, but in practice, their revenues are entirely dependent on the central budget. Thus, addressing the quality of public services in the face of shrinking populations and revenues in most municipalities involves somewhat countervailing trends (Lander et al. 2021). On the one hand, municipalities tend to limit their general competencies, citing a lack of direct responsibility. On the other hand, particularly in the fields of education and social services, the central government has – often through capacity-building projects funded by EU structural funds – taken over selected core tasks, which require the concentration of professional resources.
Citations:
ESPON. 2022. “ReSSI-EE Regional Strategies for Sustainable and Inclusive Territorial Development – Estonia.” https://www.espon.eu/sites/default/files/attachments/Regional%20strategies%20for%20sustainable%20and%20inclusive%20territorial%20development%20-%20Estonia.pdf
Ladner, A., Keuffer, N., and Bastianen, A. 2021. Local Autonomy Index in the EU, Council of Europe and OECD countries (1990-2020). Release 2.0. Brussels: European Commission.
ESPON. 2022. “ReSSI-EE Regional Strategies for Sustainable and Inclusive Territorial Development – Estonia.” https://www.espon.eu/sites/default/files/attachments/Regional%20strategies%20for%20sustainable%20and%20inclusive%20territorial%20development%20-%20Estonia.pdf
Ladner, A., Keuffer, N., and Bastianen, A. 2021. Local Autonomy Index in the EU, Council of Europe and OECD countries (1990-2020). Release 2.0. Brussels: European Commission.
Italy
Multilevel governance in Italy has facilitated the development of formal coordination and consultation mechanisms with regions and municipalities. The primary instruments for this purpose are the State-Regions Conference (Conferenza Permanente per i Rapporti tra lo Stato, le Regioni e le Province Autonome di Trento e Bolzano) and the State-Municipalities-Local Autonomies Conference (Conferenza Stato-Città ed Autonomie Locali), both of which meet at least monthly. Local authorities also use their associations, the Conference of Italian Regions and the National Association of Italian Municipalities, to exert influence on national authorities.
According to the Interactive Rule Index, Italy does not score highly in terms of interaction between different levels of government. However, during the Draghi government (February 2021 – October 2022), subnational governments were largely excluded from the process of formulating the National Resilience and Recovery Plan. This marked a departure from the long-standing cooperation between different levels of government. This decision seems deliberate, aimed at avoiding excessive compromises, and reflects the Draghi government’s lack of trust in the regions’ ability to be proactive and efficient in both the formulation and implementation of the plan.
Aside from this exception, the central government is in constant contact with the regions and municipalities. Consultation and negotiation are common tools in policy formulation and implementation. However, the dynamics of interaction are often influenced by the political alignment between the central government and subnational governments. For example, following the dramatic floods that hit the Emilia Romagna region in May 2023, significant contrasts emerged between the regional and national governments regarding the recovery process and the slowness with which public funds were delivered to the affected areas.
According to the Interactive Rule Index, Italy does not score highly in terms of interaction between different levels of government. However, during the Draghi government (February 2021 – October 2022), subnational governments were largely excluded from the process of formulating the National Resilience and Recovery Plan. This marked a departure from the long-standing cooperation between different levels of government. This decision seems deliberate, aimed at avoiding excessive compromises, and reflects the Draghi government’s lack of trust in the regions’ ability to be proactive and efficient in both the formulation and implementation of the plan.
Aside from this exception, the central government is in constant contact with the regions and municipalities. Consultation and negotiation are common tools in policy formulation and implementation. However, the dynamics of interaction are often influenced by the political alignment between the central government and subnational governments. For example, following the dramatic floods that hit the Emilia Romagna region in May 2023, significant contrasts emerged between the regional and national governments regarding the recovery process and the slowness with which public funds were delivered to the affected areas.
Citations:
Profeti, Stefania, and Brunetta Baldi. 2021. “Le regioni italiane e il PNRR: la (vana) ricerca di canali d’accesso all’agenda.” Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche 2021 (3): 431-457.
Brunetta Baldi and Stefania Profeti. 2022. “Le regioni nel sistema politico: venti splendide cinquantenni?” In Il sistema politico italiano. Cittadini, attori e istituzioni, eds. Milano: Mondadori Università, 278-303.
REV: on the State-Regions Conference see https://www.statoregioni.it/it/conferenza-stato-regioni/, on the State-Cities Conference see: http://www.conferenzastatocitta.it/home/
Profeti, Stefania, and Brunetta Baldi. 2021. “Le regioni italiane e il PNRR: la (vana) ricerca di canali d’accesso all’agenda.” Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche 2021 (3): 431-457.
Brunetta Baldi and Stefania Profeti. 2022. “Le regioni nel sistema politico: venti splendide cinquantenni?” In Il sistema politico italiano. Cittadini, attori e istituzioni, eds. Milano: Mondadori Università, 278-303.
REV: on the State-Regions Conference see https://www.statoregioni.it/it/conferenza-stato-regioni/, on the State-Cities Conference see: http://www.conferenzastatocitta.it/home/
Japan
Coordination between the central government and subnational self-governments is conducted mainly through the secondment of ministry staff to field organizations, and through internal party communication between local and national politicians of the ruling party. In the self-rule index for local authorities in the European Union, Council of Europe and OECD countries from 1990 to 2020, local governments in Japan scored relatively low in terms of autonomy in the financial transfer system, as a large proportion of state grants to local authorities are earmarked. On the other hand, municipalities have gained somewhat in fiscal autonomy. While ministries have considerable influence over local budgets, they receive information about the needs of self-governments through a dense network of prefectural and municipal government agencies. This system, however, can lead to the transmission of interministerial frictions to the local level. Central-local coordination is also ensured by politicians of the ruling party who lobby in LDP decision-making organs for the interest of their constituencies. Due to the depopulation of rural regions, many municipalities in Japan have been merged, which has led to a decrease in the number of local politicians with connections to central authorities that could redress the situation.
The abolition of agency-delegated functions following the implementation of the decentralization reform of 2000 strengthened local autonomy. At the same time, the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council was established in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications to mediate conflicts between the national government and local self-governments. The council’s rulings are subject to appeal to a high court. Notably, the council became an arena for the legal struggle between the central government and Okinawa Prefecture over the relocation of Futenma U.S. military base. In September 2023, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the government’s position.
In addition, meetings of the Forum for Consultations between the national and local governments are held several times each year. The last meeting with the participation of Prime Minister Kishida in October 2023 focused on topics such as decentralization, digital administrative and fiscal reforms, policies for children and child-rearing, and the implementation of the My Number system.
The abolition of agency-delegated functions following the implementation of the decentralization reform of 2000 strengthened local autonomy. At the same time, the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council was established in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications to mediate conflicts between the national government and local self-governments. The council’s rulings are subject to appeal to a high court. Notably, the council became an arena for the legal struggle between the central government and Okinawa Prefecture over the relocation of Futenma U.S. military base. In September 2023, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the government’s position.
In addition, meetings of the Forum for Consultations between the national and local governments are held several times each year. The last meeting with the participation of Prime Minister Kishida in October 2023 focused on topics such as decentralization, digital administrative and fiscal reforms, policies for children and child-rearing, and the implementation of the My Number system.
Citations:
Ladner, Andreas, Keuffer, Nicolas, and Bastianen, Alexander. 2021. “Self-rule index for local authorities in the EU, Council of Europe and OECD countries, 1990-2020.” European Commission. http://www.andreasladner.ch/dokumente/Eigene%20Arbeiten/LAI_2_0%20Final%20report%20published%20on%20the%20website%20of%20the%20EC.pdf
Local Autonomy Law. 1947. https://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/document?lawid=322AC0000000067
Muramatsu, Michio. 2001. “Intergovernmental Relations in Japan: Models and Perspectives.” World Bank Institute. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/fr/241461468278058512/pdf/330320JP0wbi37178.pdf
Prime Minister’s Office of Japan. 2023. “Forum for Consultations between the National and Local Governments.” https://japan.kantei.go.jp/101_kishida/actions/202310/19kunitochiho.html
“Top court ruling on Henoko base suit an insult to local autonomy.” The Asahi Shinbun, 5 September 2023. https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14997693
Ladner, Andreas, Keuffer, Nicolas, and Bastianen, Alexander. 2021. “Self-rule index for local authorities in the EU, Council of Europe and OECD countries, 1990-2020.” European Commission. http://www.andreasladner.ch/dokumente/Eigene%20Arbeiten/LAI_2_0%20Final%20report%20published%20on%20the%20website%20of%20the%20EC.pdf
Local Autonomy Law. 1947. https://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/document?lawid=322AC0000000067
Muramatsu, Michio. 2001. “Intergovernmental Relations in Japan: Models and Perspectives.” World Bank Institute. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/fr/241461468278058512/pdf/330320JP0wbi37178.pdf
Prime Minister’s Office of Japan. 2023. “Forum for Consultations between the National and Local Governments.” https://japan.kantei.go.jp/101_kishida/actions/202310/19kunitochiho.html
“Top court ruling on Henoko base suit an insult to local autonomy.” The Asahi Shinbun, 5 September 2023. https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14997693
Latvia
Long-standing cooperation exists between the Cabinet of Ministers and the Latvian Association of Local Government (LPS). The LPS, an organization that voluntarily unites local governments in Latvia, was established in December 1991. Representing over half of all local municipalities, the LPS is authorized to negotiate with the Cabinet of Ministers on behalf of these local governments. The Cabinet of Ministers and the LPS agree annually on a share of budgetary transfers to local authorities, as all taxes are centrally collected. Representatives from the LPS participate in Cabinet of Ministers meetings and discussions. Since the LPS is considered a social partner for the government, it provides opinions on draft laws, draft regulations, and white papers.
There are five planning regions. The Councils of Planning Regions are intended to serve as crucial coordinators at the regional level. However, these planning regions lack genuine functions and were originally created to coordinate the work of municipalities prior to the administrative-territorial reforms of 2021. Despite the municipal mergers, the status and functions of the planning regions remain unchanged, and their current role in the multilevel governance system is unclear.
The Latvian Association of Municipalities (LPS) and the Latvian Association of Cities (LLPA) are key organizations ensuring multilevel coordination. Meanwhile, municipalities around Riga and the capital city formed an NGO, “Riga Metropolitan Society” – representing the interests of municipalities that comprise almost half of the Latvian population. Thus, each association brings municipal intergovernmental coordination into various arrangements, combining formal and informal approaches.
There has been formal and informal intergovernmental interaction. For example, the prime minister participated in the Latvian Association of Local and Regional Governments meeting. On October 31, Prime Minister Evika Siliņa and Gints Kaminskis, head of the Latvian Association of Local and Regional Governments, signed an agreement and protocol on differences regarding the 2024 budget and the fiscal framework for the next three years. This step signifies the government and local authorities’ commitment to promoting municipalities’ development and financial stability in the coming years (Užule 2023).
The Latvian Association of Local and Regional Governments also meets with ministers to discuss policy changes affecting local authorities, their tasks, and the people who live there. Since the end of November, the Latvian Association of Local and Regional Governments has met with the Minister for Climate Action and Energy, the Minister for Agriculture, the Minister for Health, and the Minister for Transport (Latvijas Pašvaldību Savienība, 2024).
Civil servants in local government do not express dissatisfaction with being given token opportunities to participate in decision-making processes at the central government level.
There are five planning regions. The Councils of Planning Regions are intended to serve as crucial coordinators at the regional level. However, these planning regions lack genuine functions and were originally created to coordinate the work of municipalities prior to the administrative-territorial reforms of 2021. Despite the municipal mergers, the status and functions of the planning regions remain unchanged, and their current role in the multilevel governance system is unclear.
The Latvian Association of Municipalities (LPS) and the Latvian Association of Cities (LLPA) are key organizations ensuring multilevel coordination. Meanwhile, municipalities around Riga and the capital city formed an NGO, “Riga Metropolitan Society” – representing the interests of municipalities that comprise almost half of the Latvian population. Thus, each association brings municipal intergovernmental coordination into various arrangements, combining formal and informal approaches.
There has been formal and informal intergovernmental interaction. For example, the prime minister participated in the Latvian Association of Local and Regional Governments meeting. On October 31, Prime Minister Evika Siliņa and Gints Kaminskis, head of the Latvian Association of Local and Regional Governments, signed an agreement and protocol on differences regarding the 2024 budget and the fiscal framework for the next three years. This step signifies the government and local authorities’ commitment to promoting municipalities’ development and financial stability in the coming years (Užule 2023).
The Latvian Association of Local and Regional Governments also meets with ministers to discuss policy changes affecting local authorities, their tasks, and the people who live there. Since the end of November, the Latvian Association of Local and Regional Governments has met with the Minister for Climate Action and Energy, the Minister for Agriculture, the Minister for Health, and the Minister for Transport (Latvijas Pašvaldību Savienība, 2024).
Civil servants in local government do not express dissatisfaction with being given token opportunities to participate in decision-making processes at the central government level.
Citations:
Latvijas Pašvaldību savienība. “In Latvian.” https://www.lps.lv/lv
Finanšu ministrija. 2023. “Ministru kabineta un Latvijas Pašvaldību savienības vienošanās un domstarpību protokoli.” https://www.fm.gov.lv/lv/ministru-kabineta-un-latvijas-pasvaldibu-savienibas-vienosanas-un-domstarpibu-protokoli
Ministru kabinets. 2023. “Latvijas Pašvaldību savienības domes sēde.” https://www.mk.gov.lv/lv/notikums/latvijas-pasvaldibu-savienibas-domes-sede-2?date=0
Užule, L. 2023. “Ministru kabinets un LPS vienojas veicināt pašvaldību attīstību un finanšu stabilitāti.” https://www.lps.lv/lv/zinas/lps/7904-ministru-kabinets-un-lps-vienojas-veicinat-pasvaldibu-attistibu-un-finansu-stabilitati
Latvijas pašvaldību savienība. Ziņas. https://www.lps.lv/lv/zinas/lps/
Latvijas Pašvaldību savienība. “In Latvian.” https://www.lps.lv/lv
Finanšu ministrija. 2023. “Ministru kabineta un Latvijas Pašvaldību savienības vienošanās un domstarpību protokoli.” https://www.fm.gov.lv/lv/ministru-kabineta-un-latvijas-pasvaldibu-savienibas-vienosanas-un-domstarpibu-protokoli
Ministru kabinets. 2023. “Latvijas Pašvaldību savienības domes sēde.” https://www.mk.gov.lv/lv/notikums/latvijas-pasvaldibu-savienibas-domes-sede-2?date=0
Užule, L. 2023. “Ministru kabinets un LPS vienojas veicināt pašvaldību attīstību un finanšu stabilitāti.” https://www.lps.lv/lv/zinas/lps/7904-ministru-kabinets-un-lps-vienojas-veicinat-pasvaldibu-attistibu-un-finansu-stabilitati
Latvijas pašvaldību savienība. Ziņas. https://www.lps.lv/lv/zinas/lps/
Portugal
Portugal, recognized as one of the more centralized nations within the European Union, is undergoing a transformation in its approach to regional governance. Prime Minister António Costa has emphasized the importance of state reform regarding decentralization, a key element in improving the quality of public services.
This commitment to restructuring state services is evident in the transformation of the CCDRs (Comissões de Coordenação e Desenvolvimento Regional) into public institutes, a move that constitutes a substantial reform in regional administration. These commissions now have a president elected by the mayors of the region rather than being chosen by the government. Only a single vice president, still appointed by the executive, remains, but this will no longer occur after the next municipal elections in 2025.
This reform is seen as a foundational step toward meeting the constitutional mandate of regionalization and creating favorable political conditions for enhanced local governance.
In 2023, this commitment was underscored by a 6.3% increase in financial transfers from the central administration to municipal budgets, marking a clear step toward greater fiscal empowerment of local authorities. However, the process of transferring powers from the central administration to local authorities has been long and complex, with advances and setbacks. According to the judges of the Court of Auditors (TdC), this process has also been characterized by a lack of clarity and transparency, as well as by the scarcity of funds accompanying the new responsibilities of local authorities (Público, 2024).
According to the “Self-Rule Index for Local Authorities in the EU, Council of Europe, and OECD” report, Portugal has seen one of the most notable rises in the Local Autonomy Index (LAI) scores, positioning its municipalities at a medium-high autonomy level. Despite this progress, Portuguese subnational government entities – municipalities, parishes (freguesias), and intermunicipal cooperative units – still possess fewer spending and revenue powers compared to their counterparts in other EU countries. This disparity is reflected in the Portuguese multilevel governance system, which appears considerably centralized when juxtaposed with other European and OECD countries (OECD, 2020).
To address these challenges and improve cooperation, Portugal has established 23 Intermunicipal Councils (CIMs in Portuguese, corresponding to the NUTS 3 level) and created metropolitan areas for Lisbon and Porto. These measures aim to manage tasks beneficial across municipal boundaries and to enhance sustainable mobility, housing, and the licensing process in collaboration with local authorities. However, the role of both metropolitan and non-metropolitan intermunicipal cooperation remains limited, with only a small portion of local spending currently allocated to the CIMs and MAs.
Prime Minister António Costa advocates for executing public policies in areas such as the licensing process, housing, and sustainable mobility in partnership with local authorities. This collaborative approach promises to streamline processes and elevate the standard of public services offered to citizens. The ongoing efforts to decentralize and enhance autonomy reflect a promising shift toward a more equitable distribution of power and responsibilities between the central government and local entities in Portugal. The impact of these initiatives on the centralized system remains to be seen.
This commitment to restructuring state services is evident in the transformation of the CCDRs (Comissões de Coordenação e Desenvolvimento Regional) into public institutes, a move that constitutes a substantial reform in regional administration. These commissions now have a president elected by the mayors of the region rather than being chosen by the government. Only a single vice president, still appointed by the executive, remains, but this will no longer occur after the next municipal elections in 2025.
This reform is seen as a foundational step toward meeting the constitutional mandate of regionalization and creating favorable political conditions for enhanced local governance.
In 2023, this commitment was underscored by a 6.3% increase in financial transfers from the central administration to municipal budgets, marking a clear step toward greater fiscal empowerment of local authorities. However, the process of transferring powers from the central administration to local authorities has been long and complex, with advances and setbacks. According to the judges of the Court of Auditors (TdC), this process has also been characterized by a lack of clarity and transparency, as well as by the scarcity of funds accompanying the new responsibilities of local authorities (Público, 2024).
According to the “Self-Rule Index for Local Authorities in the EU, Council of Europe, and OECD” report, Portugal has seen one of the most notable rises in the Local Autonomy Index (LAI) scores, positioning its municipalities at a medium-high autonomy level. Despite this progress, Portuguese subnational government entities – municipalities, parishes (freguesias), and intermunicipal cooperative units – still possess fewer spending and revenue powers compared to their counterparts in other EU countries. This disparity is reflected in the Portuguese multilevel governance system, which appears considerably centralized when juxtaposed with other European and OECD countries (OECD, 2020).
To address these challenges and improve cooperation, Portugal has established 23 Intermunicipal Councils (CIMs in Portuguese, corresponding to the NUTS 3 level) and created metropolitan areas for Lisbon and Porto. These measures aim to manage tasks beneficial across municipal boundaries and to enhance sustainable mobility, housing, and the licensing process in collaboration with local authorities. However, the role of both metropolitan and non-metropolitan intermunicipal cooperation remains limited, with only a small portion of local spending currently allocated to the CIMs and MAs.
Prime Minister António Costa advocates for executing public policies in areas such as the licensing process, housing, and sustainable mobility in partnership with local authorities. This collaborative approach promises to streamline processes and elevate the standard of public services offered to citizens. The ongoing efforts to decentralize and enhance autonomy reflect a promising shift toward a more equitable distribution of power and responsibilities between the central government and local entities in Portugal. The impact of these initiatives on the centralized system remains to be seen.
Citations:
Decreto-Lei nº36/2023. 2023. DR, 1ª série, Nº 102, p. 6. https://files.dre.pt/1s/2023/05/10200/0000600027.pdf
OECD. 2020. Decentralisation and Regionalisation in Portugal. What Reform Scenarios? https://doi.org/10.1787/fea62108-en
Público. 2024. “Tribunal de Contas: Financiamento para descentralização insuficiente e não claro.” https://www.publico.pt/2024/01/29/local/noticia/tribunal-contas-financiamento-descentralizacao-insuficiente-claro-2022-2078556
Decreto-Lei nº36/2023. 2023. DR, 1ª série, Nº 102, p. 6. https://files.dre.pt/1s/2023/05/10200/0000600027.pdf
OECD. 2020. Decentralisation and Regionalisation in Portugal. What Reform Scenarios? https://doi.org/10.1787/fea62108-en
Público. 2024. “Tribunal de Contas: Financiamento para descentralização insuficiente e não claro.” https://www.publico.pt/2024/01/29/local/noticia/tribunal-contas-financiamento-descentralizacao-insuficiente-claro-2022-2078556
Slovenia
Slovenia is divided into 212 municipalities. Most of these municipalities are small and understaffed, making it difficult for them to cover all policy areas. Only the larger cities have departments that manage specific policy areas. Additionally, local governments struggle with inadequate funding and often inefficient budget use due to the small size of the municipalities and lack of resource pooling for shared services. Consequently, dissatisfaction between local and national levels often stems from the fee received from the national budget (the so-called “povprečnina”).
Municipalities, however, possess a certain degree of local autonomy. The extent of administrative supervision impacts the independence of local government. From a comparative perspective, Slovenia has the lightest forms of administrative supervision.
In October 2023, the Government Office for Legislation organized a public consultation on establishing the Register of Legal Acts of Local Communities, which representatives of municipalities, associations of municipalities, official gazettes, and other experts attended.
Municipalities, however, possess a certain degree of local autonomy. The extent of administrative supervision impacts the independence of local government. From a comparative perspective, Slovenia has the lightest forms of administrative supervision.
In October 2023, the Government Office for Legislation organized a public consultation on establishing the Register of Legal Acts of Local Communities, which representatives of municipalities, associations of municipalities, official gazettes, and other experts attended.
Citations:
Andreas Ladner, Nicolas Keuffer, and Alexander Bastianen. 2021. “Self-rule Index for Local Authorities in the EU, Council of Europe and OECD Countries, 1990–2020.” European Commission. http://www.andreasladner.ch/dokumente/Eigene%20Arbeiten/LAI_2_0%20Final%20report%20published%20on%20the%20website%20of%20the%20EC.pdf
Služba vlade Republike Slovenije za zakonodajo. 2023. “Javni posvet: vzpostavitev Registra pravnih aktov lokalnih skupnosti.” https://www.gov.si/novice/2023-10-23-javni-posvet-vzpostavitev-registra-pravnih-aktov-lokalnih-skupnosti/
Andreas Ladner, Nicolas Keuffer, and Alexander Bastianen. 2021. “Self-rule Index for Local Authorities in the EU, Council of Europe and OECD Countries, 1990–2020.” European Commission. http://www.andreasladner.ch/dokumente/Eigene%20Arbeiten/LAI_2_0%20Final%20report%20published%20on%20the%20website%20of%20the%20EC.pdf
Služba vlade Republike Slovenije za zakonodajo. 2023. “Javni posvet: vzpostavitev Registra pravnih aktov lokalnih skupnosti.” https://www.gov.si/novice/2023-10-23-javni-posvet-vzpostavitev-registra-pravnih-aktov-lokalnih-skupnosti/
Spain
The constitution does not establish an institutional framework for shared government, continuous political dialogue, legislative cooperation, or conflict resolution among different government levels. Autonomous communities do not participate in central state decision-making, even in matters directly affecting them. Sectoral conferences have assumed the role of facilitating cooperation between the central government and AC governments. Each conference establishes a specific framework for cooperation among administrative levels, with some having a permanent organizational structure and meeting regularly, while others have never convened.
Although sectoral conferences have a political composition, they focus on technical matters and do not serve as channels for political relations. They operate hierarchically, and some have adopted internal rules of procedure allowing shared decision-making. These conferences have been crucial for implementing the RRP. Since December 2022, 139 sectoral conferences and over 35 bilateral meetings with autonomous communities have been held regarding RRP implementation. These meetings have seen the adoption of criteria for fund distribution and monitoring.
The Conference of Presidents represents the highest level of multilateral cooperation between the central government and autonomous communities. The new standing order for the conference, adopted in March 2022, establishes a permanent secretariat and specific rules for adopting common agreements, though the planned number of meetings has not been met.
Coordination and consultation mechanisms do not include local self-government. Intergovernmental relations between the central government and autonomous communities concerning local matters were organized through the Sectoral Conference for Local Affairs, which was dissolved in June 2022 due to inactivity. The National Commission for Local Administration is the permanent body for collaboration between the General State Administration and local administration. The Spanish Federation of Municipalities and Provinces (FEMP) cooperates with the government in several dialogue forums on local government matters.
Subnational self-government officials frequently express dissatisfaction with the lack of institutionalized participation in central government decision-making processes, particularly in education policy. Institutionalized participation would reduce conflict and improve framework legislation. Local self-government political decision-makers often express dissatisfaction at not being able to participate in central and regional government decision-making processes, such as those related to immigration.
Although sectoral conferences have a political composition, they focus on technical matters and do not serve as channels for political relations. They operate hierarchically, and some have adopted internal rules of procedure allowing shared decision-making. These conferences have been crucial for implementing the RRP. Since December 2022, 139 sectoral conferences and over 35 bilateral meetings with autonomous communities have been held regarding RRP implementation. These meetings have seen the adoption of criteria for fund distribution and monitoring.
The Conference of Presidents represents the highest level of multilateral cooperation between the central government and autonomous communities. The new standing order for the conference, adopted in March 2022, establishes a permanent secretariat and specific rules for adopting common agreements, though the planned number of meetings has not been met.
Coordination and consultation mechanisms do not include local self-government. Intergovernmental relations between the central government and autonomous communities concerning local matters were organized through the Sectoral Conference for Local Affairs, which was dissolved in June 2022 due to inactivity. The National Commission for Local Administration is the permanent body for collaboration between the General State Administration and local administration. The Spanish Federation of Municipalities and Provinces (FEMP) cooperates with the government in several dialogue forums on local government matters.
Subnational self-government officials frequently express dissatisfaction with the lack of institutionalized participation in central government decision-making processes, particularly in education policy. Institutionalized participation would reduce conflict and improve framework legislation. Local self-government political decision-makers often express dissatisfaction at not being able to participate in central and regional government decision-making processes, such as those related to immigration.
Switzerland
Swiss federalism is dual rather than cooperative. The extensive member-state implementation of federal policy is a consequence of this arrangement, and has become even more nuanced with the reorganization of the financial equalization and division of tasks between the confederation and the cantons (Neugestaltung des Finanzausgleichs und der Aufgabenteilung zwischen Bund und Kantonen NFA) that came into force in 2008. Still, both horizontal and vertical coordination takes place. The most important form of horizontal policy coordination takes place via intercantonal conferences. The cantons have established specialized intercantonal conferences in 15 key policy areas (e.g., finance, social affairs, health).
As Vatter (2018: 99) states, these conferences serve three purposes. First, they provide a forum for exchanging information, best practices and benchmarks. Second, they enhance cooperation in implementing cantonal policies. Third, they enable the cantons to coordinate their interests and policy positions at the federal level. Intercantonal conferences are organizations that are not institutionalized by the federal constitution (Schnabel and Mueller, 2017: 552). They are formed by the cantons in a bottom-up manner and on a voluntary basis.
Vertically, there is close contact between the three federal layers, between governments and the executive administration. However, cantons are full-fledged political systems and consequently insist on their discretionary autonomy. Coordination is somewhat easier among administrative actors due to their shared professional language and values. Mavrot and Sager (2018) refer to vertical epistemic communities.
While these mechanisms broadly work for public service delivery, several authors agree that the system failed to ensure functional policy delivery during the COVID-19 crisis (Ali et al. 2024, Mavrot/Sager 2023). Across the various COVID-19 waves, there was uncertainty as to which governance level was in charge of crisis management, which led to delayed responses and incoherence (Mavrot/Sager 2023). Vertical coordination thus should be strengthened in times of crisis.
As Vatter (2018: 99) states, these conferences serve three purposes. First, they provide a forum for exchanging information, best practices and benchmarks. Second, they enhance cooperation in implementing cantonal policies. Third, they enable the cantons to coordinate their interests and policy positions at the federal level. Intercantonal conferences are organizations that are not institutionalized by the federal constitution (Schnabel and Mueller, 2017: 552). They are formed by the cantons in a bottom-up manner and on a voluntary basis.
Vertically, there is close contact between the three federal layers, between governments and the executive administration. However, cantons are full-fledged political systems and consequently insist on their discretionary autonomy. Coordination is somewhat easier among administrative actors due to their shared professional language and values. Mavrot and Sager (2018) refer to vertical epistemic communities.
While these mechanisms broadly work for public service delivery, several authors agree that the system failed to ensure functional policy delivery during the COVID-19 crisis (Ali et al. 2024, Mavrot/Sager 2023). Across the various COVID-19 waves, there was uncertainty as to which governance level was in charge of crisis management, which led to delayed responses and incoherence (Mavrot/Sager 2023). Vertical coordination thus should be strengthened in times of crisis.
Citations:
Ali, Azad, Fritz Sager, and Philipp Trein. 2024. “Coordination in a Loosely Coupled Core: Insights from Switzerland.” In Coordination at the Core? Executive Decision-Making in International Organizations and the EU, eds. Jean-Michel Eymeri-Douzans, Marie Goransson, and Hussein Kassim.
Mavrot, C., and F. Sager. 2018. “Vertical Epistemic Communities in Multilevel Governance.” Policy & Politics 46 (3): 391-407. https://doi.org/10.1332/030557316X14788733118252
Mavrot, C., and F. Sager. 2023. “Blame-avoidance and fragmented crisis management during the COVID-19 pandemic in Switzerland.” European Policy Analysis 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1002/epa2.1194
Mueller, Sean, and Alan Fenna. 2022. “Dual versus Administrative Federalism: Origins and Evolution of Two Models.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 52 (4): 525–552. https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjac008
Schnabel, Johanna, and Sean Mueller. 2017. “Vertical Influence or Horizontal Coordination? The Purpose of Intergovernmental Councils in Switzerland.” Regional & Federal Studies 27 (5): 549-572.
Vatter, Adrian. 2018. Swiss Federalism: The Transformation of a Federal Model. London: Routledge.
Ali, Azad, Fritz Sager, and Philipp Trein. 2024. “Coordination in a Loosely Coupled Core: Insights from Switzerland.” In Coordination at the Core? Executive Decision-Making in International Organizations and the EU, eds. Jean-Michel Eymeri-Douzans, Marie Goransson, and Hussein Kassim.
Mavrot, C., and F. Sager. 2018. “Vertical Epistemic Communities in Multilevel Governance.” Policy & Politics 46 (3): 391-407. https://doi.org/10.1332/030557316X14788733118252
Mavrot, C., and F. Sager. 2023. “Blame-avoidance and fragmented crisis management during the COVID-19 pandemic in Switzerland.” European Policy Analysis 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1002/epa2.1194
Mueller, Sean, and Alan Fenna. 2022. “Dual versus Administrative Federalism: Origins and Evolution of Two Models.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 52 (4): 525–552. https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjac008
Schnabel, Johanna, and Sean Mueller. 2017. “Vertical Influence or Horizontal Coordination? The Purpose of Intergovernmental Councils in Switzerland.” Regional & Federal Studies 27 (5): 549-572.
Vatter, Adrian. 2018. Swiss Federalism: The Transformation of a Federal Model. London: Routledge.
6
Belgium
Belgium has a federal structure with little hierarchy, known as cooperative federalism. Each level controls its areas of responsibility and cannot be dictated a different behavior by another level (except courts). In this flat structure, various government levels must negotiate any form of cooperation. This proved necessary during the COVID-19 crisis, where cooperation was effective but tedious and open to logrolling. The crisis brought renewed awareness of the need for enhanced cooperation, which has improved somewhat compared to a decade ago, though it depends heavily on the ministers’ personal willingness to exchange and cooperate.
The federate entities (regions) have better capacity to induce cooperation among cities and smaller municipalities. Small municipalities were merged in the late 1970s to save on fixed costs. Today, the regions provide technical expertise and high-powered financial incentives to their cities, enforcing de facto cooperation more smoothly than between the regions and the federal government. Mayors benefit from high levels of autonomy in their choice of Instruments (Ladner et al. 2021).
For example, municipalities have joined forces to establish intermunicipal waste agencies, improving waste management practices and saving costs. The Brussels-Capital Region works closely with its municipalities to improve public transport, leading to better connectivity and accessibility. The Walloon Region promotes cooperation among its cities through cultural events, attracting tourists and fostering community. Many Belgian municipalities have committed to the Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy, pledging to reduce CO2 emissions by at least 40% by 2030 and to adopt an integrated approach to tackling climate change.
The federate entities (regions) have better capacity to induce cooperation among cities and smaller municipalities. Small municipalities were merged in the late 1970s to save on fixed costs. Today, the regions provide technical expertise and high-powered financial incentives to their cities, enforcing de facto cooperation more smoothly than between the regions and the federal government. Mayors benefit from high levels of autonomy in their choice of Instruments (Ladner et al. 2021).
For example, municipalities have joined forces to establish intermunicipal waste agencies, improving waste management practices and saving costs. The Brussels-Capital Region works closely with its municipalities to improve public transport, leading to better connectivity and accessibility. The Walloon Region promotes cooperation among its cities through cultural events, attracting tourists and fostering community. Many Belgian municipalities have committed to the Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy, pledging to reduce CO2 emissions by at least 40% by 2030 and to adopt an integrated approach to tackling climate change.
Citations:
Ladner, Andreas, Nicolas Keuffer, and Alexander Bastianen. 2021. “Self-rule index for local authorities in the EU, Council of Europe and OECD countries, 1990-2020.” http://www.andreasladner.ch/dokumente/Eigene%20Arbeiten/LAI_2_0%20Final%20report%
20published%20on%20the%20website%20of%20the%20EC.pdf
National and regional governments often rely and collaborate with local governments to improve public service delivery:
Vlaanderen is Sterke Steden – het Vlaamse stedenbeleid | Vlaanderen.be: https://www.vlaanderen.be/vlaanderen-is-sterke-steden-het-vlaamse-stedenbeleid
https://www.uvcw.be/missions/defense
https://crac.wallonie.be/le-centre/missions
Tutelle – Fonctionnement général des communes | Rise 360 (articulate.com) : https://rise.articulate.com/share/cYfpyPd-fbrjaCxxjUOMuo_0RfE2hl0v#/lessons/zE7rm9Y8mGpuRkG79SWtIHpV5SHOBasj
Examples:
Waterafvoer en riolering | Vlaanderen.be: https://www.vlaanderen.be/waterafvoer-en-riolering
Lokale besturen en publieke laadinfrastructuur | Vlaanderen.be: https://www.vlaanderen.be/lokale-besturen-en-publieke-laadinfrastructuur
The federal government cooperates on a regular basis with regional/community entities:
Samenwerking met federale en regionale overheden | Vlaanderen.be: https://www.vlaanderen.be/intern/beleid-en-regelgeving/regelgeving-en-besluitvorming/werking-en-besluitvorming-vlaamse-regering/samenwerking/samenwerking-met-federale-en-regionale-overheden
https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=19946&langId=en
https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overlegcomit%C3%A9
https://cidh.be/nl/activiteiten-van-de-ichr
https://www.sdgs.be/nl/news/interministeriele-conferentie-duurzame-ontwikkeling-imcdo-organiseert-informatieve-dag-over-0
https://overlegorganen.gezondheid.belgie.be/nl/advies-en-overlegorgaan/interministeriele-conferentie/interministeriele-conferentie-volksgezondheid
https://www.vlaanderen.be/intern/beleid-en-regelgeving/regelgeving-en-besluitvorming/werking-en-besluitvorming-vlaamse-regering/samenwerking/samenwerking-met-federale-en-regionale-overheden
Organes et processus de décision (climat.be)
But:
https://www.knack.be/nieuws/belgie/interministeriele-conferentie-migratie-ligt-al-meer-dan-jaar-stil/
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20220920_93596677
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20230825_95121625
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20230302_98058535
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20220831_91297366
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20231023_96850704
Ideas for improvement:
https://m.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20160522_02301085
Ladner, Andreas, Nicolas Keuffer, and Alexander Bastianen. 2021. “Self-rule index for local authorities in the EU, Council of Europe and OECD countries, 1990-2020.” http://www.andreasladner.ch/dokumente/Eigene%20Arbeiten/LAI_2_0%20Final%20report%
20published%20on%20the%20website%20of%20the%20EC.pdf
National and regional governments often rely and collaborate with local governments to improve public service delivery:
Vlaanderen is Sterke Steden – het Vlaamse stedenbeleid | Vlaanderen.be: https://www.vlaanderen.be/vlaanderen-is-sterke-steden-het-vlaamse-stedenbeleid
https://www.uvcw.be/missions/defense
https://crac.wallonie.be/le-centre/missions
Tutelle – Fonctionnement général des communes | Rise 360 (articulate.com) : https://rise.articulate.com/share/cYfpyPd-fbrjaCxxjUOMuo_0RfE2hl0v#/lessons/zE7rm9Y8mGpuRkG79SWtIHpV5SHOBasj
Examples:
Waterafvoer en riolering | Vlaanderen.be: https://www.vlaanderen.be/waterafvoer-en-riolering
Lokale besturen en publieke laadinfrastructuur | Vlaanderen.be: https://www.vlaanderen.be/lokale-besturen-en-publieke-laadinfrastructuur
The federal government cooperates on a regular basis with regional/community entities:
Samenwerking met federale en regionale overheden | Vlaanderen.be: https://www.vlaanderen.be/intern/beleid-en-regelgeving/regelgeving-en-besluitvorming/werking-en-besluitvorming-vlaamse-regering/samenwerking/samenwerking-met-federale-en-regionale-overheden
https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=19946&langId=en
https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overlegcomit%C3%A9
https://cidh.be/nl/activiteiten-van-de-ichr
https://www.sdgs.be/nl/news/interministeriele-conferentie-duurzame-ontwikkeling-imcdo-organiseert-informatieve-dag-over-0
https://overlegorganen.gezondheid.belgie.be/nl/advies-en-overlegorgaan/interministeriele-conferentie/interministeriele-conferentie-volksgezondheid
https://www.vlaanderen.be/intern/beleid-en-regelgeving/regelgeving-en-besluitvorming/werking-en-besluitvorming-vlaamse-regering/samenwerking/samenwerking-met-federale-en-regionale-overheden
Organes et processus de décision (climat.be)
But:
https://www.knack.be/nieuws/belgie/interministeriele-conferentie-migratie-ligt-al-meer-dan-jaar-stil/
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20220920_93596677
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20230825_95121625
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20230302_98058535
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20220831_91297366
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20231023_96850704
Ideas for improvement:
https://m.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20160522_02301085
Israel
Almost all ministries responsible for providing services have regional offices. These offices oversee service provision at the local level and consult with local authorities. In addition, each local authority has departments for education, welfare and planning, which regularly exchange information with the central government. These communication channels are bureaucratic mechanisms, meaning they do not involve elected local politicians.
However, elected politicians at the local level who are part of the coalition often hold responsibility for specific fields and act like ministers at the local level. Therefore, they frequently try to promote their agendas by utilizing bureaucratic mechanisms.
Local authorities are united under the Local Authorities Center. This organization unites the heads of the local authorities (political rank) and represents the needs of their localities to the central government.
Policymaking in Israel is extremely centralized, and local governments have little autonomy and limited opportunities to express their views regarding policies (Finkelstein 2020). This applies to both bureaucrats and politicians. During the COVID-19 crisis, there was a demand to increase the autonomy and discretion of local authorities. So far, this has not occurred.
However, elected politicians at the local level who are part of the coalition often hold responsibility for specific fields and act like ministers at the local level. Therefore, they frequently try to promote their agendas by utilizing bureaucratic mechanisms.
Local authorities are united under the Local Authorities Center. This organization unites the heads of the local authorities (political rank) and represents the needs of their localities to the central government.
Policymaking in Israel is extremely centralized, and local governments have little autonomy and limited opportunities to express their views regarding policies (Finkelstein 2020). This applies to both bureaucrats and politicians. During the COVID-19 crisis, there was a demand to increase the autonomy and discretion of local authorities. So far, this has not occurred.
Citations:
Finkelstein, A. 2020. Local Government in Israel: General Background, Core Issues and Challenges. Israel Democracy Institute. https://www.idi.org.il/media/15356/local-government-in-israel-general-background-core-issues-and-challenges.pdf
Finkelstein, A. 2020. Local Government in Israel: General Background, Core Issues and Challenges. Israel Democracy Institute. https://www.idi.org.il/media/15356/local-government-in-israel-general-background-core-issues-and-challenges.pdf
National policymakers rarely work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
5
Canada
Local and regional governments in Canada are created by provincial governments, meaning the federal government’s powers toward these local entities are limited. The federal government frequently tries to influence these governments through spending programs but has few mechanisms to ensure compliance (Tindal and Tindal 2000). However, some areas allow the federal government to have an indirect influence or interact with local governments, such as funding transportation or industrial infrastructure on a one-off basis.
In Canada, the powers of the federal, provincial, territorial, and local governments are distributed based on the principles of federalism. The federal government’s powers are outlined in the Constitution Act, 1867, focusing primarily on matters of national concern. Local governments derive their powers from provincial or territorial legislation, and their authority is subject to the framework established by the respective province or territory.
Federal programs and policies can have implications for local governments. For example, national housing strategies, environmental regulations, and social welfare programs may affect local communities, and local governments may be involved in their implementation. The federal government often provides financial assistance to local governments through fiscal transfer programs designed to support specific policy objectives, such as infrastructure development, housing, or social services. However, the funds are typically transferred to the provincial or territorial government, which then may or may not allocate them to local governments.
The federal government may contribute to local infrastructure projects through funding programs. While the funds are often administered at the provincial or territorial level, they can indirectly benefit local governments. Examples include investments in public transit, water infrastructure, and community facilities.
In emergencies or disasters, the federal government assists local governments, often deploying troops to help with floods, forest fires, and other natural calamities. This support may include financial aid, resources, and coordination efforts.
A more robust federal presence is necessary for engaging with local governments in areas with a significant Indigenous population or impact. Indigenous affairs remain under federal jurisdiction, but native communities often rely on provinces for highways and other services. Consultation and collaboration with local governments are part of the federal government’s efforts to address Indigenous rights and interests.
Other specific federal departments and agencies may collaborate with local governments on certain projects or initiatives. This collaboration often occurs in areas such as community development, environmental protection, and social programs.
In Canada, the powers of the federal, provincial, territorial, and local governments are distributed based on the principles of federalism. The federal government’s powers are outlined in the Constitution Act, 1867, focusing primarily on matters of national concern. Local governments derive their powers from provincial or territorial legislation, and their authority is subject to the framework established by the respective province or territory.
Federal programs and policies can have implications for local governments. For example, national housing strategies, environmental regulations, and social welfare programs may affect local communities, and local governments may be involved in their implementation. The federal government often provides financial assistance to local governments through fiscal transfer programs designed to support specific policy objectives, such as infrastructure development, housing, or social services. However, the funds are typically transferred to the provincial or territorial government, which then may or may not allocate them to local governments.
The federal government may contribute to local infrastructure projects through funding programs. While the funds are often administered at the provincial or territorial level, they can indirectly benefit local governments. Examples include investments in public transit, water infrastructure, and community facilities.
In emergencies or disasters, the federal government assists local governments, often deploying troops to help with floods, forest fires, and other natural calamities. This support may include financial aid, resources, and coordination efforts.
A more robust federal presence is necessary for engaging with local governments in areas with a significant Indigenous population or impact. Indigenous affairs remain under federal jurisdiction, but native communities often rely on provinces for highways and other services. Consultation and collaboration with local governments are part of the federal government’s efforts to address Indigenous rights and interests.
Other specific federal departments and agencies may collaborate with local governments on certain projects or initiatives. This collaboration often occurs in areas such as community development, environmental protection, and social programs.
Citations:
Tindal, C. R., and S. N. Tindal. 2000. Local Government in Canada. Toronto: Nelson Canada.
Tindal, C. R., and S. N. Tindal. 2000. Local Government in Canada. Toronto: Nelson Canada.
France
The Fifth Republic reinstated the Senate as the formal institution for the representation of “territories.” Its designation through mainly local officeholders was designed to give local governments a say on national politics. The holding of political mandates at both the local and national levels, also a rule until 2014, was seen as a means for consultation. Mechanisms for actual consultation and coordination of local governments by national authorities, however, remained few and far between. Most such dialogue has either taken place through ad hoc consultations when, for instance, President Emmanuel Macron invited 220 mayors to the Élysée to talk about urban violence after the riots of June 2023. In many cases, however, local officeholders complain about the lack of understanding from national authorities. Lobbying by the big associations representing local officeholders, such as the Association of the Mayors of France, is often intense. In 2022 and 2023, the absence of the president at this group’s congresses was seen as a sign of disdain and deep misunderstanding. Top-down approaches remain largely dominant. This being said, according to the self-rule index established by the EU and covering 57 countries (EU 2021), France is placed within the group of countries with the highest degree of local autonomy.
Greece
Greece’s governance structure includes 13 self-governed regions and 332 self-governed municipalities, regulated by codified legislation adopted in 2006. Regional governors and mayors, who serve five-year terms (increased from four years in 2023), often belong to political parties different from the ruling national party, exercising significant political discretion.
The central government effectively controls subnational authorities when they execute their administrative competences. Greece is divided into seven “Decentralized Administrations,” which are branches of the central government that oversee regional and local governments and carry out tasks not assigned to subnational authorities.
Compared to other OECD countries, Greece’s local authorities have a narrower scope of tasks and functions, indicating below-average “institutional depth.” Moreover, regional and local governments in Greece have limited fiscal and organizational autonomy (European Commission 2022: 25, 29, 33, 36, and 49). Their revenue primarily comes from the state budget.
Ongoing discussions between the central government, subnational authorities, and experts focus on recalibrating the distribution of tasks and funding between central and subnational governments. For example, an expert committee led by a constitutional law professor engaged with representatives from various levels of government during 2020–2021 to reassess task distribution, but no significant progress was made.
Although the autonomy of subnational self-governments is nominally guaranteed by the constitution, which requires the central government to provide them with the necessary legislative, regulatory, and financial resources to perform their tasks (Article 102), subnational governments have limited financial resources. Additionally, the central government frequently changes the number and nature of tasks assigned to subnational governments, regardless of the ruling party.
The instability in the mandate of subnational governments is rooted in the fiscal mismanagement of funds by municipalities before the economic crisis of the previous decade. As a result, while there is cooperation between national policymakers and subnational authorities, this cooperation rarely translates into effective public service delivery.
The central government effectively controls subnational authorities when they execute their administrative competences. Greece is divided into seven “Decentralized Administrations,” which are branches of the central government that oversee regional and local governments and carry out tasks not assigned to subnational authorities.
Compared to other OECD countries, Greece’s local authorities have a narrower scope of tasks and functions, indicating below-average “institutional depth.” Moreover, regional and local governments in Greece have limited fiscal and organizational autonomy (European Commission 2022: 25, 29, 33, 36, and 49). Their revenue primarily comes from the state budget.
Ongoing discussions between the central government, subnational authorities, and experts focus on recalibrating the distribution of tasks and funding between central and subnational governments. For example, an expert committee led by a constitutional law professor engaged with representatives from various levels of government during 2020–2021 to reassess task distribution, but no significant progress was made.
Although the autonomy of subnational self-governments is nominally guaranteed by the constitution, which requires the central government to provide them with the necessary legislative, regulatory, and financial resources to perform their tasks (Article 102), subnational governments have limited financial resources. Additionally, the central government frequently changes the number and nature of tasks assigned to subnational governments, regardless of the ruling party.
The instability in the mandate of subnational governments is rooted in the fiscal mismanagement of funds by municipalities before the economic crisis of the previous decade. As a result, while there is cooperation between national policymakers and subnational authorities, this cooperation rarely translates into effective public service delivery.
Citations:
The legislation regulating subnational authorities is the “Municipal and Community Code,” Law 3463/2006.
European Commission. 2022. “Self-Rule Index for Local Authorities in the EU, Council of Europe and OECD Countries, 1990-2020.” http://www.andreasladner.ch/dokumente/Eigene%20Arbeiten/LAI_2_0%20Final%20report%20published%20on%20the%20website%20of%20the%20EC.pdf
The legislation regulating subnational authorities is the “Municipal and Community Code,” Law 3463/2006.
European Commission. 2022. “Self-Rule Index for Local Authorities in the EU, Council of Europe and OECD Countries, 1990-2020.” http://www.andreasladner.ch/dokumente/Eigene%20Arbeiten/LAI_2_0%20Final%20report%20published%20on%20the%20website%20of%20the%20EC.pdf
Ireland
According to Callanan (2018, 370) “there is not much point taking part in local decision-making if local government operates in a straitjacket and all the key decisions have already been taken at the national level.” Power in Ireland’s unitary state is highly centralized, with minimal regional governance and local institutions functioning more as local administrations than local governments. This weak subnational governance, one of the weakest among the EU 27, has had a lasting impact on local policy analysis capacity. Size plays an important role in the welfare of countries. As a relatively small state, Ireland may have underdeveloped innovation, administrative, and policy analysis capacities, and has been slow to recognize the benefits of learning from other small states. Quinlivan (2021) suggests that local governments are inadvertently playing innovative roles in the policy process, economic development and democratic reforms.
Although the general governance landscape remains unchanged, new governance structures targeting coordination across all levels of government, including the local level, are emerging in sustainable development. These arrangements are being examined through an EPA-funded research project undertaken by the IPA. By the end of 2023, there have been no substantial changes or redistribution of powers/functions within the Irish government’s administrative-territorial landscape. However, in January 2023, The Citizens’ Assembly published a report recommending the devolution of some 15 service areas (including housing, healthcare, transport and emergency services) to the local mayoral level, with another six areas (such as education, police, and water provision) to be devolved after 5-10 years. The report initiated discussions with experts on local government powers and the constitution in Ireland, but the adoption of its recommendations at the policy level remains to be seen.
The Public Service Leadership Group (PSLG), the Civil Service Management Board (CSMB), and interministerial governance groups – such as the Climate Action Advisory Board and the Senior Official Groups supporting Cabinet Committees at a high level and the Bioeconomy Implementation Group and Water Policy Advisory Committee at a junior level – are crucial parts of the coordination landscape. PSLG meets quarterly, while CSMB meets monthly.
Ireland is increasingly demonstrating the capacity to govern with foresight by investing in internal government instruments, processes and structures that enable anticipatory governance. The country has established several commissions (on housing, tax and welfare, pensions) to facilitate long-term thinking. Despite this progress, Ireland is still known for “implementation deficit disorder” (Molloy, 2010), with communication and implementation gaps in national and local delivery, particularly in housing, asylum policy, health, procurement and skills shortages. Horizontal coordination remains problematic, with ineffective mechanisms between central government and specialized ministries. Although there are many effective but informal processes improving policy coherence, they are vulnerable to personnel changes. Formal cross-ministerial coordination often focuses on blame avoidance rather than emphasizing incentives, synergies and opportunities. National decision-makers collaborate through regional bodies with weak local government/administration.
In the context of climate action, McGloughlin and Sweeney (2012) found that higher-level objectives from national government were not incorporated into local policy documents. To address this, vertical coordination is now supported by four Climate Action Regional Offices and central Guidelines for Local Authority Climate Action Plans published in 2023. However, the absence of data on the actual extent of coordination across levels, including consultation mechanisms and satisfaction levels, effectively limits the assessment of these collaborations.
Although the general governance landscape remains unchanged, new governance structures targeting coordination across all levels of government, including the local level, are emerging in sustainable development. These arrangements are being examined through an EPA-funded research project undertaken by the IPA. By the end of 2023, there have been no substantial changes or redistribution of powers/functions within the Irish government’s administrative-territorial landscape. However, in January 2023, The Citizens’ Assembly published a report recommending the devolution of some 15 service areas (including housing, healthcare, transport and emergency services) to the local mayoral level, with another six areas (such as education, police, and water provision) to be devolved after 5-10 years. The report initiated discussions with experts on local government powers and the constitution in Ireland, but the adoption of its recommendations at the policy level remains to be seen.
The Public Service Leadership Group (PSLG), the Civil Service Management Board (CSMB), and interministerial governance groups – such as the Climate Action Advisory Board and the Senior Official Groups supporting Cabinet Committees at a high level and the Bioeconomy Implementation Group and Water Policy Advisory Committee at a junior level – are crucial parts of the coordination landscape. PSLG meets quarterly, while CSMB meets monthly.
Ireland is increasingly demonstrating the capacity to govern with foresight by investing in internal government instruments, processes and structures that enable anticipatory governance. The country has established several commissions (on housing, tax and welfare, pensions) to facilitate long-term thinking. Despite this progress, Ireland is still known for “implementation deficit disorder” (Molloy, 2010), with communication and implementation gaps in national and local delivery, particularly in housing, asylum policy, health, procurement and skills shortages. Horizontal coordination remains problematic, with ineffective mechanisms between central government and specialized ministries. Although there are many effective but informal processes improving policy coherence, they are vulnerable to personnel changes. Formal cross-ministerial coordination often focuses on blame avoidance rather than emphasizing incentives, synergies and opportunities. National decision-makers collaborate through regional bodies with weak local government/administration.
In the context of climate action, McGloughlin and Sweeney (2012) found that higher-level objectives from national government were not incorporated into local policy documents. To address this, vertical coordination is now supported by four Climate Action Regional Offices and central Guidelines for Local Authority Climate Action Plans published in 2023. However, the absence of data on the actual extent of coordination across levels, including consultation mechanisms and satisfaction levels, effectively limits the assessment of these collaborations.
Citations:
Dublin Citizens’ Assembly. 2023. “https://citizensassembly.ie/dublin-citizens-assembly/”
Callanan, M. 2018. Local Government in the Republic of Ireland. Dublin: Institute of Public Administration.
Quinlan, A. 2021. “Ireland’s ‘unique blend’ – local government and policy analysis.” In Policy Analysis in Ireland, eds. J. Hogan and M. P. Murphy, 79-92. Bristol: Policy Press.
McGloughlin, J. S., and J. Sweeney. 2011. “Multi-level Climate Policies in Ireland.” Irish Geographer 44 (1): 137-50.
Torney, D., and O’Mahony, T. 2023. “Transforming Governance and Policy.” Irish Climate Change Assessment Volume 4 (Chapter 7). https://www.epa.ie/publications/monitoring–assessment/climate-change/ICCA_Volume-4.pdf
Dublin Citizens’ Assembly. 2023. “https://citizensassembly.ie/dublin-citizens-assembly/”
Callanan, M. 2018. Local Government in the Republic of Ireland. Dublin: Institute of Public Administration.
Quinlan, A. 2021. “Ireland’s ‘unique blend’ – local government and policy analysis.” In Policy Analysis in Ireland, eds. J. Hogan and M. P. Murphy, 79-92. Bristol: Policy Press.
McGloughlin, J. S., and J. Sweeney. 2011. “Multi-level Climate Policies in Ireland.” Irish Geographer 44 (1): 137-50.
Torney, D., and O’Mahony, T. 2023. “Transforming Governance and Policy.” Irish Climate Change Assessment Volume 4 (Chapter 7). https://www.epa.ie/publications/monitoring–assessment/climate-change/ICCA_Volume-4.pdf
Slovakia
Overall, Slovakia’s legislative framework requires subnational self-governments (regional and local) to actively discuss central government policy initiatives that directly affect them. Many formal and informal forums operate mostly on a hierarchical basis; however, it is difficult to establish any regular pattern regarding binding decisions or informal recommendations. Typically, the central government cooperates with self-governments and their organizations.
Previous Fico-led governments organized meetings in various locations across Slovakia to consult with respective self-governing bodies. However, the quality of these discussions and the relationship between the central state and self-governments significantly depend on the different administrations. During the 2022 Matovič and Heger governments, relations between the central state and representative organizations of self-governments (ZMOS – Association of all municipalities; SK8 – Association of Regional Self-Governments; and Únia miest Slovenska – Union of Cities) were visibly antagonistic.
For example, in September 2022, ZMOS organized protests in front of the Government Office, criticizing the government for its lack of action in dealing with inflation and the energy crisis (increasing costs). The self-government associations frequently criticized draft laws, but their comments were often ignored (see Správy RTVS, 30 June 2022). In 2023, under the caretaker government, the situation improved. With the start of the new Fico government, future relations remain uncertain.
Previous Fico-led governments organized meetings in various locations across Slovakia to consult with respective self-governing bodies. However, the quality of these discussions and the relationship between the central state and self-governments significantly depend on the different administrations. During the 2022 Matovič and Heger governments, relations between the central state and representative organizations of self-governments (ZMOS – Association of all municipalities; SK8 – Association of Regional Self-Governments; and Únia miest Slovenska – Union of Cities) were visibly antagonistic.
For example, in September 2022, ZMOS organized protests in front of the Government Office, criticizing the government for its lack of action in dealing with inflation and the energy crisis (increasing costs). The self-government associations frequently criticized draft laws, but their comments were often ignored (see Správy RTVS, 30 June 2022). In 2023, under the caretaker government, the situation improved. With the start of the new Fico government, future relations remain uncertain.
Citations:
Obce budú mať viac peňazí, tvrdí Matovič. ZMOS však oponuje. Správy RTVS 30 June 2022. https://spravy.rtvs.sk/2022/06/obce-budu-mat-viac-penazi-tvrdi-matovic-zmos-vsak-oponuje/
www.zmos.sk
https://samospravnekraje.sk/
https://www.uniamiest.sk/
Obce budú mať viac peňazí, tvrdí Matovič. ZMOS však oponuje. Správy RTVS 30 June 2022. https://spravy.rtvs.sk/2022/06/obce-budu-mat-viac-penazi-tvrdi-matovic-zmos-vsak-oponuje/
www.zmos.sk
https://samospravnekraje.sk/
https://www.uniamiest.sk/
Netherlands
Since 2023, there has been a formalized code for intergovernmental relations between the central government, the Association of Provincial Authorities (IPO), Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG) and the Union of Water Authorities (UvW). It was concluded because national government had the bad habit of formulating new policies with far-reaching policy co-production implications for regional or local governments without much prior consultation or structural budget allocation. The intention of the code is that national government will involve other tiers of government early enough that the new policy proposals can still be amended.
Putting this into perspective: Since the decentralization of national spatial and housing planning in 2001, and the abolition of the Ministry for Spatial Planning and the Environment in 2010, the central government has faced all sorts of complex, “wicked” problems, in some cases deriving from European agreements, and often exacerbated by intentionally delayed implementation. It often then tasks municipalities (youth care, housing asylum-seekers) or provinces (climate, nitrogen, housing, asylum reception/registration, energy transition) with (co)implementing solutions. Importantly, such tasks have been imposed without certainty regarding corresponding structural budgets.
The political implication is that regional and local policymaking has gained in importance, even for voters. Provincial responsibility and thus political resistance against policies for licenses to operate (new or expanded) nitrogen-emitting farms and licenses to locate solar panel fields or large windmill parks led almost directly to the Farmer-Citizen Movement’s rise to become the largest political party in the Senate (which is indirectly elected by provincial councils). Another implication is that differences and inequalities between regions have become a focus of political debate about equal opportunities. Similarly, choices in funding (or failing to fund) large infrastructure projects have increased the gap between cities and rural areas. There is a sense that The Hague does not really understand the regions, and that it sometimes deliberately keeps regions small.
Provinces depend on the Provincial Fund for almost half of their revenues; one-third comes from motor vehicle tax surcharges, from which the increasing number of electrical cars are exempted. Provincial governments are displeased with the central government because it has discontinued the normal funding system for special allowances without offering any clarity about a possible alternative. More and more, a temporary pot of money is being added to new tasks on the basis of ad hoc negotiations; this transforms the province level from an independent administrative tier into a project office that implements government policy.
Something similar is occurring at the local level, where implementation of the new system has been delayed until 2027, plunging local governments into years of financial uncertainty.
Putting this into perspective: Since the decentralization of national spatial and housing planning in 2001, and the abolition of the Ministry for Spatial Planning and the Environment in 2010, the central government has faced all sorts of complex, “wicked” problems, in some cases deriving from European agreements, and often exacerbated by intentionally delayed implementation. It often then tasks municipalities (youth care, housing asylum-seekers) or provinces (climate, nitrogen, housing, asylum reception/registration, energy transition) with (co)implementing solutions. Importantly, such tasks have been imposed without certainty regarding corresponding structural budgets.
The political implication is that regional and local policymaking has gained in importance, even for voters. Provincial responsibility and thus political resistance against policies for licenses to operate (new or expanded) nitrogen-emitting farms and licenses to locate solar panel fields or large windmill parks led almost directly to the Farmer-Citizen Movement’s rise to become the largest political party in the Senate (which is indirectly elected by provincial councils). Another implication is that differences and inequalities between regions have become a focus of political debate about equal opportunities. Similarly, choices in funding (or failing to fund) large infrastructure projects have increased the gap between cities and rural areas. There is a sense that The Hague does not really understand the regions, and that it sometimes deliberately keeps regions small.
Provinces depend on the Provincial Fund for almost half of their revenues; one-third comes from motor vehicle tax surcharges, from which the increasing number of electrical cars are exempted. Provincial governments are displeased with the central government because it has discontinued the normal funding system for special allowances without offering any clarity about a possible alternative. More and more, a temporary pot of money is being added to new tasks on the basis of ad hoc negotiations; this transforms the province level from an independent administrative tier into a project office that implements government policy.
Something similar is occurring at the local level, where implementation of the new system has been delayed until 2027, plunging local governments into years of financial uncertainty.
Citations:
Association of Provincial Authorities (IPO), Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG), Union of Water Authorities (UvW), and the national government. 2023. Code on Inter-Administrative Relations.
I&O Research, Kanne, and Van der Schelde. 2023. “Provinciale Staten: Stikstof en Linkse Samenwerking Zorgen voor Dynamiek.” February 16.
Elke regio telt! Een nieuwe aanpak van verschillen tussen regio’s, Den Haag: Raad voor de leefomgeving en infrastructuur; Raad voor het Openbaar Bestuur, Raad voor Volksgezondheid en Samenleving, maart 2023.
Chavannes, De Correspondent. 2023. “Welkom bij Projectbureau Provincie, voor alle Lastige Zaken waar Den Haag niet uitkomt.” March 13.
NRC. 2022. “Grote stadsregio’s groeien, het noorden blijft achter.” November 27.
Van den Berg. 2023. “Polarisatie in de provincie.” Parlement.com March 10.
Centrum voor Onderzoek van de Economie van de Lagere Overheden (COELO). 2022. “Advies over het uitkeringsstelsel tussen Rijk en provincies en gemeenten.”
Leeuw, Binnenlands. 2022. “VNG: rijk overlegde niet over verandering financiering.” Bestuur, October 14.
Association of Provincial Authorities (IPO), Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG), Union of Water Authorities (UvW), and the national government. 2023. Code on Inter-Administrative Relations.
I&O Research, Kanne, and Van der Schelde. 2023. “Provinciale Staten: Stikstof en Linkse Samenwerking Zorgen voor Dynamiek.” February 16.
Elke regio telt! Een nieuwe aanpak van verschillen tussen regio’s, Den Haag: Raad voor de leefomgeving en infrastructuur; Raad voor het Openbaar Bestuur, Raad voor Volksgezondheid en Samenleving, maart 2023.
Chavannes, De Correspondent. 2023. “Welkom bij Projectbureau Provincie, voor alle Lastige Zaken waar Den Haag niet uitkomt.” March 13.
NRC. 2022. “Grote stadsregio’s groeien, het noorden blijft achter.” November 27.
Van den Berg. 2023. “Polarisatie in de provincie.” Parlement.com March 10.
Centrum voor Onderzoek van de Economie van de Lagere Overheden (COELO). 2022. “Advies over het uitkeringsstelsel tussen Rijk en provincies en gemeenten.”
Leeuw, Binnenlands. 2022. “VNG: rijk overlegde niet over verandering financiering.” Bestuur, October 14.
UK
The highest-level mechanism for coordination in the UK is the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC), chaired by the prime minister and attended by the leaders of the devolved administrations. An explainer from the Institute for Government (2017) sets out the tasks of the JMC, based on a Memorandum of Understanding. It “should provide central coordination of the overall relationship between the UK and the devolved nations, and: consider non-devolved matters which affect devolved responsibilities (and vice versa); consider devolved matters if it is beneficial to discuss their respective treatment in the different parts of the UK; keep the arrangements for liaison between the governments under review; and consider disputes between the governments.”
The explainer documents the limitations of the JMC and its subcommittees for specific policy areas, noting its purely consultative role and the perception from the devolved administrations (DAs) that the agenda is set by the central government. As noted (see G1.3), the UK government seems to prefer informal mechanisms over the formal use of intergovernmental relations mechanisms like the JMC (Henderson 2023). The JMC machinery exists to discuss arising matters (e.g., disputes), not routine coordination. The UK government respects the right of devolved governments to set their own public service priorities, such as health services and schools, and often leads “four nations” approaches to emergencies like COVID-19 and common concerns such as tobacco controls, which involve both UK-reserved and devolved elements (Cairney 2024).
Within the UK government, the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (which has had several name changes over the years) has the most direct coordinating role with subnational governments. Most of the department’s work focuses on England, but it also has some UK-wide responsibilities.
The explainer documents the limitations of the JMC and its subcommittees for specific policy areas, noting its purely consultative role and the perception from the devolved administrations (DAs) that the agenda is set by the central government. As noted (see G1.3), the UK government seems to prefer informal mechanisms over the formal use of intergovernmental relations mechanisms like the JMC (Henderson 2023). The JMC machinery exists to discuss arising matters (e.g., disputes), not routine coordination. The UK government respects the right of devolved governments to set their own public service priorities, such as health services and schools, and often leads “four nations” approaches to emergencies like COVID-19 and common concerns such as tobacco controls, which involve both UK-reserved and devolved elements (Cairney 2024).
Within the UK government, the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (which has had several name changes over the years) has the most direct coordinating role with subnational governments. Most of the department’s work focuses on England, but it also has some UK-wide responsibilities.
Citations:
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/article/explainer/devolution-joint-ministerial-committee#:~:text=The%20Joint%20Ministerial%20Committee%20%28JMC%29%20is%20a%20set,created%20in%201999%20at%20the%20start%20of%20devolution
Cairney, P. 2024. “Expert Report for the UK Covid-19 Public Inquiry – Module 2A: Core UK Decision-Making and Political Governance – Scotland.” https://www.covid19.public-inquiry.uk/documents/inq000274154-expert-report-by-professor-paul-cairney-titled-expert-report-for-the-uk-covid-19-public-inquiry-module-2a-core-uk-decision-making-and-political-governance-scotland-dated-09-01/
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/article/explainer/devolution-joint-ministerial-committee#:~:text=The%20Joint%20Ministerial%20Committee%20%28JMC%29%20is%20a%20set,created%20in%201999%20at%20the%20start%20of%20devolution
Cairney, P. 2024. “Expert Report for the UK Covid-19 Public Inquiry – Module 2A: Core UK Decision-Making and Political Governance – Scotland.” https://www.covid19.public-inquiry.uk/documents/inq000274154-expert-report-by-professor-paul-cairney-titled-expert-report-for-the-uk-covid-19-public-inquiry-module-2a-core-uk-decision-making-and-political-governance-scotland-dated-09-01/
USA
The quality of collaboration between federal and state governments depends on the specific policy area. For example, some areas, such as transport infrastructure (especially interstate transport), public health, and emergency management, have tended to show good levels of coordination and interaction between federal and state governments (Bloom 2019).
Yet, in many policy areas, state governments exercise a reasonably high degree of autonomy (Grumbach 2019). Although the federal government is a major financer of health, education, and welfare programs, ultimately, the delivery of these largely rests with state governments (Merriman 2019).
The frequency of meetings between federal and state officials depends on context and policy area (Bakvis and Brown 2010). The closest moments of interaction are typically tied to specific emergencies or threats (Rossi 2013). For example, when concerns over public health emerge, the Department of Health and Human Services may meet with state health departments to coordinate a response.
The president occasionally convenes “White House Summits,” which are intended both to signal the president’s policy priorities and to serve as coordinating and networking opportunities for state and local officials at a high level.
Government departments that provide funding for major programs administered by state and local governments may regularly meet with subnational officials to monitor the progress of these programs. Officials in the U.S. Department of Education, for example, will meet with state education policymakers and officials to discuss issues such as curriculum, student performance, and funding inequalities (Hackett 2017).
Some departments have joint federal-state programs. This is especially true in law enforcement, with federal agencies like the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Justice working with local agencies on matters such as anti-terrorism or immigration enforcement (Stuntz 2001).
Yet, in many policy areas, state governments exercise a reasonably high degree of autonomy (Grumbach 2019). Although the federal government is a major financer of health, education, and welfare programs, ultimately, the delivery of these largely rests with state governments (Merriman 2019).
The frequency of meetings between federal and state officials depends on context and policy area (Bakvis and Brown 2010). The closest moments of interaction are typically tied to specific emergencies or threats (Rossi 2013). For example, when concerns over public health emerge, the Department of Health and Human Services may meet with state health departments to coordinate a response.
The president occasionally convenes “White House Summits,” which are intended both to signal the president’s policy priorities and to serve as coordinating and networking opportunities for state and local officials at a high level.
Government departments that provide funding for major programs administered by state and local governments may regularly meet with subnational officials to monitor the progress of these programs. Officials in the U.S. Department of Education, for example, will meet with state education policymakers and officials to discuss issues such as curriculum, student performance, and funding inequalities (Hackett 2017).
Some departments have joint federal-state programs. This is especially true in law enforcement, with federal agencies like the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Justice working with local agencies on matters such as anti-terrorism or immigration enforcement (Stuntz 2001).
Citations:
Ben Merriman. 2019. Conservative Innovators: How States Are Challenging Federal Power. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Jacob Grumbach. 2018. “From Backwaters to Major Policymakers: Policy Polarization in the States, 1970-2014.” Perspectives on Politics.
Nicholas Bloom. 2019. How States Shaped Postwar America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
William Stuntz. 2001. “Terrorism, Federalism, and Police Misconduct.” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy.
Herman Bakvis and Douglas Brown. 2010. “Policy Coordination in Federal Systems: Comparing Intergovernmental Processes and Outcomes in Canada and the United States.” Publius.
Jim Rossi. 2014. “Maladaptive Federalism: The Structural Barriers to Coordination of State Sustainability Initiatives.”
Ben Merriman. 2019. Conservative Innovators: How States Are Challenging Federal Power. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Jacob Grumbach. 2018. “From Backwaters to Major Policymakers: Policy Polarization in the States, 1970-2014.” Perspectives on Politics.
Nicholas Bloom. 2019. How States Shaped Postwar America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
William Stuntz. 2001. “Terrorism, Federalism, and Police Misconduct.” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy.
Herman Bakvis and Douglas Brown. 2010. “Policy Coordination in Federal Systems: Comparing Intergovernmental Processes and Outcomes in Canada and the United States.” Publius.
Jim Rossi. 2014. “Maladaptive Federalism: The Structural Barriers to Coordination of State Sustainability Initiatives.”
4
Hungary
In Hungary, citizens generally trust municipalities more than the national government, and this gap continues to grow (Kákai/Kovács 2023). Since Fidesz lost control of Hungary’s major cities, including the capital and many smaller settlements, in the municipal elections in October 2019, the government has sought to further disempower opposition-led municipalities. The Orbán government instrumentalized the COVID-19 pandemic in this respect, drawing on the state of emergency to further curtail municipal competencies. It has deprived them of important revenue sources, including vehicle taxes, car parking fees and business taxes. It has also prohibited them from raising taxes to cope with the hardships of the pandemic.
The government has also canceled several local development projects, most in opposition-led municipalities, and has misused anti-crisis legislation that provides for the creation of “special economic areas” by transferring tax revenues from opposition-led municipalities to Fidesz-controlled counties. Some observers have called the attack on opposition-run municipalities “the real COVID-19 coup in Hungary” (Györi et al. 2021:31). While the government’s measures have hit opposition-led municipalities hardest, Fidesz-ruled settlements have also been affected, prompting even leaders loyal to Fidesz to protest against the draining of local public administration resources.
Municipalities, in general, are vulnerable to the central government’s political will, as checks and balances have been removed over time and self-governing rights have been curtailed. Left-leaning municipalities may receive little or even negative attention from the government, while those within the Fidesz camp might receive an excess of scrutiny. It is at the municipal level where the redistribution of EU funds partly occurs.
As a consequence, these political spaces are highly vulnerable to corruption. The freezing of EU funds has harshly struck municipalities and Fidesz-led cities. The government must expect criticism here. To tackle the biased use of funds, the European Union is increasingly working on programs where financial transfers are distributed directly to municipalities, including opposition-led cities and towns. In parallel, the Association of Hungarian Municipalities (MÖSZ), led by the opposition mayor of a suburb of Budapest (Gödöllő), is lobbying for increased financial autonomy for local self-governments. However, due to political tensions, these efforts have been disregarded by the central government, even though some Fidesz mayors have also raised concerns regarding specific measures, such as the “solidarity tax” levied in 2023 to redistribute local business tax revenue toward poorer municipalities.
The government has also canceled several local development projects, most in opposition-led municipalities, and has misused anti-crisis legislation that provides for the creation of “special economic areas” by transferring tax revenues from opposition-led municipalities to Fidesz-controlled counties. Some observers have called the attack on opposition-run municipalities “the real COVID-19 coup in Hungary” (Györi et al. 2021:31). While the government’s measures have hit opposition-led municipalities hardest, Fidesz-ruled settlements have also been affected, prompting even leaders loyal to Fidesz to protest against the draining of local public administration resources.
Municipalities, in general, are vulnerable to the central government’s political will, as checks and balances have been removed over time and self-governing rights have been curtailed. Left-leaning municipalities may receive little or even negative attention from the government, while those within the Fidesz camp might receive an excess of scrutiny. It is at the municipal level where the redistribution of EU funds partly occurs.
As a consequence, these political spaces are highly vulnerable to corruption. The freezing of EU funds has harshly struck municipalities and Fidesz-led cities. The government must expect criticism here. To tackle the biased use of funds, the European Union is increasingly working on programs where financial transfers are distributed directly to municipalities, including opposition-led cities and towns. In parallel, the Association of Hungarian Municipalities (MÖSZ), led by the opposition mayor of a suburb of Budapest (Gödöllő), is lobbying for increased financial autonomy for local self-governments. However, due to political tensions, these efforts have been disregarded by the central government, even though some Fidesz mayors have also raised concerns regarding specific measures, such as the “solidarity tax” levied in 2023 to redistribute local business tax revenue toward poorer municipalities.
Citations:
Kákai, L., and I. P. Kovács. “Cui Prodest? Why Local Governance Came to a Deadlock in Hungary.” Politics in Central Europe 19(1): 21-42.
Kákai, L., and I. P. Kovács. “Cui Prodest? Why Local Governance Came to a Deadlock in Hungary.” Politics in Central Europe 19(1): 21-42.
Poland
Cooperation between central and subnational authorities have been characterized by grown tensions and asymmetry. Poland’s score on the Local Government Index (Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego 2023) dropped from 73.58 to 56.68 points between 2014 and 2021, primarily due to the diminishing political and institutional power of local entities. The Joint Commission of the Government and Local Government (Komisja Wspólna Rządu i Samorządu Terytorialnego or KWRiST) – a forum for developing common positions with 11 thematic commissions – was marginalized, with a fourfold increase in the number of laws prepared by the government that were not reviewed by this body.
The quality of the government’s oversight of local governments was unsatisfactory and politicized, particularly at the voivodeship level, as evidenced by a high rate of annulments of “supervisory acts” by administrative courts. General limitations on independent control of the constitutionality of legal provisions further complicated the situation. Moreover, due to the consequences of COVID-19, the war in Ukraine and very high inflation rates, the financial situation of many municipalities deteriorated, leaving many local budgets in very poor condition. Most municipal administrations continued to provide their basic services, but the quality of these services declined. In many cases, the distribution of financial and governmental support to local administrations depended on their political affiliations. Widespread dissatisfaction with national-local relations was observed, particularly within big cities (for example, on the part of the Association of Polish Cities – Związek Miast Polskich), most of which were governed by the opposition. In contrast, smaller administrations led by PiS supporters were highly supportive of the national government.
The quality of the government’s oversight of local governments was unsatisfactory and politicized, particularly at the voivodeship level, as evidenced by a high rate of annulments of “supervisory acts” by administrative courts. General limitations on independent control of the constitutionality of legal provisions further complicated the situation. Moreover, due to the consequences of COVID-19, the war in Ukraine and very high inflation rates, the financial situation of many municipalities deteriorated, leaving many local budgets in very poor condition. Most municipal administrations continued to provide their basic services, but the quality of these services declined. In many cases, the distribution of financial and governmental support to local administrations depended on their political affiliations. Widespread dissatisfaction with national-local relations was observed, particularly within big cities (for example, on the part of the Association of Polish Cities – Związek Miast Polskich), most of which were governed by the opposition. In contrast, smaller administrations led by PiS supporters were highly supportive of the national government.
Citations:
Lackowska, M., et al. 2023. “The Local Government Index 2023.” https://www.batory.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/The.Local-Government.Index _.2023.pdf
Lackowska, M., et al. 2023. “The Local Government Index 2023.” https://www.batory.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/The.Local-Government.Index _.2023.pdf
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There is no effective multilevel cooperation between the central and subnational governments.
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