To what extent does the government facilitate the participation of trade unions and business organizations in policymaking?
The government is able to effectively involve trade unions and business organizations in policy development.
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Austria
Labor and business organizations – or as they are commonly referred to in Austria, the “social partners” – have played an extremely powerful and important role in postwar Austrian politics. Considering their exceptionally prominent role in Austrian politics and public policymaking, it is remarkable that this role, and the desire to maintain it, was constitutionally acknowledged only in 2008.
Compared to interest group politics or interest group/government relations in many other countries, the top labor and business organizations in Austria – the Austrian Economic Chambers (Wirtschaftskammern) and the Federation of Austrian Industry (Die Industriellenvereinigung) for business and employers; the Austrian Trade Union Federation (Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund) and the Austrian Federal Chamber of Labor (Arbeiterkammern) for employees; and the Austrian Chamber of Agriculture (Landwirtschaftskammer) for farmers – are not mere pressure groups seeking to exert influence on political decision-makers from the outside. Rather, they have been directly involved in public policymaking, sometimes formulating nearly complete laws themselves, which parliament then merely approves. This role has long been facilitated by the large share of MPs representing labor and business.
Further, the social partners have been involved in parliamentary deliberations of important bills at the committee stage. Additionally, like other interest groups, the social partners have had and used the opportunity to express their views during the institutionalized review in parliament, which marks a distinct stage in the legislative process in Austria.
To some extent, the notable power of the social partners has reflected the relative weakness – the internal split and disunity – of many Austrian governments (Rathgeb 2017). All else being equal, internally divided governments face a powerful incentive to share policymaking authority with the social partners.
While recent governments have not been significantly more divided internally than previous ones, the overall trend has been toward a long-term weakening of the social partnership as powerful players in the public policymaking process (Tálos and Hinterseer 2019). The reasons for this include the dramatically shrinking share of ministers with close personal ties to one of the social partners, the ideological distance to corporatist forms of governance of governing parties, and a shrinking membership of the trade unions. Still, while the long-standing special status of the social partners – or the social partnership for that matter – is largely gone, the recurrent recent crises facing Austria and many other countries have resulted in unexpected (re)gains in terms of influence.
Compared to interest group politics or interest group/government relations in many other countries, the top labor and business organizations in Austria – the Austrian Economic Chambers (Wirtschaftskammern) and the Federation of Austrian Industry (Die Industriellenvereinigung) for business and employers; the Austrian Trade Union Federation (Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund) and the Austrian Federal Chamber of Labor (Arbeiterkammern) for employees; and the Austrian Chamber of Agriculture (Landwirtschaftskammer) for farmers – are not mere pressure groups seeking to exert influence on political decision-makers from the outside. Rather, they have been directly involved in public policymaking, sometimes formulating nearly complete laws themselves, which parliament then merely approves. This role has long been facilitated by the large share of MPs representing labor and business.
Further, the social partners have been involved in parliamentary deliberations of important bills at the committee stage. Additionally, like other interest groups, the social partners have had and used the opportunity to express their views during the institutionalized review in parliament, which marks a distinct stage in the legislative process in Austria.
To some extent, the notable power of the social partners has reflected the relative weakness – the internal split and disunity – of many Austrian governments (Rathgeb 2017). All else being equal, internally divided governments face a powerful incentive to share policymaking authority with the social partners.
While recent governments have not been significantly more divided internally than previous ones, the overall trend has been toward a long-term weakening of the social partnership as powerful players in the public policymaking process (Tálos and Hinterseer 2019). The reasons for this include the dramatically shrinking share of ministers with close personal ties to one of the social partners, the ideological distance to corporatist forms of governance of governing parties, and a shrinking membership of the trade unions. Still, while the long-standing special status of the social partners – or the social partnership for that matter – is largely gone, the recurrent recent crises facing Austria and many other countries have resulted in unexpected (re)gains in terms of influence.
Citations:
Tálos, Emmerich, and Tobias Hinterseer. 2019. Sozialpartnerschaft: ein zentraler politischer Gestaltungsfaktor der Zweiten Republik am Ende?. Wien: Studienverlag.
Paster, Thomas. 2022. “Sozialpartnerschaft und Arbeitgeber* innenverbände in Österreich.” In Sozialpartnerschaftliche Handlungsfelder: Kontinuitäten, Brüche und Perspektiven: Aktuelle Befunde, eds. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 29-43.
Rathgeb, P. 2017. “Relying on Weak Governments: Austrian Trade Unions and the Politics of Smoothed Dualization.” OZP: Austrian Journal of Political Science 45 (3): 45-55.
Tálos, Emmerich, and Tobias Hinterseer. 2019. Sozialpartnerschaft: ein zentraler politischer Gestaltungsfaktor der Zweiten Republik am Ende?. Wien: Studienverlag.
Paster, Thomas. 2022. “Sozialpartnerschaft und Arbeitgeber* innenverbände in Österreich.” In Sozialpartnerschaftliche Handlungsfelder: Kontinuitäten, Brüche und Perspektiven: Aktuelle Befunde, eds. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 29-43.
Rathgeb, P. 2017. “Relying on Weak Governments: Austrian Trade Unions and the Politics of Smoothed Dualization.” OZP: Austrian Journal of Political Science 45 (3): 45-55.
Denmark
Denmark has a long-standing tradition of including trade unions and business organizations in the policy process, particularly through tripartite negotiations. During the legislative process, these social partners are routinely consulted and invited to provide information on proposals. More broadly, interest organizations also offer valuable information to politicians and civil servants. This practice is formalized through the Economic Council, where major organizations are represented.
Tripartite negotiations are likely the most important venue for exchanging information and developing policy involving trade unions and employer organizations. These negotiations are informal, as they are not regulated by law. This informality means there is no set schedule for when negotiations should occur; the government decides when to call them. Despite their informal nature, these negotiations are crucial and have been used to agree on issues such as wage compensation during the pandemic. They address various labor market issues, ranging from sexual harassment to long-term investment in lifelong learning and education (Ministry of Employment 2023).
The tripartite negotiations secure information flows between major stakeholders in the Danish labor market, both private and public, and ensure a high degree of legitimacy for proposals that the government can then turn into legislation or adopt in collective agreements. Some observers find that the tripartite negotiations are opaque and lack transparency. Nevertheless, these negotiations have proven useful in avoiding conflict between workers and employers and in securing stability in the Danish labor market.
Tripartite negotiations are likely the most important venue for exchanging information and developing policy involving trade unions and employer organizations. These negotiations are informal, as they are not regulated by law. This informality means there is no set schedule for when negotiations should occur; the government decides when to call them. Despite their informal nature, these negotiations are crucial and have been used to agree on issues such as wage compensation during the pandemic. They address various labor market issues, ranging from sexual harassment to long-term investment in lifelong learning and education (Ministry of Employment 2023).
The tripartite negotiations secure information flows between major stakeholders in the Danish labor market, both private and public, and ensure a high degree of legitimacy for proposals that the government can then turn into legislation or adopt in collective agreements. Some observers find that the tripartite negotiations are opaque and lack transparency. Nevertheless, these negotiations have proven useful in avoiding conflict between workers and employers and in securing stability in the Danish labor market.
Citations:
Ministry of Employment. 2023. “Trepartsaftaler.” https://bm.dk/arbejdsomraader/politiske-aftaler/trepartsaftaler
Ministry of Employment. 2023. “Trepartsaftaler.” https://bm.dk/arbejdsomraader/politiske-aftaler/trepartsaftaler
Finland
The principle of tripartite policy preparation is deeply rooted in Finnish political traditions. The government facilitates the participation of trade unions and business organizations in policymaking to a large degree, sometimes relegating the entire preparatory process to the social partners. These social partners play a crucial role in all stages of the policymaking process, including agenda-setting, policy formulation, deliberation and decision-making, policy implementation, and performance monitoring.
Tripartite negotiations are crucial for pension policies, as the principles and reforms of the earnings-related pension scheme are negotiated between the social partners and the state (Finnish Center for Pensions, n.d.).
The process of tripartite negotiations has a strong institutional framework supported by legislation and both permanent and ad hoc working groups. It also includes mechanisms that engage capital and labor in expert commissions, public hearings and performance monitoring. Communication is ongoing and involves all members of the private sector and labor. However, the process is not fully transparent to outsiders. For example, the working groups very seldom organize public hearings.
Members of organizations representing capital and labor sometimes express dissatisfaction with token participation in the policymaking process, especially regarding government plans to change the negotiation framework. However, the government generally succeeds in moderating disputes within and between labor and capital groups, and in balancing diverse opinions in practice.
Tripartite negotiations are crucial for pension policies, as the principles and reforms of the earnings-related pension scheme are negotiated between the social partners and the state (Finnish Center for Pensions, n.d.).
The process of tripartite negotiations has a strong institutional framework supported by legislation and both permanent and ad hoc working groups. It also includes mechanisms that engage capital and labor in expert commissions, public hearings and performance monitoring. Communication is ongoing and involves all members of the private sector and labor. However, the process is not fully transparent to outsiders. For example, the working groups very seldom organize public hearings.
Members of organizations representing capital and labor sometimes express dissatisfaction with token participation in the policymaking process, especially regarding government plans to change the negotiation framework. However, the government generally succeeds in moderating disputes within and between labor and capital groups, and in balancing diverse opinions in practice.
Citations:
Finnish Center for Pensions. n.d. “Tripartite Negotiations.” https://www.etk.fi/en/finnish-pension-system/administration-and-supervision/tripartite-negotiations/
Finnish Center for Pensions. n.d. “Tripartite Negotiations.” https://www.etk.fi/en/finnish-pension-system/administration-and-supervision/tripartite-negotiations/
Norway
In Norway, both employees and enterprises are well-organized. On the labor side, the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) is the largest, while on the capital side, the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprises (NHO) dominates. Due to their historical roles and significance, these two organizations enjoy a privileged position with frequent, informal access to government and national policymaking. This is in addition to their formal roles, which they share with other organizations for capital and labor. Their privileged status is particularly evident in economic and industrial policymaking and wage determination.
The cooperation between these social partners and the government produces a less transparent tripartite system of consensus-oriented policymaking, frequently criticized by other, smaller trade unions and employer organizations. It is a solid norm that the government never expresses any opinion on internal conflicts within or between the organizations.
A separate regime for cooperation between the state and organized interests exists in the agriculture sector. Norwegian farmers and food production (excluding fish) are protected from international competition and imports, and a significant proportion of farmers’ income comes from state subsidies. A consensus norm dictates that a man-year in agriculture should earn an amount equal to that in manufacturing. Each year there are negotiations between the government and farmers’ organizations to determine the level of subsidies required to fulfill this norm.
The cooperation between these social partners and the government produces a less transparent tripartite system of consensus-oriented policymaking, frequently criticized by other, smaller trade unions and employer organizations. It is a solid norm that the government never expresses any opinion on internal conflicts within or between the organizations.
A separate regime for cooperation between the state and organized interests exists in the agriculture sector. Norwegian farmers and food production (excluding fish) are protected from international competition and imports, and a significant proportion of farmers’ income comes from state subsidies. A consensus norm dictates that a man-year in agriculture should earn an amount equal to that in manufacturing. Each year there are negotiations between the government and farmers’ organizations to determine the level of subsidies required to fulfill this norm.
Sweden
Cooperation between the government and trade unions in Sweden is traditionally strong and has historically played a central role in shaping the country’s policies and legislation. This cooperation is an expression of the Swedish model, which is based on a tripartite structure in which the government, employer organizations, and trade unions work together to resolve labor market issues. This approach is often referred to as the “Saltsjöbad spirit” (Elvander 1988). In 2022, the main agreement between labor, employers, and the government was renewed with modified rules and under political pressure (Kjellberg 2023a).
Union membership in most Western countries has declined over the past few decades, though Sweden and other Nordic countries seem somewhat sheltered from such trends. However, in the last two decades, even Sweden has exhibited both a decline in trade union membership and a less close relationship between the unions and their traditional political partners, i.e., Social Democratic Parties. Foreign-born workers are not unionized to the same extent as Swedish-born workers, which can be explained by the fact that workers not born in Sweden are mainly employed in sectors that are difficult to organize, especially in the service sector with low qualification requirements. Despite this, around 90% of all workers are covered by collective agreements, i.e., mainly bilateral negotiations between labor and capital.
While the union density rate has remained relatively stable at 70% in recent years (with slight fluctuations), the density rate for private-sector employers is around 88%. In the public sector, the degree of organization is 100% for obvious reasons. This means that around 88% of employees work in companies affiliated with an employers’ association (Kjellberg 2023b).
With regard to power resources and the strengthening of tripartite agreements, the integration of the interest groups of labor and capital has been implemented both intensively and comprehensively in Sweden. While cooperation between unions, employers’ associations, and the government takes many forms, the most institutionalized policy feedback mechanism is the referral (“remiss”) system (Government Offices of Sweden, n.d.).
Union membership in most Western countries has declined over the past few decades, though Sweden and other Nordic countries seem somewhat sheltered from such trends. However, in the last two decades, even Sweden has exhibited both a decline in trade union membership and a less close relationship between the unions and their traditional political partners, i.e., Social Democratic Parties. Foreign-born workers are not unionized to the same extent as Swedish-born workers, which can be explained by the fact that workers not born in Sweden are mainly employed in sectors that are difficult to organize, especially in the service sector with low qualification requirements. Despite this, around 90% of all workers are covered by collective agreements, i.e., mainly bilateral negotiations between labor and capital.
While the union density rate has remained relatively stable at 70% in recent years (with slight fluctuations), the density rate for private-sector employers is around 88%. In the public sector, the degree of organization is 100% for obvious reasons. This means that around 88% of employees work in companies affiliated with an employers’ association (Kjellberg 2023b).
With regard to power resources and the strengthening of tripartite agreements, the integration of the interest groups of labor and capital has been implemented both intensively and comprehensively in Sweden. While cooperation between unions, employers’ associations, and the government takes many forms, the most institutionalized policy feedback mechanism is the referral (“remiss”) system (Government Offices of Sweden, n.d.).
Citations:
Elvander, Nils. 1988. Den svenska modellen. Stockholm.
Government Offices of Sweden. n.d. “Remisser.” https://www.regeringen.se/remisser/
Kjellberg, Anders. 2023a. Den svenska modellen ur ett nordiskt perspektiv: facklig anslütning och nytt huvudavtal. https://lucris.lub.lu.se/ws/portalfiles/portal/148881382/Arena_Ide_2023_Kjellberg_4_juni_Slutvers.pdf
Kjellberg, Anders. 2023b. “Parternas organisationsgrad och kollektivavtalens utbredning.” Melingsinstitutets årsrapport https://lucris.lub.lu.se/ws/portalfiles/portal/138623782/Parternas_organisationsgrad_2022_Kjellberg.pdf
Elvander, Nils. 1988. Den svenska modellen. Stockholm.
Government Offices of Sweden. n.d. “Remisser.” https://www.regeringen.se/remisser/
Kjellberg, Anders. 2023a. Den svenska modellen ur ett nordiskt perspektiv: facklig anslütning och nytt huvudavtal. https://lucris.lub.lu.se/ws/portalfiles/portal/148881382/Arena_Ide_2023_Kjellberg_4_juni_Slutvers.pdf
Kjellberg, Anders. 2023b. “Parternas organisationsgrad och kollektivavtalens utbredning.” Melingsinstitutets årsrapport https://lucris.lub.lu.se/ws/portalfiles/portal/138623782/Parternas_organisationsgrad_2022_Kjellberg.pdf
Switzerland
Policymaking in Switzerland is strongly based on public consultation with interest groups. Traditionally, in the Swiss liberal-conservative political system, business and employer interest groups have more influence and power than trade unions or non-producer interests. The latter, however, have recently enjoyed a significant increase in their political influence (Kriesi 1980; 1982; Häusermann et al. 2004; Armingeon 2011; Sciarini et al. 2015; Eichenberger 2020; Mach et al. 2020).
Within Switzerland’s corporatist system, which links the state and organizations representing labor and capital, there are numerous pre-parliamentary procedures and committees focused on consultation with various societal groups. One of the main such mechanisms is the consultation procedure, which enables invited (communal and cantonal umbrella organizations, relevant interest groups) and uninvited parties to submit statements in the context of a preliminary legislative procedure. These instruments are designed to prevent government proposals from failing in parliament or in subsequent referendums, and to offer solutions that benefit all parties. However, authorities can synthesize and integrate these comments into the design of policy at their discretion.
Research shows that the degree of corporatist integration has declined in recent years. This is in part attributable to the growing intensity of conflicts between the social partners, as well as to the influence of European integration and internationalization. If judged from a comparative perspective, the level of corporatist integration remains very high in Switzerland, but from a historical perspective it is low.
During the pandemic, corporatism proved to be a resilient and efficient instrument for swift socioeconomic policymaking, although this corporatist coordination happened very silently, while the mass media was more focused on lobbying efforts (Armingeon and Sager 2022). These neocorporatist features also gave the upper hand to economic actors with regard to influencing COVID-19 measures, to the detriment of other CSOs (Sager/Mavrot 2020). In any case, the direct democracy aspects of the system offer interest groups very significant influence, since they can threaten to trigger a referendum. This offers strong incentives for political elites to incorporate major interest groups in the policy-development process. On the other hand, the federal government has become stronger in the domestic political environment due to the consequences of European integration.
Within Switzerland’s corporatist system, which links the state and organizations representing labor and capital, there are numerous pre-parliamentary procedures and committees focused on consultation with various societal groups. One of the main such mechanisms is the consultation procedure, which enables invited (communal and cantonal umbrella organizations, relevant interest groups) and uninvited parties to submit statements in the context of a preliminary legislative procedure. These instruments are designed to prevent government proposals from failing in parliament or in subsequent referendums, and to offer solutions that benefit all parties. However, authorities can synthesize and integrate these comments into the design of policy at their discretion.
Research shows that the degree of corporatist integration has declined in recent years. This is in part attributable to the growing intensity of conflicts between the social partners, as well as to the influence of European integration and internationalization. If judged from a comparative perspective, the level of corporatist integration remains very high in Switzerland, but from a historical perspective it is low.
During the pandemic, corporatism proved to be a resilient and efficient instrument for swift socioeconomic policymaking, although this corporatist coordination happened very silently, while the mass media was more focused on lobbying efforts (Armingeon and Sager 2022). These neocorporatist features also gave the upper hand to economic actors with regard to influencing COVID-19 measures, to the detriment of other CSOs (Sager/Mavrot 2020). In any case, the direct democracy aspects of the system offer interest groups very significant influence, since they can threaten to trigger a referendum. This offers strong incentives for political elites to incorporate major interest groups in the policy-development process. On the other hand, the federal government has become stronger in the domestic political environment due to the consequences of European integration.
Citations:
Armingeon, Klaus. 2011. “A Prematurely Announced Death? Swiss Corporatism in Comparative Perspective.” In Switzerland in Europe: Continuity and Change in the Swiss Political Economy, eds. C. Trampusch and A. Mach. London/New York: Routledge.
Armingeon, Klaus, and Fritz Sager. 2022. “Muting Science: Input Overload Versus Scientific Advice in Swiss Policymaking During the COVID-19 Pandemic.” Unpublished paper.
Eichenberger, S. 2020. “The Rise of Citizen Groups within the Administration and Parliament in Switzerland.” Swiss Political Science Review 26 (2): 206-227.
Fischer, Manuel, and Pascal Sciarini. 2019. “Die Position der Regierung in Entscheidungsstrukturen.” In Blackbox Exekutive. Regierungslehre in der Schweiz, eds. Adrian Ritz, Theo Haldemann, and Fritz Sager. Zürich: NZZ Libro, 49-64.
Häusermann, S., Mach, A., and Papadopoulos, Y. 2004. “From Corporatism to Partisan Politics: Social Policy Making under Strain in Switzerland.” Revue Suisse de Science Politique 11 (3): 33-59.
Kriesi, H. 1980. Entscheidungsstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Schweizer Politik. Frankfurt am Main, New York: Campus.
Kriesi, H. 1982. “The Structure of the Swiss Political System.” In Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making, eds. G. Lehmbruch and P. C. Schmitter. London, Beverly Hills: Sage.
Lexicon of parliamentary terms. 2022. “Consultation procedure.” https://www.parlament.ch/en/%C3%BCber-das-parlament/parlamentsw%C3%B6rterbuch/parlamentsw%C3%B6rterbuch-detail?WordId=225
MACH, A., VARONE, F., and EICHENBERGER, S. 2020. “Transformations of Swiss Neo-Corporatism: From Pre-Parliamentary Negotiations toward Privileged Pluralism in the Parliamentary Venue.” In CAREJA, R., EMMENEGGER, P., and GIGER, N., eds. The European Social Model under Pressure. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-27043-8_4
Sager, F., and C. Mavrot. 2020. “Switzerland’s COVID-19 Policy Response: Consociational Crisis Management and Neo-Corporatist Reopening.” European Policy Analysis 6: 293-304.
Sciarini, Pascal, Manuel Fischer, and Denise Traber, eds. 2015. Political Decision-Making in Switzerland. The Consensus Model under Pressure. Houndsmill, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Armingeon, Klaus. 2011. “A Prematurely Announced Death? Swiss Corporatism in Comparative Perspective.” In Switzerland in Europe: Continuity and Change in the Swiss Political Economy, eds. C. Trampusch and A. Mach. London/New York: Routledge.
Armingeon, Klaus, and Fritz Sager. 2022. “Muting Science: Input Overload Versus Scientific Advice in Swiss Policymaking During the COVID-19 Pandemic.” Unpublished paper.
Eichenberger, S. 2020. “The Rise of Citizen Groups within the Administration and Parliament in Switzerland.” Swiss Political Science Review 26 (2): 206-227.
Fischer, Manuel, and Pascal Sciarini. 2019. “Die Position der Regierung in Entscheidungsstrukturen.” In Blackbox Exekutive. Regierungslehre in der Schweiz, eds. Adrian Ritz, Theo Haldemann, and Fritz Sager. Zürich: NZZ Libro, 49-64.
Häusermann, S., Mach, A., and Papadopoulos, Y. 2004. “From Corporatism to Partisan Politics: Social Policy Making under Strain in Switzerland.” Revue Suisse de Science Politique 11 (3): 33-59.
Kriesi, H. 1980. Entscheidungsstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Schweizer Politik. Frankfurt am Main, New York: Campus.
Kriesi, H. 1982. “The Structure of the Swiss Political System.” In Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making, eds. G. Lehmbruch and P. C. Schmitter. London, Beverly Hills: Sage.
Lexicon of parliamentary terms. 2022. “Consultation procedure.” https://www.parlament.ch/en/%C3%BCber-das-parlament/parlamentsw%C3%B6rterbuch/parlamentsw%C3%B6rterbuch-detail?WordId=225
MACH, A., VARONE, F., and EICHENBERGER, S. 2020. “Transformations of Swiss Neo-Corporatism: From Pre-Parliamentary Negotiations toward Privileged Pluralism in the Parliamentary Venue.” In CAREJA, R., EMMENEGGER, P., and GIGER, N., eds. The European Social Model under Pressure. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-27043-8_4
Sager, F., and C. Mavrot. 2020. “Switzerland’s COVID-19 Policy Response: Consociational Crisis Management and Neo-Corporatist Reopening.” European Policy Analysis 6: 293-304.
Sciarini, Pascal, Manuel Fischer, and Denise Traber, eds. 2015. Political Decision-Making in Switzerland. The Consensus Model under Pressure. Houndsmill, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Most of the time, the government is able to effectively involve trade unions and business organizations in policy development.
8
Belgium
Belgium is known for its strong culture of consultation and consensus, particularly in relation to socioeconomic policies. Pineda-Hernández et al. (2022) demonstrate that Belgium has both a high bargaining coverage (96% according to OECD data) and a high level of centralization.
In the Belgian political landscape, both trade unions and employers’ associations hold significant representation within the decision-making process at the federal and regional echelons. Their ability to negotiate with each other and the government is bolstered by their representation of a substantial and stable proportion of employees and corporations. Their inclusion in a multitude of committees ensures that their viewpoints are effectively articulated to, and taken into account by, the authorities. Furthermore, they have the capacity to forge binding agreements among themselves, thereby exerting considerable influence over the entire economic terrain of Belgium.
Nevertheless, there are instances where these entities engage in negotiations that result in unbalanced agreements, necessitating the Belgian government to intervene and bridge the ensuing financial disparity. Moreover, the occasional failure of trade unions and employers’ associations to reach consensus can impede their capacity to shape public policy effectively. This highlights the complexities inherent in the decision-making process and the challenges faced by these entities in their pursuit of influencing policy.
Despite generally positive indicators and outcomes, there are underlying issues eroding the power of social dialogue and the dynamics of social partners. This is evident in the declining share of produced wealth going to wages, indicating a shift in the balance of power between labor and capital to the detriment of workers and trade unions (Hermans 2022).
In the Belgian political landscape, both trade unions and employers’ associations hold significant representation within the decision-making process at the federal and regional echelons. Their ability to negotiate with each other and the government is bolstered by their representation of a substantial and stable proportion of employees and corporations. Their inclusion in a multitude of committees ensures that their viewpoints are effectively articulated to, and taken into account by, the authorities. Furthermore, they have the capacity to forge binding agreements among themselves, thereby exerting considerable influence over the entire economic terrain of Belgium.
Nevertheless, there are instances where these entities engage in negotiations that result in unbalanced agreements, necessitating the Belgian government to intervene and bridge the ensuing financial disparity. Moreover, the occasional failure of trade unions and employers’ associations to reach consensus can impede their capacity to shape public policy effectively. This highlights the complexities inherent in the decision-making process and the challenges faced by these entities in their pursuit of influencing policy.
Despite generally positive indicators and outcomes, there are underlying issues eroding the power of social dialogue and the dynamics of social partners. This is evident in the declining share of produced wealth going to wages, indicating a shift in the balance of power between labor and capital to the detriment of workers and trade unions (Hermans 2022).
Citations:
Pineda-Hernández, K., Rycx, F., and Volral, M. 2022. “How Collective Bargaining Shapes Poverty: New Evidence for Developed Countries.” British Journal of Industrial Relations 60 (3): 895–928. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12693
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?lang=en&SubSessionId=ca458b88-af39-4929-a213-4719b63c342e&themetreeid=13
https://worker-participation.eu/national-industrial-relations/countries/belgium
https://www.etui.org/covid-social-impact/belgium/industrial-relations-in-belgium-background-summary
Hermans, M. 2022. “Hoe sterk is het sociaal overleg nog?” Samenleving & Politiek 29: 36-41. Available at https://www.sampol.be/2022/01/hoe-sterk-is-het-sociaal-overleg-nog
Pineda-Hernández, K., Rycx, F., and Volral, M. 2022. “How Collective Bargaining Shapes Poverty: New Evidence for Developed Countries.” British Journal of Industrial Relations 60 (3): 895–928. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12693
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?lang=en&SubSessionId=ca458b88-af39-4929-a213-4719b63c342e&themetreeid=13
https://worker-participation.eu/national-industrial-relations/countries/belgium
https://www.etui.org/covid-social-impact/belgium/industrial-relations-in-belgium-background-summary
Hermans, M. 2022. “Hoe sterk is het sociaal overleg nog?” Samenleving & Politiek 29: 36-41. Available at https://www.sampol.be/2022/01/hoe-sterk-is-het-sociaal-overleg-nog
Czechia
The Council of Economic and Social Accord (Rada hospodářské a sociální dohody, RHSD) is the institutional mechanism for involving employers’ and employees’ representatives (trade unions) in negotiations with the government on significant economic and social development issues. Established in 1990, the RHSD operates under Rules of Procedure that determine the regularity of meetings. In addition to plenary sessions and the Bureau, specialized working groups also convene. The frequency of these meetings depends on the government’s attitude toward social dialogue during its term.
During the review period, the RHSD held regular plenary sessions, with meeting minutes and subsequent press conferences publicly available on the government website. In 2022, six regular sessions were held, along with one extraordinary session addressing the situation in Ukraine and its impact on the Czech Republic. In 2023, six sessions were also held. Additionally, tripartite meetings occurred at the ministry level to address specific sectoral issues, such as education and health. Tripartite meetings at the regional level also took place.
All three partners consider tripartite meetings crucial, but satisfaction with the results varies depending on how well views and demands are balanced. Examples include negotiations on minimum wage increases, guaranteed wage increases, and the so-called consolidation package. In the latter case, the government was unwilling to compromise.
During the review period, the RHSD held regular plenary sessions, with meeting minutes and subsequent press conferences publicly available on the government website. In 2022, six regular sessions were held, along with one extraordinary session addressing the situation in Ukraine and its impact on the Czech Republic. In 2023, six sessions were also held. Additionally, tripartite meetings occurred at the ministry level to address specific sectoral issues, such as education and health. Tripartite meetings at the regional level also took place.
All three partners consider tripartite meetings crucial, but satisfaction with the results varies depending on how well views and demands are balanced. Examples include negotiations on minimum wage increases, guaranteed wage increases, and the so-called consolidation package. In the latter case, the government was unwilling to compromise.
Citations:
https://vlada.gov.cz/assets/ppov/tripartita/Jednaci-rad.pdf
https://vlada.gov.cz/assets/ppov/tripartita/Jednaci-rad.pdf
Lithuania
The government effectively involves trade unions and business organizations in policy development. The Tripartite Council serves as the main forum for regular discussions of new policy initiatives between government officials, business associations and trade unions. Additionally, representatives of trade unions and business associations are often invited to participate in ad hoc groups, such as those focused on reforms of the Labor Code or tax laws. The consultation processes are generally public and inclusive.
However, the involvement of business associations – and especially trade unions – in policy development tends to be uneven and varies with government cabinets. The center-right government that came into office in 2024 tends to favor business organizations over trade unions. This is evident from several recent key policymaking initiatives, such as the renewal of the activities of the State Progress Council to lead the development of the long-term Lithuania 2050 strategy and a series of tax reform proposals. In both cases the presence of business associations was strong, while trade unions were not represented.
However, the involvement of business associations – and especially trade unions – in policy development tends to be uneven and varies with government cabinets. The center-right government that came into office in 2024 tends to favor business organizations over trade unions. This is evident from several recent key policymaking initiatives, such as the renewal of the activities of the State Progress Council to lead the development of the long-term Lithuania 2050 strategy and a series of tax reform proposals. In both cases the presence of business associations was strong, while trade unions were not represented.
Slovenia
Slovenia’s neo-corporatist system positions business and labor representatives as key non-state actors in the policymaking process. The Economic and Social Council (ESC) institutionalizes the participation of the government, ministries, and business and labor representatives, where these parties discuss policy and consider the interests of both employers and employees. This involvement extends beyond labor legislation.
Coordination between the government and social partners within the ESC framework occurs through ESC meetings, meetings of the ESC college, and gatherings of negotiating groups and expert committees. The ESC college has been active since 2017, alongside the negotiating groups and expert committees.
During Prime Minister Cerar’s term, the ESC held 65 monthly meetings, averaging 1.35 meetings per month, each lasting about 3 hours and 2 minutes. Under Prime Minister Šarec, ESC members participated in 17 meetings, averaging 0.94 meetings per month, with each meeting lasting about 3 hours and 20 minutes. During Prime Minister Janša’s term, 16 ESC meetings were held until May 2021, averaging 1.10 meetings per month, with each meeting lasting about 5 hours and 6 minutes. After May 2021, the ESC ceased to meet due to the withdrawal of the trade unions. In July 2021, the president of the ESC wrote to council members, urging them to revive social dialogue and warning of the harmful consequences of inaction and lack of coordination.
ESC members met with Acting Prime Minister Golob for the first time on July 15, 2022, more than a year after the last meeting. During this meeting, the prime minister presented the government’s priorities for the 2022 – 2026 term. The ESC held 12 regular meetings until July 2023. However, since then, employers’ organizations, which had repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction and concern about the inadequate tripartite social dialogue over the past year, have withdrawn from the ESC until conditions for genuine tripartite social dialogue are guaranteed. In September 2023, the president of the ESC wrote to council members and the Prime Minister’s Office, urging the revival of social dialogue.
Coordination between the government and social partners within the ESC framework occurs through ESC meetings, meetings of the ESC college, and gatherings of negotiating groups and expert committees. The ESC college has been active since 2017, alongside the negotiating groups and expert committees.
During Prime Minister Cerar’s term, the ESC held 65 monthly meetings, averaging 1.35 meetings per month, each lasting about 3 hours and 2 minutes. Under Prime Minister Šarec, ESC members participated in 17 meetings, averaging 0.94 meetings per month, with each meeting lasting about 3 hours and 20 minutes. During Prime Minister Janša’s term, 16 ESC meetings were held until May 2021, averaging 1.10 meetings per month, with each meeting lasting about 5 hours and 6 minutes. After May 2021, the ESC ceased to meet due to the withdrawal of the trade unions. In July 2021, the president of the ESC wrote to council members, urging them to revive social dialogue and warning of the harmful consequences of inaction and lack of coordination.
ESC members met with Acting Prime Minister Golob for the first time on July 15, 2022, more than a year after the last meeting. During this meeting, the prime minister presented the government’s priorities for the 2022 – 2026 term. The ESC held 12 regular meetings until July 2023. However, since then, employers’ organizations, which had repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction and concern about the inadequate tripartite social dialogue over the past year, have withdrawn from the ESC until conditions for genuine tripartite social dialogue are guaranteed. In September 2023, the president of the ESC wrote to council members and the Prime Minister’s Office, urging the revival of social dialogue.
Citations:
Ekonomsko socialna svet. 2023. “Aktualno.” http://www.ess.si/ess/ess-si.nsf/ekonomsko-socialni-svet/seja%20Ekonomsko-socialnega%20sveta
Ekonomsko socialna svet. 2023. “Aktualno.” http://www.ess.si/ess/ess-si.nsf/ekonomsko-socialni-svet/seja%20Ekonomsko-socialnega%20sveta
Spain
The Economic and Social Council (ESC) consists of employers’ organizations, trade unions, and other societal representatives, as provided for in the constitution. Other government advisory bodies are established by specific policies. The ESC and other advisory bodies issue opinions on draft legislation, but these opinions are not binding on the government.
The extent of labor representatives’ participation in executive policymaking varies with the governing party. Under the current left-wing executive, particularly since 2020, this cooperation has been limited. Between 2022 and 2023, trade unions, business organizations, and the government signed several agreements, including those related to temporary layoffs. The government has been successful in moderating disputes within employer organizations and trade unions and has supported agreements such as increasing the minimum wage. However, members of trade unions and employer organizations have expressed dissatisfaction with their participation in the policymaking process, indicating that the government does not always follow up on consultation talks or present policy initiatives before these talks begin.
The extent of labor representatives’ participation in executive policymaking varies with the governing party. Under the current left-wing executive, particularly since 2020, this cooperation has been limited. Between 2022 and 2023, trade unions, business organizations, and the government signed several agreements, including those related to temporary layoffs. The government has been successful in moderating disputes within employer organizations and trade unions and has supported agreements such as increasing the minimum wage. However, members of trade unions and employer organizations have expressed dissatisfaction with their participation in the policymaking process, indicating that the government does not always follow up on consultation talks or present policy initiatives before these talks begin.
Netherlands
CSOs for both capital and labor are still firmly embedded in the culture and practices of “poldering” (see “Effective Civil Society Organizations (Capital and Labor)”).
7
Canada
These two should be separated. Business associations are often consulted by Canadian governments. Trade unions are rarely consulted, if ever, outside of policies affecting training and worker education.
Canadian business associations are highly fragmented compared to those in most other industrialized nations, although they are similar to the disaggregated landscape of the United States. Representation is divided among various general business associations covering broad sections of the economy. For example, the Business Council on National Issues and the Canadian Council of Chief Executives represent large corporations; the Canadian Federation of Independent Business represents small businesses; and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce represents a wide range of businesses organized into local chambers. In the manufacturing sector, the Canadian Manufacturers’ Association has merged into Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters. At a more specific level, numerous trade associations represent other industrial sectors, individual industries, and industry sub-segments. This extensive overlap makes it difficult to determine exactly which organizations are responsible for what functions, posing a challenge for Canadian governments trying to devise a coherent industrial strategy in consultation with business interests.
Trade associations perform five main functions in policymaking: (i) monitoring political developments relevant to the association’s members, including policy proposals, regulations, legislation, appointments, and the emergence of new issues; (ii) direct lobbying of proximate policymakers, involving personal contacts and representations before various government agencies at home and abroad; (iii) indirect lobbying – affecting policy indirectly by attempting to shape public opinion through media relations, advocacy advertising, public relations activities, etc.; (iv) building alliances with other groups to broaden the base of influence; and (v) research and policy analysis to provide a solid basis for advocacy.
In addition, trade associations can play an important role in policy implementation, such as administering product standards and labeling regulations. These political functions are easier to perform when an association’s membership is relatively homogenous and drawn from a single industry or business segment. In this context, members’ interests are more coherent and united, allowing for clear and forceful advocacy. Broader-based groups, on the other hand, must make policy compromises to accommodate a more diverse membership, which can attenuate their voices. However, broad-based groups have the advantage of representing a wider sector of the economy, making their input harder for policymakers to ignore (Stritch 2007 and 2018).
Labor today tends to intervene in the policy process at a general and political level, rather than a bureaucratic and specific one, and conducts its policy analysis activities accordingly. Between elections, the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) is closely engaged with the parliamentary process, producing an annual pre-budget brief to the Standing Committee on Finance and frequently appearing before parliamentary committees considering legislation or holding general policy reviews. Some affiliates also participate in these processes. Engagement with ministers and public servants is less frequent but not uncommon. The CLC usually has ongoing contact with the ministers of labor and of human resources development (now human resources and skills development) regarding issues of worker training, workplace issues (including labor issues in the federal jurisdiction), and unemployment insurance. These relations tend to wax and wane depending on personal relationships between ministers and labor leadership.
On occasion, the depth of engagement has been considerable, particularly concerning training issues. In a handful of industries – notably steel and electronic products manufacturing – extensive training and adjustment programs were developed and delivered jointly by unions and employers in the early 1990s with government financial support. Despite the general demise of training boards, broad planning for labor needs continues today through bipartite national sector councils.
In addition, the autoworkers were heavily engaged with the government and business during the Canada – United States – Mexico free trade negotiations. However, that engagement tends to be sector specific and issue dependent.
Ultimately, labor engagement in social bargaining with employers and governments depends on the willingness of governments to promote such arrangements despite employer indifference or hostility. This willingness has rarely been forthcoming (Jackson and Baldwin 2007).
Canadian business associations are highly fragmented compared to those in most other industrialized nations, although they are similar to the disaggregated landscape of the United States. Representation is divided among various general business associations covering broad sections of the economy. For example, the Business Council on National Issues and the Canadian Council of Chief Executives represent large corporations; the Canadian Federation of Independent Business represents small businesses; and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce represents a wide range of businesses organized into local chambers. In the manufacturing sector, the Canadian Manufacturers’ Association has merged into Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters. At a more specific level, numerous trade associations represent other industrial sectors, individual industries, and industry sub-segments. This extensive overlap makes it difficult to determine exactly which organizations are responsible for what functions, posing a challenge for Canadian governments trying to devise a coherent industrial strategy in consultation with business interests.
Trade associations perform five main functions in policymaking: (i) monitoring political developments relevant to the association’s members, including policy proposals, regulations, legislation, appointments, and the emergence of new issues; (ii) direct lobbying of proximate policymakers, involving personal contacts and representations before various government agencies at home and abroad; (iii) indirect lobbying – affecting policy indirectly by attempting to shape public opinion through media relations, advocacy advertising, public relations activities, etc.; (iv) building alliances with other groups to broaden the base of influence; and (v) research and policy analysis to provide a solid basis for advocacy.
In addition, trade associations can play an important role in policy implementation, such as administering product standards and labeling regulations. These political functions are easier to perform when an association’s membership is relatively homogenous and drawn from a single industry or business segment. In this context, members’ interests are more coherent and united, allowing for clear and forceful advocacy. Broader-based groups, on the other hand, must make policy compromises to accommodate a more diverse membership, which can attenuate their voices. However, broad-based groups have the advantage of representing a wider sector of the economy, making their input harder for policymakers to ignore (Stritch 2007 and 2018).
Labor today tends to intervene in the policy process at a general and political level, rather than a bureaucratic and specific one, and conducts its policy analysis activities accordingly. Between elections, the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) is closely engaged with the parliamentary process, producing an annual pre-budget brief to the Standing Committee on Finance and frequently appearing before parliamentary committees considering legislation or holding general policy reviews. Some affiliates also participate in these processes. Engagement with ministers and public servants is less frequent but not uncommon. The CLC usually has ongoing contact with the ministers of labor and of human resources development (now human resources and skills development) regarding issues of worker training, workplace issues (including labor issues in the federal jurisdiction), and unemployment insurance. These relations tend to wax and wane depending on personal relationships between ministers and labor leadership.
On occasion, the depth of engagement has been considerable, particularly concerning training issues. In a handful of industries – notably steel and electronic products manufacturing – extensive training and adjustment programs were developed and delivered jointly by unions and employers in the early 1990s with government financial support. Despite the general demise of training boards, broad planning for labor needs continues today through bipartite national sector councils.
In addition, the autoworkers were heavily engaged with the government and business during the Canada – United States – Mexico free trade negotiations. However, that engagement tends to be sector specific and issue dependent.
Ultimately, labor engagement in social bargaining with employers and governments depends on the willingness of governments to promote such arrangements despite employer indifference or hostility. This willingness has rarely been forthcoming (Jackson and Baldwin 2007).
Citations:
Stritch, Andrew. 2007. “Business Associations and Policy Analysis in Canada.” In Policy Analysis in Canada: The State of the Art, eds. L. Dobuzinskis, M. Howlett, and D. Laycock, 242–59. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Stritch, Andrew. 2018. “Policy Analytical Capacity and Canadian Business Associations.” In Policy Analysis in Canada, 297–317. Policy Press. https://doi.org/10.1332/policypress/9781447334910.003.0014
Jackson, Andrew, and Bob Baldwin. 2007. “Policy Analysis by the Labour Movement in a Hostile Environment.” In Policy Analysis in Canada: The State of the Art, eds. L. Dobuzinskis, M. Howlett, and D. Laycock, 260-72. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Stritch, Andrew. 2007. “Business Associations and Policy Analysis in Canada.” In Policy Analysis in Canada: The State of the Art, eds. L. Dobuzinskis, M. Howlett, and D. Laycock, 242–59. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Stritch, Andrew. 2018. “Policy Analytical Capacity and Canadian Business Associations.” In Policy Analysis in Canada, 297–317. Policy Press. https://doi.org/10.1332/policypress/9781447334910.003.0014
Jackson, Andrew, and Bob Baldwin. 2007. “Policy Analysis by the Labour Movement in a Hostile Environment.” In Policy Analysis in Canada: The State of the Art, eds. L. Dobuzinskis, M. Howlett, and D. Laycock, 260-72. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Germany
Trade unions and business organizations generally have only an advisory role in the political process in Germany. However, they still wield some political influence. These groups are part of the self-governing bodies of social security insurances. Representatives from both sides are often invited to participate in public hearings in parliament as experts or stakeholders. They also contribute to legislative initiatives on issues of central importance to capital and labor. Furthermore, representatives from unions and employers’ organizations sit on numerous advisory boards and bodies that advise the federal government (Rütters/Mielke, n.d.).
One exception to the limitation on advising roles is the minimum wage commission, which is entitled to set the minimum wage. It is composed of three representatives each from the trade unions and business organizations, plus one chairman (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, 2023). However, the new government elected in 2021 decided to set the minimum wage themselves and raised it to €12 per hour. After that, the usual process allowing the commission to decide the minimum wage was restored (Lesch et al., 2021, p. 194), at least for the time being.
There are no official, regular meetings between trade unions, business organizations, and government officials. However, certain ministers – first and foremost the minister of labor and the minister for economic affairs, and sometimes even the chancellor himself – meet regularly with representatives from capital and labor to discuss current affairs. It is difficult to determine how much the government acts upon these consultations.
In July 2022, Chancellor Olaf Scholz met with trade unions and business organizations for a “concerted action” (Konzertierte Aktion) but did not invite the federation of small and medium-sized businesses (Bundesverband der Mittelständischen Wirtschaft). This omission was heavily criticized by the federation (Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk, 2022). That being said, criticism of or dissatisfaction with too little participation in the political process is rare.
In Germany, wage bargaining operates autonomously. Trade unions and employers’ organizations negotiate wages and working conditions without political intervention. Consequently, the government does not interfere in collective bargaining rounds and is typically not entitled to resolve disputes between unions and business organizations (Strünck, n.d.). Pleas from the government and other political institutions usually do not influence the collective bargaining rounds and are typically rejected by the negotiating parties swiftly. Additionally, there are no serious debates about limiting the function of autonomy in wage bargaining (Lesch et al., 2023: 26).
One exception to the limitation on advising roles is the minimum wage commission, which is entitled to set the minimum wage. It is composed of three representatives each from the trade unions and business organizations, plus one chairman (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, 2023). However, the new government elected in 2021 decided to set the minimum wage themselves and raised it to €12 per hour. After that, the usual process allowing the commission to decide the minimum wage was restored (Lesch et al., 2021, p. 194), at least for the time being.
There are no official, regular meetings between trade unions, business organizations, and government officials. However, certain ministers – first and foremost the minister of labor and the minister for economic affairs, and sometimes even the chancellor himself – meet regularly with representatives from capital and labor to discuss current affairs. It is difficult to determine how much the government acts upon these consultations.
In July 2022, Chancellor Olaf Scholz met with trade unions and business organizations for a “concerted action” (Konzertierte Aktion) but did not invite the federation of small and medium-sized businesses (Bundesverband der Mittelständischen Wirtschaft). This omission was heavily criticized by the federation (Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk, 2022). That being said, criticism of or dissatisfaction with too little participation in the political process is rare.
In Germany, wage bargaining operates autonomously. Trade unions and employers’ organizations negotiate wages and working conditions without political intervention. Consequently, the government does not interfere in collective bargaining rounds and is typically not entitled to resolve disputes between unions and business organizations (Strünck, n.d.). Pleas from the government and other political institutions usually do not influence the collective bargaining rounds and are typically rejected by the negotiating parties swiftly. Additionally, there are no serious debates about limiting the function of autonomy in wage bargaining (Lesch et al., 2023: 26).
Citations:
Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund. 2023. “Mindestlohnkommission: Aufgaben und Mitglieder.” https://www.dgb.de/schwerpunkt/mindestlohn/++co++916083ea-bd10-11e4-93f3-52540023ef1a
Lesch, H., Bach, H., and Vogel, S. 2023. “Tarifautonomie in der Legalitätskrise.” https://www.iwkoeln.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Studien/policy_papers/PDF/2023/IW-Policy-Paper_2023-Tarifautonomie-Legitimit%C3%A4tskrise.pdf
Lesch, H., Schneider, H., and Schröder, C. 2021. “Anpassungsverfahren beim gesetzlichen Mindestlohn: Argumente gegen eine politische Lohnfindung.” List Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik 47 (2-4): 193-217.
Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk. 2022. “Entlastungen: Scholz trifft sich mit Arbeitgebern und Gewerkschaften.” https://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/deutschland/politik/kampf-gegen-inflation-scholz-treffen-arbeitgeber-100.html
Rütters, P., and Mielke, S. n.d. “Gewerkschaften.” Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/lexika/handwoerterbuch-politisches-system/202034/gewerkschaften
Strünck, C. n.d. “Tarifpolitik/Tarifautonomie.” https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/lexika/handwoerterbuch-politisches-system/202193/tarifpolitik-tarifautonomie/
Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund. 2023. “Mindestlohnkommission: Aufgaben und Mitglieder.” https://www.dgb.de/schwerpunkt/mindestlohn/++co++916083ea-bd10-11e4-93f3-52540023ef1a
Lesch, H., Bach, H., and Vogel, S. 2023. “Tarifautonomie in der Legalitätskrise.” https://www.iwkoeln.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Studien/policy_papers/PDF/2023/IW-Policy-Paper_2023-Tarifautonomie-Legitimit%C3%A4tskrise.pdf
Lesch, H., Schneider, H., and Schröder, C. 2021. “Anpassungsverfahren beim gesetzlichen Mindestlohn: Argumente gegen eine politische Lohnfindung.” List Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik 47 (2-4): 193-217.
Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk. 2022. “Entlastungen: Scholz trifft sich mit Arbeitgebern und Gewerkschaften.” https://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/deutschland/politik/kampf-gegen-inflation-scholz-treffen-arbeitgeber-100.html
Rütters, P., and Mielke, S. n.d. “Gewerkschaften.” Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/lexika/handwoerterbuch-politisches-system/202034/gewerkschaften
Strünck, C. n.d. “Tarifpolitik/Tarifautonomie.” https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/lexika/handwoerterbuch-politisches-system/202193/tarifpolitik-tarifautonomie/
Greece
Greece has established executive and legislative mechanisms that involve representatives of capital and labor in expert commissions and public hearings. Legislation adopted in 1990 and amended in 2021 requires that these representatives negotiate with the government on issues such as salaries, wages, and other aspects of labor relations. For example, the National General Collective Labor Agreement (EGSSE) was negotiated and signed by the national social partners in 2021 (Eurofound 2022), incorporating the European Social Partners Framework Agreement on Digitalization (2020). The social partners also established working groups to address digitalization issues, such as the right to disconnect and maintaining legal working hours for remote workers.
When draft legislation on labor issues is submitted to parliament, the “Permanent Committee on Social Affairs” is convened to debate the legislation. Representatives of employers and employees are invited to participate in these committee sessions.
In Greece, all members of the private sector and labor are involved in negotiations. These negotiations occur between associations representing employers – such as SEV (industrialists), ESEE (merchants), and GSEVEE (small firms) – and the General Confederation of Workers of Greece (GSEE). Similar negotiations take place between the government and the Confederation of Civil Service Unions (ADEDY) regarding public employee salaries.
Although organizational density in Greece is relatively low (approximately 19%; OECD 2021), collective agreements are extended to cover non-organized employers and employees. These agreements are periodically renegotiated, as they may last between one and three years. Additionally, sector-level negotiations between employers and employees are common.
In cases of labor disputes, the Mediation and Arbitration Agency (OMED), established in 1990, supports collective negotiations and intervenes between conflicting interests.
Since 2022, a new institutional mechanism, the “Council of Social Partners,” has involved representatives of capital and labor in consultations on employment policy. This council is attached to the national Public Employment Service (DYPAS) and can also be convened by the Minister of Labor.
During the economic crisis of the previous decade, the participation of social partners in policymaking was often nominal, with wages, salaries, and other labor-related issues being negotiated between the Greek government and representatives of Greece’s creditors (the “Troika”). However, participation is no longer merely tokenistic.
While the government can balance the interests of capital and labor, it is not obligated to act on the outcomes of consultation talks. The Ministry of Labor alone has the authority to decide on minimum wages and working hours, in line with relevant EU regulations and directives.
When draft legislation on labor issues is submitted to parliament, the “Permanent Committee on Social Affairs” is convened to debate the legislation. Representatives of employers and employees are invited to participate in these committee sessions.
In Greece, all members of the private sector and labor are involved in negotiations. These negotiations occur between associations representing employers – such as SEV (industrialists), ESEE (merchants), and GSEVEE (small firms) – and the General Confederation of Workers of Greece (GSEE). Similar negotiations take place between the government and the Confederation of Civil Service Unions (ADEDY) regarding public employee salaries.
Although organizational density in Greece is relatively low (approximately 19%; OECD 2021), collective agreements are extended to cover non-organized employers and employees. These agreements are periodically renegotiated, as they may last between one and three years. Additionally, sector-level negotiations between employers and employees are common.
In cases of labor disputes, the Mediation and Arbitration Agency (OMED), established in 1990, supports collective negotiations and intervenes between conflicting interests.
Since 2022, a new institutional mechanism, the “Council of Social Partners,” has involved representatives of capital and labor in consultations on employment policy. This council is attached to the national Public Employment Service (DYPAS) and can also be convened by the Minister of Labor.
During the economic crisis of the previous decade, the participation of social partners in policymaking was often nominal, with wages, salaries, and other labor-related issues being negotiated between the Greek government and representatives of Greece’s creditors (the “Troika”). However, participation is no longer merely tokenistic.
While the government can balance the interests of capital and labor, it is not obligated to act on the outcomes of consultation talks. The Ministry of Labor alone has the authority to decide on minimum wages and working hours, in line with relevant EU regulations and directives.
Citations:
Eurofound. 2022. “Collective Bargaining and Social Dialogue – Back to Normal in 2021?” https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/en/resources/article/2022/collective-bargaining-and-social-dialogue-back-normal-2021#:~:text=In%20Greece%2C%20the%20National%20General,European%20social%20partners%20(2020)
OECD. 2021. “Greece – Main Indicators and Characteristics of Collective Bargaining.” https://www.oecd.org/employment/collective-bargaining-database-greece.pdf
Sotiropoulos, D. A. 2019. “Political Party–Interest Group Linkages in Greece Before and After the Onset of the Economic Crisis.” Mediterranean Politics 24 (5): 605-625.
The legislation regulating collective agreements between capital and labor is 1896/1990. Ιt was amended in 2021 through Law 4808/2021.
The website of the Ηellenic Federation of Enterprises, i.e. the association of Greek industrialists (SEV), is https://en.sev.org.gr/
The website of the General Confederation of Workers of Greece (GSEE) is https://gsee.gr/
The website of the Confederation of Civil Service Unions (ADEDY) is https://adedy.gr/
The website of the Mediation and Arbitration Agency (OMED) is https://www.omed.gr
The website of the Hellenic Confederation of Professionals, Craftsmen, and Merchants (GSEVEE) is https://www.gsevee.gr/en-us/about
The website of the Hellenic Confederation of Commerce and Entrepreneurship (ESEE) is https://esee.gr/en/home-en/
The website of the Permanent Parliamentary Committee on Social Affairs is is
https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Koinovouleftikes-Epitropes/CommiteeDetailView?CommitteeId=583b7a49-8542-41c0-8e16-e1c22246bfa6
Τhe law adopted in 2022 on the Council of Social Partners is Law 4921/2022.
Eurofound. 2022. “Collective Bargaining and Social Dialogue – Back to Normal in 2021?” https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/en/resources/article/2022/collective-bargaining-and-social-dialogue-back-normal-2021#:~:text=In%20Greece%2C%20the%20National%20General,European%20social%20partners%20(2020)
OECD. 2021. “Greece – Main Indicators and Characteristics of Collective Bargaining.” https://www.oecd.org/employment/collective-bargaining-database-greece.pdf
Sotiropoulos, D. A. 2019. “Political Party–Interest Group Linkages in Greece Before and After the Onset of the Economic Crisis.” Mediterranean Politics 24 (5): 605-625.
The legislation regulating collective agreements between capital and labor is 1896/1990. Ιt was amended in 2021 through Law 4808/2021.
The website of the Ηellenic Federation of Enterprises, i.e. the association of Greek industrialists (SEV), is https://en.sev.org.gr/
The website of the General Confederation of Workers of Greece (GSEE) is https://gsee.gr/
The website of the Confederation of Civil Service Unions (ADEDY) is https://adedy.gr/
The website of the Mediation and Arbitration Agency (OMED) is https://www.omed.gr
The website of the Hellenic Confederation of Professionals, Craftsmen, and Merchants (GSEVEE) is https://www.gsevee.gr/en-us/about
The website of the Hellenic Confederation of Commerce and Entrepreneurship (ESEE) is https://esee.gr/en/home-en/
The website of the Permanent Parliamentary Committee on Social Affairs is is
https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Koinovouleftikes-Epitropes/CommiteeDetailView?CommitteeId=583b7a49-8542-41c0-8e16-e1c22246bfa6
Τhe law adopted in 2022 on the Council of Social Partners is Law 4921/2022.
Ireland
In the past decade, the central government has fostered the involvement of CSOs, including trade unions and business associations, in the policymaking process, with a special emphasis on economic dialogue. The tripartite social partnership of public and private employers and employees, which was nearly halted during the economic crisis, has re-emerged, albeit with less involvement from private sector stakeholders. O’Donnell (2021) found that the state created useful institutional governance structures to involve social partners – employers, unions, farmers and voluntary/community organizations – particularly through the National Economic and Social Council (NESC). NESC’s early social partnership work was instrumental in enabling a strategy for development to overcome the national economic crisis of the 1980s (NESC 1986), playing a central role in its resolution. Since the social partnership process dissipated in 2010, the government has facilitated the participation of CSOs – such as trade unions, business associations and social and environmental groups – in policy dialogue. Ireland has a strong track record of consensus-building through social partnership and policy processes, once described as “a deliberative miracle” (Sabel 2000). This contributes to high levels of public trust, which, despite experiencing some decline, remain relatively strong. While both O’Donnell and Sabel note the successes of social partnership and dialogue, the extent and satisfaction of business and labor CSOs with policy participation remains unclear.
Citations:
Sabel, C. 2020. “Governance and Wicked Problems: Environment, Climate, Human Services and Quality Jobs.” Paper prepared for the Knowledge and Policy: Confronting Governance Challenges in the New Decade Conference, January. Dublin: NESC and Department of Sociology, Maynooth University.
O’Donnell, R. 2021. The Social Partners and the NESC: From Tripartite Dialogue via Common Knowledge Events to Network Knowledge. Bristol: Policy Press.
Sabel, C. 2020. “Governance and Wicked Problems: Environment, Climate, Human Services and Quality Jobs.” Paper prepared for the Knowledge and Policy: Confronting Governance Challenges in the New Decade Conference, January. Dublin: NESC and Department of Sociology, Maynooth University.
O’Donnell, R. 2021. The Social Partners and the NESC: From Tripartite Dialogue via Common Knowledge Events to Network Knowledge. Bristol: Policy Press.
Japan
Big businesses involved in the Japan Business Federation (Nippon Keidanren), the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the Japan Association of Corporate Executives are engaged in planning policies. The chairpersons of big corporations are often invited to cabinet advisory bodies, and dominate among private-sector experts of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, which prepares fiscal and economic policy guidelines and basic rules for budget compilation. The actual influence of capital organizations on policy decisions, however, is largely dependent on the position of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in decision-making. While Prime Minister Abe heavily relied on METI bureaucrats, Prime Minister Kishida represents a more balanced interministerial approach.
Trade union representatives as well as organized business have been taking part in advisory councils in the field of labor market policy at the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare for decades. Until the 1990s, this was understood to resemble a veto right on many aspects of labor regulation. With the advent of cabinet-level councils in the 1990s and 2000s – to which trade unions were not invited or held a minority position – the influence of unions has waned somewhat, and policymaking has largely moved to the cabinet level, with organized business remaining influential. On the other hand, Prime Minister Kishida’s agenda of improving redistribution of wealth and the concept of growth based on domestic demand (so-called new capitalism) has made union demands for higher wages attractive even to LDP governments. Rengô has intensified contacts with the government and Rengô Chairperson Yoshino Tomoko is currently a member of the key cabinet advisory organ, which is composed mostly of CEOs from big corporations. In June 2023, the council issued the revised Grand Design and Action Plan for a New Form of Capitalism, which includes a range of labor market reforms, such as support for reskilling, the introduction of job-based wages tailored to individual company conditions and the facilitation of labor mobility to growth industries.
Trade union representatives as well as organized business have been taking part in advisory councils in the field of labor market policy at the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare for decades. Until the 1990s, this was understood to resemble a veto right on many aspects of labor regulation. With the advent of cabinet-level councils in the 1990s and 2000s – to which trade unions were not invited or held a minority position – the influence of unions has waned somewhat, and policymaking has largely moved to the cabinet level, with organized business remaining influential. On the other hand, Prime Minister Kishida’s agenda of improving redistribution of wealth and the concept of growth based on domestic demand (so-called new capitalism) has made union demands for higher wages attractive even to LDP governments. Rengô has intensified contacts with the government and Rengô Chairperson Yoshino Tomoko is currently a member of the key cabinet advisory organ, which is composed mostly of CEOs from big corporations. In June 2023, the council issued the revised Grand Design and Action Plan for a New Form of Capitalism, which includes a range of labor market reforms, such as support for reskilling, the introduction of job-based wages tailored to individual company conditions and the facilitation of labor mobility to growth industries.
Citations:
Cabinet Secretariat. 2023. “Grand Design and Action Plan for a New Form of Capitalism: 2023 Revised Version.” https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/atarashii_sihonsyugi/pdf/ap2023en.pdf
OECD. 2021. “Main Indicators and Characteristics of Collective Bargaining.” https://www.oecd.org/employment/collective-bargaining-database-japan.pdf
Cabinet Secretariat. 2023. “Grand Design and Action Plan for a New Form of Capitalism: 2023 Revised Version.” https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/atarashii_sihonsyugi/pdf/ap2023en.pdf
OECD. 2021. “Main Indicators and Characteristics of Collective Bargaining.” https://www.oecd.org/employment/collective-bargaining-database-japan.pdf
Latvia
The involvement of civil society organizations (CSOs) is facilitated through a structured approach in the policy development process within sectoral ministries in Latvia. This includes early CSO engagement in discussions, ensuring that various societal interests are represented in decision-making, and fostering open and responsible planning. The process is designed to ensure genuine collaboration between ministries and CSOs, constructive dialogue, and the inclusion of diverse groups in budget planning and oversight. However, the approach acknowledges the limited financial and human resources of CSOs and the non-remunerative nature of their participation. Thus, there is a need for further capacity-building of CSO organizations to ensure effective communication in the policymaking process.
The government has created opportunities for civil society organizations (CSOs) to participate in policymaking through online tools where policy proposals are accessible to the public and CSOs (e.g., the TAP portal). Additionally, 526 CSOs signed the Memorandum between the government and CSOs in November 2023. Regular meetings of the Council of the Memorandum oversee the implementation of the cooperation memorandum. In 2023, the Memorandum Council discussed upcoming legislation on public participation in decision-making and local referenda.
The Free Trade Union Confederation of Latvia (LBAS), the Latvian Chambers of Commerce (LTRK), and the Employers Confederation of Latvia (LDDK) are the most significant CSOs representing labor and capital and capable of influencing policymaking processes as well as policy outcomes.
LDDK represents the interests of employers, usually advocating for business-friendly policies and engaging in social dialogue with government and labor unions. It often plays a crucial role in shaping Latvia’s labor market policies and economic strategies. LDDK focuses on updates relevant to Latvian business environments and strategic priorities, including geopolitical, economic, social, and digital transformation challenges. It mentions the involvement of experts in more than 1,000 policy-planning activities and the integration of 64 directives into national employment regulations in 2022 (LDDK Gada Pārskats, 2023).
LTRK addresses the needs of small businesses by facilitating meetings with ministries and conducting education campaigns to amplify their voices. The Latvian Free Trade Union Confederation (LBAS) focuses on occupational safety, labor law, gender equality issues, the European Semester, education, youth employment, sectoral expert councils, social issues, international action, and the economy.
LTRK, LDDK, and LBAS are known as the big three and are usually present in working groups and at Cabinet of Ministers meetings. Several smaller CSOs exist, but they channel their opinions through the most prominent players in the field.
The National Tripartite Cooperation Council (NTSP) is a platform that brings together employers’ associations, business associations, and trade unions. The council serves as a policy decision-making and implementation tool, particularly on labor markets, legislation, and social security issues. Over the years, it has proved to be an effective platform for uniting various interests.
Civil society organizations (CSOs) do not often express dissatisfaction with token participation in policymaking because they are usually included in important meetings. However, recent criticism has been directed at the government concerning the development of a government action plan. Critics note that not all ministries have sufficiently involved social partners in formulating growth-oriented government deliverables. Additionally, there has been criticism of the contents of the government declaration.
The government has created opportunities for civil society organizations (CSOs) to participate in policymaking through online tools where policy proposals are accessible to the public and CSOs (e.g., the TAP portal). Additionally, 526 CSOs signed the Memorandum between the government and CSOs in November 2023. Regular meetings of the Council of the Memorandum oversee the implementation of the cooperation memorandum. In 2023, the Memorandum Council discussed upcoming legislation on public participation in decision-making and local referenda.
The Free Trade Union Confederation of Latvia (LBAS), the Latvian Chambers of Commerce (LTRK), and the Employers Confederation of Latvia (LDDK) are the most significant CSOs representing labor and capital and capable of influencing policymaking processes as well as policy outcomes.
LDDK represents the interests of employers, usually advocating for business-friendly policies and engaging in social dialogue with government and labor unions. It often plays a crucial role in shaping Latvia’s labor market policies and economic strategies. LDDK focuses on updates relevant to Latvian business environments and strategic priorities, including geopolitical, economic, social, and digital transformation challenges. It mentions the involvement of experts in more than 1,000 policy-planning activities and the integration of 64 directives into national employment regulations in 2022 (LDDK Gada Pārskats, 2023).
LTRK addresses the needs of small businesses by facilitating meetings with ministries and conducting education campaigns to amplify their voices. The Latvian Free Trade Union Confederation (LBAS) focuses on occupational safety, labor law, gender equality issues, the European Semester, education, youth employment, sectoral expert councils, social issues, international action, and the economy.
LTRK, LDDK, and LBAS are known as the big three and are usually present in working groups and at Cabinet of Ministers meetings. Several smaller CSOs exist, but they channel their opinions through the most prominent players in the field.
The National Tripartite Cooperation Council (NTSP) is a platform that brings together employers’ associations, business associations, and trade unions. The council serves as a policy decision-making and implementation tool, particularly on labor markets, legislation, and social security issues. Over the years, it has proved to be an effective platform for uniting various interests.
Civil society organizations (CSOs) do not often express dissatisfaction with token participation in policymaking because they are usually included in important meetings. However, recent criticism has been directed at the government concerning the development of a government action plan. Critics note that not all ministries have sufficiently involved social partners in formulating growth-oriented government deliverables. Additionally, there has been criticism of the contents of the government declaration.
Citations:
Latvijas Darba devēju konfederācija. ” https://lddk.lv/en/about-lddk/more-about-lddk/”
Latvijas Darba devēju konfederācija. “Gada pārskati.” https://lddk.lv/par-lddk/gada-parskati/
Latvijas Tirdzniecības un Rūpniecības kamera. “Paveiktie darbi biedru interešu pārstāvībā.” https://www.ltrk.lv/lv/content/5089
Latvijas Brīvo arodbiedrību savienība. “Darbības virzieni.” https://arodbiedribas.lv/darbibas-virzieni/
Finanšu ministrija. 2020. “Nevalstisko organizāciju (NVO) iesaiste budžeta izstrādes procesā nozaru ministrijās.” https://www.fm.gov.lv/lv/media/1118/download
Latvijas Pilsoniskā alianse. “In Latvian.” https://nvo.lv/lv/musejie/biedri/#darba_deveju_organizacijas_arodbiedribas_profesionalas_biedribas_un_dibinajumi
Latvijas darba devēju konfederācija. 2024. “LDDK vērtējumā valdības rīcības plāna izstrādes procesā un satura kvalitātē trūkusi konsekvence.” https://lddk.lv/aktualitate/jaunumi/lddk-vertejuma-valdibas-ricibas-plana-izstrades-procesa-un-satura-kvalitate-trukusi-konsekvence/
Latvijas darba devēju konfederācija. 2023. “LDDK: valdības deklarācijā trūkst skaidra redzējuma un ambiciozu mērķu ekonomikā.” https://lddk.lv/aktualitate/jaunumi/lddk-valdibas-deklaracija-trukst-skaidra-redzejuma-un-ambiciozu-merku-ekonomika/
Latvijas Darba devēju konfederācija. ” https://lddk.lv/en/about-lddk/more-about-lddk/”
Latvijas Darba devēju konfederācija. “Gada pārskati.” https://lddk.lv/par-lddk/gada-parskati/
Latvijas Tirdzniecības un Rūpniecības kamera. “Paveiktie darbi biedru interešu pārstāvībā.” https://www.ltrk.lv/lv/content/5089
Latvijas Brīvo arodbiedrību savienība. “Darbības virzieni.” https://arodbiedribas.lv/darbibas-virzieni/
Finanšu ministrija. 2020. “Nevalstisko organizāciju (NVO) iesaiste budžeta izstrādes procesā nozaru ministrijās.” https://www.fm.gov.lv/lv/media/1118/download
Latvijas Pilsoniskā alianse. “In Latvian.” https://nvo.lv/lv/musejie/biedri/#darba_deveju_organizacijas_arodbiedribas_profesionalas_biedribas_un_dibinajumi
Latvijas darba devēju konfederācija. 2024. “LDDK vērtējumā valdības rīcības plāna izstrādes procesā un satura kvalitātē trūkusi konsekvence.” https://lddk.lv/aktualitate/jaunumi/lddk-vertejuma-valdibas-ricibas-plana-izstrades-procesa-un-satura-kvalitate-trukusi-konsekvence/
Latvijas darba devēju konfederācija. 2023. “LDDK: valdības deklarācijā trūkst skaidra redzējuma un ambiciozu mērķu ekonomikā.” https://lddk.lv/aktualitate/jaunumi/lddk-valdibas-deklaracija-trukst-skaidra-redzejuma-un-ambiciozu-merku-ekonomika/
New Zealand
Capital and labor are involved in the policymaking process through general institutionalized mechanisms for consultation. Select committees and government departments often hold public consultations and hearings, and invite submissions from stakeholders on topics related to specific pieces of legislation. Furthermore, the government conducts regulatory impact assessments before implementing regulations or policies, which involves consultations to evaluate the potential effects on stakeholders and the public. The government may also set up working groups to address specific policy issues by bringing together representatives from relevant sectors. For example, the Labour government under Ardern established a working group comprising business and trade union representatives to draw up the framework for the Fair Pay Agreements bill (Cooke 2022a).
In addition, there are specific institutional mechanisms to facilitate the participation of trade unions and business organizations in policymaking, perhaps the most significant being the Future of Work Tripartite Forum, convened by the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment (MBIE). The Employment Relations Authority (ERA) and MBIE also offer mediation and arbitration services, providing a neutral platform for negotiation and resolution between employers and employees.
The frequency of engagement between government officials and representatives from capital and labor varies based on the nature of ongoing discussions and the political orientation of the parties in power.
The government plays a significant role in moderating disputes between labor and capital, although the extent of success can depend on several factors, such as the complexity of the issues and the willingness of stakeholders to engage in resolution processes. The Fair Pay Agreements bill is an example of failed dispute moderation: BusinessNZ – New Zealand’s largest employers’ representative – began to boycott the consultation process in 2022, hoping for a change in government in 2023 (Cooke 2022b).
In addition, there are specific institutional mechanisms to facilitate the participation of trade unions and business organizations in policymaking, perhaps the most significant being the Future of Work Tripartite Forum, convened by the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment (MBIE). The Employment Relations Authority (ERA) and MBIE also offer mediation and arbitration services, providing a neutral platform for negotiation and resolution between employers and employees.
The frequency of engagement between government officials and representatives from capital and labor varies based on the nature of ongoing discussions and the political orientation of the parties in power.
The government plays a significant role in moderating disputes between labor and capital, although the extent of success can depend on several factors, such as the complexity of the issues and the willingness of stakeholders to engage in resolution processes. The Fair Pay Agreements bill is an example of failed dispute moderation: BusinessNZ – New Zealand’s largest employers’ representative – began to boycott the consultation process in 2022, hoping for a change in government in 2023 (Cooke 2022b).
Citations:
Cooke, H. 2022. “Government introduces Fair Pay Agreements bill, will exclude contracts, allow regional differences.” Stuff, March 29. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/300553017/government-introduces-fair-pay-agreements-bill-will-exclude-contracts-allow-regional-differences
Cooke, H. 2022. “New Zealand has just passed a law that will revolutionise workers’ rights. It probably won’t last.” The Guardian, October 28. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/29/new-zealand-has-just-passed-a-law-that-will-revolutionise-workers-rights-it-probably-wont-last
Cooke, H. 2022. “Government introduces Fair Pay Agreements bill, will exclude contracts, allow regional differences.” Stuff, March 29. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/300553017/government-introduces-fair-pay-agreements-bill-will-exclude-contracts-allow-regional-differences
Cooke, H. 2022. “New Zealand has just passed a law that will revolutionise workers’ rights. It probably won’t last.” The Guardian, October 28. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/29/new-zealand-has-just-passed-a-law-that-will-revolutionise-workers-rights-it-probably-wont-last
USA
There are many ways in which labor and businesses can influence government policymaking in the United States. The Department of Labor and the Department of Commerce operate as an institutional hub for contact between the federal government and labor and business, respectively (Bensman and Kesselman 2020).
Both labor and business employ full-time lobbyists to advocate for their members and interests. They also have their own campaign organizations and participate in elections through fundraising, advertising, and donations. Labor and business are well-integrated into the party culture of both the Democratic and Republican parties, although labor has historically had, and continues to have, much closer links with the Democrats (Milkman 2019).
Federal agencies occasionally solicit input from labor and business groups during public consultations. For instance, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) seeks comments from various advocacy groups, including unions and businesses, on potential environmental regulations or standards. During the public comment period, unions and business organizations contribute to this process (Hertel-Fernandez 2019).
Various federal agencies also invite unions and business leaders to sit on advisory committees, task forces, and in behind-the-scenes meetings. For example, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regularly invites representatives from labor and business to sit on its advisory committees concerning workplace health and safety (Schickler and Caughey 2011).
Both labor and business employ full-time lobbyists to advocate for their members and interests. They also have their own campaign organizations and participate in elections through fundraising, advertising, and donations. Labor and business are well-integrated into the party culture of both the Democratic and Republican parties, although labor has historically had, and continues to have, much closer links with the Democrats (Milkman 2019).
Federal agencies occasionally solicit input from labor and business groups during public consultations. For instance, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) seeks comments from various advocacy groups, including unions and businesses, on potential environmental regulations or standards. During the public comment period, unions and business organizations contribute to this process (Hertel-Fernandez 2019).
Various federal agencies also invite unions and business leaders to sit on advisory committees, task forces, and in behind-the-scenes meetings. For example, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regularly invites representatives from labor and business to sit on its advisory committees concerning workplace health and safety (Schickler and Caughey 2011).
Citations:
Ruth Milkman. 2019. “The World We Have Lost: US Labor in the Obama Years.” In Looking Back on President Barack Obama’s Legacy, ed. W. Rich. Palgrave.
Alexander Hertel-Fernandez. 2019. “Asymmetric Partisan Polarization, Labor Policy, and Cross-State Political-Power Building.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.
David Bensman and Donald Kesselman. 2020. “The Obama Administration’s Labor and Employment Legacy.” In Obama’s Fractured Legacy, ed. F. Verginolle de Chantal. Edinburgh.
Dorian Warren. 2014. “The Politics of Labor Policy Reform.” In The Politics of Major Policy Reform in Postwar America, eds. J. Jenkins and S. Milkis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Eric Schickler and Devin Caughey. 2011. “Public Opinion, Organized Labor, and the Limits of New Deal Liberalism.” Studies in American Political Development.
Ruth Milkman. 2019. “The World We Have Lost: US Labor in the Obama Years.” In Looking Back on President Barack Obama’s Legacy, ed. W. Rich. Palgrave.
Alexander Hertel-Fernandez. 2019. “Asymmetric Partisan Polarization, Labor Policy, and Cross-State Political-Power Building.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.
David Bensman and Donald Kesselman. 2020. “The Obama Administration’s Labor and Employment Legacy.” In Obama’s Fractured Legacy, ed. F. Verginolle de Chantal. Edinburgh.
Dorian Warren. 2014. “The Politics of Labor Policy Reform.” In The Politics of Major Policy Reform in Postwar America, eds. J. Jenkins and S. Milkis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Eric Schickler and Devin Caughey. 2011. “Public Opinion, Organized Labor, and the Limits of New Deal Liberalism.” Studies in American Political Development.
6
Australia
There is limited institutionalized involvement of capital and labor in policymaking processes. Businesses and trade unions influence policy through informal means, such as meetings with government officials and the movement of individuals between government and private sector employment. In the case of unions, influence is to a considerable extent confined to periods when the Labor Party is in power, noting that unions have significant input into the preselection of Labor candidates. Otherwise, informal mechanisms include meetings between government officials and the leaders of these private sector organizations, and the movement of individuals between government employment and employment in private sector organizations. While the latter may have some beneficial impact in terms of knowledge transfer between sectors, there has been concern that such movement may undermine governance in the public interest (for instance, because it may mean that the private firms which frequently recruit government employees may be able to draw on the connections of these persons to advance their firm’s interests). This phenomenon has been described as the problem of the “revolving door” between government and the private (and especially corporate) sector (Centre for Public Integrity 2023).
The relationships between government, trade unions and business depend on the political complexion of the government. In general, the Liberal-National Coalition is regarded as being more pro-business and, as noted, Labor is closely associated with the union movement. However, these generalizations mask a large degree of consensus and important parallels between governments of all stripes in the Australian context. Most importantly in this regard, the Labor Party has generally been a strong defender of the fundamentals of the market economy, and therefore is open to business in a political sense. More radical left-leaning critics claim that business has often preferred Labor to form government because it is more able to keep the unions in check, thereby reducing the costs of industrial action (De 2023).
The relationships between government, trade unions and business depend on the political complexion of the government. In general, the Liberal-National Coalition is regarded as being more pro-business and, as noted, Labor is closely associated with the union movement. However, these generalizations mask a large degree of consensus and important parallels between governments of all stripes in the Australian context. Most importantly in this regard, the Labor Party has generally been a strong defender of the fundamentals of the market economy, and therefore is open to business in a political sense. More radical left-leaning critics claim that business has often preferred Labor to form government because it is more able to keep the unions in check, thereby reducing the costs of industrial action (De 2023).
Citations:
Centre for Public Integrity. 2023. “Closing the Revolving Door.” https://publicintegrity.org.au/research_papers/closing-the-revolving-door/
De, P. 2023. “Labor’s Connection to Trade Unions – For Better or Worse?” Redflag. https://redflag.org.au/article/labors-connection-trade-unions-better-or-worse
Centre for Public Integrity. 2023. “Closing the Revolving Door.” https://publicintegrity.org.au/research_papers/closing-the-revolving-door/
De, P. 2023. “Labor’s Connection to Trade Unions – For Better or Worse?” Redflag. https://redflag.org.au/article/labors-connection-trade-unions-better-or-worse
Estonia
Consultations with societal actors are regulated by government guidelines outlined in the Good Practice of Involvement (GPI), in place since 2012. Although not legally binding, the GPI prescribes detailed procedures for engaging social stakeholders in the policymaking process. All ministries employ an engagement coordinator to assist interested citizens and advocacy groups. The main focus is on consultations during the preparatory phase, when a broad range of societal actors is typically involved. However, policymaking does not always entirely adhere to GPI principles. Additionally, engagement practices have not yet been fully incorporated into the policy implementation and policy evaluation phases.
The Estonian Trade Union Confederation’s (ETUC) policy-formulation capacity is relatively weak, due both to low membership rates and fragmentation within the system (Kallaste 2023). Trade unions’ ties with political parties were stronger during the early years of Estonian independence; recently, these links have diminished. However, in 2022, the general secretary of ETUC entered the government as a minister. The unions appear to be more involved when the Social Democrats are in power, although this involvement is more informal than institutional.
Social partners are formal partners of the government in tripartite social insurance funds, which constitute the main structural form of dialogue. Beyond this, the primary focus is on determining the annual national minimum wage. The shortage of teachers has heightened the salience of the Estonian Educational Personnel Union, which has been intensively demanding an increase in teachers’ statutory salaries (a promise yet to be fulfilled by the government). This unmet demand led to a teachers’ strike in January 2024 and increased public awareness of unions.
The Estonian Employers Confederation (EEC) has been active for a longer period, indicating both its greater legitimacy among previous governments and a better position in power relations. The number of policy proposals developed by the EEC and its analytical capacities have significantly increased in recent years. For example, the EEC was behind the Governance Reform Radar initiative, and is closely linked to the State Reform Foundation, which has produced a detailed list of reform proposals. However, the State Reform Foundation has been dormant since 2019.
The Estonian Trade Union Confederation’s (ETUC) policy-formulation capacity is relatively weak, due both to low membership rates and fragmentation within the system (Kallaste 2023). Trade unions’ ties with political parties were stronger during the early years of Estonian independence; recently, these links have diminished. However, in 2022, the general secretary of ETUC entered the government as a minister. The unions appear to be more involved when the Social Democrats are in power, although this involvement is more informal than institutional.
Social partners are formal partners of the government in tripartite social insurance funds, which constitute the main structural form of dialogue. Beyond this, the primary focus is on determining the annual national minimum wage. The shortage of teachers has heightened the salience of the Estonian Educational Personnel Union, which has been intensively demanding an increase in teachers’ statutory salaries (a promise yet to be fulfilled by the government). This unmet demand led to a teachers’ strike in January 2024 and increased public awareness of unions.
The Estonian Employers Confederation (EEC) has been active for a longer period, indicating both its greater legitimacy among previous governments and a better position in power relations. The number of policy proposals developed by the EEC and its analytical capacities have significantly increased in recent years. For example, the EEC was behind the Governance Reform Radar initiative, and is closely linked to the State Reform Foundation, which has produced a detailed list of reform proposals. However, the State Reform Foundation has been dormant since 2019.
Citations:
Epp, Kallaste. 2023. “Trade Unions in Estonia: Less than Meets the Eye.” In Trade Unions in the European Union, eds. Kurt Vandaele, Torsten Müller, and Jeremy Waddington. Brussels, Berlin, Bern, New York, Oxford, Warsaw, Vienna: Peter Lang, 359−386.
Epp, Kallaste. 2023. “Trade Unions in Estonia: Less than Meets the Eye.” In Trade Unions in the European Union, eds. Kurt Vandaele, Torsten Müller, and Jeremy Waddington. Brussels, Berlin, Bern, New York, Oxford, Warsaw, Vienna: Peter Lang, 359−386.
Israel
Generally, there are no institutionalized mechanisms for tripartite consultation. A roundtable of employer, labor union and government representatives was formed in 2009 as part of the coalition agreement based on a Labor Party demand. However, the roundtable was discontinued after that coalition dissolved (Bondy and Maggor 2023). Currently, any consultation with employers and unions occurs on an ad hoc basis.
Moreover, the government generally avoids such consultation unless the cooperation of labor or capital is required for policy implementation. This applies to collective agreements in the public sector or when the government wishes to promote a reform in government-owned companies.
Unions participate in roundtables at the ministry level, alongside other stakeholder groups. For example, teachers’ unions are invited to roundtables held by the Ministry of Education.
The consultation process is not transparent to the public and is often not inclusive. Some governments have attempted to promote various reforms without consultation or with limited consultation. Other governments have taken a more inclusive approach. However, consultations are not formalized and, therefore, depend on the minister or ministers in power. In many cases, the lack of inclusive consultation has resulted in strikes and hindered progress in the suggested reforms.
Usually, the government does not play an active or productive role in resolving conflicts between labor and capital.
Moreover, the government generally avoids such consultation unless the cooperation of labor or capital is required for policy implementation. This applies to collective agreements in the public sector or when the government wishes to promote a reform in government-owned companies.
Unions participate in roundtables at the ministry level, alongside other stakeholder groups. For example, teachers’ unions are invited to roundtables held by the Ministry of Education.
The consultation process is not transparent to the public and is often not inclusive. Some governments have attempted to promote various reforms without consultation or with limited consultation. Other governments have taken a more inclusive approach. However, consultations are not formalized and, therefore, depend on the minister or ministers in power. In many cases, the lack of inclusive consultation has resulted in strikes and hindered progress in the suggested reforms.
Usually, the government does not play an active or productive role in resolving conflicts between labor and capital.
Citations:
Bondy, A. S., and E. Maggor. 2023. “Balancing the Scales: Labour Incorporation and the Politics of Growth Model Transformation.” New Political Economy 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2023.2217770
Bondy, A. S., and E. Maggor. 2023. “Balancing the Scales: Labour Incorporation and the Politics of Growth Model Transformation.” New Political Economy 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2023.2217770
Portugal
The government facilitates the engagement of trade unions and business organizations through the Economic and Social Council (CES), a constitutional body for consultation and social concertation, allowing their participation in decision-making. For instance, during the Social Dialogue meeting in September 2023, employers’ confederations presented their written opinions regarding considerations for the 2024 State Budget, specifically advocating for tax reductions for companies and workers.
However, critics argue that the involvement of business organizations and trade unions in public policymaking in Portugal is not substantial and tends to occur after the formulation of public policy proposals.
However, critics argue that the involvement of business organizations and trade unions in public policymaking in Portugal is not substantial and tends to occur after the formulation of public policy proposals.
Citations:
Lusa. “Confederações patronais querem redução da carga fiscal em 2024.” Eco Sapo. https://eco.sapo.pt/2023/09/13/confederacoes-patronais-querem-reducao-da-carga-fiscal-em-2024/
(13.09.2023)
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). “Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance EUROPE 2022 Portugal.” https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/Portugal-country-profile-EU-report-2022.pdf
Frazão, J. P. 2023. “Cinco décadas de democracia em Portugal. ‘Ponto mais negativo é a falta de participação da sociedade civil.’” Rádio Renascença. https://rr.sapo.pt/noticia/politica/2023/04/24/cinco-decadas-de-democracia-em-portugal-ponto-mais-negativo-e-a-falta-de-participacao-da-sociedade-civil/328833/
Conselho Económico e Social. 2021. “Acordo sobre formação profissional e qualificação: um desígnio estratégico para as pessoas, para as empresas e para o país.” https://ces.pt/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/acordo-2021.pdf
Frazão, J. P. 2023. “Cinco décadas de democracia em Portugal. ‘Ponto mais negativo é a falta de participação da sociedade civil.’” Rádio Renascença. https://rr.sapo.pt/noticia/politica/2023/04/24/cinco-decadas-de-democracia-em-portugal-ponto-mais-negativo-e-a-falta-de-participacao-da-sociedade-civil/328833/
Conselho Económico e Social. 2021. Acordo sobre formação profissional e qualificação: um desígnio estratégico para as pessoas, para as empresas e para o país. https://ces.pt/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/acordo-2021.pdf
Lusa. “Confederações patronais querem redução da carga fiscal em 2024.” Eco Sapo. https://eco.sapo.pt/2023/09/13/confederacoes-patronais-querem-reducao-da-carga-fiscal-em-2024/
(13.09.2023)
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). “Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance EUROPE 2022 Portugal.” https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/Portugal-country-profile-EU-report-2022.pdf
Frazão, J. P. 2023. “Cinco décadas de democracia em Portugal. ‘Ponto mais negativo é a falta de participação da sociedade civil.’” Rádio Renascença. https://rr.sapo.pt/noticia/politica/2023/04/24/cinco-decadas-de-democracia-em-portugal-ponto-mais-negativo-e-a-falta-de-participacao-da-sociedade-civil/328833/
Conselho Económico e Social. 2021. “Acordo sobre formação profissional e qualificação: um desígnio estratégico para as pessoas, para as empresas e para o país.” https://ces.pt/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/acordo-2021.pdf
Frazão, J. P. 2023. “Cinco décadas de democracia em Portugal. ‘Ponto mais negativo é a falta de participação da sociedade civil.’” Rádio Renascença. https://rr.sapo.pt/noticia/politica/2023/04/24/cinco-decadas-de-democracia-em-portugal-ponto-mais-negativo-e-a-falta-de-participacao-da-sociedade-civil/328833/
Conselho Económico e Social. 2021. Acordo sobre formação profissional e qualificação: um desígnio estratégico para as pessoas, para as empresas e para o país. https://ces.pt/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/acordo-2021.pdf
Slovakia
The existing institutional mechanisms facilitate the active involvement of non-state actors in capital and labor policymaking and implementation. Legislation clearly defines the roles of key actors, including trade unions and employers’ associations.
The Economic and Social Council (ESC) serves as a consultative and coordinating body for the government and social partners at the national level. Meetings are held regularly according to a government plan, and all information from these meetings is published on the government’s website. The ESC and other institutional mechanisms, such as legislative rules, ensure a formal, inclusive process that allows participation from both private sector and labor representatives.
Non-state members of the ESC and other civil society organizations in this sector have a highly visible presence. Media coverage frequently highlights their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their involvement in the policymaking process and its outcomes, as required by media law.
As a consultative body, the ESC’s recommendations are not mandatory for the government. For example, most comments from non-state members regarding the state budgets for 2022 and 2023 were not incorporated by the OĽANO-led governments. A notable aspect of the ESC’s activities is its role in negotiating between employers’ and employees’ representatives over the minimum wage (as per Law 663/2007 on the minimum wage). While negotiations for the 2022 minimum wage were unsuccessful and the state set the rate, agreements were reached for the 2023 and 2024 minimum wage levels.
The Economic and Social Council (ESC) serves as a consultative and coordinating body for the government and social partners at the national level. Meetings are held regularly according to a government plan, and all information from these meetings is published on the government’s website. The ESC and other institutional mechanisms, such as legislative rules, ensure a formal, inclusive process that allows participation from both private sector and labor representatives.
Non-state members of the ESC and other civil society organizations in this sector have a highly visible presence. Media coverage frequently highlights their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their involvement in the policymaking process and its outcomes, as required by media law.
As a consultative body, the ESC’s recommendations are not mandatory for the government. For example, most comments from non-state members regarding the state budgets for 2022 and 2023 were not incorporated by the OĽANO-led governments. A notable aspect of the ESC’s activities is its role in negotiating between employers’ and employees’ representatives over the minimum wage (as per Law 663/2007 on the minimum wage). While negotiations for the 2022 minimum wage were unsuccessful and the state set the rate, agreements were reached for the 2023 and 2024 minimum wage levels.
Citations:
Zákon č. 103/2007 Z. z. o trojstranných konzultáciách na celoštátnej úrovni. 2007. https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2007/103/
Zákon 663/2007 Z. z. o minimálnej mzde. 2007. https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2007/663/
Zákon č. 103/2007 Z. z. o trojstranných konzultáciách na celoštátnej úrovni. 2007. https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2007/103/
Zákon 663/2007 Z. z. o minimálnej mzde. 2007. https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2007/663/
The government is rarely able to effectively involve trade unions and business organizations in policy development.
5
Poland
Institutional mechanisms in Poland currently fall short of actively involving capital and labor organizations from the outset of policymaking processes. The use of expert commissions, public hearings and performance monitoring is infrequent and irregular. The consultation process lacks transparency, hindering effective communication between government officials and representatives of capital and labor. The existing institutional setup provides only for limited inclusion of various private sector and labor stakeholders.
Under the PiS government, cooperation with major organizations depended on these group’s ideological and political proximity, rendering the dialogue exclusive and not inclusive of all types of organizations. For example, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki and Solidarity labor union Chairman Piotr Duda, who supported the PiS government, signed an agreement on June 7, 2023 introducing a series of changes advocated by this trade union, including pay raises for public sector employees. In contrast, arguments voiced by teachers’ unions such as the Polish Teachers Union (Związek Nauczycielstwa Polskiego), which has been highly critical of changes in the educational system and the politicization of schools, were not acknowledged.
Representatives of the labor sector and the government gathered under the auspices of the president within the Social Dialogue Council, but real consultation and exchanges of opinion were limited. The most frequently cited problem by employers’ organizations and trade unions was the difficulties arising from legal regulations and procedures (respectively 47.0% and 34.8% of survey respondents cited this issue). Employers’ organizations often identified issues in their interactions with the public administration (33.2%), while trade unions pointed to challenges related to an insufficient number of volunteers for social work (31.4%) (GUS 2023).
Under the PiS government, cooperation with major organizations depended on these group’s ideological and political proximity, rendering the dialogue exclusive and not inclusive of all types of organizations. For example, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki and Solidarity labor union Chairman Piotr Duda, who supported the PiS government, signed an agreement on June 7, 2023 introducing a series of changes advocated by this trade union, including pay raises for public sector employees. In contrast, arguments voiced by teachers’ unions such as the Polish Teachers Union (Związek Nauczycielstwa Polskiego), which has been highly critical of changes in the educational system and the politicization of schools, were not acknowledged.
Representatives of the labor sector and the government gathered under the auspices of the president within the Social Dialogue Council, but real consultation and exchanges of opinion were limited. The most frequently cited problem by employers’ organizations and trade unions was the difficulties arising from legal regulations and procedures (respectively 47.0% and 34.8% of survey respondents cited this issue). Employers’ organizations often identified issues in their interactions with the public administration (33.2%), while trade unions pointed to challenges related to an insufficient number of volunteers for social work (31.4%) (GUS 2023).
Citations:
GUS. 2023. “Partnerzy dialogu społecznego – organizacje pracodawców i związki zawodowe w 2022 r.” https://stat.gov.pl/download/gfx/portalinformacyjny/pl/defaultaktualnosci/5490/16/2/1/partnerzy_dialogu_spolecznego_-_organizacje_pracodawcow_i_zwiazki_zawodowe_w_2022_r.pdf
https://www.worker-participation.eu/national-industrial-relations/countries/poland
GUS. 2023. “Partnerzy dialogu społecznego – organizacje pracodawców i związki zawodowe w 2022 r.” https://stat.gov.pl/download/gfx/portalinformacyjny/pl/defaultaktualnosci/5490/16/2/1/partnerzy_dialogu_spolecznego_-_organizacje_pracodawcow_i_zwiazki_zawodowe_w_2022_r.pdf
https://www.worker-participation.eu/national-industrial-relations/countries/poland
4
Italy
As in other European countries, and perhaps more so in Italy, the relationship between the government and the representatives of capital and labor has deteriorated over time. Italy has experienced significant political disintermediation, meaning the government has only sporadically involved the main trade unions and the associations representing the primary manufacturers in the policymaking process. This trend has been evident under both the Draghi and Meloni governments.
The Draghi government held some consultations with major unions on tax and pension policies, but their impact on final policy decisions in these areas was minimal. Similarly, Meloni has consulted both sides in a very ritualistic manner. Notably, both the main unions and the primary manufacturers’ association were highly critical of the budget law passed under the Draghi government for 2022, as well as the two budget laws passed under the Meloni government for 2023 and 2024.
In recent years, a trend has emerged characterized by a significant lack of consideration for the main demands of capital and labor. The Meloni government has focused more on approving segmented policies with clear beneficiaries, such as pensioners, employees, the self-employed, and other micro-interests.
The Draghi government held some consultations with major unions on tax and pension policies, but their impact on final policy decisions in these areas was minimal. Similarly, Meloni has consulted both sides in a very ritualistic manner. Notably, both the main unions and the primary manufacturers’ association were highly critical of the budget law passed under the Draghi government for 2022, as well as the two budget laws passed under the Meloni government for 2023 and 2024.
In recent years, a trend has emerged characterized by a significant lack of consideration for the main demands of capital and labor. The Meloni government has focused more on approving segmented policies with clear beneficiaries, such as pensioners, employees, the self-employed, and other micro-interests.
UK
The notion of “social partners” as actors in governance is not well entrenched in the UK, in contrast to several continental European countries. Unions exercised substantial power in the third quarter of the 20th century, and institutions of corporatism were established. However, after Margaret Thatcher came to power, a succession of legislative acts curbed union power, and the decline of heavily unionized sectors such as mining and steel-making led to a sharp decrease in union influence. While certain individual unions and employer organizations maintain influence in specific areas, neither the Trade Union Congress (TUC) nor the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) routinely shape public policies. In fact, the CBI has faced scandals in the past two years that have undermined its authority, leading to the resignation of some major companies. Other employer organizations may have gained influence from the CBI’s disarray, but none have emerged as powerful alternative voices of business. The devolved Scottish and Welsh governments have shown more commitment to the idea of social partnership as part of more consensual “policy styles,” but they do not oversee many of the policy sectors traditionally associated with tripartism (Cairney 2019).
The past two years have seen a resurgence of tensions in industrial relations, particularly in the health and transport sectors. Although the UK government funds nearly all of the National Health Service and provides large subsidies for transport, it has largely stood back in resolving disputes. In health, the government’s rationale is that pay review bodies should set pay, while in the railways, it has sought to portray disputes as being between private owners and the unions.
One noteworthy exception to the limited involvement of social partners is the Low Pay Commission, which recommends annual changes in the minimum wage.
The past two years have seen a resurgence of tensions in industrial relations, particularly in the health and transport sectors. Although the UK government funds nearly all of the National Health Service and provides large subsidies for transport, it has largely stood back in resolving disputes. In health, the government’s rationale is that pay review bodies should set pay, while in the railways, it has sought to portray disputes as being between private owners and the unions.
One noteworthy exception to the limited involvement of social partners is the Low Pay Commission, which recommends annual changes in the minimum wage.
Citations:
Cairney. 2019. “Policy Styles in the UK: Majoritarian UK versus Devolved Consensus Democracies?” In Policy Styles and Policy-Making: Exploring the National Dimension, eds. Michael Howlett and Jale Tosun. London: Routledge.
Cairney. 2019. “Policy Styles in the UK: Majoritarian UK versus Devolved Consensus Democracies?” In Policy Styles and Policy-Making: Exploring the National Dimension, eds. Michael Howlett and Jale Tosun. London: Routledge.
3
Hungary
To consolidate its control over public narratives and remove limits on its authority, the governing administration has sought to undermine and suppress groups in society that maintain ideological and financial autonomy from the governing party. This approach has escalated the likelihood of societal discord, as opportunities for mediating and resolving divergent viewpoints have been increasingly reduced. Consequently, the Orbán governments have rarely and selectively consulted with societal actors. Trade unions and social and environmental groups have had little influence in the policy process. The two main exceptions have been the representatives of large multinational firms, upon which the Hungarian economy depends, and the churches, which have aligned closely with the government. In addition, the government has organized so-called national consultations and fake referendums based on letters to citizens containing misleading and manipulated questions. The actual function of these letters is to keep Fidesz voters in a state of perpetual mobilization, partly by making it possible to compose lists of those who have answered these letters.
Additionally, trade unions and employers’ associations struggle due to the government’s disregard of tripartite interest reconciliation, with the exception of trade unions that have been co-opted by the government. For instance, the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (HCCI), whose annual meetings are often attended by the prime minister and members of his cabinet, is frequently used as a source of legitimation for unpopular economic measures. Collective bargaining is highly decentralized. The National Economic and Social Council (NGTT) serves as the central social dialogue platform, and includes representatives of employers, employees, churches, civil society, academia and the arts. However, the government does not participate in these discussions, thus relegating the body to a consultative role. Even in this capacity, the government does not utilize the expertise available via the NGTT.
The reduction of state involvement in labor relations, as seen in the labor code reform, enhances the negotiation partners’ autonomy. However, this relationship is skewed in favor of employers. In this context, it is unsurprising that unions and employers’ associations are rarely consulted in the context of policy formulation. The government did not consult business organizations before adopting its controversial October 2021 decree, which allowed employers to mandate COVID-19 vaccinations for employees. This decree prompted extensive legal debates and interpretations, resulting in chaos. The government eventually withdrew it quietly, which was at least a minor success for employers. Overall, the neoliberal stance of the Hungarian government positions employers’ associations as the government’s natural partners. These associations have some influence if they support the government’s general policy direction. This influence, however, does not extend to unions. By intentionally reducing institutionalized patterns of social dialogue, the government has widened the gap between the state and society. “The lack of an autonomous social dialogue supports anti-pluralist trends, a characteristic feature of populist governance,” as Hungler (2022: 114) correctly stated.
Additionally, trade unions and employers’ associations struggle due to the government’s disregard of tripartite interest reconciliation, with the exception of trade unions that have been co-opted by the government. For instance, the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (HCCI), whose annual meetings are often attended by the prime minister and members of his cabinet, is frequently used as a source of legitimation for unpopular economic measures. Collective bargaining is highly decentralized. The National Economic and Social Council (NGTT) serves as the central social dialogue platform, and includes representatives of employers, employees, churches, civil society, academia and the arts. However, the government does not participate in these discussions, thus relegating the body to a consultative role. Even in this capacity, the government does not utilize the expertise available via the NGTT.
The reduction of state involvement in labor relations, as seen in the labor code reform, enhances the negotiation partners’ autonomy. However, this relationship is skewed in favor of employers. In this context, it is unsurprising that unions and employers’ associations are rarely consulted in the context of policy formulation. The government did not consult business organizations before adopting its controversial October 2021 decree, which allowed employers to mandate COVID-19 vaccinations for employees. This decree prompted extensive legal debates and interpretations, resulting in chaos. The government eventually withdrew it quietly, which was at least a minor success for employers. Overall, the neoliberal stance of the Hungarian government positions employers’ associations as the government’s natural partners. These associations have some influence if they support the government’s general policy direction. This influence, however, does not extend to unions. By intentionally reducing institutionalized patterns of social dialogue, the government has widened the gap between the state and society. “The lack of an autonomous social dialogue supports anti-pluralist trends, a characteristic feature of populist governance,” as Hungler (2022: 114) correctly stated.
Citations:
Hungler, S. 2022. “Labor Law Reforms after the Populist Turn in Hungary.” Review of Central and East European Law 47(1): 84-114.
Hungler, S. 2022. “Labor Law Reforms after the Populist Turn in Hungary.” Review of Central and East European Law 47(1): 84-114.
The government is not able to effectively involve trade unions and business organizations in policy development.
2
France
The need to involve capital and labor organizations more regularly in policymaking processes has been discussed for decades. Over the past two decades, governments have sought the consultation of interest groups more systematically, and these practices have to some extent been adopted as legal obligations, creating institutional mechanisms of concertation between government, business organizations and trade unions. Moreover, the rules of social negotiations were modernized, notably by the Larcher law of 2007. This law required the government to present plans for social and labor legislation to the social partners, giving them an opportunity to negotiate and agree on possible solutions that could then be transformed into law.
This attempt to rejuvenate social dialogue and social concertation produced limited results. The problem is twofold: First, only some of the trade unions (the CFDT, UNSA) seek a constructive role in negotiating social reforms with the government; others (CGT, FO) tend to reject this sort of negotiation, sticking to their role of mobilizing social forces against governmental plans. Second, governments have not regularly sought social concertation, and often have not taken the positions of the capital and labor organizations into account.
If President Macron, who came to power in 2017, seemed to follow this approach at the beginning of his first mandate, it gradually became clear that he was particularly reluctant to concede the social partner organizations a role in the policymaking process. Regarding these organizations as defenders of the status quo, and thus hostile to his reform ideas, he often relied on his parliamentary majority to pass his reform bills without real social consultation. For instance, during his first mandate, he ignored an unemployment insurance agreement that had been negotiated by the social partner organizations and adopted a government bill instead (2021). The pension reform in 2023, which was submitted to parliament without previous social consultation, led to months of protests and created a rare united front among trade unions. The government was able to overcome resistance on the streets and in parliament only by forcing the bill through parliament, resorting to the 49.3 procedure (see “Effective Cross-Party Cooperation”). This attitude by Macron has led the majority of capital and labor organizations to express their deep dissatisfaction with this “solitary” method of governing without allowing a voice to the representatives of civil society.
In summary, the government does not involve capital and labor CSOs strongly in policymaking processes, and does not seek to moderate disputes between capital and labor. If attempts to enhance the consultation process are made after deep social unrest (JDD 2023), they remain piecemeal.
This attempt to rejuvenate social dialogue and social concertation produced limited results. The problem is twofold: First, only some of the trade unions (the CFDT, UNSA) seek a constructive role in negotiating social reforms with the government; others (CGT, FO) tend to reject this sort of negotiation, sticking to their role of mobilizing social forces against governmental plans. Second, governments have not regularly sought social concertation, and often have not taken the positions of the capital and labor organizations into account.
If President Macron, who came to power in 2017, seemed to follow this approach at the beginning of his first mandate, it gradually became clear that he was particularly reluctant to concede the social partner organizations a role in the policymaking process. Regarding these organizations as defenders of the status quo, and thus hostile to his reform ideas, he often relied on his parliamentary majority to pass his reform bills without real social consultation. For instance, during his first mandate, he ignored an unemployment insurance agreement that had been negotiated by the social partner organizations and adopted a government bill instead (2021). The pension reform in 2023, which was submitted to parliament without previous social consultation, led to months of protests and created a rare united front among trade unions. The government was able to overcome resistance on the streets and in parliament only by forcing the bill through parliament, resorting to the 49.3 procedure (see “Effective Cross-Party Cooperation”). This attitude by Macron has led the majority of capital and labor organizations to express their deep dissatisfaction with this “solitary” method of governing without allowing a voice to the representatives of civil society.
In summary, the government does not involve capital and labor CSOs strongly in policymaking processes, and does not seek to moderate disputes between capital and labor. If attempts to enhance the consultation process are made after deep social unrest (JDD 2023), they remain piecemeal.
Citations:
Luc Rouban. 2018. La double fracture du dialogue social. https://www.sciencespo.fr/cevipof/sites/sciencespo.fr.cevipof/files/Dialogue_social_Luc_Rouban_note1-5.pdf
Rapport Chertier. 2006. “Pour une modernisation du dialogue social. Rapport au Premier ministre.” https://www.vie-publique.fr/rapport/28224-pour-une-modernisation-du-dialogue-social-rapport-au-premier-ministre
Gilbert Cette, Guy Groux, and Richard Robert. 2023. “Une démocratie sociale hésitante.” telos-eu. https://www.telos-eu.com/fr/societe/une-democratie-sociale-hesitante.html
Duval. 2023. “Pourquoi la France est-elle incapable de passer des compromis sociaux et comment en sortir?” Fondation Jean Jaurès, June 18. https://www.jean-jaures.org/publication/pourquoi-la-france-est-elle-incapable-de-passer-des-compromis-sociaux-et-comment-en-sortir/
JDD. 2023. “Emmanuel Macron appelle les syndicats à un « dialogue social responsable ».” lejdd.fr June 5. https://www.lejdd.fr/politique/emmanuel-macron-appelle-les-syndicats-un-dialogue-social-responsable-135440
Luc Rouban. 2018. La double fracture du dialogue social. https://www.sciencespo.fr/cevipof/sites/sciencespo.fr.cevipof/files/Dialogue_social_Luc_Rouban_note1-5.pdf
Rapport Chertier. 2006. “Pour une modernisation du dialogue social. Rapport au Premier ministre.” https://www.vie-publique.fr/rapport/28224-pour-une-modernisation-du-dialogue-social-rapport-au-premier-ministre
Gilbert Cette, Guy Groux, and Richard Robert. 2023. “Une démocratie sociale hésitante.” telos-eu. https://www.telos-eu.com/fr/societe/une-democratie-sociale-hesitante.html
Duval. 2023. “Pourquoi la France est-elle incapable de passer des compromis sociaux et comment en sortir?” Fondation Jean Jaurès, June 18. https://www.jean-jaures.org/publication/pourquoi-la-france-est-elle-incapable-de-passer-des-compromis-sociaux-et-comment-en-sortir/
JDD. 2023. “Emmanuel Macron appelle les syndicats à un « dialogue social responsable ».” lejdd.fr June 5. https://www.lejdd.fr/politique/emmanuel-macron-appelle-les-syndicats-un-dialogue-social-responsable-135440
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