Luxembourg

   

Executive Capacity

#14
Key Findings
With its comparatively small administration, Luxembourg falls into the upper-middle ranks internationally (rank 14) with respect to executive capacity. Its score on this measure is unchanged relative to 2014.

The country’s small executive has limited resources for strategic planning. The Prime Minister’s Office lacks broad policy-assessment and coordination capacities, and is not legally allowed to work with line ministries in policy preparation. The prime minister is responsible for policy communication, with consensus between ministers an important norm.

Informal coordination is very important. Implementation is generally effective if somewhat slow. A new municipal-finance reform aims to provide municipalities with greater financial security. The PMO does not have the resources to formally monitor ministry activities.

RIAs for draft bills are required, but are not publicly available or independently evaluated. Policy development typically involves broad and institutionalized consultation with economic interest groups and other civil-society organizations as relevant.

Strategic Capacity

#22

How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?

10
 9

Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
 8
 7
 6


Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
 5
 4
 3


Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
 2
 1

In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
Strategic Planning
4
Luxembourg’s small size and thus the small size of its administration, does not allow for sufficient strategic planning capacity. A few public bodies offer simulations, such as the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies Luxembourg (STATEC) and the General Inspectorate of Social Security (Inspection Générale de la Sécurité Sociale, IGSS). The State Economic and Social Council (Conseil économique et social) and the merged public research institute LISER offer more qualitative analyses. The research department of the central bank (Banque Centrale du Luxembourg) and the general inspectorate of the financial sector (Commission de surveillance du secteur financier, CSSF), focus on economics and finance planning. While these institutions are state-financed, they are nevertheless not sufficiently equipped to offer long-term planning activities. State Economic and Social Council reports are partly written by civil servants of the relevant ministry departments. Strategic planning is mostly done, if not commissioned, by institutions abroad, which offer the advantage of independence and guidance via international standards. Once a report is submitted, negotiations begin between the minister and promoters; the final compromise is a draft of the project, designed abroad.

Citations:
“Autres acteurs.” Le portail des statistiques du Luxembourg, www.statistiques.public.lu/fr/acteurs/autres/index.html. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Banque centrale du Luxembourg, www.bcl.lu/fr/index.html. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier, www.cssf.lu/en/. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Conseil économique et social, www.ces.public.lu/fr.html. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research, www.liser.lu. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

How influential are non-governmental academic experts for government decisionmaking?

10
 9

In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with a panel of non-governmental academic experts at an early stage of government decision-making.
 8
 7
 6


For major political projects, the government transparently consults with a panel of non-governmental academic experts at an early stage of government decision-making.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, the government transparently consults with a panel of non-governmental academic experts at an early stage of government decision-making.
 2
 1

The government does not consult with non-governmental academic experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
Scholarly Advice
7
Luxembourg’s main research institutions were founded only recently. For instance, the national university was founded in 2003. Three additional national research centers (CRP-Gabriel Lippmann, CRP-Henri Tudor, CRP-Santé) were founded in 1999, which were later combined into two research centers: the Luxembourg Institute of Science and Technology and Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research. The House of Innovation also provides space for about 500 scientists and researchers from CRP-Henri Tudor, Luxinnovation and the Dr. Widong Center in Esch-Beval.

For major policy reform projects, the government mostly consults highly reputed institutions abroad. Receiving scholarly advice from institutions abroad favors independent analysis. Considering the country’s small size, links between government and national research facilities are strong.

Citations:
“Annuaire de la compétitivité 2015: un peu mieux, mais est-ce durable?” Union des Entreprises Luxembourgeoises, www.uel.lu/410-annuaire-de-la-competitivite-2015. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Genevois, Anne-Sophie. “Pratiques des entreprises du secteur privé en matière de prospection de candidats à l’embauche.” Population et Emploi, vol. 42, 20 Aug. 2009, www.statistiques.public.lu/catalogue-publications/population-emploi-CEPS/2009/PDF-Population-et-Emploi-42-2009.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Grubb, David. Audit du service public de l’emploi au Luxembourg. OECD, 2007. www.oecd.org/fr/els/39424034.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Rössler, Wulf. Gemeindepsychiatrie: Grundlagen Und Leitlinien: Planungsstudie Luxemburg. Verlag Integrative Psychiatrie, 1993.

Rössler, Wulf. Psychiatrie Luxemburg: Stand der Umsetzung der Empfehlungen der Planungsstudie 2005. Ministère-Direction de la Santé, 2009. www.sante.public.lu/fr/publications/r/rapport-rossler-psychiatrie-lux-de-2009/rapport-rossler-psychiatrie-lux-de-2009.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Interministerial Coordination

#9

Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills substantively?

10
 9

The GO / PMO has comprehensive sectoral policy expertise and provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s strategic and budgetary priorities.
 8
 7
 6


The GO / PMO has sectoral policy expertise and evaluates important draft bills.
 5
 4
 3


The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise, but does not evaluate draft bills.
 2
 1

The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
GO Expertise
6
The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) employs around 40 civil servants, mostly trained in law, economics and political sciences. As a result, the PMO does not have sufficient resources to assess all the activities of government ministries. Due to the limited capacities of all ministries, including the PMO, there is no management body or special committee designated to manage interministerial coordination. After the inauguration of the new government in December 2013, interministerial coordination presented some difficulties.
Senior civil servants in the ministries prepare a “pré-conseil” or pre-briefing for the weekly meeting of ministers (conseil de gouvernement). All draft bills have to be adopted at both stages, before being introduced to parliament, as well as revised within these two interministerial meetings. The Inspectorate General of Finance (Inspection générale des finances, IGF) evaluates draft bills and participates in numerous committees.

Citations:
“Budgeting in Luxembourg: Analysis and recommendations.” OECD Journal on Budgeting, Supplement 1, vol. 2012, 2013, www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/governance/oecd-journal-on-budgeting-volume-2012-supplement-1_budget-v12-sup1-en#.WL7foKw2to5#page81. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Conseil de gouvernement.” Le portal de l’actualité gouvermentale, www.gouvernement.lu/1719191/conseil-gouv. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Gouvernement.” Le portal de l’actualité gouvermentale, www.gouvernement.lu/1719075/gouvernement. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Inspection générale de la sécurité sociale.” Ministère de la Sécurité Sociale, www.mss.public.lu/acteurs/igss/index.html. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Inspection générale des finances, www.igf.etat.lu. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Can the government office / prime minister’s office return items envisaged for the cabinet meeting on the basis of policy considerations?

10
 9

The GO/PMO can return all/most items on policy grounds.
 8
 7
 6


The GO/PMO can return some items on policy grounds.
 5
 4
 3


The GO/PMO can return items on technical, formal grounds only.
 2
 1

The GO/PMO has no authority to return items.
GO Gatekeeping
8
The long period of leadership of former Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker (in office 1995 – 2013) gave him the authority to reject policy proposals or inspire new policy projects. In general, the prime minister can withdraw a project or a draft bill without formal procedures. However, the prime minister is considered the first among equals (primus inter pares) and should avoid interfering where possible, particularly in issues that are the responsibility of ministers from other coalition parties. Consultative bodies, interministerial meetings and the Inspection General of Finance (Inspection générale des finances, IGF), which is affiliated with the budget ministry, function as arbiters in policymaking.

Citations:
“Mémorial A n° 173 de 2009.” Journal officiel du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, 29 July 2009, legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/memorial/2009/173#page=2. Accessed 7 Mar. 2017.

To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?

10
 9

There are inter-related capacities for coordination in the GO/PMO and line ministries.
 8
 7
 6


The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
 5
 4
 3


Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
 2
 1

Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
Line Ministries
8
The Prime Minister’s Office is not legally allowed to be involved in the preparation of bills or proposals by line ministries. Sensitive political proposals are often contained in the coalition program. There are no institutionalized mechanisms of coordination between line ministries and there is no unit dealing with policy assessment and evaluation. Informally, however, no sensitive proposal is presented to the Council of Ministers without being approved beforehand by the prime minister. An informal body of ministerial civil servants meets ahead of the Council of Ministers, to prepare the agenda and make adjustments if needed. Even though the prime minister has not held the influential finance portfolio since 2009, his central role in the governance process has not been weakened.

Citations:
“Arrêté grand-ducal du 28 janvier 2015 portant constitution des Ministères.” Journal officiel du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, 30 Jan. 2015, legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/agd/2015/01/28/n1/jo. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Gouvernement.” Le portal de l’actualité gouvermentale, www.gouvernement.lu/1719075/gouvernement. Accessed 7 Mar. 2017.

Le gouvernement du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg. Le Service information et presse du gouvernement luxembourgeois, 2013. www.gouvernement.lu/3723809/SIP_Gouvernement_2016_EN. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?

10
 9

The large majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
 8
 7
 6


Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
 5
 4
 3


There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
 2
 1

There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
Cabinet Committees
8
There are no cabinet committees, in the strict sense. The Council of Ministers (Luxembourg’s cabinet) has to rely entirely on the work of line ministries or interministerial groups, if more than one department is concerned. Generally, the Council of Ministers is well prepared, as only bills that have been accepted informally are presented. Moreover, bills must be scrutinized by experts at the Ministry of Finance and the inspector general of finance (Inspection générale des finances), which is comprised of senior civil servants and chaired by the secretary general of the Council of Ministers. This informal body insures that coherence prevails. The Prime Minister’s Office has assumed some horizontal competences on issues that concern more than one ministry, notably in the field of administrative simplification, ethical and deontological questions.

Citations:
“Gouvernement.” Le portal de l’actualité gouvermentale, www.gouvernement.lu/1719075/gouvernement. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Inspection générale des finances, www.igf.etat.lu. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Système politique.” Le portal de l’actualité gouvermentale, www.gouvernement.lu/482644/systeme-politique. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?

10
 9

Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
 8
 7
 6


Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
 5
 4
 3


There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
 2
 1

There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
Ministerial Bureaucracy
9
Senior ministry officials and interministerial meetings are important in the preparation of draft bills and for cabinet meetings. There is both formal and informal coordination in the conception of new policy, in policy modification or in the conception of a pre-draft bill. As part of the process, interministerial ad hoc groups are formed. Normally, a pre-draft bill is already the result of consultation with social partners and civil society groups. Once the pre-draft bill is published, official consultation rounds start again.

Citations:
“Système politique.” Le portail officiel du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, www.luxembourg.public.lu/fr/le-grand-duche-se-presente/systeme-politique/index.html. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Thomas, Bernard, and Laurent Schmit. “Die Unentbehrlichen: Wie viel Macht haben hohe Beamte?” Forum.lu, Sept. 2013, www.forum.lu/pdf/artikel/7693_332_ThomasSchmit.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?

10
 9

Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 8
 7
 6


In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 2
 1

Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Informal Coordination
9
There are many opportunities for informal coordination, given Luxembourg’s small size, its close-knit society and government administration. Those in public administration responsible for early policy research and formulation, are well familiar with representatives of social organizations and members of civil society research institutions. There are many opportunities for informal contact between public servants and experts from research institutions, businesses and civil society. Senior civil servants simultaneously responsible for various projects, have an enormous workload and represent the government within different bodies, boards and committees.

Evidence-based Instruments

#34

To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?

10
 9

RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
 8
 7
 6


RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
 5
 4
 3


RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
 2
 1

RIA are not applied or do not exist.
RIA Application
4
At the end of the 1990s, Luxembourg launched its first draft for regulatory impact assessments (RIAs), to simplify administrative procedures at both, the national and European levels. Since 2004, the government has systematized the potential impact of legislative proposals by aligning legislative and administrative processes under the responsibility of a competent authority, the Plateforme interministérielle de réforme et de simplification administrative. Furthermore, the so-called Omnibus Bill is currently being deliberated in parliament and should be voted on in early 2017.

Since 2009, all draft bills have been required to undergo a regulatory impact assessment. Within eight weeks before adoption of a draft bill, the government has to carry out consultations with stakeholders, considering their expertise and responding to requests. Based on adequate analyses, a draft bill is adapted, completed and submitted to parliament. The impact assessment is necessarily attached to legislation or regulation submitted to the Council of Ministers. Prior to submission, the secretariat of the Council forwards a copy to the interministerial platform, which prepares a formal statement to the Council.

The standard impact evaluation form (a checklist form, or “fiche d’évaluation d’impact”) was revised in 2010 to include gender mainstreaming principles. It enabled a close cooperation with the Ministry for Equal Opportunities. Although regulatory impact assessment programs have been instituted for some years, there is still room for improvement, especially in making such evidence-based instruments more widespread. Further improvements should be implemented through an ex ante verification process on a national and European level.

Citations:
Building an Institutional Framework for Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA): Guidance for Policy Makers. OECD, 2008. www.oecd.org/regreform/regulatory-policy/40984990.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Gestion de la qualité sur base du modèle d’auto-évaluation CAF.” Portal de la Fonction publique, www.fonction-publique.public.lu/fr/modernisation-etat/qualite-publique/gestion-qualite-base-caf/. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

L’amélioration des organisations publiques par l’auto-évaluation. Centre européen de ressources CAF, 2013. www.fonction-publique.public.lu/fr/publications/brochures/caf/brochure-CAF.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Modernisation de l’Etat.” Portal de la Fonction publique, www.fonction-publique.public.lu/fr/modernisation-etat/index.html. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2015: Luxembourg. OECD, 2015. www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/Luxembourg-web.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?

10
 9

RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
 8
 7
 6


The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
 5
 4
 3


The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
 2
 1

RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
Quality of RIA Process
2
An open and consultative regulatory impact assessment (RIA) process does not exist. The procedure requires an interministerial exchange between governmental departments and coordination groups, including a consultation of experts. Impact assessment data originates from internal ministry documents, which may be consulted by the state Council of Ministers and parliamentary members.

Unlike parliamentary procedures, there is no public access to RIA documents and evaluations are not intended for publication. As in most OECD countries, there is no risk management in the formal process of developing harmonized standards. RIAs are not evaluated by an independent body.

Since the general introduction of RIAs in 2009, there has not been enough transparency or civil society participation in the process. Efforts should be made to increase the involvement of stakeholders.

Citations:
Building an Institutional Framework for Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA): Guidance for Policy Makers. OECD, 2008. www.oecd.org/regreform/regulatory-policy/40984990.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Modernisation de l’État.” Portal de la Fonction publique, www.fonction-publique.public.lu/fr/modernisation-etat/index.html. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.
OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2015. OECD, 2015. www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/oecd-regulatory-policy-outlook-2015_9789264238770-en. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Plateforme interministérielle.” Portal de la Fonction publique, www.fonction-publique.public.lu/fr/support/recherche/index.php?q=plateforme+interministerielle. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Promoting inclusive growth through better regulation. The role of regulatory impact assessment. OECD, 2015. www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=GOV/RPC%282015%294&docLanguage=En. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?

10
 9

Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
 8
 7
 6


Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
 5
 4
 3


Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
 2
 1

Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
Sustainability Check
3
A systematic sustainability assessment process does not exist in Luxembourg. The government plans to introduce effective sustainability checks and the systematic monitoring of relevant administrative and legislative acts. In general, the impact of policies and policy side effects at all levels (economic, social and environmental), need to be evaluated with reference to principles of sustainable development and sustainable decision-making. It is essential to agree on Regulatory impact assessment (RIA) procedures to “benefit from improved coherence and coordination between ministries, civil society and stakeholders.” Sustainability checks at all levels should be made transparent by establishing harmonized legislation with binding RIA standards.

Citations:
Ein nachhaltiges Luxemburg für mehr Lebensqualität. Le gouvernement du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, 2010. www.environnement.public.lu/developpement_durable/dossiers/pndd_2010/PNDD.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Mémorial A n° 102 de 2004.” Journal officiel du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, 2 July 2004, legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/memorial/2004/102#page=2#page=2. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Rapport d’activité 2014. Ministère du Développement durable et des Infrastructures, 2015. www.gouvernement.lu/5330895/2014-rapport-activite-travaux-publics.pdf. Accessed 7 Mar. 2017.

Societal Consultation

#5

To what extent does the government consult with societal actors to support its policy?

10
 9

The government successfully motivates societal actors to support its policy.
 8
 7
 6


The government facilitates the acceptance of its policy among societal actors.
 5
 4
 3


The government consults with societal actors.
 2
 1

The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
Negotiating Public Support
8
Luxembourg is a consensus-oriented society with a well-known model of neo-corporatism (the Luxembourg Model), which became institutionalized in the aftermath of the steel crisis in the 1970s. When introducing a draft bill to parliament, the government normally launches a broad consultation process. Unions and employers’ organizations are consulted in any case; every draft bill is submitted to the respective organization of employees (Chambre des Salariés) and to employers’ organizations (Chambre de Commerce and Chambre des Métiers). Depending on the purpose of the draft bill or the new policy, civil society is included in the process. Nevertheless, the tripartite system is considered to have failed in 2010, when the three partners were unable to reach an agreement on critical issues. However, the new government relaunched the social dialogue with employers and employees and the process has functioned reasonably well since then.

Citations:
Clément, Franz. Consociativisme et dialogue social: Les relations professionnelles au Grand-Duché de Luxembourg. Éditions universitaires européennes, 2012.

Hilgert, Romain. “Ruf nach Leadership.” Land.lu, 18 Jan. 2013, www.land.lu/2013/01/18/ruf-nach-leadership/. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Mémorial A n° 144 de 2015.” Journal officiel du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, 27 July 2015, legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/memorial/2015/144. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Sind Konkordanz-, Konsens- und Drei-Partnermodelle “Schönwetter-Veranstaltungen”? Das Beispiel Luxembourg.” Konkordanzdemokratie: Ein Demokratietyp der Vergangenheit?, edited by Stefan Köppl and Uwe Kranenpohl, Nomos, 2012, pp. 117 – 132.

“Système politique.” Le portail officiel du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, www.luxembourg.public.lu/fr/le-grand-duche-se-presente/systeme-politique/index.html. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Xavier Bettel au sujet des défis du nouveau gouvernement.” Le portail officiel du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, 18 Dec. 2013, www.gouvernement.lu/3370722/16-bettel-tageblatt. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Policy Communication

#6

To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?

10
 9

The government effectively coordinates the communication of ministries; ministries closely align their communication with government strategy. Messages are factually coherent with the government’s plans.
 8
 7
 6


The government coordinates the communication of ministries. Contradictory statements are rare, but do occur. Messages are factually coherent with the government’s plans.
 5
 4
 3


The ministries are responsible for informing the public within their own particular areas of competence; their statements occasionally contradict each other. Messages are sometimes not factually coherent with the government’s plans.
 2
 1

Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually coherent with the government’s plans.
Coherent Communication
8
After Council of Ministers meetings on Fridays, the prime minister holds a public press conference, to communicate the body’s work effectively and coherently. This weekly press briefing had been the government’s main method of communicating. Whereas public press briefings under former Prime Minister Juncker were rare toward the end of his administration, at least at the beginning, public relations have been given more importance under the new coalition.

Aside from the prime minister, no government member has a press officer. Reporting directly to the prime minister, the state Press and Information Service (SIP) works to coordinate a coherent and wide-ranging government communication policy. Government members are encouraged not to voice disagreement in public, so as to make the impression of unanimous decision-making.

Citations:
“Attributions.” Le portal de l’actualité gouvermentale, www.gouvernement.lu/4021433/attributions. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Die acht größten Kommunikationspannen der Regierung.” Luxemburger Wort, 27 Apr. 2015, www.wort.lu/de/politik/nach-dem-ausrutscher-von-schneider-die-acht-groessten-kommunikationspannen-der-regierung-553d34f80c88b46a8ce581f0. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

For further information:

“Service information et presse (SIP).” Le portal de l’actualité gouvermentale, www.gouvernement.lu/sip. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Implementation

#12

To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?

10
 9

The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
 8
 7
 6


The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
 5
 4
 3


The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
 2
 1

The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
Government Efficiency
7
In general, the government can implement its policy objectives, usually outlined in electoral promises or coalition government programs. This might take longer than planned, given that a policy based on maximum consensus is often cumbersome. But projects are sometimes not only slowed down but delayed indefinitely, especially when powerful lobbies are involved. This is particularly the case for major infrastructural or zoning projects, such as the tramway system for the city of Luxembourg, which was under discussion for 25 years before agreement was reached in 2013. A law proposal, that was already very far advanced, was postponed before the 1999 election. Since then, different aspects have been discussed, studies have been carried out and constructions on the first elements of the tram project have started.

Citations:
“Parliament votes for the tram.” Luxemburger Wort, 5 June 2014, www.wort.lu/en/politics/central-train-station-to-luxexpo-parliament-votes-for-the-tram-5390279cb9b398870803124a. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Un tram à Luxembourg en 2017.” Luxemburger Wort, www.wort.lu/fr/luxembourg/un-tram-a-luxembourg-en-2017-4feadec6e4b026f9aa61740e. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

To what extent does the organization of government provide incentives to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?

10
 9

The organization of government successfully provides strong incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 8
 7
 6


The organization of government provides some incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 5
 4
 3


The organization of government provides weak incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 2
 1

The organization of government does not provide any incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program.
Ministerial Compliance
7
The Luxembourg electoral system combines proportional representation of candidate lists and a type of majority system that allows a voter to pick individual candidates by giving them preferential votes on more than one list.
Consequently, the voters, and not the party, decide on the composition of parliament and even of the government, since those candidates with the best results usually become ministers. This system encourages politicians to pursue personal initiatives, but as they generally address small lobbies, such projects do not typically conflict with the government’s agenda.
“Go-it-alone” actions are not uncommon because ministers and candidates want to raise their profile to benefit precisely from these personal votes that ultimately make the difference. Especially in pre-electoral periods, this kind of deviant behavior is quite frequent. Ministers are usually allowed to pursue their pet topics, provided they manage to convince their colleagues in government and the prime minister.

Citations:
“Das Wahlsystem in Luxemburg.” Claude Biver, 11 Oct. 2013, cbiver.eu/?s=das+Wahlsystem. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Fehlen, Fernand. “Für eine Wahlrechtsreform.” Forum.lu, Nov. 2013, www.forum.lu/pdf/artikel/7726_334_Fehlen.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

—. “Wahlsystem und politische Kultur.” Forum.lu, Sept. 2013, www.forum.lu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/7695_332_Fehlen.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Wahlsystem.” Le portail officiel du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, www.luxembourg.public.lu/de/le-grand-duche-se-presente/systeme-politique/systeme-electoral/. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Wahlsystem und politische Kultur.” Forum.lu – Für Politik, Gesellschaft Und Kultur in Luxemburg, Sept. 2013, www.forum.lu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/7695_332_Fehlen.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
 8
 7
 6


The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
 5
 4
 3


The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
 2
 1

The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
Monitoring Ministries
6
There is no formal monitoring by the Prime Minister’s Office, as no institutional resources exist to carry this out. The small size of the government administration and ongoing discussions between ministers, foster a high level of transparency without the necessity of explicit monitoring tools. In case of conflicts, the prime minister moderates and acts as conciliator.

Citations:
Schroen, M. “Das politische System Luxemburgs.” Die Politischen Systeme Westeuropas, edited by Wolfgang Ismayr, 4th ed., VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008, pp. 483 - 514.

How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies and executive agencies with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 8
 7
 6


The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 5
 4
 3


The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 2
 1

The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
Monitoring Agencies, Bureaucracies
8
Executive agencies and the administration usually lack the autonomy to pursue a course of action independent of guidelines issued by the responsible ministers. Sometimes the strong personality of an agency head leads to conflict. If this happens, the views of the minister or his key collaborators usually prevail. In the domain of social security and public finance, monitoring is more centralized and effective, since the financial implications for the state are much more consequential. The two agencies that wield considerable control are the Social Security Inspectorate General (Inspection Générale de la Sécurité Sociale, IGSS), which is attached to the Ministry of Social Security and the General Inspectorate of Finance (Inspection générale des finances, IGF), which is attached to the Ministry of Finance.

Citations:
“Finances publiques.” Ministère des Finances, www.mf.public.lu/finances_publiques/. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Inspection générale de la sécurité sociale.” Ministère de la Sécurité Sociale, www.mss.public.lu/acteurs/igss/. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Inspection générale des finances, www.igf.etat.lu. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?

10
 9

The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
 8
 7
 6


The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
 5
 4
 3


The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
 2
 1

The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
Task Funding
7
Since 2015, the Ministry of the Interior has overseen 105 municipalities in Luxembourg. This supervision is paired with substantial financial transfers from the central government to local entities, which, apart from a substantial share in corporate income tax (CIT) revenues, lack autonomous sources of revenue. Two-thirds of local entities have fewer than 3,000 inhabitants, a size which is believed to be far too small to handle modern political, administrative and technical matters. The government had planned to reduce the number of local municipalities to 71 by the end of 2017. However, the new government has weakened this objective, as it does not correspond to a top-down strategy for municipal mergers. The aim is to have no municipality under 3,000 inhabitants, thus reducing operational costs and improving administrative and technical efficiency. Municipalities frequently complain that funding from the central government is insufficient. The government has used financial transfers to overcome local resistance to municipality mergers. So-called municipal associations (syndicats intercommunaux) exist in fields, such as culture and sports, to help improve the quality of local government. In December 2016, parliament voted in favor of a reform of the municipal finance system. The reform aims to provide municipalities financial and planning security.

Citations:
Halsdorf, J.-M. “Die Kommunal- und Verwaltungsreform im Großherzogtum Luxembourg - Grundzüge und Perspektiven.” Kommunalreformen in Deutschland, edited by Martin Junkernheinrich and Wolfgang H. Lorig, Nomos, 2013, pp. 445 – 462.

“Reform der Gemeindefinanzen: Kersch macht ernst.” Luxemburger Wort, 5 July 2016, www.wort.lu/de/politik/reform-der-gemeindefinanzen-kersch-macht-ernst-577b61f5ac730ff4e7f6304d. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Résumé des travaux du 25 avril 2014.” Le portal de l’actualité gouvermentale, 25 Apr. 2014, www.gouvernement.lu/3673077/25-conseil. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Syndicat des Villes et Communes Luxembourgeoises, www.syvicol.lu. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 8
 7
 6


Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 5
 4
 3


The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 2
 1

The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
Constitutional Discretion
7
Local government increasingly depends on transfers from the central government. Land use regulation was centralized during the review period. Nevertheless, a serious conflict between local interests and the aims of the government’s transport and land use planning body (Integrierte Verkehrs- und Landesplanung, IVL) occurred when the construction of a large business center in a rural region near the capital was not authorized. Following a reform of the education system, municipalities lost one of their major prerogatives, which was the autonomous management of primary school (students four to 12 years old) teaching staff. In return, the government has promised to provide more autonomy, through territorial reform, especially in the form of expanded financial autonomy and the provision of support for municipal finances through regional funds.

Citations:
Eser, Th. W./Scholtes, M. (2008), Raumentwicklung, Regionalpolitik und Landesplanung, in: Lorig, W./Hirsch, M. (ed.), Das politische System Luxembourgs, Wiesbaden, pp. 286-309.

Feist, Peter. “Der Tanz Beginnt | D’Lëtzebuerger Land.” D’Lëtzebuerger Land, 8 Feb. 2013, www.land.lu/2013/02/08/der-tanz-beginnt%E2%80%A9/. Accessed 21 Mar. 2017.

“Schlecht gerüstet.” Forum.lu – Für Politik, Gesellschaft Und Kultur in Luxemburg, June 2013, www.forum.lu/pdf/artikel/7660_330_Eicher.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?

10
 9

Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
 8
 7
 6


Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
 5
 4
 3


Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
 2
 1

Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
National Standards
9
The Ministry of the Interior supports local administration. As part of territorial reforms, the administration responsible for monitoring municipal finances, will be integrated within the existing national Auditing Court (Cour des Comptes). The government is not entirely free to optimize and improve local government. More than one-third of members of parliament also have a local mandate and in 2013 17 worked as city mayors. This is one reason why conflicts of interests between national and local mandates sometimes arise in parliamentary processes, depending on the issues being discussed. In its 2013 program, the government declared that dual mandates would no longer be allowed. Though no reform has yet been implemented.

Citations:
Cour des comptes du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, www.cour-des-comptes.lu/. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Député-maire: deux mandats qui ne seront plus cumulables au Luxembourg.” Luxemburger Wort, 9 Dec. 2013, www.wort.lu/fr/luxembourg/depute-maire-deux-mandats-qui-ne-seront-plus-cumulables-au-luxembourg-52a59f5de4b010cbc9a3834b. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Kein gläserner Abgeordneter.” Tageblatt, 9 Jan. 2013, www.tageblatt.lu/nachrichten/story/31314170. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Théry, Patrick. “Werden Doppelmandate abgeschafft?” L’essentiel, 7 Mar. 2016, www.lessentiel.lu/de/luxemburg/story/19791348. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Adaptability

#10

To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?

10
 9

The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
 8
 7
 6


In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational.
 2
 1

The government has not adapted domestic government structures no matter how useful adaptation might be.
Domestic Adaptability
7
Luxembourg has made progress in implementing European legislation. In terms of the transposition of EU directives, Luxembourg’s performance is moderate, yet it has improved in recent years. Given the size of the country, there is limited scope for improving the government administration’s human resources. A single civil servant is typically responsible for a number of tasks that would be assigned to an entire team in other EU member states. For example, European Social Fund (ESF) activities fall under the responsibility of only four civil servants who have other responsibilities in addition to European programs. Despite a lack of personnel, work expected by European and supranational institutions is completed. The government presented its national plan (Luxembourg 2020. Plan national pour une croissance intelligente, durable et inclusive) in April 2013, in which budgetary mechanisms are adapted.

Luxembourg often responds to international requests by launching an ad hoc group. The country has also done well in conforming national law to EU directives, sometimes transposing laws verbatim. However, this does not guarantee that the law will be followed verbatim; differences between de jure and de facto interpretations have emerged.

Citations:
The 16th update of the Stability and Growth Programme of the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg 2015 - 2019. Ministère des Finances, 2015. www.mf.public.lu/publications/programme/16th_update_stability_growth_programme.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Bilan compétitivité 2015: Stabilité dans un environnement à risques.” Le portal de l’actualité gouvermentale, 22 Oct. 2015, www.gouvernement.lu/5363183/22-closener-competitivite. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. European Commission, 2014. ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2014/eccom2014_en.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Council recommendation on the National Reform Programme 2014 of Luxembourg and delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme of Luxembourg. Official Journal of the European Union, 2014. ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2014/csr2014_council_luxembourg_en.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Europe 2020 in Luxembourg.” European Commission, ec.europa.eu/europe2020/europe-2020-in-your-country/luxembourg/national-reform-programme/index_en.htm. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

National plan for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth - Luxembourg 2020. Ministère de l’Économie, 2016. www.gouvernement.lu/5978972/2016-pnr-luxembourg-en.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Pierre Gramegna présente le Programme de stabilité et de croissance et le Programme national de réforme.” Le portal de l’actualité gouvermentale, 30 Apr. 2015, www.gouvernement.lu/4789506/30-gramegna-stabilite. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Politiques macroéconomiques et evolution de finances publiques 2011 - 2015. Ministère des Finances, 2012. www.mf.public.lu/publications/divers/previsions_fin_180412.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Reporting table on national Europe 2020 targets and key commitments for the next 12 months. European Commission, 2014. ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2014/annex32014_luxembourg_en.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Secrétariat général.” European Commission, ec.europa.eu/info/departments/secretariat-general_fr. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively in international efforts to foster global public goods?

10
 9

The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
 8
 7
 6


The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
 5
 4
 3


The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
 2
 1

The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
International Coordination
8
Luxembourg is mainly involved in international reform initiatives in cooperation with the European Union. The legal framework for the launch of the European Citizens’ Initiative was passed by the parliament in 2012.

Luxembourg is ranked high within the European Union for the inclusiveness of its welfare benefits, as its programs are both generous and wide-ranging. However, with a Gini index coefficient of 28.5 in 2015, Luxembourg is a middling performer within the EU-28 (which has an average Gini index coefficient of 31). The generous social transfers and the high share of social transfers in relation to total income, not only reduce poverty risks, but also sustainably strengthen social cohesion.

The country’s Gini index score highlights the positive effects of government transfer policies. However, Luxembourg also retains a number of labor-market protection measures and unsustainable pension policies; both provide incentives to leave the labor market early and opt instead for replacement revenues. Attitudes of the insured – mainly residents and nationals – are partly still those of consumers of welfare provisions. The system’s main weakness is the “early exit” attitude which is expressed by many residents.

Citations:
Fusco, Alessio, et al. Gini Country Report Luxembourg. Gini Growing Inequalities’ Impacts, 2013. www.gini-research.org/system/uploads/456/original/Luxembourg.pdf?1372249144. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income.” Eurostat, ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=tessi190. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Mémorial A n° 61 de 2012.” Journal officiel du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, 29 Mar. 2012, legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/memorial/2012/61. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

National plan for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth - Luxembourg 2020. Ministère de l’Économie, 2014. ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2014/nrp2014_luxembourg_en.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Observatoire de la compétitivité.” Le portal de l’actualité gouvermentale, www.gouvernement.lu/odc. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

For further informations:

Mutual Information System on Social Protection, www.missoc.org. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Organizational Reform

#20

To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?

10
 9

The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
 8
 7
 6


The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
 5
 4
 3


The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
 2
 1

There is no monitoring.
Self-monitoring
5
In the absence of systematic monitoring of institutional arrangements, the government relies mainly on international expertise. EU and OECD data significantly effects the political agenda, and the implementation of social and economic policies. For example, the 2007 OECD country report on research and innovation, led to the creation of a higher research and innovation committee and subsequently to the updated ERAWATCH assessment of research systems and policies in 2013.

An example for best practices is the 2006 Council of Europe report, “Profile of the Luxembourgish educational linguistic policy,” a two-year investigation involving national stakeholders. The report led to the reform of language teaching in 2009. The OECD audit of the country’s public employment service (L’Agence pour le développement de l’emploi, ADEM), against the background of a rising jobless rate, resulted in a draft bill adopted in 2012. Self-monitoring seems to be beyond the capacity of government authorities. It has also become clear that sustainable changes would require the creation of in-house analysis and forward-looking planning capacities. No ministry or administration is currently able to fulfill these requirements.

Citations:
Alexander, Susan, and Milena Slavcheva. “RIO Country Report 2015: Luxembourg.” European Commission, 2015, rio.jrc.ec.europa.eu/en/file/9475/download?token=bWx1mCeH. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Luxembourg RIO Country Report.” European Commission, rio.jrc.ec.europa.eu/en/country-analysis/Luxembourg/country-report. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy: Luxembourg 2015.” OECD, 2015, www.oecd.org/sti/inno/Luxembourg-Innovation-2015.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Science and Innovation: Luxembourg.” OECD, 2012, www.oecd.org/luxembourg/sti-outlook-2012-luxembourg.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Shewbridge, Claire, et al. “OECD Reviews of Evaluation and Assessment in Education: Luxembourg.” OECD, 2012, www.oecd.org/edu/school/OECD%20Reviews%20of%20Evaluation%20and%20Assessment%20in%20Education%20-%20Luxembourg.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?

10
 9

The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
 8
 7
 6


The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
 5
 4
 3


The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
 2
 1

The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
Institutional Reform
7
The previous government’s 2009 program outlined a series of administrative reforms. One of the most ambitious, the general opening of the civil service to citizens of the European Union, with the exception of some positions relating to national sovereignty, came into effect on 1 January 2010. The change is expected to gradually improve the quality of government administration. Nevertheless, the number of EU citizens hired remains low at approximately 5%, especially in the higher ranks. This is due to a compulsory language test in the three national languages (Luxembourgish, French and German), which limits the number of applications from non-nationals who aren’t fluent in all of these languages. Other reforms are directed to the area of e-government, such as a planned implementation of electronic internal and external document exchange. To date, Luxembourg has neither an overall e-government law, nor specific freedom of information legislation.

Citations:
Loi du 18 décembre 2009

“ePractice.” European Commission, 21 Apr. 2016, joinup.ec.europa.eu/community/epractice/description?utm_source=epractice&utm_medium=epractice&utm_campaign=epractice. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Luxembourg: eGovernment State of Play.” European Commission, ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=5561. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Luxembourg.” European Commission, ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=6459. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Programme national de réforme du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg dans le cadre du semestre européen 2015.” Le gouvernement du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, 2015, www.gouvernement.lu/5664568/2015-pnr-luxembourg-fr.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Providing an Alternative to Silence: Towards Greater Protection and Support for Whistleblowers in the EU.” Transparency International Luxembourg, 2013, www.transparency.lu/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Luxembourg-ATS-Providing-an-alternative-to-silence-Country-Report-ENG-v4.11.2013-Clean.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.
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