To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments meet national (minimum) standards in delivering public services?
The central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
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9
France
Mitigating a long tradition of state centralization, a broad near-consensus on the need for decentralization has influenced political debates for decades. This has taken the form of devolution of power to local governments (regions, departments, cities) as well as de-concentration – that is, distributing state authorities’ representatives throughout the territory (rather than only in Paris), and giving more power to the local representatives of these national authorities, especially the prefects (Biard 2007). In all cases, the central state continues to set objectives and define the possible ways of achieving them. If local experiments have been authorized and become more widespread, such as today’s experiments regarding the distribution of a minimal income, the national authorities oversee the definition of the design and process for these experiments. For instance, in the case of the minimal wage, national authorities have granted the possibility of conditioning the minimal income on a specific number of hours worked for the public service. Departments mainly were presented with the option of opting in for this.
Overall, standards and objectives set by the state are largely respected because of strict procedural obligations. The prefects and regional courts of account closely monitor local governments’ actions, and can denounce and – as has happened in several cases – either prosecute local officials or go over their heads in cases of insubordination. Moreover, local governments still have limited resources at their disposal. Local expenditures represent only 20% of total public expenditures in France, compared to the average of 31% in Europe overall (Ecale and Turban 2019). State-region contracts are also systematically used to define key targets and key performance indicators. Regions also use these indicators when subcontracting, for instance with regional train lines.
Resistance to the central authorities’ positions exists in different forms. Calls for more autonomy for local governments are frequent. Overseas territories as well as Corsica benefit from a large de facto room for maneuver. Resistance has also taken the form of direct opposition to legislation such as the law of net zero soil artificialization, which was vehemently opposed by Laurent Wauquiez, president of the Regional Council of Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes.
Overall, standards and objectives set by the state are largely respected because of strict procedural obligations. The prefects and regional courts of account closely monitor local governments’ actions, and can denounce and – as has happened in several cases – either prosecute local officials or go over their heads in cases of insubordination. Moreover, local governments still have limited resources at their disposal. Local expenditures represent only 20% of total public expenditures in France, compared to the average of 31% in Europe overall (Ecale and Turban 2019). State-region contracts are also systematically used to define key targets and key performance indicators. Regions also use these indicators when subcontracting, for instance with regional train lines.
Resistance to the central authorities’ positions exists in different forms. Calls for more autonomy for local governments are frequent. Overseas territories as well as Corsica benefit from a large de facto room for maneuver. Resistance has also taken the form of direct opposition to legislation such as the law of net zero soil artificialization, which was vehemently opposed by Laurent Wauquiez, president of the Regional Council of Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes.
Citations:
Biard, M. 2007. Les lilliputiens de la centralisation: des intendants aux préfets, les hésitations d’un modèle français. Seyssel: Editions Champ Vallon.
Ecalle, F., and S. Turban. 2019. “Autonomie des collectivités territoriales : une comparaison européenne.” Note d’analyse France Stratégie 80. Retrieved 15 January 2024 from https://www.strategie.gouv.fr/publications/autonomie-collectivites-territoriales-une-comparaison-europeenne.
Biard, M. 2007. Les lilliputiens de la centralisation: des intendants aux préfets, les hésitations d’un modèle français. Seyssel: Editions Champ Vallon.
Ecalle, F., and S. Turban. 2019. “Autonomie des collectivités territoriales : une comparaison européenne.” Note d’analyse France Stratégie 80. Retrieved 15 January 2024 from https://www.strategie.gouv.fr/publications/autonomie-collectivites-territoriales-une-comparaison-europeenne.
Most of the time, the central government ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
8
Czechia
The creation of standards for the performance of public administration agencies is the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior. The strategic document “Client-oriented Public Administration 2030” concept, adopted in 2020 (Mugglin et al. 2022: 21), contains more than 70 concrete measures aimed at bringing public administration closer to the citizens. There is a system of measurement and evaluation of public administration to assess the services provided, approved by the government resolution of July 2020. Public Service Standards are also in place for the ministries that provide these services, including performance evaluation criteria. A system of sanctions is not mentioned in them.
The accessibility of public services and infrastructure is primarily addressed in relation to the quality of life in individual regions. There is a standardization of the spatial availability of public services, which responds to current needs and represents a specific social obligation to provide a given service at a particular geographical level.
Comprehensive and rigorous standards have been developed for evaluating all levels of education. The key organization is the inspectorate, subordinated to the Ministry of Education Youth and Sport. The latest set of evaluation criteria was published in June 2022, specifying a four-point scale, from excellent to inadequate. Judgments are made across six areas, with three to five specific questions within each, making possible an overall judgment of the area. Evaluations are conducted by inspectors visiting establishments either following specific complaints or as part of routine inspections. Visits are frequent, with 20,349 reported to the 4,200 basic schools in the 2022 – 2023 school year, including 1,021 full inspections. Judgments of inadequate were rare and mostly related to the state of buildings.
The accessibility of public services and infrastructure is primarily addressed in relation to the quality of life in individual regions. There is a standardization of the spatial availability of public services, which responds to current needs and represents a specific social obligation to provide a given service at a particular geographical level.
Comprehensive and rigorous standards have been developed for evaluating all levels of education. The key organization is the inspectorate, subordinated to the Ministry of Education Youth and Sport. The latest set of evaluation criteria was published in June 2022, specifying a four-point scale, from excellent to inadequate. Judgments are made across six areas, with three to five specific questions within each, making possible an overall judgment of the area. Evaluations are conducted by inspectors visiting establishments either following specific complaints or as part of routine inspections. Visits are frequent, with 20,349 reported to the 4,200 basic schools in the 2022 – 2023 school year, including 1,021 full inspections. Judgments of inadequate were rare and mostly related to the state of buildings.
Citations:
Vláda České republiky. 2020. Client-Oriented Public Administration 2030. Praha: Vláda České republiky. https://www.mvcr.cz/soubor/client-oriented-public-administration-2030.aspx
https://www.csicr.cz/cz/Dokumenty/Vyrocni-zpravy/Kvalita-vzdelavani-ve-skolnim-roce-2022-2023-%E2%80%93-vyr
Vláda České republiky. 2020. Client-Oriented Public Administration 2030. Praha: Vláda České republiky. https://www.mvcr.cz/soubor/client-oriented-public-administration-2030.aspx
https://www.csicr.cz/cz/Dokumenty/Vyrocni-zpravy/Kvalita-vzdelavani-ve-skolnim-roce-2022-2023-%E2%80%93-vyr
Denmark
Article 82 of the Danish constitution stipulates requires delegation to local units in Denmark, and further states: “The right of municipalities to manage their own affairs independently, under state supervision, shall be laid down by statute.” This creates a tension between municipalities’ rights to deliver policies adjusted to local circumstances and the welfare state objective of ensuring the same standard for everyone. Media reports highlighting different levels of service in key policy areas across municipalities have drawn particular attention.
National laws set standards with varying degrees of discretion for local authorities. The central government can supervise whether standards are met through benchmarks and tests, and can require the publication of performance indicators such as hospital waiting list outcomes and school performance results. The country’s active press plays a role in exposing problems. The central government – which bears ultimate political responsibility – can intervene by setting stricter standards or by transferring extra funds to certain activities.
Rhetorical action, such as shaming underachievers, is also sometimes part of the strategy. A recent example includes proposals to introduce minimum standards for various public services. This aims to reduce variation across the municipalities.
The Danish government has a reasonably good track record in terms of implementing its agenda. Budget arrangements – including the Budget Law – lay out a clear framework for how regions and municipalities operate in this regard.
Since regional and municipal governments interact directly with citizens, they must also manage public expectations regarding the level and quality of services, despite often having limited scope for action. The degree of autonomy afforded to municipalities has fluctuated over the years. Some have suggested that regions, which are primarily responsible for healthcare services, should be eliminated, with their responsibilities taken over directly by the central government.
Until recently, there has been discussion about setting national minimum standards in key welfare areas like daycare and old-age care. However, a recent government initiative aims to provide more decentralized choice and responsibility, anticipating that this will lead to greater efficiency and a better ability to meet citizen demands.
National laws set standards with varying degrees of discretion for local authorities. The central government can supervise whether standards are met through benchmarks and tests, and can require the publication of performance indicators such as hospital waiting list outcomes and school performance results. The country’s active press plays a role in exposing problems. The central government – which bears ultimate political responsibility – can intervene by setting stricter standards or by transferring extra funds to certain activities.
Rhetorical action, such as shaming underachievers, is also sometimes part of the strategy. A recent example includes proposals to introduce minimum standards for various public services. This aims to reduce variation across the municipalities.
The Danish government has a reasonably good track record in terms of implementing its agenda. Budget arrangements – including the Budget Law – lay out a clear framework for how regions and municipalities operate in this regard.
Since regional and municipal governments interact directly with citizens, they must also manage public expectations regarding the level and quality of services, despite often having limited scope for action. The degree of autonomy afforded to municipalities has fluctuated over the years. Some have suggested that regions, which are primarily responsible for healthcare services, should be eliminated, with their responsibilities taken over directly by the central government.
Until recently, there has been discussion about setting national minimum standards in key welfare areas like daycare and old-age care. However, a recent government initiative aims to provide more decentralized choice and responsibility, anticipating that this will lead to greater efficiency and a better ability to meet citizen demands.
Citations:
Frederiksen. 2023. “Opening speech to parliament.” https://www.stm.dk/statsministeren/taler/statsministerens-tale-ved-folketingets-aabning-den-3-oktober-2023
Frederiksen. 2023. “Opening speech to parliament.” https://www.stm.dk/statsministeren/taler/statsministerens-tale-ved-folketingets-aabning-den-3-oktober-2023
Germany
The provision of public services in Germany, including education, housing, healthcare, waste management, public transport, and land use, is generally well-organized among various levels of governance. Due to the country’s federal constitution, subnational governments enjoy a relatively high level of autonomy and decision-making power. Consequently, defining nationwide standards can be challenging in some areas. However, according to the constitutional understanding of German federalism, full harmonization of standards through central guidance is not desirable.
Public services are split among the federal, subnational, and communal levels and, in some cases, outsourced to nonprofit institutions or indirect public administrations (such as social security). In certain instances, minimum standards are decided at the federal level, such as the BSI (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik) minimum standard for IT security, while in others, subnational governments impose rules (Hebestreit and Korte, 2022; Hegele and Behnke, 2017).
Environmental standards are defined at the national level. For education, federal states have the authority to set standards but coordinate to some extent through the committee of state ministers for culture and education (Kultusministerkonferenz). Compared to a centralized governance system, this leads to greater differences in school organization and educational attainment. Healthcare is organized nationally and divided into a two-tier mandatory healthcare system that generally functions well at high costs and is mainly controlled by independent national agencies.
Frequent assessments and reports on compliance with minimum standards are provided by ministries, responsible providers, intergovernmental agencies, and independent nonprofit institutions. Subnational governments function as supervisory bodies, taking on sanctioning and oversight roles in the provision of public services.
Public services are split among the federal, subnational, and communal levels and, in some cases, outsourced to nonprofit institutions or indirect public administrations (such as social security). In certain instances, minimum standards are decided at the federal level, such as the BSI (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik) minimum standard for IT security, while in others, subnational governments impose rules (Hebestreit and Korte, 2022; Hegele and Behnke, 2017).
Environmental standards are defined at the national level. For education, federal states have the authority to set standards but coordinate to some extent through the committee of state ministers for culture and education (Kultusministerkonferenz). Compared to a centralized governance system, this leads to greater differences in school organization and educational attainment. Healthcare is organized nationally and divided into a two-tier mandatory healthcare system that generally functions well at high costs and is mainly controlled by independent national agencies.
Frequent assessments and reports on compliance with minimum standards are provided by ministries, responsible providers, intergovernmental agencies, and independent nonprofit institutions. Subnational governments function as supervisory bodies, taking on sanctioning and oversight roles in the provision of public services.
Citations:
Hebestreit, R., and Korte, K.-R. 2022. “The Executive: The German Government and Civil Service.” In The Oxford Handbook of German Politics, eds. K. Larres, H. Moroff, and R. Wittlinger. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hegele, Y., and N. Behnke. 2017. “Horizontal Coordination in Cooperative Federalism: The Purpose of Ministerial Conferences in Germany.” Regional and Federal Studies 27 (5): 529-548.
Hebestreit, R., and Korte, K.-R. 2022. “The Executive: The German Government and Civil Service.” In The Oxford Handbook of German Politics, eds. K. Larres, H. Moroff, and R. Wittlinger. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hegele, Y., and N. Behnke. 2017. “Horizontal Coordination in Cooperative Federalism: The Purpose of Ministerial Conferences in Germany.” Regional and Federal Studies 27 (5): 529-548.
Japan
As a unitary state, Japan has coherent standards for the delivery of public services. Adherence to national standards is supervised mainly by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, which monitors training activities and personnel transfers between the central administration and subgovernments. Implementation of uniform standards of public services is controlled by the field agencies of different ministries. In 2001, a public sector performance assessment on the ministerial level based on plan-do-check-action cycles was introduced through the Government Policy Evaluations Act. Subnational governments are not obliged to perform similar assessments, but all prefectures, almost all major cities and the majority of municipalities have introduced self-evaluation systems.
Plans to allow prefectures to diverge from national standards in Special Economic Zones, initially proposed by the Koizumi government in 2003 and later by the Abe government (2012 – 2020), have introduced the idea of letting regions compete for best practices and regulatory reform (Yashiro 2016). However, this has not yet led to major change and regulatory coherence can still be considered high. Japan scores highly for government effectiveness in the World Governance Index. Municipalities and prefectures enjoy some leeway on how to achieve policy goals (e.g., childcare).
Enhancement of uniformity in the provision of public services is one of the key elements of the digitalization of government services, which accelerated after the establishment of the Digital Agency in September 2021. The introduction of My Number – a 12-digit personal number used to streamline and link all administrative interactions of citizens – has been crucial in this reform. However, the provision of My Number cards to all citizens has been plagued with software glitches and privacy issues. In May 2023, it was revealed that 60% of medical institutions using an online insurance confirmation system had experienced problems with the My Number system, including wrongly linking personal data. In total, 130,000 bank accounts were erroneously linked. The large number of reported problems undermines the public image and reliability of the system, even before successive public services are combined through My Number, starting with the issuance of health insurance cards in 2024.
Plans to allow prefectures to diverge from national standards in Special Economic Zones, initially proposed by the Koizumi government in 2003 and later by the Abe government (2012 – 2020), have introduced the idea of letting regions compete for best practices and regulatory reform (Yashiro 2016). However, this has not yet led to major change and regulatory coherence can still be considered high. Japan scores highly for government effectiveness in the World Governance Index. Municipalities and prefectures enjoy some leeway on how to achieve policy goals (e.g., childcare).
Enhancement of uniformity in the provision of public services is one of the key elements of the digitalization of government services, which accelerated after the establishment of the Digital Agency in September 2021. The introduction of My Number – a 12-digit personal number used to streamline and link all administrative interactions of citizens – has been crucial in this reform. However, the provision of My Number cards to all citizens has been plagued with software glitches and privacy issues. In May 2023, it was revealed that 60% of medical institutions using an online insurance confirmation system had experienced problems with the My Number system, including wrongly linking personal data. In total, 130,000 bank accounts were erroneously linked. The large number of reported problems undermines the public image and reliability of the system, even before successive public services are combined through My Number, starting with the issuance of health insurance cards in 2024.
Citations:
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. 2017. “Chihô Kôkyô Dantai ni okeru Gyôsei Hyôka no Torikumi Jôkyô” [Status of administrative evaluation efforts in local governments]. https://www.soumu.go.jp/iken/02gyosei04_04000062.html
“My Number glitches undermine Japan’s digital future.” The Japan Times, June 9. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2023/06/09/editorials/my-number-failure/
Kaufmann, Daniel, and Aart Kraay. 2023. “Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2023 Update.” www.govindicators.org
Yashiro, Naohiro. “Regulatory Coherence: The Case of Japan.” In Gill, D. and P. Intal, Jr., eds.
(eds. 2016. The Development of Regulatory Management Systems in East Asia: Country Studies. Jakarta: ERIA, 2015-4, pp. 27-113.)
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. 2017. “Chihô Kôkyô Dantai ni okeru Gyôsei Hyôka no Torikumi Jôkyô” [Status of administrative evaluation efforts in local governments]. https://www.soumu.go.jp/iken/02gyosei04_04000062.html
“My Number glitches undermine Japan’s digital future.” The Japan Times, June 9. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2023/06/09/editorials/my-number-failure/
Kaufmann, Daniel, and Aart Kraay. 2023. “Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2023 Update.” www.govindicators.org
Yashiro, Naohiro. “Regulatory Coherence: The Case of Japan.” In Gill, D. and P. Intal, Jr., eds.
(eds. 2016. The Development of Regulatory Management Systems in East Asia: Country Studies. Jakarta: ERIA, 2015-4, pp. 27-113.)
New Zealand
New Zealand is one of the most centralized jurisdictions in the OECD. More than 90% of government workers are employed by central government organizations, and almost all citizen-facing public services – including policing, fire services, education and health – are central government activities. Almost all local regulation is undertaken by an agent of the central government, with little locally initiated regulation. This high degree of government centralization makes it relatively easy to enforce national standards in the delivery of public services.
The delivery of public services sometimes involves a degree of decentralization. In such cases, the central government monitors compliance with minimum standards using performance indicators and frameworks.
For example, in 2010, Whānau Ora was launched to enable a family-centered approach to supporting Māori well-being and development. A framework of indicators, outcome measures and funding allocation criteria was created, and the second stage of implementation in 2014 involved establishing three regional-level commissioning agencies to foster closer connections between communities in need and funding decisions. A Whānau Ora Partnership Group, comprising six iwi (Māori tribe delegates) and six government representatives, was also established to provide strategic oversight. It continues as the preferred model for delivering self-determined services to Māori families (Whanau Ora, 2023).
Another initiative involves the organization of the Ministry of Health, which sets national health policies and guidelines. Until mid-2022, district health boards (DHBs) had considerable autonomy in delivering healthcare services within their regions. Various indicators, such as waiting times for elective surgeries and patient satisfaction surveys, were used to assess the performance of DHBs.
Environmental services have also been partially devolved. While regulations and standards are set at the national level by agencies like the Ministry for the Environment, local councils implement these standards and regulations. Performance indicators in this area can include measures related to air and water quality or waste management.
The central government has mechanisms to address noncompliance with minimum standards, such as technical assistance or withholding funding. However, despite these mechanisms, the quality of public services can vary significantly between subnational units.
The Labour government under Ardern and Hipkins sought to centralize some public services. One notable example is the overhaul of the health system – which was seen as too complex and fragmented – and the merging of the 20 DHBs into Health New Zealand in July 2022. Under the new model, Health New Zealand will manage all health services, including hospital and specialist services and primary and community care (Martin 2022). Another example is the proposed Three Waters reform, which aimed to consolidate the ownership and management of drinking water, wastewater and stormwater services. The goal was to enhance the quality, reliability and safety of these services across New Zealand. However, the proposal sparked heated debates among stakeholders and was significantly revamped before the 2023 election. The provision of higher education offerings in the vocational sector was also in the process of being centralized under Labour.
There are ongoing discussions about improving public service delivery in Māori communities, which generally lag on socioeconomic measures such as education, health and housing. For instance, the Labour government established the Māori Health Authority (Te Aka Whai Ora) to address disparities in health outcomes for the Māori population. It also sought a co-governance model between the Crown, Māori and local councils for the delivery of the Three Waters model. However, the new coalition government led by National has indicated that it will abolish both these initiatives (Hill 2023; RNZ 2023).
The delivery of public services sometimes involves a degree of decentralization. In such cases, the central government monitors compliance with minimum standards using performance indicators and frameworks.
For example, in 2010, Whānau Ora was launched to enable a family-centered approach to supporting Māori well-being and development. A framework of indicators, outcome measures and funding allocation criteria was created, and the second stage of implementation in 2014 involved establishing three regional-level commissioning agencies to foster closer connections between communities in need and funding decisions. A Whānau Ora Partnership Group, comprising six iwi (Māori tribe delegates) and six government representatives, was also established to provide strategic oversight. It continues as the preferred model for delivering self-determined services to Māori families (Whanau Ora, 2023).
Another initiative involves the organization of the Ministry of Health, which sets national health policies and guidelines. Until mid-2022, district health boards (DHBs) had considerable autonomy in delivering healthcare services within their regions. Various indicators, such as waiting times for elective surgeries and patient satisfaction surveys, were used to assess the performance of DHBs.
Environmental services have also been partially devolved. While regulations and standards are set at the national level by agencies like the Ministry for the Environment, local councils implement these standards and regulations. Performance indicators in this area can include measures related to air and water quality or waste management.
The central government has mechanisms to address noncompliance with minimum standards, such as technical assistance or withholding funding. However, despite these mechanisms, the quality of public services can vary significantly between subnational units.
The Labour government under Ardern and Hipkins sought to centralize some public services. One notable example is the overhaul of the health system – which was seen as too complex and fragmented – and the merging of the 20 DHBs into Health New Zealand in July 2022. Under the new model, Health New Zealand will manage all health services, including hospital and specialist services and primary and community care (Martin 2022). Another example is the proposed Three Waters reform, which aimed to consolidate the ownership and management of drinking water, wastewater and stormwater services. The goal was to enhance the quality, reliability and safety of these services across New Zealand. However, the proposal sparked heated debates among stakeholders and was significantly revamped before the 2023 election. The provision of higher education offerings in the vocational sector was also in the process of being centralized under Labour.
There are ongoing discussions about improving public service delivery in Māori communities, which generally lag on socioeconomic measures such as education, health and housing. For instance, the Labour government established the Māori Health Authority (Te Aka Whai Ora) to address disparities in health outcomes for the Māori population. It also sought a co-governance model between the Crown, Māori and local councils for the delivery of the Three Waters model. However, the new coalition government led by National has indicated that it will abolish both these initiatives (Hill 2023; RNZ 2023).
Citations:
Hill, R. 2023. “Election could bring massive change for Māori health services.” RNZ, October 12. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/te-manu-korihi/499995/election-could-bring-massive-change-for-maori-health-services
Martin, H. 2022. “Cheat Sheet: How New Zealand’s Health System Is Changing.” Stuff, June 18. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/health/300614631/cheat-sheet-how-new-zealands-health-system-is-changing
RNZ. 2023. “National pledges to scrap Three Waters and ‘deliver local water well’.” 15 February. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/484842/national-pledges-to-scrap-three-waters-and-deliver-local-water-well
Whanau Ora. 2023. “History of Whanau Ora.” https://www.horoutawhanauora.com/history-of-whanau-ora/
Hill, R. 2023. “Election could bring massive change for Māori health services.” RNZ, October 12. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/te-manu-korihi/499995/election-could-bring-massive-change-for-maori-health-services
Martin, H. 2022. “Cheat Sheet: How New Zealand’s Health System Is Changing.” Stuff, June 18. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/health/300614631/cheat-sheet-how-new-zealands-health-system-is-changing
RNZ. 2023. “National pledges to scrap Three Waters and ‘deliver local water well’.” 15 February. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/484842/national-pledges-to-scrap-three-waters-and-deliver-local-water-well
Whanau Ora. 2023. “History of Whanau Ora.” https://www.horoutawhanauora.com/history-of-whanau-ora/
Norway
Equal access to high-quality public services across the country for all citizens is a national policy objective. The provision of these services is decentralized to 356 local authorities and, for specialized health services, to four regional state enterprises. The legislation regulating service production is based on the principle of providing citizens with rights to services of high, professionally defined quality.
The combination of local responsibility for provision and national quality standards creates tension within the system. A comprehensive system of central state economic transfers to local authorities aims to match the amount given to each municipality with quantitative indicators of service needs. For medical general practitioners and childcare, the state also transfers resources directly to the service providers. This system is intended to ensure equal and high service quality for all citizens. However, national performance and quality indicators are controversial and exist only for some diagnosis-related treatments in hospitals.
The tension between central standard-setting and local service provision is not restricted to traditional welfare services; it is also evident in the provision of other public goods, such as well-functioning ecosystems and area planning.
The combination of local responsibility for provision and national quality standards creates tension within the system. A comprehensive system of central state economic transfers to local authorities aims to match the amount given to each municipality with quantitative indicators of service needs. For medical general practitioners and childcare, the state also transfers resources directly to the service providers. This system is intended to ensure equal and high service quality for all citizens. However, national performance and quality indicators are controversial and exist only for some diagnosis-related treatments in hospitals.
The tension between central standard-setting and local service provision is not restricted to traditional welfare services; it is also evident in the provision of other public goods, such as well-functioning ecosystems and area planning.
Slovenia
Slovenia’s government is highly centralized, with all major public administrative institutions and ministries located in the capital. Although some institutions, including administrative units, inspectorates, and institutes, have territorial units, there is a clear hierarchy among them. Furthermore, Slovenia does not have regions; the subnational level is represented solely by 212 municipalities with limited competences. The division of responsibilities between the national and local levels can sometimes lead to conflicts, particularly regarding the funding of local infrastructure such as bridge maintenance or water management licenses.
In recent years, the issue of unequal workloads among administrative units has emerged. Slovenia has 58 administrative units responsible for performing state administration tasks uniformly at the subnational level. These tasks include issuing identity cards, travel documents, and driving licenses, as well as registering residences and vehicles, issuing certificates and permits for public events, weapons, building and use permits, and certificates for checking the conformity of buildings.
The division of administrative units dates back to the previous political system, resulting in significant variations in their size and workload. In 2023, the Ministry of Public Administration proposed an amendment to the Act on State Administration to address these disparities. The amendment allows for transferring local jurisdiction between administrative units if a unit cannot manage a large number of cases within a reasonable time frame. This measure aims to expedite case resolutions and reduce backlogs for service users.
In recent years, the issue of unequal workloads among administrative units has emerged. Slovenia has 58 administrative units responsible for performing state administration tasks uniformly at the subnational level. These tasks include issuing identity cards, travel documents, and driving licenses, as well as registering residences and vehicles, issuing certificates and permits for public events, weapons, building and use permits, and certificates for checking the conformity of buildings.
The division of administrative units dates back to the previous political system, resulting in significant variations in their size and workload. In 2023, the Ministry of Public Administration proposed an amendment to the Act on State Administration to address these disparities. The amendment allows for transferring local jurisdiction between administrative units if a unit cannot manage a large number of cases within a reasonable time frame. This measure aims to expedite case resolutions and reduce backlogs for service users.
Citations:
Al. Ma. 2023. “Vlada za možnost prenosa krajevne pristojnosti med upravnimi enotami.” MMC RTV SLO, February 1. https://www.rtvslo.si/slovenija/vlada-za-moznost-prenosa-krajevne-pristojnosti-med-upravnimi-enotami/656494
Al. Ma. 2023. “Vlada za možnost prenosa krajevne pristojnosti med upravnimi enotami.” MMC RTV SLO, February 1. https://www.rtvslo.si/slovenija/vlada-za-moznost-prenosa-krajevne-pristojnosti-med-upravnimi-enotami/656494
Sweden
Over the past decades, public services have been extensively decentralized. Once the provision and management of services are transferred from the national level to local governments, safeguarding national standards – and even defining and sustaining those standards – becomes problematic. This issue is exacerbated with increasingly privatized services, where oversight over national standards is even more challenging.
For a unitary state, the Swedish subnational level has pronounced autonomy, constitutionally protected in the idea of “kommunal självstyre,” or municipal self-government (SKR, 2024). In practice, this does not mean the 21 regions and 290 municipalities can make policy as they wish; rather, they have considerable leeway in implementing broadly articulated national policy and providing a wide range of welfare services, such as healthcare, which is the responsibility of the regions, and education, which is the responsibility of the municipalities.
The national government employs extensive evaluation structures to control policy implementation at the national level. Public agencies manage these evaluations. For example, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (Myndigketen för samhällsskydd och beredskap, MSB) oversees Risk and Vulnerability Analyses, which are reported up the levels of governance from the municipal to the national (MSB, 2021). Municipal public servants have expressed concerns that these reports become instrumental, creating disproportionate work relative to the benefits they provide.
For a unitary state, the Swedish subnational level has pronounced autonomy, constitutionally protected in the idea of “kommunal självstyre,” or municipal self-government (SKR, 2024). In practice, this does not mean the 21 regions and 290 municipalities can make policy as they wish; rather, they have considerable leeway in implementing broadly articulated national policy and providing a wide range of welfare services, such as healthcare, which is the responsibility of the regions, and education, which is the responsibility of the municipalities.
The national government employs extensive evaluation structures to control policy implementation at the national level. Public agencies manage these evaluations. For example, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (Myndigketen för samhällsskydd och beredskap, MSB) oversees Risk and Vulnerability Analyses, which are reported up the levels of governance from the municipal to the national (MSB, 2021). Municipal public servants have expressed concerns that these reports become instrumental, creating disproportionate work relative to the benefits they provide.
Citations:
MSB (The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency). 2021. “Risk- och sårbarhetsanalyser.” https://www.msb.se/sv/amnesomraden/krisberedskap–civilt-forsvar/risk–och-sarbarhetsanalyser/
SKR (Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions). 2024. “Lokala självstyret, historiskt tillbakablick.” https://skr.se/skr/demokratiledningstyrning/styrningledning/kommunaltsjalvstyre/lokalasjalvstyrethistorisktillbakablick.61409.html
MSB (The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency). 2021. “Risk- och sårbarhetsanalyser.” https://www.msb.se/sv/amnesomraden/krisberedskap–civilt-forsvar/risk–och-sarbarhetsanalyser/
SKR (Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions). 2024. “Lokala självstyret, historiskt tillbakablick.” https://skr.se/skr/demokratiledningstyrning/styrningledning/kommunaltsjalvstyre/lokalasjalvstyrethistorisktillbakablick.61409.html
7
Australia
The federal government is committed to providing uniform national services and works to ensure consistent program delivery, particularly in health and education. This is complicated by differences in state sizes, population distribution, and resistance from state governments keen to preserve their independence. Variation in funding levels according to need, determined by the Commonwealth Grants Commission, helps ensure uniformity.
High-level coordination mechanisms, including the National Cabinet, provide a forum for governments of all jurisdictions to discuss mutual concerns. The federal bargain, enforced through constitutional law and the courts, grants states significant autonomy over service provision. The national government, with greater revenue-raising capacity, can incentivize certain services and act as a provider of last resort. However, states retain significant control over public service delivery in education, healthcare, public transport, and housing, resulting in policy divergence across jurisdictions.
The COVID-19 pandemic was a critical period in Australian federalism, leading to the institutionalization of the National Cabinet and a revival of state power. The Australian federal system contributed to the country’s low mortality rate, as states could devise policies suited to their circumstances, with the National Cabinet smoothing potential clashes. However, the National Cabinet did not always ensure coherence, as shown by unilateral decisions to close/open state borders during and after the pandemic, which may have increased economic costs.
High-level coordination mechanisms, including the National Cabinet, provide a forum for governments of all jurisdictions to discuss mutual concerns. The federal bargain, enforced through constitutional law and the courts, grants states significant autonomy over service provision. The national government, with greater revenue-raising capacity, can incentivize certain services and act as a provider of last resort. However, states retain significant control over public service delivery in education, healthcare, public transport, and housing, resulting in policy divergence across jurisdictions.
The COVID-19 pandemic was a critical period in Australian federalism, leading to the institutionalization of the National Cabinet and a revival of state power. The Australian federal system contributed to the country’s low mortality rate, as states could devise policies suited to their circumstances, with the National Cabinet smoothing potential clashes. However, the National Cabinet did not always ensure coherence, as shown by unilateral decisions to close/open state borders during and after the pandemic, which may have increased economic costs.
Citations:
Murphy, J.R., and E. Arban. 2023. “Assessing the Performance of Australian Federalism in Responding to the Pandemic.” Publius 51 (4): 627-649. https://academic.oup.com/publius/article/51/4/627/6352190
Murphy, J.R., and E. Arban. 2023. “Assessing the Performance of Australian Federalism in Responding to the Pandemic.” Publius 51 (4): 627-649. https://academic.oup.com/publius/article/51/4/627/6352190
Estonia
A number of public services in Estonia are provided at the local level, although the quantity and quality of services vary greatly relative to the size and capacity of municipalities. According to the Estonian constitution, local self-governments can independently decide on all local issues. The rights and responsibilities of local governments are stipulated in detail in the Local Government Organization Act. In 2018, a major local government reform was undertaken, reducing the number of municipalities from 213 to 79. This reform aimed to enhance local governance capacity and improve the quality of public services, addressing resource shortages, especially in smaller and remote areas.
Estonia’s population is projected to decline by 2040 in all but two counties. While the whole country will lose about 2% of its population by 2040, most regions will lose more than 20% of their population, bringing population density to one of the lowest levels in Europe (OECD 2021). In international comparison, Estonia is among the least decentralized countries when measured by the subnational government share of general government spending as a share of GDP (ibid.).
While Estonian municipalities are legally responsible for a number of public services, their capacity to fulfill these responsibilities is limited due to high dependency on central grants, significant differences in per capita revenues and a lack of regional cooperation. Most state grants are earmarked and equalized against regional differences; however, they may disincentivize efficient service delivery and do not allow for adaptation to regional needs and demand (OECD 2022).
Since 2017, regulations have set the main principles for the governance of services, but these regulations provide broad directions rather than concrete quality standards. This approach is due to both disparities between municipalities and increasing local discrepancies in service delivery that respond to different needs. Although Estonia scores high with regard to the digitalization of services, there are challenges related to the quality, access, and integration of these solutions due to a lack of cooperation between responsible agencies (Elbrecht and Kobin 2022).
Thus, while a formal system is in place to ensure a basic universal list of services in each municipality, the implementation process faces serious challenges due to a shortage of qualified labor in regions, resulting in difficult trade-offs between accessibility and quality. Furthermore, the serious effects of a shrinking population are not widely understood among municipalities or citizens (OECD 2022).
Despite a large share of unmet medical needs, a lack of health centers in nearly a third of municipalities and limited out-of-hours appointments (NAO 2022), Estonia performs comparatively well in terms of people’s satisfaction with public services (OECD 2023). However, the shortage of doctors, teachers, policemen and rescue workers has reached a level at which the provision of public services according to established quality standards faces serious challenges (NAO 2022).
Recent strategic documents and state reform plans all agree that important steps need to be taken to effectively collaborate with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services, and several pilots and e-solutions are being undertaken. However, the issue does not seem to be a lack of analysis or an overarching vision, but rather the ability and courage to implement the agreed-upon goals. This will require the central government to enhance voluntary cooperation between municipalities, especially for services that benefit from a larger scale – for example, education and some infrastructure such as roads – so as to better utilize economies of scale and improve the scope of public service provision at the municipal level.
Estonia’s population is projected to decline by 2040 in all but two counties. While the whole country will lose about 2% of its population by 2040, most regions will lose more than 20% of their population, bringing population density to one of the lowest levels in Europe (OECD 2021). In international comparison, Estonia is among the least decentralized countries when measured by the subnational government share of general government spending as a share of GDP (ibid.).
While Estonian municipalities are legally responsible for a number of public services, their capacity to fulfill these responsibilities is limited due to high dependency on central grants, significant differences in per capita revenues and a lack of regional cooperation. Most state grants are earmarked and equalized against regional differences; however, they may disincentivize efficient service delivery and do not allow for adaptation to regional needs and demand (OECD 2022).
Since 2017, regulations have set the main principles for the governance of services, but these regulations provide broad directions rather than concrete quality standards. This approach is due to both disparities between municipalities and increasing local discrepancies in service delivery that respond to different needs. Although Estonia scores high with regard to the digitalization of services, there are challenges related to the quality, access, and integration of these solutions due to a lack of cooperation between responsible agencies (Elbrecht and Kobin 2022).
Thus, while a formal system is in place to ensure a basic universal list of services in each municipality, the implementation process faces serious challenges due to a shortage of qualified labor in regions, resulting in difficult trade-offs between accessibility and quality. Furthermore, the serious effects of a shrinking population are not widely understood among municipalities or citizens (OECD 2022).
Despite a large share of unmet medical needs, a lack of health centers in nearly a third of municipalities and limited out-of-hours appointments (NAO 2022), Estonia performs comparatively well in terms of people’s satisfaction with public services (OECD 2023). However, the shortage of doctors, teachers, policemen and rescue workers has reached a level at which the provision of public services according to established quality standards faces serious challenges (NAO 2022).
Recent strategic documents and state reform plans all agree that important steps need to be taken to effectively collaborate with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services, and several pilots and e-solutions are being undertaken. However, the issue does not seem to be a lack of analysis or an overarching vision, but rather the ability and courage to implement the agreed-upon goals. This will require the central government to enhance voluntary cooperation between municipalities, especially for services that benefit from a larger scale – for example, education and some infrastructure such as roads – so as to better utilize economies of scale and improve the scope of public service provision at the municipal level.
Citations:
Elbrecht, G., and R. Kobin. 2023. “Riigireformi analüüs. Riigireformi tagasivaade ja riigivalitsemise edasised suunad.” Rahandusministeerium. https://www.fin.ee/riigihaldus-ja-avalik-teenistus/riigihaldus/riigireform
National Audit Office. 2022. “Healthcare Trends in Estonia.” https://www.riigikontroll.ee/Suhtedavalikkusega/Pressiteated/tabid/168/ItemId/2378/amid/557/language/en-US/Default.aspx
OECD. 2022. “Executive Summary.” In Shrinking Smartly in Estonia: Preparing Regions for Demographic Change, OECD Publishing, Paris. https://doi.org/10.1787/e7bfbd91-en
OECD. 2023. “Government at a Glance. Estonia.” https://www.oecd.org/publication/government-at-a-glance/2023/country-notes/estonia-e1676b75#section-d1e27
Elbrecht, G., and R. Kobin. 2023. “Riigireformi analüüs. Riigireformi tagasivaade ja riigivalitsemise edasised suunad.” Rahandusministeerium. https://www.fin.ee/riigihaldus-ja-avalik-teenistus/riigihaldus/riigireform
National Audit Office. 2022. “Healthcare Trends in Estonia.” https://www.riigikontroll.ee/Suhtedavalikkusega/Pressiteated/tabid/168/ItemId/2378/amid/557/language/en-US/Default.aspx
OECD. 2022. “Executive Summary.” In Shrinking Smartly in Estonia: Preparing Regions for Demographic Change, OECD Publishing, Paris. https://doi.org/10.1787/e7bfbd91-en
OECD. 2023. “Government at a Glance. Estonia.” https://www.oecd.org/publication/government-at-a-glance/2023/country-notes/estonia-e1676b75#section-d1e27
Finland
The organization of public healthcare, social welfare and rescue services in Finland was reformed in 2023. Responsibility for these crucial public services was transferred from municipalities to so-called well-being services counties. The key objective of the reform was to improve the availability and quality of basic public services throughout Finland. As part of the reform, 21 self-governing well-being services counties were established. Additionally, the Helsinki city administration is responsible for organizing health, social and rescue services within its own area. Municipalities continue to be responsible for educational services, which, along with city planning, constitute their most important functions.
The provision of public services by subnational entities is based on law. Regional authorities supervise the quality and access of these services. However, there are generally very few national minimum standards, and those that are in place mostly pertain to maximum queuing times for healthcare services. Even here, the regional authorities have limited opportunities for enforcement.
Research and development agencies under various ministries monitor the standard of services using a multitude of indicators. The problem with this monitoring system is the sheer number of indicators and the lack of key indicators established at the political level. This monitoring does not lead to sanctions or reforms. Uneven quality levels and access to public services are considered major problems in Finland.
Citizens may file complaints with the Parliamentary Ombudsman. The Ombudsman oversees the legality of actions taken by the authorities, primarily by investigating received complaints.
The provision of public services by subnational entities is based on law. Regional authorities supervise the quality and access of these services. However, there are generally very few national minimum standards, and those that are in place mostly pertain to maximum queuing times for healthcare services. Even here, the regional authorities have limited opportunities for enforcement.
Research and development agencies under various ministries monitor the standard of services using a multitude of indicators. The problem with this monitoring system is the sheer number of indicators and the lack of key indicators established at the political level. This monitoring does not lead to sanctions or reforms. Uneven quality levels and access to public services are considered major problems in Finland.
Citizens may file complaints with the Parliamentary Ombudsman. The Ombudsman oversees the legality of actions taken by the authorities, primarily by investigating received complaints.
Citations:
Hiilamo, H. 2020. “Why did Social and Healthcare Services Reform Fail in Finland?” Socialmedicinsk Tidskrift 97 (3): 433-441.
Hiilamo, H. 2020. “Why did Social and Healthcare Services Reform Fail in Finland?” Socialmedicinsk Tidskrift 97 (3): 433-441.
Latvia
Nationwide minimum standards for all critical areas are established through national laws and service standards, with guidelines for measuring client satisfaction with public services developed in 2019.
The Public Utilities Regulatory Commission, an independent state body, monitors the activities of public service providers and market development in Latvia. It ensures that citizens receive uninterrupted, reliable, high-quality public services at economically reasonable prices. The commission oversees eight sectors: natural gas, electricity, heat, water, electronic communications, postal services, packaging deposits, and municipal waste disposal.
In 2020, the Cabinet of Ministers accepted a new medium-term plan, the “Service Environment Improvement Plan 2020 – 2023.” This plan aims to modernize public services and public administration, focusing on user-oriented, proactive, and efficient service delivery. It aligns with government priorities for structural reforms and modern governance. The plan envisions accessible, supportive, and personalized public services utilizing modern technologies and innovative solutions. Its goals include providing innovative and efficiently organized public services, shifting from reactive to proactive service, focusing on citizens’ and businesses’ needs, integrating services at regional and European levels, and moving toward primarily digital service delivery. However, an ex post assessment of the plan’s impacts has not yet been conducted.
The State Audit Office, which audits local authorities, prepared a handbook in 2023 summarizing its recommendations and key findings regarding public service delivery, including advice on how local governments can ensure minimum standards in public service provision.
The central government, through various ministries, oversees compliance with minimum standards. For example, in 2021, the Ministry of Welfare reported on efforts to develop a unified approach for social services in municipalities, aiming to ensure minimum standards across Latvia. Typically, each ministry oversees standards within its specific area, while local authorities have broad responsibilities, allowing them to set and implement varying quality and minimum service standards with some flexibility. This decentralized approach indicates that while there are efforts for uniformity at the national level, local implementation varies. Nevertheless, there are many cooperative intergovernmental bodies.
There are no financial sanctions for noncompliance, but there is financial accountability. The central government may dismiss those responsible for not ensuring compliance with minimum standards. For example, the municipality of Rēzekne city is facing a severe financial crisis, with a shortfall of several million euros for 2023 expenses. In response, the municipality prepared a long-term financial improvement plan. However, upon evaluation, the Ministry of Finance remained unconvinced that the municipality could meet its obligations to creditors. Consequently, the minister for environmental protection and regional development dismissed the mayor.
Subnational governments in Latvia use key performance indicators (KPIs) to varying extents to implement reforms and comply with minimum standards. Studies and proposals have highlighted the importance of collecting and compiling data in public administration. Although current data collection practices have evolved, they have not always been a priority during reforms, resulting in fragmented or inconsistent practices. There is an awareness of the need for effective data use and KPIs in subnational governance, but practical implementation and consistency across various regions still need improvement.
The Public Utilities Regulatory Commission, an independent state body, monitors the activities of public service providers and market development in Latvia. It ensures that citizens receive uninterrupted, reliable, high-quality public services at economically reasonable prices. The commission oversees eight sectors: natural gas, electricity, heat, water, electronic communications, postal services, packaging deposits, and municipal waste disposal.
In 2020, the Cabinet of Ministers accepted a new medium-term plan, the “Service Environment Improvement Plan 2020 – 2023.” This plan aims to modernize public services and public administration, focusing on user-oriented, proactive, and efficient service delivery. It aligns with government priorities for structural reforms and modern governance. The plan envisions accessible, supportive, and personalized public services utilizing modern technologies and innovative solutions. Its goals include providing innovative and efficiently organized public services, shifting from reactive to proactive service, focusing on citizens’ and businesses’ needs, integrating services at regional and European levels, and moving toward primarily digital service delivery. However, an ex post assessment of the plan’s impacts has not yet been conducted.
The State Audit Office, which audits local authorities, prepared a handbook in 2023 summarizing its recommendations and key findings regarding public service delivery, including advice on how local governments can ensure minimum standards in public service provision.
The central government, through various ministries, oversees compliance with minimum standards. For example, in 2021, the Ministry of Welfare reported on efforts to develop a unified approach for social services in municipalities, aiming to ensure minimum standards across Latvia. Typically, each ministry oversees standards within its specific area, while local authorities have broad responsibilities, allowing them to set and implement varying quality and minimum service standards with some flexibility. This decentralized approach indicates that while there are efforts for uniformity at the national level, local implementation varies. Nevertheless, there are many cooperative intergovernmental bodies.
There are no financial sanctions for noncompliance, but there is financial accountability. The central government may dismiss those responsible for not ensuring compliance with minimum standards. For example, the municipality of Rēzekne city is facing a severe financial crisis, with a shortfall of several million euros for 2023 expenses. In response, the municipality prepared a long-term financial improvement plan. However, upon evaluation, the Ministry of Finance remained unconvinced that the municipality could meet its obligations to creditors. Consequently, the minister for environmental protection and regional development dismissed the mayor.
Subnational governments in Latvia use key performance indicators (KPIs) to varying extents to implement reforms and comply with minimum standards. Studies and proposals have highlighted the importance of collecting and compiling data in public administration. Although current data collection practices have evolved, they have not always been a priority during reforms, resulting in fragmented or inconsistent practices. There is an awareness of the need for effective data use and KPIs in subnational governance, but practical implementation and consistency across various regions still need improvement.
Citations:
Sabiedrisko pakalpojumu regulēšanas komisija. 2023. “Gada pārskats 2022.” https://www.sprk.gov.lv/sites/default/files/editor/SPRK_gada_parskats_2022_.pdf
Ministru kabinets. 2020. “Par pakalpojumu vides pilnveides plānu 2020.-2023. gadam.” https://www.vestnesis.lv/op/2020/27.3
Valsts kontrole. 2023. “Pašvaldību rokasgrāmata.” https://www.lrvk.gov.lv/uploads/files/Dokumenti/Par%20mums/Strat%C4%93%C4%A3ija/Pasvaldibu_rokasgramata_01_12_2023.pdf
Labklājības ministrija. 2021. “Informatīvais ziņojums par vienmērīgu sociālo pakalpojumu tīkla attīstību pašvaldībās un vienotas pieejas veidošanu sociālo pakalpojumu nodrošināšanā iedzīvotājiem.” https://tapportals.mk.gov.lv/legal_acts/8d83ec55-047f-4f8c-ab7d-7bb181cd67db
Vides aizsardzības un reģionālās attīstības ministrija. 2023. “VARAM Minister I. Bērziņa No Amata Atstādina Rēzeknes Valstspilsētas Domes Priekšsēdētāju.” https://www.varam.gov.lv/lv/jaunums/varam-ministre-i-berzina-no-amata-atstadina-rezeknes-valstspilsetas-domes-priekssedetaju
Konsorts. 2016. “Zinātniskais pētījums – Vietējās pašvaldības vadīšanai nepieciešamie statistikas rādītāji.” https://blis.lps.lv/index.php/component/lpsmedia/?task=file.download&id=107
Sabiedrisko pakalpojumu regulēšanas komisija. 2023. “Gada pārskats 2022.” https://www.sprk.gov.lv/sites/default/files/editor/SPRK_gada_parskats_2022_.pdf
Ministru kabinets. 2020. “Par pakalpojumu vides pilnveides plānu 2020.-2023. gadam.” https://www.vestnesis.lv/op/2020/27.3
Valsts kontrole. 2023. “Pašvaldību rokasgrāmata.” https://www.lrvk.gov.lv/uploads/files/Dokumenti/Par%20mums/Strat%C4%93%C4%A3ija/Pasvaldibu_rokasgramata_01_12_2023.pdf
Labklājības ministrija. 2021. “Informatīvais ziņojums par vienmērīgu sociālo pakalpojumu tīkla attīstību pašvaldībās un vienotas pieejas veidošanu sociālo pakalpojumu nodrošināšanā iedzīvotājiem.” https://tapportals.mk.gov.lv/legal_acts/8d83ec55-047f-4f8c-ab7d-7bb181cd67db
Vides aizsardzības un reģionālās attīstības ministrija. 2023. “VARAM Minister I. Bērziņa No Amata Atstādina Rēzeknes Valstspilsētas Domes Priekšsēdētāju.” https://www.varam.gov.lv/lv/jaunums/varam-ministre-i-berzina-no-amata-atstadina-rezeknes-valstspilsetas-domes-priekssedetaju
Konsorts. 2016. “Zinātniskais pētījums – Vietējās pašvaldības vadīšanai nepieciešamie statistikas rādītāji.” https://blis.lps.lv/index.php/component/lpsmedia/?task=file.download&id=107
Portugal
When competencies are centralized within the central government, national standards are largely applied uniformly due to the control and provision of most public services under central government guidance. Conversely, competencies decentralized to subnational governments (regional governments or local municipalities) allow for more diverse application.
According to the theory of fiscal federalism, if there are minimum standards that should be adhered to nationally, these competencies are generally centralized (e.g., national curriculum in education). Conversely, if there is a desire to adapt to local preferences, competencies should be decentralized (e.g., extracurricular activities).
Despite differences between municipalities in certain services, Decree-Law 36/2023 was approved under the “Closer Government” initiative, converting the Regional Coordination and Development Commissions (CCDR) into public institutes. This change at the regional level allows for the creation of a body to coordinate regional reforms, fostering alignment between national public policies and their regional implementation based on a program contract signed by the prime minister and the presidents of each CCDR. This reform aims to provide higher-quality public services and promote territorial cohesion through decentralization. It is still too early to evaluate whether this objective will be achieved.
According to the theory of fiscal federalism, if there are minimum standards that should be adhered to nationally, these competencies are generally centralized (e.g., national curriculum in education). Conversely, if there is a desire to adapt to local preferences, competencies should be decentralized (e.g., extracurricular activities).
Despite differences between municipalities in certain services, Decree-Law 36/2023 was approved under the “Closer Government” initiative, converting the Regional Coordination and Development Commissions (CCDR) into public institutes. This change at the regional level allows for the creation of a body to coordinate regional reforms, fostering alignment between national public policies and their regional implementation based on a program contract signed by the prime minister and the presidents of each CCDR. This reform aims to provide higher-quality public services and promote territorial cohesion through decentralization. It is still too early to evaluate whether this objective will be achieved.
Citations:
Governo de Portugal. “Descentralização é «o caminho para a coesão territorial».”
https://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/gc23/comunicacao/noticia?i=descentralizacao-e-o-caminho-para-a-coesao-territorial
(02.03.2023)
DRE. 2023. Decreto-Lei nº 36/2023. 1ª série, Nº 102, May 20. https://files.dre.pt/1s/2023/05/10200/0000600027.pdf
Governo de Portugal. “Novos passos no processo de descentralização.”
https://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/gc23/comunicacao/noticia?i=novos-passos-no-processo-de-descentralizacao
(24.05.2023)
Governo de Portugal. “Descentralização é «o caminho para a coesão territorial».”
https://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/gc23/comunicacao/noticia?i=descentralizacao-e-o-caminho-para-a-coesao-territorial
(02.03.2023)
DRE. 2023. Decreto-Lei nº 36/2023. 1ª série, Nº 102, May 20. https://files.dre.pt/1s/2023/05/10200/0000600027.pdf
Governo de Portugal. “Novos passos no processo de descentralização.”
https://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/gc23/comunicacao/noticia?i=novos-passos-no-processo-de-descentralizacao
(24.05.2023)
Spain
Increased territorial inequalities among public administrations constrain subnational self-governments from meeting national minimum standards for delivering public services. The central government has always aimed to ensure uniform national standards, but this has not been completely effective. Regional governments sometimes design and implement their own public policies without following clearly defined national standards. Few national standards or performance indicators exist for important policy areas such as social services, education, or transport.
In some policy fields, subnational governments use key performance indicators to implement reforms with minimum standards. In other fields, like open government or climate governance, some autonomous communities have adopted higher standards than the national government. As a result, variations in the quality of public services offered by autonomous communities exist, as reflected in recent education (PISA 2023), public health (FADSP 2023), and quality of government (European Commission 2021) reports. Minimum standards are set by basic framework national legislation but are not enforced effectively. The High Inspectorate has not been particularly effective in monitoring the provision of services by autonomous communities.
Regulations on financial sustainability within public administration and local governments have strengthened the central government’s tools to ensure regional and local governments meet national minimum standards. Sanctions for noncompliance are limited. Article 155 of the constitution allows the central government to intervene in an autonomous community, but this instrument has been applied only twice.
In 2022–2023, the national Ministry of Health developed a reform to enhance coordination and multilevel governance within the national health system. The government is establishing a National Public Health Center to improve governance and foster cooperation between the autonomous communities’ healthcare and public health services. The Sectoral Conference for Public Health monitors compliance with minimum standards in the NHS. Other sectoral conferences monitor the implementation of common agreements, especially regarding the execution of the RRP, where compliance is tied to fund transfers.
In some policy fields, subnational governments use key performance indicators to implement reforms with minimum standards. In other fields, like open government or climate governance, some autonomous communities have adopted higher standards than the national government. As a result, variations in the quality of public services offered by autonomous communities exist, as reflected in recent education (PISA 2023), public health (FADSP 2023), and quality of government (European Commission 2021) reports. Minimum standards are set by basic framework national legislation but are not enforced effectively. The High Inspectorate has not been particularly effective in monitoring the provision of services by autonomous communities.
Regulations on financial sustainability within public administration and local governments have strengthened the central government’s tools to ensure regional and local governments meet national minimum standards. Sanctions for noncompliance are limited. Article 155 of the constitution allows the central government to intervene in an autonomous community, but this instrument has been applied only twice.
In 2022–2023, the national Ministry of Health developed a reform to enhance coordination and multilevel governance within the national health system. The government is establishing a National Public Health Center to improve governance and foster cooperation between the autonomous communities’ healthcare and public health services. The Sectoral Conference for Public Health monitors compliance with minimum standards in the NHS. Other sectoral conferences monitor the implementation of common agreements, especially regarding the execution of the RRP, where compliance is tied to fund transfers.
Citations:
European Quality of Government Index. 2021. “European Quality of Government Index 2021.” https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/information-sources/maps/quality-of-government_en
Federación de Asociaciones para la Defensa de la Sanidad Pública. 2023. “Los servicios sanitarios de las CCAA.” https://fadsp.es/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/InformeSerSanCCAA2023.pdf
OECD. 2023. “PISA 2022 Results.” https://www.oecd.org/publication/pisa-2022-results/
European Quality of Government Index. 2021. “European Quality of Government Index 2021.” https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/information-sources/maps/quality-of-government_en
Federación de Asociaciones para la Defensa de la Sanidad Pública. 2023. “Los servicios sanitarios de las CCAA.” https://fadsp.es/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/InformeSerSanCCAA2023.pdf
OECD. 2023. “PISA 2022 Results.” https://www.oecd.org/publication/pisa-2022-results/
6
Austria
In Austria’s federation, many policies are decided at the federal level. In areas where the federal government has the power to legislate through the Nationalrat, central governments can establish national standards. From a purely constitutional perspective, subnational governments have limited room to introduce significantly different public service standards. However, in practice, the central government – notwithstanding the strong constitutional and fiscal centralization that marks the Austrian federation – is remarkably weak when it comes to enforcing its political will against potential resistance from state governments (Eller 2023).
Subnational self-governments in Austria effectively utilize their constitutional scope of discretion. While the constitution limits the competencies and independent financial resources of the states (Länder) and municipalities, national administrative tasks are often carried out by subnational agencies. This gives the states considerable de facto political power.
Each state can largely defend its own way of dealing with certain issues by setting up its own legal and administrative regimes, resulting in a highly complex and opaque system of state and federal rules. This is particularly true in policy fields such as education, health, and construction. There have also been remarkably strong differences between the states in the overall amount of money paid to applicants in various areas of social policy. The COVID-19 pandemic provided the most glaring and dramatic examples of the large diversity of competing rules on Austrian soil. State governors (“Landeshauptleute”) have long been identified as exceptionally powerful political players beyond the national level.
A defining feature of the Austrian federation is that the states do not have to take significant responsibility for their own finances. Only about 2% of the states’ fiscal income is generated at the state level. The majority of the funds are provided by the federal government, and states can negotiate for additional funds if necessary, which is quite common in constitutional practice.
Subnational self-governments in Austria effectively utilize their constitutional scope of discretion. While the constitution limits the competencies and independent financial resources of the states (Länder) and municipalities, national administrative tasks are often carried out by subnational agencies. This gives the states considerable de facto political power.
Each state can largely defend its own way of dealing with certain issues by setting up its own legal and administrative regimes, resulting in a highly complex and opaque system of state and federal rules. This is particularly true in policy fields such as education, health, and construction. There have also been remarkably strong differences between the states in the overall amount of money paid to applicants in various areas of social policy. The COVID-19 pandemic provided the most glaring and dramatic examples of the large diversity of competing rules on Austrian soil. State governors (“Landeshauptleute”) have long been identified as exceptionally powerful political players beyond the national level.
A defining feature of the Austrian federation is that the states do not have to take significant responsibility for their own finances. Only about 2% of the states’ fiscal income is generated at the state level. The majority of the funds are provided by the federal government, and states can negotiate for additional funds if necessary, which is quite common in constitutional practice.
Citations:
Eller, Mathias. 2023. “Federalism in Austria.” In Encyclopedia of Contemporary Constitutionalism, eds. J. Cremades and C. Hermida. Cham: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31739-7_35
Karlhofer, Ferdinand, and Günther Pallaver. 2013. “Strength through Weakness: State Executive Power and Federal Reform in Austria.” Swiss Political Science Review 19 (1): 41-59.
https://www.statistik.at/fileadmin/pages/348/Mindestsicherung_und_Sozialhilfe_der_Bundeslaender_im_Jahr_2021.pdf
https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000142184719/oesterreich-und-der-foerderalismus-land-der-fuerstentuemer
https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000141467766/ein-neuer-foederalismus-muss-her
Eller, Mathias. 2023. “Federalism in Austria.” In Encyclopedia of Contemporary Constitutionalism, eds. J. Cremades and C. Hermida. Cham: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31739-7_35
Karlhofer, Ferdinand, and Günther Pallaver. 2013. “Strength through Weakness: State Executive Power and Federal Reform in Austria.” Swiss Political Science Review 19 (1): 41-59.
https://www.statistik.at/fileadmin/pages/348/Mindestsicherung_und_Sozialhilfe_der_Bundeslaender_im_Jahr_2021.pdf
https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000142184719/oesterreich-und-der-foerderalismus-land-der-fuerstentuemer
https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000141467766/ein-neuer-foederalismus-muss-her
Ireland
Ireland operates a highly centralized parliamentary executive and legislative system, supported by a generalist, apolitical civil service layer dominated by the Department of Finance and the DoT. National government collaborates with regional bodies, but local government is politically, administratively, functionally and financially controlled centrally. This centralization leaves local governments weak, with limited autonomy for a few functions and lacking constitutional protection (Quinlivan 2021). Central government sets standards and monitors their implementation through subnational levels. Critical policies, such as those related to healthcare, social welfare, water services, public transport and housing, are drafted at the national level, with minimal influence from local or regional levels. The Health Services Executive (HSE) is the largest semi-autonomous office in Ireland, responsible for public healthcare services. It operates under the HSE Code of Governance, established by the Ministry for Health and Children in 2007 and last updated in 2015. The HSE was formed by amalgamating local health boards in 2005. Due to cost overruns and service delivery issues, the ministry began reorganizing the HSE into six new health regions in late 2022, aiming for implementation in 2024. This reorganization is intended to allow some level of autonomy and proactivity at regional and local levels.
The Better Public Services strategy is overseen by the Public Services Transformation Division in the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (DPENDR), with arrangements to support its delivery currently being developed.
In environmental services, local governments play a greater role in achieving standards set at both national and EU levels. The Office of Environmental Enforcement works at the local level to guide, advise and audit local authorities’ performance, while the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) enforces standards nationally.
Coordination mechanisms exist to facilitate interministerial policy interaction, but they do not always effectively support implementation across private sector actors. Policy implementation is sometimes delegated to private actors, such as those procuring waste disposal contracts, with central monitoring by the EPA. Although the EPA has some regional offices, it remains a central bureaucracy and executive agency. Subnational ministries do not monitor these activities to ensure effective policy implementation. Central government ministries can intervene at lower political levels if effective implementation is threatened but have limited capacity to direct private actors.
The HSE, EPA and their respective offices oversee the implementation of strategies and ensure compliance with minimum standards. The Climate Change Advisory Council also assists the EPA in monitoring Ireland’s climate action performance. However, in areas such as social housing provision, a lack of transparency and difficulties in accessing necessary resources at the national level have consistently prevented local authorities from meeting nationally set standards.
The Better Public Services strategy is overseen by the Public Services Transformation Division in the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (DPENDR), with arrangements to support its delivery currently being developed.
In environmental services, local governments play a greater role in achieving standards set at both national and EU levels. The Office of Environmental Enforcement works at the local level to guide, advise and audit local authorities’ performance, while the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) enforces standards nationally.
Coordination mechanisms exist to facilitate interministerial policy interaction, but they do not always effectively support implementation across private sector actors. Policy implementation is sometimes delegated to private actors, such as those procuring waste disposal contracts, with central monitoring by the EPA. Although the EPA has some regional offices, it remains a central bureaucracy and executive agency. Subnational ministries do not monitor these activities to ensure effective policy implementation. Central government ministries can intervene at lower political levels if effective implementation is threatened but have limited capacity to direct private actors.
The HSE, EPA and their respective offices oversee the implementation of strategies and ensure compliance with minimum standards. The Climate Change Advisory Council also assists the EPA in monitoring Ireland’s climate action performance. However, in areas such as social housing provision, a lack of transparency and difficulties in accessing necessary resources at the national level have consistently prevented local authorities from meeting nationally set standards.
Citations:
Health Service Executive. 2023. “Health Regions.” https://www.hse.ie/eng/about/who/health-regions/
A. Quinlan. 2021. “Ireland’s ‘Unique Blend’ – Local Government and Policy Analysis.” In J. Hogan and M. P. Murphy, eds., Policy Analysis in Ireland, 79-92. Bristol: Policy Press.
Health Service Executive. 2023. “Health Regions.” https://www.hse.ie/eng/about/who/health-regions/
A. Quinlan. 2021. “Ireland’s ‘Unique Blend’ – Local Government and Policy Analysis.” In J. Hogan and M. P. Murphy, eds., Policy Analysis in Ireland, 79-92. Bristol: Policy Press.
Lithuania
National public-service standards at the subnational level are ensured through centralized or regional governance arrangements. For example, landfills are connected in a regional network of service providers. The decentralized provision of other public services at the local level has produced uneven quality in areas such as school education and the accessibility of primary healthcare services. The Public Management Improvement Program aims to define minimal quality standards for various public functions such as healthcare, education and social services. A recent report from the National Audit Office found that the central government still lacks reliable and comprehensive data on the provision of public services, which is necessary for the effective modernization and standardization of services. More specifically, the National Audit Office recommended improving the accessibility of personal healthcare services in Lithuania.
In March 2022, the government adopted the Public Administration Development Program 2022 – 2030. It acknowledged that the quality of public administration and public services was not systematically monitored and committed to improving it, along with the quality and accessibility of public services across the country. One of the government’s priorities for 2023 was to improve the quality of public services provided by municipalities and their infrastructure by implementing innovative technological solutions.
In March 2022, the government adopted the Public Administration Development Program 2022 – 2030. It acknowledged that the quality of public administration and public services was not systematically monitored and committed to improving it, along with the quality and accessibility of public services across the country. One of the government’s priorities for 2023 was to improve the quality of public services provided by municipalities and their infrastructure by implementing innovative technological solutions.
Citations:
Ministry of Interior of Lithuania. 2023. “The Public Administration Development Program of 2022-2030.” https://vrm.lrv.lt/lt/administracine-informacija/planavimo-dokumentai-2/pletros-programos/2022-2030-metu-viesojo-valdymo-pletros-programa/
Ministry of Interior of Lithuania. 2023. “The Public Administration Development Program of 2022-2030.” https://vrm.lrv.lt/lt/administracine-informacija/planavimo-dokumentai-2/pletros-programos/2022-2030-metu-viesojo-valdymo-pletros-programa/
Switzerland
The Swiss political system is one of the most decentralized systems in the world. The subnational self-governments, called cantons, and the municipalities enjoy substantial autonomy not only in terms of organization but also in terms of policy, while the federal state has a subsidiary role. Within the scope of their quite significant competencies, it is up to the cantons and municipalities to decide what public services they want to offer, to what extent and at what level of quality. While this can lead to “distributive injustice” (Sager & Thomann 2016) – the fact that not all Swiss citizens enjoy the same quality of public service depending on where they live – cantonal flexibility of this kind is a historical feature firmly grounded in the Swiss politico-institutional system. Due to the cantons’ high degree of legislative autonomy, the delegation of tasks applies not only to the actual implementation of federal laws (i.e., the right to act) but also to the adaptation of these provisions to local conditions (i.e., the right to decide). The cantons’ authority extends not only to policy implementation, but also to the tasks of designing and programming policy. Indeed, according to Article 3 of the constitution: “The cantons are sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is not limited by the federal constitution; they shall exercise all rights which are not transferred to the confederation.”
Furthermore, even in areas in which the federal state has tasks and powers, such as social insurance, environmental protection or zoning, the federal level is dependent on the cantons for the implementation of federal legislation. According to Vatter (2007, p. 91), “While the federation holds the legislative power in many areas, responsibility for implementing federal policies resides to a large extent with the cantons.” Cantons have considerable flexibility in performing their work, and the implementation of federal guidelines frequently varies substantially between cantons. Zoning policy has offered examples in which the same federal regulation has led to opposite outcomes in different cantons. In addition, much implementation is carried out by interest organizations through the corporatist channel. According to Sager and Thomann, the delivery of public services varies among the cantons and is determined by the party-political composition of each government, policy pressures and bureaucratic preferences at the cantonal level. This analysis allows for many different constellations, which helps explain the large variation in cantonal implementation of federal laws. Sager et al. (2019) further show how the cantons use their discretionary power to complement federal policies in order to achieve their stated objectives. Sometimes cantons are even key drivers of change in areas that would normally be better addressed at the federal level (e.g., tobacco regulation), thus creating a bottom-up dynamic of policy change (Mavrot & Sager forthcoming 2024). The delivery of public services must therefore be seen as a multilevel process.
Therefore, there are no national standards for public services except regarding those limited parts of the administration that implement federal law. However, all public services must comply with the rule of law and the human rights standards set out in the constitution. A comparatively small number of issues (i.e., social policies, rules regarding health insurance) are decided at the federal level and are thus subject to national standards. In these cases, federal laws are implemented by cantonal administrations and their implementation partners, who have to follow national norms and are subject to strict monitoring. Multilateral agreements between some or all cantons for common standards of public services – known as “Konkordate” – can be seen as a functional equivalent to national policy standards. As member-state implementation in all policy sectors leads to marked differences in both conformance and performance compliance, the federal government increasingly employs nonbinding policy programs instead of legal acts to steer the cantons and ensure distributive justice in service delivery. These programs often take the form of financial incentives or funding schemes for achieving given policy goals. They rest upon deliberative action rather than hierarchical coercion.
Finally, federal agencies are monitored by the Swiss Federal Audit Office and the Parliamentary Control of the Administration. Public and semi-public enterprises are monitored by various independent regulatory agencies.
Furthermore, even in areas in which the federal state has tasks and powers, such as social insurance, environmental protection or zoning, the federal level is dependent on the cantons for the implementation of federal legislation. According to Vatter (2007, p. 91), “While the federation holds the legislative power in many areas, responsibility for implementing federal policies resides to a large extent with the cantons.” Cantons have considerable flexibility in performing their work, and the implementation of federal guidelines frequently varies substantially between cantons. Zoning policy has offered examples in which the same federal regulation has led to opposite outcomes in different cantons. In addition, much implementation is carried out by interest organizations through the corporatist channel. According to Sager and Thomann, the delivery of public services varies among the cantons and is determined by the party-political composition of each government, policy pressures and bureaucratic preferences at the cantonal level. This analysis allows for many different constellations, which helps explain the large variation in cantonal implementation of federal laws. Sager et al. (2019) further show how the cantons use their discretionary power to complement federal policies in order to achieve their stated objectives. Sometimes cantons are even key drivers of change in areas that would normally be better addressed at the federal level (e.g., tobacco regulation), thus creating a bottom-up dynamic of policy change (Mavrot & Sager forthcoming 2024). The delivery of public services must therefore be seen as a multilevel process.
Therefore, there are no national standards for public services except regarding those limited parts of the administration that implement federal law. However, all public services must comply with the rule of law and the human rights standards set out in the constitution. A comparatively small number of issues (i.e., social policies, rules regarding health insurance) are decided at the federal level and are thus subject to national standards. In these cases, federal laws are implemented by cantonal administrations and their implementation partners, who have to follow national norms and are subject to strict monitoring. Multilateral agreements between some or all cantons for common standards of public services – known as “Konkordate” – can be seen as a functional equivalent to national policy standards. As member-state implementation in all policy sectors leads to marked differences in both conformance and performance compliance, the federal government increasingly employs nonbinding policy programs instead of legal acts to steer the cantons and ensure distributive justice in service delivery. These programs often take the form of financial incentives or funding schemes for achieving given policy goals. They rest upon deliberative action rather than hierarchical coercion.
Finally, federal agencies are monitored by the Swiss Federal Audit Office and the Parliamentary Control of the Administration. Public and semi-public enterprises are monitored by various independent regulatory agencies.
Citations:
Linder, W. and S. Mueller. 2021. “Federalism.” In Swiss Democracy, eds. W. Linder and S. Mueller. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63266-3_3
Mavrot, Céline, and Fritz Sager. Forthcoming 2024. “The Local Tackling of Global Issues: A Governance Paradox in Federal States.” Territory, Politics, Governance.
Ritz, M., O. Neumann, and F. Sager. 2019. “Senkt New Public Management die Verwaltungsausgaben in den Schweizer Kantonen? Eine empirische Analyse über zwei Dekaden.” Swiss Polit Sci Rev 25 (3): 226–252. doi:10.1111/spsr.12381
Sager, F., Ingold, K., and Balthasar, A. 2017. Policy-Analyse in der Schweiz: Besonderheiten, Theorien, Beispiele. Zürich: NZZ.
Sager, F., and E. Thomann. 2016. “A Multiple Streams Approach to Member State Implementation Research: Politics, Problem Construction and Policy Paths in Swiss Asylum Policy.” Journal of Public Policy 37 (3): 287–314.
Sager, F., Rüefli, C., and Thomann, E. 2019. “Fixing Federal Faults: Complementary Member State Policies in Swiss Health Care Policy.” International Review of Public Policy 1 (2). http://journals.openedition.org/irpp/426
Vatter, A. 2007. “Federalism.” In Klöti, U. et al., eds., Handbook of Swiss Politics, 2nd edn, 77-99. Zurich: Neue Zürcher Zeitung.
Linder, W. and S. Mueller. 2021. “Federalism.” In Swiss Democracy, eds. W. Linder and S. Mueller. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63266-3_3
Mavrot, Céline, and Fritz Sager. Forthcoming 2024. “The Local Tackling of Global Issues: A Governance Paradox in Federal States.” Territory, Politics, Governance.
Ritz, M., O. Neumann, and F. Sager. 2019. “Senkt New Public Management die Verwaltungsausgaben in den Schweizer Kantonen? Eine empirische Analyse über zwei Dekaden.” Swiss Polit Sci Rev 25 (3): 226–252. doi:10.1111/spsr.12381
Sager, F., Ingold, K., and Balthasar, A. 2017. Policy-Analyse in der Schweiz: Besonderheiten, Theorien, Beispiele. Zürich: NZZ.
Sager, F., and E. Thomann. 2016. “A Multiple Streams Approach to Member State Implementation Research: Politics, Problem Construction and Policy Paths in Swiss Asylum Policy.” Journal of Public Policy 37 (3): 287–314.
Sager, F., Rüefli, C., and Thomann, E. 2019. “Fixing Federal Faults: Complementary Member State Policies in Swiss Health Care Policy.” International Review of Public Policy 1 (2). http://journals.openedition.org/irpp/426
Vatter, A. 2007. “Federalism.” In Klöti, U. et al., eds., Handbook of Swiss Politics, 2nd edn, 77-99. Zurich: Neue Zürcher Zeitung.
Netherlands
National standards are implicit in the nationwide local government funding model, which allocates a share of national tax revenues to the 342 local governments on the basis of numerous variables corrected for economic conjuncture. This funding today comprises 86% of local government budgets. For local governments, the problem with this funding system is its economic volatility and its weak level of responsiveness to new implementation tasks deriving from new national legislation. This frequently implies policy co-production with regional and local government. This of course has budgetary implications which are negotiated per new policy and with different standards. In this way, local governments are turned rapidly into implementers of national policy, and equality of standards is not guaranteed.
Local governments by themselves try to meet mutually agreed-upon standards. Several studies by local audit chambers have involved comparisons and benchmarks for particular kinds of services. Local governments have been organizing voluntary peer reviews of each other’s executive capacities. As part of a knowledge platform (Waarstaatjegemeente.nl), the Association of Dutch Local Governments (VNG) produces a comparative report on the status of local governments that collects relevant policy evaluations and is intended to assist local governments in their policymaking-related information management.
Nevertheless, due to the implementation of ill-considered decentralization plans, which frequently include funding cutbacks (e.g., in local youth care), it is likely that the uniformity of national standards in the delivery of services has diminished. Particularly, perceived disparities between public services in rural as compared to urban areas has become a topic of political concern. This partially contributed to the establishment of a new political party, the Farmers Citizen Movement. Instead of strict output equality, official discourse now refers to “situational equality.”
The fast pace of decentralization eroded many possible benefits. Decentralization was accompanied by the expectation that municipalities could manage with less money. Instead, they have been structurally short of money for years now, leading to a reduction of crucial social services and backlogs in assistance to those who are most vulnerable. Local governments’ high level of dependence on the national government for additional financing during financial shortages is exacerbated by factors such as economic decline. Limited options for increasing local revenues lead either to attempts to seek additional funding from the national government or expenditure cuts. However, expanding municipal taxes itself may have drawbacks, such as creating disparities in service offerings between wealthier and poorer municipalities. Moreover, local revenues can be volatile and sensitive to economic cycles, potentially requiring municipalities to maintain higher reserves or take on more debt during challenging times, depending on the type of taxes levied. Further research is suggested, with the goal of exploring the extent of these issues in countries where local governments rely heavily on their own revenues.
The development toward less equality is somewhat counteracted by increasing cooperation between municipalities in transboundary tasks (e.g., tax collection, garbage collection and treatment, youth care, care for the elderly, regional energy and innovation policy). Cooperation agreements for such transboundary tasks escape normal democratic control by local councils, and have reached numbers, budgets and degrees of intensity that give rise to concerns about the scope and quality of local democracy.
Local governments by themselves try to meet mutually agreed-upon standards. Several studies by local audit chambers have involved comparisons and benchmarks for particular kinds of services. Local governments have been organizing voluntary peer reviews of each other’s executive capacities. As part of a knowledge platform (Waarstaatjegemeente.nl), the Association of Dutch Local Governments (VNG) produces a comparative report on the status of local governments that collects relevant policy evaluations and is intended to assist local governments in their policymaking-related information management.
Nevertheless, due to the implementation of ill-considered decentralization plans, which frequently include funding cutbacks (e.g., in local youth care), it is likely that the uniformity of national standards in the delivery of services has diminished. Particularly, perceived disparities between public services in rural as compared to urban areas has become a topic of political concern. This partially contributed to the establishment of a new political party, the Farmers Citizen Movement. Instead of strict output equality, official discourse now refers to “situational equality.”
The fast pace of decentralization eroded many possible benefits. Decentralization was accompanied by the expectation that municipalities could manage with less money. Instead, they have been structurally short of money for years now, leading to a reduction of crucial social services and backlogs in assistance to those who are most vulnerable. Local governments’ high level of dependence on the national government for additional financing during financial shortages is exacerbated by factors such as economic decline. Limited options for increasing local revenues lead either to attempts to seek additional funding from the national government or expenditure cuts. However, expanding municipal taxes itself may have drawbacks, such as creating disparities in service offerings between wealthier and poorer municipalities. Moreover, local revenues can be volatile and sensitive to economic cycles, potentially requiring municipalities to maintain higher reserves or take on more debt during challenging times, depending on the type of taxes levied. Further research is suggested, with the goal of exploring the extent of these issues in countries where local governments rely heavily on their own revenues.
The development toward less equality is somewhat counteracted by increasing cooperation between municipalities in transboundary tasks (e.g., tax collection, garbage collection and treatment, youth care, care for the elderly, regional energy and innovation policy). Cooperation agreements for such transboundary tasks escape normal democratic control by local councils, and have reached numbers, budgets and degrees of intensity that give rise to concerns about the scope and quality of local democracy.
Citations:
Jansen. 2023. “Principeakkoord over Hervormingsagenda Jeugd. De zorgen over bezuinigingen en financiële afspraken zijn niet geheel weggenomen.” Binnenlands Bestuur May 17.
Bekkers. 2023. “Nieuwe financiering gemeenten pas vanaf 2027.” Binnenlands Bestuur May 2.
Waarstaatjegemeente.nl. 2022.
Jonker. 2023. “Oost-Nederland krijgt te weinig agenten, de Randstad juist relatief veel.” NOS Nieuws March 4.
Platform O. 2022. “Overheid moet meer oog krijgen voor regionaal onbehagen.” In gesprek met hoogleraar Caspar van den Berg, January 25.
Ockhuijsen. 2023. “Een kloof tussen stad en platteland? Dat hangt ervan af aan wie je het vraagt.” Nieuwsuur March 13.
Staat van de uitvoering. 2022. Den Haag. January 18, 2023.
https://nos.nl/artikel/2356722-scp-hoge-verwachtingen-decentralisati e-niet-waargemaakt
https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/longread/de-nederlandse-economie/2020/nederlandse-lokale-overheid-veel-centrale-financiering-veel-decentrale-uitgaven?onepage=true#c-4–Conclusies
Jansen. 2023. “Principeakkoord over Hervormingsagenda Jeugd. De zorgen over bezuinigingen en financiële afspraken zijn niet geheel weggenomen.” Binnenlands Bestuur May 17.
Bekkers. 2023. “Nieuwe financiering gemeenten pas vanaf 2027.” Binnenlands Bestuur May 2.
Waarstaatjegemeente.nl. 2022.
Jonker. 2023. “Oost-Nederland krijgt te weinig agenten, de Randstad juist relatief veel.” NOS Nieuws March 4.
Platform O. 2022. “Overheid moet meer oog krijgen voor regionaal onbehagen.” In gesprek met hoogleraar Caspar van den Berg, January 25.
Ockhuijsen. 2023. “Een kloof tussen stad en platteland? Dat hangt ervan af aan wie je het vraagt.” Nieuwsuur March 13.
Staat van de uitvoering. 2022. Den Haag. January 18, 2023.
https://nos.nl/artikel/2356722-scp-hoge-verwachtingen-decentralisati e-niet-waargemaakt
https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/longread/de-nederlandse-economie/2020/nederlandse-lokale-overheid-veel-centrale-financiering-veel-decentrale-uitgaven?onepage=true#c-4–Conclusies
UK
There are two distinct forms of delegation in the UK: from central government to the devolved governments of Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales according to constitutional provisions, and within the four nations to local governments. Central government is also responsible for England in several policy areas, such as education, as well as certain UK-wide functions like defense and foreign policy.
In England, but not in the other three nations, the relatively recent creation of metro mayors has emerged, mainly (but not exclusively) covering larger conurbations. These mayors have powers over selected policies, such as policing and transport. However, since they rely on large fiscal transfers from central government and have limited taxing powers, their budgets depend heavily on central government, which retains a degree of control over service delivery. Local authorities allocate a significant portion of their budgets to statutory services, particularly social care and education, and are subject to oversight by relevant ministries from central or devolved governments.
Given this complex patchwork, it is difficult to generalize about the central government’s role in meeting national standards, especially when the situation is further complicated by central government having responsibility for England and Wales in some areas, but not Scotland. Central government can intervene to put local authority councils in “special measures” in England if deemed necessary by a minister. This intervention can involve demanding plans for change or, in more extreme cases, appointing commissioners. In the past year, several prominent councils have declared or come close to bankruptcy, often due to ill-judged non-statutory policies, including property or other business schemes. Cuts in transfers from central government, particularly during the austerity period of the previous decade, have also strained local governments, sometimes leading to a retreat to providing only statutory minimum services.
For the devolved governments, especially regarding their major responsibilities like health, central government does not impose or control standards, leaving this to the voters. Compared to the UK, the Welsh and Scottish governments tend to cooperate more with local authorities to ensure relative uniformity in services such as school provision. Scotland also has a separate and distinctive education system. Where policy outcomes differ, central government has no effective role, although in the special case of Northern Ireland, when the executive is suspended due to political disagreements, the UK government rules directly and can, de facto, assure standards.
In England, but not in the other three nations, the relatively recent creation of metro mayors has emerged, mainly (but not exclusively) covering larger conurbations. These mayors have powers over selected policies, such as policing and transport. However, since they rely on large fiscal transfers from central government and have limited taxing powers, their budgets depend heavily on central government, which retains a degree of control over service delivery. Local authorities allocate a significant portion of their budgets to statutory services, particularly social care and education, and are subject to oversight by relevant ministries from central or devolved governments.
Given this complex patchwork, it is difficult to generalize about the central government’s role in meeting national standards, especially when the situation is further complicated by central government having responsibility for England and Wales in some areas, but not Scotland. Central government can intervene to put local authority councils in “special measures” in England if deemed necessary by a minister. This intervention can involve demanding plans for change or, in more extreme cases, appointing commissioners. In the past year, several prominent councils have declared or come close to bankruptcy, often due to ill-judged non-statutory policies, including property or other business schemes. Cuts in transfers from central government, particularly during the austerity period of the previous decade, have also strained local governments, sometimes leading to a retreat to providing only statutory minimum services.
For the devolved governments, especially regarding their major responsibilities like health, central government does not impose or control standards, leaving this to the voters. Compared to the UK, the Welsh and Scottish governments tend to cooperate more with local authorities to ensure relative uniformity in services such as school provision. Scotland also has a separate and distinctive education system. Where policy outcomes differ, central government has no effective role, although in the special case of Northern Ireland, when the executive is suspended due to political disagreements, the UK government rules directly and can, de facto, assure standards.
The central government rarely ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national minimum standards for public service delivery.
5
Belgium
Belgian federalism is centrifugal, having evolved from a unitary state to multiple entities with autonomous decision-making power (Faniel et al. 2021). Several core responsibilities of the Belgian central government have been delegated to provinces and municipalities and some core responsibilities have been transferred to regional or subregional levels: to the three regions (Flanders, the Brussels region, and Wallonia), and to the linguistic communities (Flemish, French, and German). Some standards are set at the federal level but implemented locally. This works well for older standards like access to free education, but newer standards, particularly on environmental issues, are more challenging to impose and are sometimes resisted by the regions.
The federal government can ensure that subnational self-governments (i.e., provinces and municipalities) meet national standards, but it cannot do so for federate entities (regions and linguistic communities). The Belgian federal model is one of cooperation: the state has no formal authority over regions and communities, as there is no hierarchy between the federal and regional/community levels. This creates complications, such as any single region being able to block an international treaty, as happened with the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) in 2016, which was withheld by Wallonia alone. It is also difficult for the federal government to impose budget limits on the regions.
Formally, there is limited capacity to impose common standards. De facto, however, coordination is relatively well enforced due to European regulations and the presence of externalities between the regions. Additionally, the ability to publicly accuse or ridicule each other for incompetence provides leverage. While this creates more scandals than necessary, Belgium continues to function and performs well economically.
The federal government can ensure that subnational self-governments (i.e., provinces and municipalities) meet national standards, but it cannot do so for federate entities (regions and linguistic communities). The Belgian federal model is one of cooperation: the state has no formal authority over regions and communities, as there is no hierarchy between the federal and regional/community levels. This creates complications, such as any single region being able to block an international treaty, as happened with the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) in 2016, which was withheld by Wallonia alone. It is also difficult for the federal government to impose budget limits on the regions.
Formally, there is limited capacity to impose common standards. De facto, however, coordination is relatively well enforced due to European regulations and the presence of externalities between the regions. Additionally, the ability to publicly accuse or ridicule each other for incompetence provides leverage. While this creates more scandals than necessary, Belgium continues to function and performs well economically.
Citations:
Faniel, J., Istasse, C., Lefebve, V., and Sägesser, C. 2021. “La Belgique, un État fédéral singulier.” Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP 2500: 7-266. https://doi.org/10.3917/cris.2500.0007
Faniel, J., Istasse, C., Lefebve, V., and Sägesser, C. 2021. “La Belgique, un État fédéral singulier.” Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP 2500: 7-266. https://doi.org/10.3917/cris.2500.0007
Greece
In Greece, national standards primarily focus on the economic performance of national and subnational authorities and agencies. The Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Finance, and the Audit Office (Elegktiko Synedrio), an independent authority, oversee regional governments and municipalities, with an emphasis on sound fiscal management. This focus emerged from the need for stricter fiscal oversight of Greek ministries and public agencies following the economic crisis of the previous decade.
In contrast, there are few national standards for decentralized public services in areas such as environmental services, education, social assistance, healthcare, land use, waste management, public transport, and housing. Greece’s current national reform program emphasizes priorities and numerical targets rather than comprehensive standards and performance indicators in these areas (Hellenic Republic 2023).
Greek authorities generally adhere to standards set by EU institutions and international forums in which the country participates. For example, the Paris Agreement (2015) and annual global climate change meetings (COP 26, COP 27, and COP 28) have established standards and indicators for environmental protection. Additionally, key performance indicators related to social assistance and healthcare, used by the European Commission and Eurostat, provide a basis for comparative evaluation among the 27 EU member states.
In contrast, there are few national standards for decentralized public services in areas such as environmental services, education, social assistance, healthcare, land use, waste management, public transport, and housing. Greece’s current national reform program emphasizes priorities and numerical targets rather than comprehensive standards and performance indicators in these areas (Hellenic Republic 2023).
Greek authorities generally adhere to standards set by EU institutions and international forums in which the country participates. For example, the Paris Agreement (2015) and annual global climate change meetings (COP 26, COP 27, and COP 28) have established standards and indicators for environmental protection. Additionally, key performance indicators related to social assistance and healthcare, used by the European Commission and Eurostat, provide a basis for comparative evaluation among the 27 EU member states.
Citations:
Hellenic Republic. 2023. “National Reform Program.” https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-05/Greece%20NRP%202023.pdf
Hellenic Republic. 2023. “National Reform Program.” https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-05/Greece%20NRP%202023.pdf
Hungary
In Hungary, the discussion about decentralization, the moderation of the Budapest-centered economy and public life, and the creation of a meso-level containing urban centers with relevant administrative tasks was intensive during the first 20 years after the democratic transition, but yielded no substantive results. Regions were established above the classical administrative meso-level, in the form of the counties (megyék). However, they remained largely statistical units without substantive institutional underpinning, even though counties do have regional-level assemblies. Still, the level of decentralization in Hungary, as a unitary state, was relatively high, and the system of self-governance was substantive. Under the Orbán governments II through V (2010 – present), the situation changed considerably, not toward an empowered meso-level, but toward strengthening the core. Due to the reforms, the quality of subnational public services in some areas has suffered because of organizational change in subnational self-governance structures and severe underfinancing. Generally, the reform initiated under the second Orbán government (2010 – 2014) preferred concentration over decentralization.
With these reforms, the government’s ability to push through centrally set political agendas improved at the expense of the self-governance of spatial units. The principle of subsidiarity was weakened. In 2023, the meso-level and counties were renamed “vármegye” following historical precedents in a typical Fidesz-identitarian move. Overall, during Orbán’s tenure, the countries have lost competencies and financial and human resources. However, the state administration’s new subnational tiers have gradually gained experience in providing services, leading to several improvements for citizens, such as the government windows (kormányablakok), where state services are provided locally.
Public services left with the subnational self-governments have suffered due to a lack of financial resources and administrative capacities, conflicting legal norms, and complex regulations. The central government has exercised strong control, resulting in the undermining of national standards, especially in healthcare, education and social services.
However, as central deconcentrated authorities have taken over some administrative tasks, the duties of smaller villages have been bundled with those of smaller cities. Between 2010 and 2020, there was a concentration and fusion of local agencies. These agencies were partly merged and elevated to the county level (Barta 2021), significantly reducing the number of institutions. National standards have been strengthened to some extent, at the cost of local and regional autonomy. Local autonomy, in particular, was reduced more significantly. The central government’s relationship with the local council of Budapest, led by influential opposition leader Gergely Karácsony, has been especially tense. The central government has threatened not to finance key infrastructural projects, such as the renovation of the city’s emblematic Chain Bridge, and has created overriding competencies in the area of public transport. In 2023, the government levied a special “solidarity tax” on wealthy municipalities to redirect local business taxes toward more underdeveloped areas, which the local council of Budapest has found unfair and has partially refused to pay (Budapest Business Journal, 2023). The government often awards direct subventions to specific municipalities on a political basis through ad hoc support schemes. The decentralization index of the Committee of Regions of the EU (2024) ranks Hungary in the midfield at 15th place out of 27 in the area of regional decentralization and relatively low at 21st out of 27 for local decentralization.
With these reforms, the government’s ability to push through centrally set political agendas improved at the expense of the self-governance of spatial units. The principle of subsidiarity was weakened. In 2023, the meso-level and counties were renamed “vármegye” following historical precedents in a typical Fidesz-identitarian move. Overall, during Orbán’s tenure, the countries have lost competencies and financial and human resources. However, the state administration’s new subnational tiers have gradually gained experience in providing services, leading to several improvements for citizens, such as the government windows (kormányablakok), where state services are provided locally.
Public services left with the subnational self-governments have suffered due to a lack of financial resources and administrative capacities, conflicting legal norms, and complex regulations. The central government has exercised strong control, resulting in the undermining of national standards, especially in healthcare, education and social services.
However, as central deconcentrated authorities have taken over some administrative tasks, the duties of smaller villages have been bundled with those of smaller cities. Between 2010 and 2020, there was a concentration and fusion of local agencies. These agencies were partly merged and elevated to the county level (Barta 2021), significantly reducing the number of institutions. National standards have been strengthened to some extent, at the cost of local and regional autonomy. Local autonomy, in particular, was reduced more significantly. The central government’s relationship with the local council of Budapest, led by influential opposition leader Gergely Karácsony, has been especially tense. The central government has threatened not to finance key infrastructural projects, such as the renovation of the city’s emblematic Chain Bridge, and has created overriding competencies in the area of public transport. In 2023, the government levied a special “solidarity tax” on wealthy municipalities to redirect local business taxes toward more underdeveloped areas, which the local council of Budapest has found unfair and has partially refused to pay (Budapest Business Journal, 2023). The government often awards direct subventions to specific municipalities on a political basis through ad hoc support schemes. The decentralization index of the Committee of Regions of the EU (2024) ranks Hungary in the midfield at 15th place out of 27 in the area of regional decentralization and relatively low at 21st out of 27 for local decentralization.
Citations:
Barta, A. 2021. “Innovative Solutions in Hungary’s Deconcentrated State Administration.” Curentul Juridic 85(2): 37-51.
Budapest Business Journal. 2023. “Budapest to Withhold Part of Central Gov’t ‘Solidarity’ Tax.” 20 April. https://bbj.hu/politics/domestic/government/budapest-to-withhold-part-of-central-gov-t-solidarity-tax
European Union Committee of the Regions. 2024. “Decentralization Index Hungary.” https://portal.cor.europa.eu/divisionpowers/Pages/Decentralization-Index.aspx?countryName=hungary
Barta, A. 2021. “Innovative Solutions in Hungary’s Deconcentrated State Administration.” Curentul Juridic 85(2): 37-51.
Budapest Business Journal. 2023. “Budapest to Withhold Part of Central Gov’t ‘Solidarity’ Tax.” 20 April. https://bbj.hu/politics/domestic/government/budapest-to-withhold-part-of-central-gov-t-solidarity-tax
European Union Committee of the Regions. 2024. “Decentralization Index Hungary.” https://portal.cor.europa.eu/divisionpowers/Pages/Decentralization-Index.aspx?countryName=hungary
Israel
In general, there is no national standard for the provision of local services. These services fall into two categories: those regulated by law and primarily funded by the central government; those funded by municipalities through local taxes, which are not regulated by the central government (Finkelstein 2020). Education and welfare services belong to the first category. The government funds 75% of these services, while localities contribute 25%. Most services are regulated in terms of target populations, content and benefits. Affluent localities with large budgets can supplement these services from their own funds, while poorer localities struggle to meet the 25% funding requirement. This disparity creates inequality in the services provided by different localities.
In the second type of services, there is no regulation and the decision on standards is left to the local authority. For instance, the local authority determines how many times a week trash should be collected and what cultural activities are provided. In education and welfare, the central government oversees the local authority to ensure that standards are met. In all other areas, there is no oversight.
Healthcare is national, and local authorities are minimally involved in decisions regarding the placement of clinics and services. Public transport is also national and falls under the responsibility of the Ministry of Transportation, which regulates all aspects.
In the second type of services, there is no regulation and the decision on standards is left to the local authority. For instance, the local authority determines how many times a week trash should be collected and what cultural activities are provided. In education and welfare, the central government oversees the local authority to ensure that standards are met. In all other areas, there is no oversight.
Healthcare is national, and local authorities are minimally involved in decisions regarding the placement of clinics and services. Public transport is also national and falls under the responsibility of the Ministry of Transportation, which regulates all aspects.
Citations:
Finkelstein, A. 2020. Local Government in Israel: General Background, Core Issues and Challenges. Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute.
Finkelstein, A. 2020. Local Government in Israel: General Background, Core Issues and Challenges. Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute.
Italy
The issue of establishing a minimum standard for public services in Italy is highly complex. Law No. 42 of 2009 on fiscal federalism aimed to address this through several mechanisms: taxation of state transfers, estimation of standard expenditure requirements for territorial authorities, new equalization mechanisms to balance the differences between entities’ fiscal capacities and their needs, convergence toward minimum service standards for all entities, and infrastructure equalization through special interventions. However, these measures have only been partially implemented and are not fully developed in terms of content. Italian policymakers have limited the scope of minimum standards to three main areas: health, welfare, and education (assigned to the Regions under current regulations), and local public transport concerning capital expenditure. The only system of minimum standards that has been clearly designed and somewhat implemented pertains to healthcare. A detailed list of minimum standards is created at the national level for the regions, which are responsible for providing healthcare. A national committee chaired by the Minister of Health conducts annual monitoring, which has revealed significant variations in regional capacity to meet these standards. In the latest monitoring (2021, published in 2023), seven regions did not meet the standards. Notably, these regions do not incur significant costs for failing to meet the standards. Although there was a provision to cut their public funds by 3%, it was never implemented.
Regarding education, the minimum standards set by the state are very general. Decree Law No. 226 of 2005 includes requirements such as meeting attendance demand, providing guidance and tutoring, supporting educational continuity, implementing training apprenticeships and alternate experiences related to professional figures, and acquiring IT and English skills. These standards are formal, not clearly defined, and difficult to monitor.
The 2022 budget law, approved in December 2021, established the first minimum social welfare standards. These include providing 30 nursery places per 100 children aged 3 to 36 months and employing one social worker per 6,500 inhabitants by 2026 in every Italian municipality.
For national standards in utilities (e.g., water, electricity, and telecoms), independent authorities are generally responsible for their definition and implementation. Implementation in this area has been fairly adequate.
Overall, there is no firm government policy on minimum standards for relevant policy fields. Utilities appear to have fair policies due to their distinct management characteristics. Where these standards exist, there is no central policy to correct or adjust local situations where they are not met.
On March 23, 2023, the center-right government presented its bill on differentiated autonomy to parliament. This legislation would allow regions to gain more power in 23 policy areas, provided they guarantee a specific minimum standard for each new policy competence they wish to acquire. The definition of these minimum standards is currently under discussion. The government has set up a committee of 61 experts to develop a proposal.
A significant issue with implementing differentiated autonomy is the allocation of financial resources. Without a robust central redistribution fund, the resources available to less affluent regions would be insufficient to meet minimum standards in critical areas.
Regarding education, the minimum standards set by the state are very general. Decree Law No. 226 of 2005 includes requirements such as meeting attendance demand, providing guidance and tutoring, supporting educational continuity, implementing training apprenticeships and alternate experiences related to professional figures, and acquiring IT and English skills. These standards are formal, not clearly defined, and difficult to monitor.
The 2022 budget law, approved in December 2021, established the first minimum social welfare standards. These include providing 30 nursery places per 100 children aged 3 to 36 months and employing one social worker per 6,500 inhabitants by 2026 in every Italian municipality.
For national standards in utilities (e.g., water, electricity, and telecoms), independent authorities are generally responsible for their definition and implementation. Implementation in this area has been fairly adequate.
Overall, there is no firm government policy on minimum standards for relevant policy fields. Utilities appear to have fair policies due to their distinct management characteristics. Where these standards exist, there is no central policy to correct or adjust local situations where they are not met.
On March 23, 2023, the center-right government presented its bill on differentiated autonomy to parliament. This legislation would allow regions to gain more power in 23 policy areas, provided they guarantee a specific minimum standard for each new policy competence they wish to acquire. The definition of these minimum standards is currently under discussion. The government has set up a committee of 61 experts to develop a proposal.
A significant issue with implementing differentiated autonomy is the allocation of financial resources. Without a robust central redistribution fund, the resources available to less affluent regions would be insufficient to meet minimum standards in critical areas.
Citations:
https://www.salute.gov.it/portale/lea/dettaglioContenutiLea.jsp?lingua=italiano&id=1300&area=Lea&menu=leaEssn
Napolitano, G.M. 2023. Finalmente i livelli.
essenziali delle prestazioni sociali? La legge di bilancio 2022 tra ambiguità e nuovi sviluppi. Diritti regionali n. 1: 51-134
https://www.salute.gov.it/portale/lea/dettaglioContenutiLea.jsp?lingua=italiano&id=1300&area=Lea&menu=leaEssn
Napolitano, G.M. 2023. Finalmente i livelli.
essenziali delle prestazioni sociali? La legge di bilancio 2022 tra ambiguità e nuovi sviluppi. Diritti regionali n. 1: 51-134
4
Canada
Canada is a highly decentralized federation where the provinces hold significant authority over many key economic, environmental, and social programs. In most cases, the federal government has little to no control over provincial actions in these areas, necessitating a system of “federal-provincial diplomacy” to advance its interests (Simeon 1972).
Moreover, Canada’s federal system has no formal provisions that specifically address federal-provincial coordination. Pressing federal-provincial issues and other matters requiring intergovernmental discussions are usually addressed in the annual First Ministers’ Conference, which includes the prime minister, provincial premiers, and territorial leaders, along with their officials. These meetings are called by the prime minister and have no formal schedule. Some similar informal arrangements exist in areas such as education and forestry. The lack of any requirement for these conferences to be held regularly has been a cause for concern regarding ongoing problems with federal-provincial coordination in many areas (Simeon 1985).
Due to the nature of this system, there are very few national standards for public service delivery in Canada, as provincial governments have extensive freedom to determine their policy objectives, instruments, and designs. When the federal government transfers funds to the provinces, it could have some practical leverage to establish standards but typically does not use this leverage because its exercise has proven counterproductive in the past (Simeon 1980).
National standards often face opposition from provinces – primarily Québec and Alberta in the modern era, but at various points in Canadian history, other provinces as well. This opposition results in a political struggle that the federal government might not win. In healthcare, for example, provincial governments must conform to the five principles of the 1984 Canada Health Act: care must be available to all eligible residents of Canada, comprehensive in coverage, accessible without financial or other barriers, portable within the country and during travel abroad, and publicly administered. However, funds from the Canada Health Transfer (CHT) are rarely withheld by the federal government even if these principles are violated or ignored. Similarly, the Canada Social Transfer (CST), which supports social assistance in provinces among other things, has a very low bar of conditionality.
Yet, within the context of the Canadian constitution, the federal government has exercised leadership in specific areas. For example, during the pandemic, it worked with provinces and territories on protective equipment and vaccines. Similarly, a Common Statement of Principles on Shared Health Care Priorities was established with provinces and territories in 2017, and agreements on universal day care were signed with provinces and territories in 2021. The government of Canada is also supporting independent agencies developing national standards around long-term care.
Moreover, Canada’s federal system has no formal provisions that specifically address federal-provincial coordination. Pressing federal-provincial issues and other matters requiring intergovernmental discussions are usually addressed in the annual First Ministers’ Conference, which includes the prime minister, provincial premiers, and territorial leaders, along with their officials. These meetings are called by the prime minister and have no formal schedule. Some similar informal arrangements exist in areas such as education and forestry. The lack of any requirement for these conferences to be held regularly has been a cause for concern regarding ongoing problems with federal-provincial coordination in many areas (Simeon 1985).
Due to the nature of this system, there are very few national standards for public service delivery in Canada, as provincial governments have extensive freedom to determine their policy objectives, instruments, and designs. When the federal government transfers funds to the provinces, it could have some practical leverage to establish standards but typically does not use this leverage because its exercise has proven counterproductive in the past (Simeon 1980).
National standards often face opposition from provinces – primarily Québec and Alberta in the modern era, but at various points in Canadian history, other provinces as well. This opposition results in a political struggle that the federal government might not win. In healthcare, for example, provincial governments must conform to the five principles of the 1984 Canada Health Act: care must be available to all eligible residents of Canada, comprehensive in coverage, accessible without financial or other barriers, portable within the country and during travel abroad, and publicly administered. However, funds from the Canada Health Transfer (CHT) are rarely withheld by the federal government even if these principles are violated or ignored. Similarly, the Canada Social Transfer (CST), which supports social assistance in provinces among other things, has a very low bar of conditionality.
Yet, within the context of the Canadian constitution, the federal government has exercised leadership in specific areas. For example, during the pandemic, it worked with provinces and territories on protective equipment and vaccines. Similarly, a Common Statement of Principles on Shared Health Care Priorities was established with provinces and territories in 2017, and agreements on universal day care were signed with provinces and territories in 2021. The government of Canada is also supporting independent agencies developing national standards around long-term care.
Citations:
Simeon, Richard. 1985. Intergovernmental Relations. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Simeon, Richard. 1980. “Intergovernmental Relations and the Challenges to Canadian Federalism.” Canadian Public Administration 23 (1): 14-32.
Simeon, Richard. 1972. Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The Making of Recent Policy in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/corporate/transparency/health-agreements/principles-shared-health-priorities.html
https://www.canada.ca/en/early-learning-child-care-agreement/agreements-provinces-territories.html
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/programs/consultation-safe-long-term-care/document.html#a1
Simeon, Richard. 1985. Intergovernmental Relations. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Simeon, Richard. 1980. “Intergovernmental Relations and the Challenges to Canadian Federalism.” Canadian Public Administration 23 (1): 14-32.
Simeon, Richard. 1972. Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The Making of Recent Policy in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/corporate/transparency/health-agreements/principles-shared-health-priorities.html
https://www.canada.ca/en/early-learning-child-care-agreement/agreements-provinces-territories.html
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/programs/consultation-safe-long-term-care/document.html#a1
Poland
The Polish model of decentralization, based on a three-tier territorial division comprising voivodeships (first level), counties (second level) and municipalities (third level), is among the most effective in Europe, as indicated by the very high score on the Local Autonomy Index. Tasks assigned to municipalities are diverse, and include spatial planning, real estate management, environmental and nature protection, water management, organization of municipal roads and traffic, water supply, telecommunications activities, local public transport, health protection, social assistance, municipal housing construction, public education, and culture.
Supervisory and oversight activities are mainly carried out by the voivode – the representative of the central bureaucracy in the regions – and, in financial matters, by the regional audit office (Regionalna Izba Obrachunkowa). If the oversight authority declares a resolution or order to be invalid, this suspends its execution by the municipal body. In the event of repeated violations of the constitution or laws, the Sejm may dissolve a municipal council.
Starting in 2015, the conservative government initiated a gradual process of centralization. Unlike Hungary, where changes have been more radical, this centralization was achieved through micro-level decisions in various areas. The government increased control over municipalities’ revenues and redistributed them using central grant programs according to a political framework.
By 2021, the government began to expand its competencies further. On June 8, 2023, the Sejm adopted a law that introduced additional municipal oversight criteria, including reliability, economy and efficiency, alongside the existing criterion of legal compliance. Although this legal amendment was not formally enacted, local authorities interpreted the change as an expansion of control rather than mere supervision, which is the chambers’ designated role.
Supervisory and oversight activities are mainly carried out by the voivode – the representative of the central bureaucracy in the regions – and, in financial matters, by the regional audit office (Regionalna Izba Obrachunkowa). If the oversight authority declares a resolution or order to be invalid, this suspends its execution by the municipal body. In the event of repeated violations of the constitution or laws, the Sejm may dissolve a municipal council.
Starting in 2015, the conservative government initiated a gradual process of centralization. Unlike Hungary, where changes have been more radical, this centralization was achieved through micro-level decisions in various areas. The government increased control over municipalities’ revenues and redistributed them using central grant programs according to a political framework.
By 2021, the government began to expand its competencies further. On June 8, 2023, the Sejm adopted a law that introduced additional municipal oversight criteria, including reliability, economy and efficiency, alongside the existing criterion of legal compliance. Although this legal amendment was not formally enacted, local authorities interpreted the change as an expansion of control rather than mere supervision, which is the chambers’ designated role.
Citations:
Lackowska, M., et al. 2023. “The Local Government Index 2023.” https://www.batory.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/The.Local-Government.Index_.2023.pdf
Lackowska, M., et al. 2023. “The Local Government Index 2023.” https://www.batory.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/The.Local-Government.Index_.2023.pdf
USA
The system of federalism in the United States creates very uneven delivery of public services across the nation (Singh 2012). The Constitution gave Congress limited powers, including the ability to lay and collect taxes, pay debts and borrow money, declare war, and raise and support an Army and Navy. Powers not listed belong to the states. Since 1887 Congress has been using the interstate commerce clause to regulate interstate commerce – a powerful tool for Congress to expand its power vis-à-vis the subnational level.
The most powerful tool the federal government has to enforce uniform standards, beyond Supreme Court judgments, is imposing conditionality on national funding to states and localities. It is very common for the federal government to seek to achieve its policy priorities by making funding conditional, either as a condition of receipt of the funds or as a condition for receipt of further funds. This method of central control is known in the academic literature as “fiscal federalism” (Hackett 2017).
While fiscal federalism can be a powerful tool, it is an imperfect one. The ability of federal officials to monitor the activities of state actors is ultimately limited by the information state governments provide or that federal agents can try to collect. More significantly, state governments often attempt to bend the conditions of funding to pursue their own policy aims. In some cases, states simply refuse the funding altogether in an expression of disagreement with the federal government’s policy priorities (Miller 2008).
Jamila Michener (2018) has compellingly discussed how Medicaid, a federally funded public health insurance program for those in poverty, is unevenly delivered. Although most of the funding comes from the federal government, states are empowered to shape the delivery of the service. This means some states impose higher levels of conditionality on Medicaid qualification than others, leading to substantial variation in the types of conditions and services Medicaid funds from state to state. This has repercussions for the internal mobility of poor Americans, who might be hesitant to move to a different state – even if employment opportunities are more attractive – due to the potential loss of health insurance for themselves or a dependent. Overall, federalism tends to exacerbate conditions of inequality within the United States, with poorer areas trapped in poverty and wealthier areas hoarding their wealth (Kelly and Witko 2012).
The most powerful tool the federal government has to enforce uniform standards, beyond Supreme Court judgments, is imposing conditionality on national funding to states and localities. It is very common for the federal government to seek to achieve its policy priorities by making funding conditional, either as a condition of receipt of the funds or as a condition for receipt of further funds. This method of central control is known in the academic literature as “fiscal federalism” (Hackett 2017).
While fiscal federalism can be a powerful tool, it is an imperfect one. The ability of federal officials to monitor the activities of state actors is ultimately limited by the information state governments provide or that federal agents can try to collect. More significantly, state governments often attempt to bend the conditions of funding to pursue their own policy aims. In some cases, states simply refuse the funding altogether in an expression of disagreement with the federal government’s policy priorities (Miller 2008).
Jamila Michener (2018) has compellingly discussed how Medicaid, a federally funded public health insurance program for those in poverty, is unevenly delivered. Although most of the funding comes from the federal government, states are empowered to shape the delivery of the service. This means some states impose higher levels of conditionality on Medicaid qualification than others, leading to substantial variation in the types of conditions and services Medicaid funds from state to state. This has repercussions for the internal mobility of poor Americans, who might be hesitant to move to a different state – even if employment opportunities are more attractive – due to the potential loss of health insurance for themselves or a dependent. Overall, federalism tends to exacerbate conditions of inequality within the United States, with poorer areas trapped in poverty and wealthier areas hoarding their wealth (Kelly and Witko 2012).
Citations:
Lisa Miller. 2008. The Perils of Federalism: Race, Poverty, and the Politics of Crime Control. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nathan Kelly, and Christopher Witko. 2012. “Federalism and American Inequality.” Journal of Politics.
Ursula Hackett. 2017. “Offers and Throffers: Education Policy Under Obama.” In The Obama Presidency and the Politics of Change, eds. E. Ashbee and J. Dumbrell. Palgrave.
Jamila Michener. 2018. Fragmented Democracy: Medicaid, Federalism, and Unequal Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lisa Miller. 2008. The Perils of Federalism: Race, Poverty, and the Politics of Crime Control. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nathan Kelly, and Christopher Witko. 2012. “Federalism and American Inequality.” Journal of Politics.
Ursula Hackett. 2017. “Offers and Throffers: Education Policy Under Obama.” In The Obama Presidency and the Politics of Change, eds. E. Ashbee and J. Dumbrell. Palgrave.
Jamila Michener. 2018. Fragmented Democracy: Medicaid, Federalism, and Unequal Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3
Slovakia
Clearly defined nationwide minimum standards to guide the decentralized provision of public services in critical areas such as environmental services, social assistance, land use, waste management, public transport, and housing are poorly defined, especially concerning the independent functions of subnational governments. Moreover, compliance monitoring with these standards is often fragmented. If the service is the original responsibility of a self-government, like waste management, the state does not set any standards related to its delivery (however, requirements defined by the EU directives automatically apply).
In healthcare, the Healthcare Surveillance Authority supervises the delivery of health services; however, standard diagnostic and treatment procedures are still not codified. Regional self-governments are responsible for the minimum network of primary care facilities, and central authorities monitor the achievement of the centrally defined minimum standard (Government decree from 12 January 2022).
The Ministry of Education approves applications from primary and secondary schools to join the “school network” (law 245/2008 Z. z. on education). However, the minimum network is not defined. The Ministry also issues the national curricula for primary and secondary education. Compliance with the national curricula is monitored by the State School Inspection.
In healthcare, the Healthcare Surveillance Authority supervises the delivery of health services; however, standard diagnostic and treatment procedures are still not codified. Regional self-governments are responsible for the minimum network of primary care facilities, and central authorities monitor the achievement of the centrally defined minimum standard (Government decree from 12 January 2022).
The Ministry of Education approves applications from primary and secondary schools to join the “school network” (law 245/2008 Z. z. on education). However, the minimum network is not defined. The Ministry also issues the national curricula for primary and secondary education. Compliance with the national curricula is monitored by the State School Inspection.
Citations:
Nariadenie vlády Slovenskej republiky z 12. januára 2022, ktorým sa ustanovujú podrobnosti o spôsobe ustanovenia minimálnej siete poskytovateľov všeobecnej ambulantnej starostlivosti. 2022. https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2022/11/20220201
Zákon 245/2008 o výchove a vzdelávaní (školský zákon). https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2008/245/
https://www.ssi.sk/
Nariadenie vlády Slovenskej republiky z 12. januára 2022, ktorým sa ustanovujú podrobnosti o spôsobe ustanovenia minimálnej siete poskytovateľov všeobecnej ambulantnej starostlivosti. 2022. https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2022/11/20220201
Zákon 245/2008 o výchove a vzdelávaní (školský zákon). https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2008/245/
https://www.ssi.sk/
The central government does nothing to ensure that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
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