To what extent does the government facilitate the participation of leading environmental CSOs in policymaking?
The government is able to effectively involve leading environmental CSOs in policy development.
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9
Sweden
Consultation with societal actors has historically been a strong feature of Swedish democracy. Public consultation remains a core component of the Swedish policymaking process. In this corporatist arrangement, the government consults with key societal partners on a wide range of issues, including those concerning the environment and climate action. Stakeholders are thus given an opportunity to influence public policy from the early stages of the policy process until implementation.
Public inquiries and participation in various committees and councils are among the forms of consultation. The government often recognizes the expertise and commitment of environmental NGOs in addressing environmental issues, viewing them as essential actors in achieving sustainability goals and promoting environmental protection.
The center-right minority government elected in 2022 has taken a permissive stance on environmental policy, eliciting criticism from environmental CSOs in print media, television, and their websites. The Swedish Climate Policy Council, an independent interdisciplinary organization tasked with evaluating Swedish climate policy against the possibility of achieving its goals, posits that the current policy will increase emissions and prevent Sweden from meeting its targets (Klimatpolitiska rådet, 2023).
Public inquiries and participation in various committees and councils are among the forms of consultation. The government often recognizes the expertise and commitment of environmental NGOs in addressing environmental issues, viewing them as essential actors in achieving sustainability goals and promoting environmental protection.
The center-right minority government elected in 2022 has taken a permissive stance on environmental policy, eliciting criticism from environmental CSOs in print media, television, and their websites. The Swedish Climate Policy Council, an independent interdisciplinary organization tasked with evaluating Swedish climate policy against the possibility of achieving its goals, posits that the current policy will increase emissions and prevent Sweden from meeting its targets (Klimatpolitiska rådet, 2023).
Citations:
Klimatpolitiska rådet. 2023. “Handlingsplan otillräcklig – ytterligare styrmedel behövs för att nå klimatmålen.” https://www.klimatpolitiskaradet.se/pressrummet/handlingsplanen-otillracklig-ytterligare-styrmedel-behovs-for-att-na-klimatmalen/
Klimatpolitiska rådet. 2023. “Handlingsplan otillräcklig – ytterligare styrmedel behövs för att nå klimatmålen.” https://www.klimatpolitiskaradet.se/pressrummet/handlingsplanen-otillracklig-ytterligare-styrmedel-behovs-for-att-na-klimatmalen/
Most of the time, the government is able to effectively involve leading environmental CSOs in policy development.
8
Denmark
The increasing focus on climate and environmental challenges has boosted the profile of a number of civil organizations, including established ones like the Danish Society for Nature Conservation and Greenpeace Denmark, as well as various grassroots organizations.
The traditions in this area are not as strong as in other policy areas, but organizations are routinely listened to when environmental policies are prepared. They also play an important role in agenda setting. Organizations representing agriculture have been very active and vocal, since environmental and climate policies may have significant implications for the sector.
The Ministry of the Environment routinely incorporates these organizations into hearing processes related to environmental policy (Ministry of the Environment 2023).
The traditions in this area are not as strong as in other policy areas, but organizations are routinely listened to when environmental policies are prepared. They also play an important role in agenda setting. Organizations representing agriculture have been very active and vocal, since environmental and climate policies may have significant implications for the sector.
The Ministry of the Environment routinely incorporates these organizations into hearing processes related to environmental policy (Ministry of the Environment 2023).
Citations:
Ministry of the Environment. 2023. “Hearing List.” https://hoeringsportalen.dk/Hearing?Authorities=Milj%C3%B8ministeriet
Ministry of the Environment. 2023. “Hearing List.” https://hoeringsportalen.dk/Hearing?Authorities=Milj%C3%B8ministeriet
Netherlands
Most CSOs in the domain of the environment are still embedded in the practices and culture of “poldering” (see “Effective CSOs (Environment)”). Some practice venue shopping by turning to the judiciary as a means of avoiding the delays and sluggishness of the “poldering” style of governance.
7
Finland
The Finnish government does not actively involve leading environmental organizations (EOs) in policymaking to the same extent as business and labor organizations. EOs are not routinely engaged across the various stages of the policymaking process such as agenda-setting, policy formulation, deliberation and decision-making, policy implementation, and performance monitoring.
Participation tends to be sporadic and ad hoc due to the absence of institutional mechanisms ensuring the active engagement of prominent environmental organizations beginning from the initial stages of policymaking on issues of central importance to this sector. However, on a case-by-case basis, environmental organizations participate in expert commissions, public hearings and performance monitoring.
Due to the small size of the country, communication between the government and environmental organizations, such as the Finnish Association for Nature Conservation (FANC), is intense. The consultation process is transparent, involving several environmental organizations.
The impact of consultations with environmental organizations on actual policies is relatively limited. Most significant decisions are made within the cabinet, negotiated among parties and outlined in the cabinet program. The government does not actively attempt to mediate disputes within and between major environmental organizations or to balance diverse opinions in practice.
Participation tends to be sporadic and ad hoc due to the absence of institutional mechanisms ensuring the active engagement of prominent environmental organizations beginning from the initial stages of policymaking on issues of central importance to this sector. However, on a case-by-case basis, environmental organizations participate in expert commissions, public hearings and performance monitoring.
Due to the small size of the country, communication between the government and environmental organizations, such as the Finnish Association for Nature Conservation (FANC), is intense. The consultation process is transparent, involving several environmental organizations.
The impact of consultations with environmental organizations on actual policies is relatively limited. Most significant decisions are made within the cabinet, negotiated among parties and outlined in the cabinet program. The government does not actively attempt to mediate disputes within and between major environmental organizations or to balance diverse opinions in practice.
Citations:
Finnish Association for Nature Conservation (FANC). n.d. “Resource Title.” https://www.sll.fi/en/
Finnish Association for Nature Conservation (FANC). n.d. “Resource Title.” https://www.sll.fi/en/
Germany
Environmental CSOs are highly respected and trusted in German society, making them well-suited to raise awareness about environmental issues and inform the public about environmental protection issues. The federal government supports environmental CSOs, such as BUND, NABU, and DNR, in their efforts and projects. These associations collaborate with the government and public administration to implement projects related to nature and the environment (Bundesregierung, 2023).
The federal government and the Bundestag, the German parliament, can consult environmental CSOs. The involvement of CSOs in the decision-making and development of draft laws varies greatly among the different federal ministries. CSOs primarily use lobbying to gain political influence. Recognized associations have the Right of Association (Verbandsklagerecht) to take legal action on behalf of the public, particularly in cases related to environmental protection, nature conservation, and animal welfare (Hummel et al., 2022: 3, 71). Any organization can comment on recent draft laws before they are discussed in the Bundestag, allowing them to shape the discussion about environmental laws both publicly and in parliament (Bundesministerium der Justiz, 2024).
Environmental CSOs contribute to the development and enhancement of the national sustainability strategy (Bundesregierung, 2023). Like German citizens, they can start a petition. If a petition reaches 50,000 signatures, the Bundestag is obliged to discuss it (Deutscher Bundestag, n.d.). Apart from these avenues, environmental CSOs do not participate directly in the policymaking process, and there are no serious discussions underway to extend their role.
There are no regular, official meetings between environmental organizations and government officials. While certain ministers and sometimes even the chancellor often meet with trade unions and business organizations, this does not seem to be the case with environmental CSOs. However, the Expert Council on Climate Issues (Expertenrat für Klimafragen, ERK), founded in 2020, consists of five experts in innovation and climate. Its main task is to monitor German carbon emissions and highlight any overshooting of sector-specific emission goals. The Bundestag and the federal government can request special reports from the ERK on climate topics, in addition to a mandatory report on carbon emissions and climate goals every two years (Expertenrat für Klimafragen, n.d.).
Environmental CSOs frequently criticize the federal government’s plans and actions and sometimes file lawsuits against the government. For example, in November 2023, the Bund für Natur- und Umweltschutz (BUND) and the Deutsche Umwelthilfe filed a suit against a governmental program of immediate action. The government had to develop this action plan due to overshooting carbon emissions in the building and transportation sectors. The court ruled in favor of the environmental organizations, stating that the program lacked short-term policies to immediately address the excess emissions (Energiezukunft, 2023). This is not the only case of an environmental CSO or a group of such organizations filing a suit against the federal government.
Major environmental CSOs are independent associations, and the federal government is not entitled to moderate disputes within or between them.
The federal government and the Bundestag, the German parliament, can consult environmental CSOs. The involvement of CSOs in the decision-making and development of draft laws varies greatly among the different federal ministries. CSOs primarily use lobbying to gain political influence. Recognized associations have the Right of Association (Verbandsklagerecht) to take legal action on behalf of the public, particularly in cases related to environmental protection, nature conservation, and animal welfare (Hummel et al., 2022: 3, 71). Any organization can comment on recent draft laws before they are discussed in the Bundestag, allowing them to shape the discussion about environmental laws both publicly and in parliament (Bundesministerium der Justiz, 2024).
Environmental CSOs contribute to the development and enhancement of the national sustainability strategy (Bundesregierung, 2023). Like German citizens, they can start a petition. If a petition reaches 50,000 signatures, the Bundestag is obliged to discuss it (Deutscher Bundestag, n.d.). Apart from these avenues, environmental CSOs do not participate directly in the policymaking process, and there are no serious discussions underway to extend their role.
There are no regular, official meetings between environmental organizations and government officials. While certain ministers and sometimes even the chancellor often meet with trade unions and business organizations, this does not seem to be the case with environmental CSOs. However, the Expert Council on Climate Issues (Expertenrat für Klimafragen, ERK), founded in 2020, consists of five experts in innovation and climate. Its main task is to monitor German carbon emissions and highlight any overshooting of sector-specific emission goals. The Bundestag and the federal government can request special reports from the ERK on climate topics, in addition to a mandatory report on carbon emissions and climate goals every two years (Expertenrat für Klimafragen, n.d.).
Environmental CSOs frequently criticize the federal government’s plans and actions and sometimes file lawsuits against the government. For example, in November 2023, the Bund für Natur- und Umweltschutz (BUND) and the Deutsche Umwelthilfe filed a suit against a governmental program of immediate action. The government had to develop this action plan due to overshooting carbon emissions in the building and transportation sectors. The court ruled in favor of the environmental organizations, stating that the program lacked short-term policies to immediately address the excess emissions (Energiezukunft, 2023). This is not the only case of an environmental CSO or a group of such organizations filing a suit against the federal government.
Major environmental CSOs are independent associations, and the federal government is not entitled to moderate disputes within or between them.
Citations:
Bundesregierung. 2023. “Die Deutsche Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie, Ein Kompass für die Zukunft.” https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/themen/nachhaltigkeitspolitik/deutsche-nachhaltigkeitsstrategie-318846
Hummel, S., Pfirter, L., and Strachwitz, R. G. 2022. Zur Lage und den Rahmenbedingungen der Zivilgesellschaft in Deutschland: Ein Bericht. Berlin: Maecenata Institut für Philanthropie und Zivilgesellschaft. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-76997-7
Bundesministerium der Justiz. 2024. “Bundesregierung und Bundesministerien im Gesetzgebungsverfahren.” https://www.bmj.de/DE/rechtsstaat_kompakt/entstehung_gesetz/regierung_ministerien/regierung_ministerien_node.html
Deutscher Bundestag. n.d. “Öffentliche Petitionen, Mitzeichnung und Quorum.” https://epetitionen.bundestag.de/epet/service.$$$.rubrik.oeffentlichePetition.html
Expertenrat für Klimafragen. n.d. “Expertenrat für Klimafragen.” https://www.expertenrat-klima.de/ueber-uns/
Energiezukunft. 2023. “Klimaschutzprogramm der Bundesregierung ungenügend.” https://www.energiezukunft.eu/politik/klimaschutzprogramm-der-bundesregierung-ungenuegend/
Bundesregierung. 2023. “Die Deutsche Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie, Ein Kompass für die Zukunft.” https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/themen/nachhaltigkeitspolitik/deutsche-nachhaltigkeitsstrategie-318846
Hummel, S., Pfirter, L., and Strachwitz, R. G. 2022. Zur Lage und den Rahmenbedingungen der Zivilgesellschaft in Deutschland: Ein Bericht. Berlin: Maecenata Institut für Philanthropie und Zivilgesellschaft. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-76997-7
Bundesministerium der Justiz. 2024. “Bundesregierung und Bundesministerien im Gesetzgebungsverfahren.” https://www.bmj.de/DE/rechtsstaat_kompakt/entstehung_gesetz/regierung_ministerien/regierung_ministerien_node.html
Deutscher Bundestag. n.d. “Öffentliche Petitionen, Mitzeichnung und Quorum.” https://epetitionen.bundestag.de/epet/service.$$$.rubrik.oeffentlichePetition.html
Expertenrat für Klimafragen. n.d. “Expertenrat für Klimafragen.” https://www.expertenrat-klima.de/ueber-uns/
Energiezukunft. 2023. “Klimaschutzprogramm der Bundesregierung ungenügend.” https://www.energiezukunft.eu/politik/klimaschutzprogramm-der-bundesregierung-ungenuegend/
Ireland
The inclusion of CSOs and advocacy groups is heralded as one of the most successful aspects of the Convention and Citizens’ Assembly processes. Many CSOs are taking positions in emerging and established governance arrangements, such as the National Economic and Social Council (NESC), to influence policy and decision-making processes. The Irish Citizens’ Assembly, addressing “how to make Ireland a leader in tackling climate change” has positioned Ireland as a pioneer in citizen participation. The Assembly’s report was brought to the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Climate Action (JOCCA), which incorporated most of its suggestions – except for the tax on GHG emissions from agriculture – into its 42 priority recommendations, including elevating climate action to the same level of importance as finance and budgetary matters (Houses of the Oireachtas 2019). This report formed the basis for the interministerial Climate Action Plan of 2019 (Harris 2021). The Bioeconomy Action Plan for 2023-2050, published at the end of 2023, includes proposals for different governance arrangements at both vertical and horizontal levels. A forum and an expert advisory group are to be set up to allow input from experts and environmental organizations. The success of these new arrangements is currently being studied by the Institute of Public Administration (IPA) (Country Brief 2023 Ireland). It is important to note that the growing interest in evidence-informed policymaking (EIPM) has somewhat shifted the focus toward professional experts at the expense of community knowledge. This has led to a preference for governmental bodies to work with larger organizations rather than advocacy CSOs. An environmental CSO report card on the progress of government commitments has noted some improvements, but overall progress on environmental issues remains inadequate given the scale of the challenges (Friends of the Earth 2023).
Citations:
European Commission. 2023. European Public Administration Country Brief 2023: Ireland.
Houses of the Oireachtas. 2019. “Joint Committee on Climate Action Debate.” https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/joint_committee_on_climate_action/2019-11-06/2/
Harris, C. 2021. “Democratic Innovations and Policy Analysis: Climate Policy and Ireland’s Citizens’ Assembly (2016-2018).” In Policy Analysis in Ireland, eds. J. Hogan and M. P. Murphy, 219-234. Bristol: Policy Press.
Friends of the Earth. 2023. “Programme for Government Report Card on the Status of Environmental Commitments Made in Ireland’s 2020 Programme for Government.” https://www.friendsoftheearth.ie/assets/files/pdf/2023_pfg_report_card_on_climate__environment_.pdf
European Commission. 2023. European Public Administration Country Brief 2023: Ireland.
Houses of the Oireachtas. 2019. “Joint Committee on Climate Action Debate.” https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/joint_committee_on_climate_action/2019-11-06/2/
Harris, C. 2021. “Democratic Innovations and Policy Analysis: Climate Policy and Ireland’s Citizens’ Assembly (2016-2018).” In Policy Analysis in Ireland, eds. J. Hogan and M. P. Murphy, 219-234. Bristol: Policy Press.
Friends of the Earth. 2023. “Programme for Government Report Card on the Status of Environmental Commitments Made in Ireland’s 2020 Programme for Government.” https://www.friendsoftheearth.ie/assets/files/pdf/2023_pfg_report_card_on_climate__environment_.pdf
Lithuania
The government is largely effective in involving leading environmental CSOs in policy development. Environmental CSOs have become increasingly active in debates addressing the preservation of forests and other natural resources. They have developed analytical capacities through their international links, which they then use to advocate particular policy proposals. The government has also involved environmental CSOs in discussions of specific policy initiatives. For example, environmental CSOs have played a significant role in drafting the long-term Lithuania 2050 strategy. They are also active in public hearings and expert committees.
As noted by the OECD in its 2021 report, “Despite environmental authorities’ outreach to non-governmental actors in drafting high-profile laws and policies, there is no active dialogue with civil society on key environmental policy priorities, particularly at the local level. Environmental awareness of the population is below the EU average, partly due to the lack of a consistent approach to environmental education. Most environmental information is accessible to the public but is fragmented across different authorities’ websites, making it more difficult to find and use.” Lithuania was advised to “consolidate public sources of environmental information and ensure regular reporting on the state of the environment. It should also provide open public access to compliance-related information about individual polluting installations.”
As noted by the OECD in its 2021 report, “Despite environmental authorities’ outreach to non-governmental actors in drafting high-profile laws and policies, there is no active dialogue with civil society on key environmental policy priorities, particularly at the local level. Environmental awareness of the population is below the EU average, partly due to the lack of a consistent approach to environmental education. Most environmental information is accessible to the public but is fragmented across different authorities’ websites, making it more difficult to find and use.” Lithuania was advised to “consolidate public sources of environmental information and ensure regular reporting on the state of the environment. It should also provide open public access to compliance-related information about individual polluting installations.”
Citations:
OECD. 2021. OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Lithuania 2021. Paris: OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/48d82b17-en
OECD. 2021. OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Lithuania 2021. Paris: OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/48d82b17-en
Norway
Civil society organizations (CSOs) frequently participate in relevant public hearings. Expert and other public commissions typically consist of individuals who collectively provide both expert knowledge and representation from central interest groups. However, there are no strict formal requirements for the composition of these bodies, except on the basis of gender. The Norwegian bureaucracy and policymaking environment is generally open and accessible, and the involvement of CSOs (environmental and others) is perceived as enhancing legitimacy in policymaking. The consultation process is transparent, though it is important to note that Norway is a small country with relatively flat hierarchies and a mix of formal and informal arenas.
It is challenging to distinguish between CSOs’ discontent with “token participation” in the policymaking process and their dissatisfaction with the current outcomes of decision-making on contentious political issues. Examples of the latter include continued oil and gas exploration, wind power stations – where the state lost a case in the Norwegian supreme court in 2021 – and wolf hunting.
Environmental organizations are generally critical of government central plans, regardless of whether the government is center-left or center-right. These organizations often sue the state because they believe the environmental consequences will be more serious than previously thought and that the knowledge base about these consequences has not been sufficiently investigated. Additionally, youth organizations often encourage boycotts of products and industries that damage the ecosystem. For example, salmon farming in Norway is believed to pose significant environmental challenges.
It is challenging to distinguish between CSOs’ discontent with “token participation” in the policymaking process and their dissatisfaction with the current outcomes of decision-making on contentious political issues. Examples of the latter include continued oil and gas exploration, wind power stations – where the state lost a case in the Norwegian supreme court in 2021 – and wolf hunting.
Environmental organizations are generally critical of government central plans, regardless of whether the government is center-left or center-right. These organizations often sue the state because they believe the environmental consequences will be more serious than previously thought and that the knowledge base about these consequences has not been sufficiently investigated. Additionally, youth organizations often encourage boycotts of products and industries that damage the ecosystem. For example, salmon farming in Norway is believed to pose significant environmental challenges.
Citations:
Supreme Court of Norway. 2021. “Licences for wind power development on Fosen ruled invalid as the construction violates Sami reindeer herders’ right to enjoy their own culture.” https://www.domstol.no/en/supremecourt/rulings/2021/supreme-court-civil-cases/hr-2021-1975-s
Supreme Court of Norway. 2021. “Licences for wind power development on Fosen ruled invalid as the construction violates Sami reindeer herders’ right to enjoy their own culture.” https://www.domstol.no/en/supremecourt/rulings/2021/supreme-court-civil-cases/hr-2021-1975-s
Slovenia
When the government passed and enforced restrictive legislation during the COVID-19 pandemic targeting civil society organizations working for environmental rights, these organizations quickly responded with protests and lobbying activities. Nevertheless, the government succeeded in adopting new criteria for civil society organizations to challenge decisions on environmental issues. For example, civil society organizations had to have at least 50 active members in the previous two years. As a result, many organizations were excluded from this procedure.
After the elections, when the center-left parties formed a coalition, civil society organizations prepared a law to counteract the previous government’s detrimental measures. This law, passed in July 2022, eliminated the impossible conditions for environmental civil society organizations to participate in administrative and judicial proceedings under the Nature Conservation Act.
In June 2023, the government established the Climate Council as the nation’s independent scientific advisory body for climate policy. In accordance with the Environmental Protection Act, the government adopted the rules of procedure for the Climate Council in 2022, regulating its functioning, and issued the decree on its establishment in 2023, thus creating the conditions for the first Slovenian scientific advisory body for climate policy.
Members of the Climate Council serve six-year terms and provide scientific advice through expert opinions and recommendations on established and proposed climate policy measures, ensuring their compliance with ratified international treaties and the EU legal order on climate change. Another key task of the council is to participate in developing climate change legislation. In 2023, the council met three times.
Candidates for the Climate Council are independent experts in climate change mitigation and adaptation, representing the natural and technical sciences as well as the social sciences and humanities.
In November 2022, the government established the Interdepartmental Working Group for International Climate Issues, comprising representatives from various ministries. The group’s tasks include developing draft positions for international climate negotiations. Representatives of non-governmental organizations are not regularly included in this interdepartmental group. In April 2023, the government established an interministerial working group to support Slovenia’s comprehensive strategic project of decarbonization as part of the transition to a circular economy.
After the elections, when the center-left parties formed a coalition, civil society organizations prepared a law to counteract the previous government’s detrimental measures. This law, passed in July 2022, eliminated the impossible conditions for environmental civil society organizations to participate in administrative and judicial proceedings under the Nature Conservation Act.
In June 2023, the government established the Climate Council as the nation’s independent scientific advisory body for climate policy. In accordance with the Environmental Protection Act, the government adopted the rules of procedure for the Climate Council in 2022, regulating its functioning, and issued the decree on its establishment in 2023, thus creating the conditions for the first Slovenian scientific advisory body for climate policy.
Members of the Climate Council serve six-year terms and provide scientific advice through expert opinions and recommendations on established and proposed climate policy measures, ensuring their compliance with ratified international treaties and the EU legal order on climate change. Another key task of the council is to participate in developing climate change legislation. In 2023, the council met three times.
Candidates for the Climate Council are independent experts in climate change mitigation and adaptation, representing the natural and technical sciences as well as the social sciences and humanities.
In November 2022, the government established the Interdepartmental Working Group for International Climate Issues, comprising representatives from various ministries. The group’s tasks include developing draft positions for international climate negotiations. Representatives of non-governmental organizations are not regularly included in this interdepartmental group. In April 2023, the government established an interministerial working group to support Slovenia’s comprehensive strategic project of decarbonization as part of the transition to a circular economy.
Citations:
Republika Slovenija. 2024. “Podnebni svet.” https://www.gov.si/zbirke/delovna-telesa/podnebni-svet/
Republika Slovenija. 2024. “Medresorska delovna skupina za usmerjanje Celovitega strateškega projekta razogljičenja Slovenije preko prehoda v krožno gospodarstvo.” https://www.gov.si/zbirke/delovna-telesa/medresorska-delovna-skupina-za-usmerjanje-celovitega-strateskega-projekta-razogljicenja-slovenije-preko-prehoda-v-krozno-gospodarstvo
Republika Slovenija. 2024. “Medresorska delovna skupina za mednarodne podnebne zadeve.” https://www.gov.si/zbirke/delovna-telesa/medresorska-delovna-skupina-za-mednarodne-podnebne-zadeve
Republika Slovenija. 2024. “Podnebni svet.” https://www.gov.si/zbirke/delovna-telesa/podnebni-svet/
Republika Slovenija. 2024. “Medresorska delovna skupina za usmerjanje Celovitega strateškega projekta razogljičenja Slovenije preko prehoda v krožno gospodarstvo.” https://www.gov.si/zbirke/delovna-telesa/medresorska-delovna-skupina-za-usmerjanje-celovitega-strateskega-projekta-razogljicenja-slovenije-preko-prehoda-v-krozno-gospodarstvo
Republika Slovenija. 2024. “Medresorska delovna skupina za mednarodne podnebne zadeve.” https://www.gov.si/zbirke/delovna-telesa/medresorska-delovna-skupina-za-mednarodne-podnebne-zadeve
Spain
Leading environmental groups and CSOs have gained technical competence and are increasingly engaged by the government in expert commissions, public hearings, and performance monitoring. Governmental objectives for climate change and energy transition are discussed with CSOs. The Ministry of Ecologic Transition has established an online platform listing all ongoing consultations, allowing CSOs to participate before regulatory development and during the draft regulation stage. Environmental CSOs express satisfaction with their participation, with limited criticism.
During the review period, the frequent use of emergency legislation has limited CSOs’ effective participation in legislative proposal preparation. However, the current Minister for Environment ranks seventh in frequency of meetings with civil society representatives among ministers appointed between 2012 and 2023, with 72 meetings.
During the review period, the frequent use of emergency legislation has limited CSOs’ effective participation in legislative proposal preparation. However, the current Minister for Environment ranks seventh in frequency of meetings with civil society representatives among ministers appointed between 2012 and 2023, with 72 meetings.
6
Austria
As with other groups, major environmental CSOs have the opportunity to present their views on scheduled bills during the institutionalized review process in parliament – if such a review occurs. A more natural method for these groups, however, is public protest, which implies a more diffuse and not necessarily less effective form of influence. Overall, the presence and influence of these groups in the policymaking arena tend to be considerably lower than those of social partners and many social welfare associations.
A particular challenge for environmental CSOs is that the environment and related issues are not as neatly defined as other policy fields. While this challenge is present in all countries, it is compounded in Austria by the complex multilevel nature of the Austrian polity, with split competencies across different levels. More specifically, some observers suggest that Austrian-style corporatism contributes to the intricate actor constellation and poses an additional obstacle to substantive policy progress. The predominance of other groups and their agendas tends to fuel the perceived conflict between economic growth and the job market versus climate change mitigation.
The recent chapters of government-environmental CSO relations have been shaped by the transition from SPÖ-led federal governments to ÖVP-led governments. In particular, the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition, in office from 2017 – 2019, significantly influenced the relationships between the government and civil society organizations, both in the environmental sector and beyond. Some observers have referred to these developments, characterized by strong polarization and widespread defamation of many groups, as “autocratization” (Simsa 2019). The Greens’ inclusion in the government alongside the ÖVP in 2019 marked a positive change. However, the concrete impact on government-environmental CSOs and their role in public policymaking appears to have been more limited than expected.
A particular challenge for environmental CSOs is that the environment and related issues are not as neatly defined as other policy fields. While this challenge is present in all countries, it is compounded in Austria by the complex multilevel nature of the Austrian polity, with split competencies across different levels. More specifically, some observers suggest that Austrian-style corporatism contributes to the intricate actor constellation and poses an additional obstacle to substantive policy progress. The predominance of other groups and their agendas tends to fuel the perceived conflict between economic growth and the job market versus climate change mitigation.
The recent chapters of government-environmental CSO relations have been shaped by the transition from SPÖ-led federal governments to ÖVP-led governments. In particular, the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition, in office from 2017 – 2019, significantly influenced the relationships between the government and civil society organizations, both in the environmental sector and beyond. Some observers have referred to these developments, characterized by strong polarization and widespread defamation of many groups, as “autocratization” (Simsa 2019). The Greens’ inclusion in the government alongside the ÖVP in 2019 marked a positive change. However, the concrete impact on government-environmental CSOs and their role in public policymaking appears to have been more limited than expected.
Citations:
Jansesberger, Viktoria, and Gabriele Spilker. 2023. “Umwelt-und Klimapolitik.” In M. Senn et al., eds., Handbuch Österreichische Außenpolitik, 345-363. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
Steurer, Reinhard, and Christoph Clar. “The Ambiguity of Federalism in Climate Policy-making.”
how the political system in Austria hinders mitigation and facilitates adaptation; in: Journal of
Environmental Policy & Planning: 20:2 (2018), 252-265
Simsa, Ruth. 2019. “Civil Society Capture by Early Stage Autocrats in Well-Developed Democracies–The Case of Austria.” Nonprofit Policy Forum 10 (3).
Simsa, R., F. Mayer, S. Muckenhuber, and T. Schweinschwaller. 2021. Rahmenbedingungen für die Zivilgesellschaft in Österreich. Berlin: Maecenata Institut für Philanthropie und Zivilgesellschaft. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-73615-2
Jansesberger, Viktoria, and Gabriele Spilker. 2023. “Umwelt-und Klimapolitik.” In M. Senn et al., eds., Handbuch Österreichische Außenpolitik, 345-363. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
Steurer, Reinhard, and Christoph Clar. “The Ambiguity of Federalism in Climate Policy-making.”
how the political system in Austria hinders mitigation and facilitates adaptation; in: Journal of
Environmental Policy & Planning: 20:2 (2018), 252-265
Simsa, Ruth. 2019. “Civil Society Capture by Early Stage Autocrats in Well-Developed Democracies–The Case of Austria.” Nonprofit Policy Forum 10 (3).
Simsa, R., F. Mayer, S. Muckenhuber, and T. Schweinschwaller. 2021. Rahmenbedingungen für die Zivilgesellschaft in Österreich. Berlin: Maecenata Institut für Philanthropie und Zivilgesellschaft. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-73615-2
Belgium
In the context of climate change, dialogue is less institutionalized and hence less effective. As mentioned under “Effective Civil Society Organizations (environment),” the civil society movement addressing climate issues can be broadly categorized into two main groups. The first group, which enjoys support from politicians across the spectrum, is largely consensual. The second group, often disavowed by politicians, is more radical.
Despite the involvement of the more consensual groups, neither group actively participates in the formulation of relevant policies. Their involvement is typically on an ad hoc and case-by-case basis. For instance, the official website (climat.be) still highlights a series of academic seminars organized in 2018. A stakeholder workshop was also arranged prior to COP 28, providing an opportunity for them to express their views and concerns. However, none of these activities are binding for the authorities.
Nevertheless, recent improvements are worth emphasizing. In the summer of 2023, the federal parliament passed a federal law on climate policy governance by a large majority. This law introduced a committee of independent scientific experts with a consultative role, among other things. Moreover, a coalition of civil society and activists lodged a formal complaint for climate inaction. The justices sentenced the governments to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55%.
As a result, civil society organizations (CSOs) are advocating for more consultation and for their opinions to be more effectively considered in the upcoming elections..
Despite the involvement of the more consensual groups, neither group actively participates in the formulation of relevant policies. Their involvement is typically on an ad hoc and case-by-case basis. For instance, the official website (climat.be) still highlights a series of academic seminars organized in 2018. A stakeholder workshop was also arranged prior to COP 28, providing an opportunity for them to express their views and concerns. However, none of these activities are binding for the authorities.
Nevertheless, recent improvements are worth emphasizing. In the summer of 2023, the federal parliament passed a federal law on climate policy governance by a large majority. This law introduced a committee of independent scientific experts with a consultative role, among other things. Moreover, a coalition of civil society and activists lodged a formal complaint for climate inaction. The justices sentenced the governments to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55%.
As a result, civil society organizations (CSOs) are advocating for more consultation and for their opinions to be more effectively considered in the upcoming elections..
Citations:
https://www.revuepolitique.be/le-mouvement-climat-doit-assumer-son-aile-radicale/
https://climat.be/politique-climatique/belge/nationale/gouvernance-climatique
https://climat.be/actualites/2023/le-parlement-federal-approuve-la-loi-relative-a-la-gouvernance-de-la-politique-climatique-federale
https://klimaatcoalitie.be/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/20231011-FR-Coalition-Climat-Elections-2024-1.pdf
The website of the Climate Case: https://affaire-climat.be/en
https://www.revuepolitique.be/le-mouvement-climat-doit-assumer-son-aile-radicale/
https://climat.be/politique-climatique/belge/nationale/gouvernance-climatique
https://climat.be/actualites/2023/le-parlement-federal-approuve-la-loi-relative-a-la-gouvernance-de-la-politique-climatique-federale
https://klimaatcoalitie.be/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/20231011-FR-Coalition-Climat-Elections-2024-1.pdf
The website of the Climate Case: https://affaire-climat.be/en
Canada
Environmental groups often have a contentious relationship with governments, which they view as being influenced by big businesses, especially environmentally degrading resource companies (Wilson and Boardman 1992). While there are opportunities for presenting briefs, these interactions are frequently antagonistic and have historically resulted in matters being routinely settled in court (Elgie 1993).
Environmental interests are advocated by interest groups or “pressure groups,” which sometimes operate through “peak associations” or overarching networks of various kinds. Members of the public organize these groups to act on their behalf to influence the political agenda of governments. Strategies of pressure groups include lobbying elected political representatives, educational campaigns aimed at influencing politicians and the general public, protests, and “direct action,” where members may engage in non-sanctioned activity.
Some environmental groups focus on general objectives, while others form in response to specific issues or conditions. Some are short-term and issue-specific; others have been active for decades.
Fund-raising mechanisms differ among groups, as do leadership and procedural questions, strategies and objectives.
In the resource and environmental policy sector, environmental groups have the capacity to organize and mobilize resources outside the political arena, subsequently bringing pressure on existing political forces to work toward enhanced environmental protection. Environmental organizations have been particularly successful in their educational activities, which are a fundamental component of policy formation. Many groups form linkages with other groups to address issues with large-scale impacts.
A Canadian success story is the Pulp Pollution Campaign in Vancouver, which was mobilized in the late 1980s by the West Coast Environmental Law Foundation and other groups. It included over 50 environmental and other public interest groups, whose public education and lobbying efforts have effectively tightened pulp pollution regulations in British Columbia.
However, smaller, issue-specific groups are also adept at maneuvering in anticipation of and response to industry edicts and government proclamations. The often local or grassroots composition of environmental groups sends a political message to both politicians and project proponents.
Environmental non-government organizations (ENGOs) have several advantages in resource and environmental policymaking that are not enjoyed by more indirect means of representing the public interest.
The use of the media to expand a base of public support is one example. The strategic use of the media by groups such as Greenpeace, for instance, has been especially effective in mobilizing public support for actions such as tanker moratoriums on the West Coast.
Yet environmental organizations, while representing a means by which the public can initiate and influence the policy process, are also limited by several factors. The uncertainty of funding, the temporary and issue-specific nature of many groups, and organizational instability restrict the success of environmental groups in dealing with other established political and economic network actors. Struggles among and within ENGOs have often dissipated activists’ morale and energy and diminished funding and public support.
The lack of direct power and formal access to the policy process, while providing groups with ideological enthusiasm and logistical freedom, means their activities must be self-motivated, adversarial, and often response-driven. Rather than playing a proactive role in the policy process, many public interest groups are typically reactive, responding to specific projects or problems. Furthermore, the consequences of their activity are rarely clear. While there is symbolic and educational value to their activity, the ability of groups to penetrate the corridors of political power and to have a voice in the policy formation or decision-making process remains limited (Hessing et al. 2005).
It is important to note that the government of Canada provides program funding to organizations and individuals focused on environmental goals and the protection of the environment. Under the Impact Assessment Act (S.C. 2019, c. 28, s.1, 75 (1)), there is also an obligation to fund participants in an impact assessment – or in a “possible impact assessment” or in relation to “follow-up” activities required under the act.
Environmental interests are advocated by interest groups or “pressure groups,” which sometimes operate through “peak associations” or overarching networks of various kinds. Members of the public organize these groups to act on their behalf to influence the political agenda of governments. Strategies of pressure groups include lobbying elected political representatives, educational campaigns aimed at influencing politicians and the general public, protests, and “direct action,” where members may engage in non-sanctioned activity.
Some environmental groups focus on general objectives, while others form in response to specific issues or conditions. Some are short-term and issue-specific; others have been active for decades.
Fund-raising mechanisms differ among groups, as do leadership and procedural questions, strategies and objectives.
In the resource and environmental policy sector, environmental groups have the capacity to organize and mobilize resources outside the political arena, subsequently bringing pressure on existing political forces to work toward enhanced environmental protection. Environmental organizations have been particularly successful in their educational activities, which are a fundamental component of policy formation. Many groups form linkages with other groups to address issues with large-scale impacts.
A Canadian success story is the Pulp Pollution Campaign in Vancouver, which was mobilized in the late 1980s by the West Coast Environmental Law Foundation and other groups. It included over 50 environmental and other public interest groups, whose public education and lobbying efforts have effectively tightened pulp pollution regulations in British Columbia.
However, smaller, issue-specific groups are also adept at maneuvering in anticipation of and response to industry edicts and government proclamations. The often local or grassroots composition of environmental groups sends a political message to both politicians and project proponents.
Environmental non-government organizations (ENGOs) have several advantages in resource and environmental policymaking that are not enjoyed by more indirect means of representing the public interest.
The use of the media to expand a base of public support is one example. The strategic use of the media by groups such as Greenpeace, for instance, has been especially effective in mobilizing public support for actions such as tanker moratoriums on the West Coast.
Yet environmental organizations, while representing a means by which the public can initiate and influence the policy process, are also limited by several factors. The uncertainty of funding, the temporary and issue-specific nature of many groups, and organizational instability restrict the success of environmental groups in dealing with other established political and economic network actors. Struggles among and within ENGOs have often dissipated activists’ morale and energy and diminished funding and public support.
The lack of direct power and formal access to the policy process, while providing groups with ideological enthusiasm and logistical freedom, means their activities must be self-motivated, adversarial, and often response-driven. Rather than playing a proactive role in the policy process, many public interest groups are typically reactive, responding to specific projects or problems. Furthermore, the consequences of their activity are rarely clear. While there is symbolic and educational value to their activity, the ability of groups to penetrate the corridors of political power and to have a voice in the policy formation or decision-making process remains limited (Hessing et al. 2005).
It is important to note that the government of Canada provides program funding to organizations and individuals focused on environmental goals and the protection of the environment. Under the Impact Assessment Act (S.C. 2019, c. 28, s.1, 75 (1)), there is also an obligation to fund participants in an impact assessment – or in a “possible impact assessment” or in relation to “follow-up” activities required under the act.
Citations:
Wilson, J. 1992. “Green Lobbies: Pressure Groups and Environmental Policy.” In R. Boardman, ed. Canadian Environmental Policy, 109–25. Toronto: Oxford University Press.
Elgie, S. 1993. “Environmental Groups and the Courts: 1970-1992.” In G. Thompson, M. L. McConnell, and L. B. Huestis eds. Environmental Law and Business in Canada, 185–224. Aurora: Canada Law Book.
Hessing, Melody, Michael Howlett, and Tracy Summerville. 2005. Canadian Natural Resource and Environmental Policy: Political Economy and Public Policy. 2nd ed. Vancouver: UBC Press.
https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/environmental-funding.html
Wilson, J. 1992. “Green Lobbies: Pressure Groups and Environmental Policy.” In R. Boardman, ed. Canadian Environmental Policy, 109–25. Toronto: Oxford University Press.
Elgie, S. 1993. “Environmental Groups and the Courts: 1970-1992.” In G. Thompson, M. L. McConnell, and L. B. Huestis eds. Environmental Law and Business in Canada, 185–224. Aurora: Canada Law Book.
Hessing, Melody, Michael Howlett, and Tracy Summerville. 2005. Canadian Natural Resource and Environmental Policy: Political Economy and Public Policy. 2nd ed. Vancouver: UBC Press.
https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/environmental-funding.html
Czechia
In 2023, thanks to pressure from NGOs such as the DUHA Movement, an amendment to the Energy Act was approved, introducing community energy. Environmental NGOs are integrated into formal policymaking structures through membership in the Council for Sustainable Development under the Ministry of the Environment and various subcommittees. The council includes a representative from the Green Circle, a coordinating body of environmental organizations that comments on and seeks to influence national and EU legislation. One of the Green Circle’s recent concerns involves plans to build high-speed train lines, which the government began discussing in 2017 and prioritized in March 2023. The Green Circle argues that alternatives might be more effective for achieving the goal of decarbonizing transport.
The DUHA Movement prides itself on its independence from the government as it monitors legislation. Its judgment on the Fiala government’s first two years was mixed, welcoming proposals to reduce carbon dependence while arguing for more support for renewable energy and less reliance on nuclear energy, for which costs were judged to have been underestimated. Its relatively sympathetic assessment of the government reflects the latter’s adherence to EU rules and the sympathies of the relevant minister within the coalition government.
A further controversy involving environmental organizations related to a proposed change to planning rules aimed at speeding up the approval of infrastructure projects. Adapted from EU law, this change responded to complaints in Czechia that environmental organizations were delaying approvals – particularly for motorway construction – by raising individual complaints at multiple stages of a project, sometimes for up to 20 years. The proposed changes would require a decision on building permits within four years and limit objections on environmental grounds. The law was approved on November 3, 2023. However, crucial changes were incorporated a few weeks beforehand without allowing space for public discussion. It remains to be seen whether environmental organizations and others will complain to the Constitutional Court, as they have threatened.
The DUHA Movement prides itself on its independence from the government as it monitors legislation. Its judgment on the Fiala government’s first two years was mixed, welcoming proposals to reduce carbon dependence while arguing for more support for renewable energy and less reliance on nuclear energy, for which costs were judged to have been underestimated. Its relatively sympathetic assessment of the government reflects the latter’s adherence to EU rules and the sympathies of the relevant minister within the coalition government.
A further controversy involving environmental organizations related to a proposed change to planning rules aimed at speeding up the approval of infrastructure projects. Adapted from EU law, this change responded to complaints in Czechia that environmental organizations were delaying approvals – particularly for motorway construction – by raising individual complaints at multiple stages of a project, sometimes for up to 20 years. The proposed changes would require a decision on building permits within four years and limit objections on environmental grounds. The law was approved on November 3, 2023. However, crucial changes were incorporated a few weeks beforehand without allowing space for public discussion. It remains to be seen whether environmental organizations and others will complain to the Constitutional Court, as they have threatened.
Citations:
https://hnutiduha.cz/sites/default/files/publikace/2023/10/priloha_tiskove_zpravy_hodnoceni_vlady_v_polocase.pdf
https://hnutiduha.cz/sites/default/files/publikace/2023/10/priloha_tiskove_zpravy_hodnoceni_vlady_v_polocase.pdf
Estonia
Environmental groups have traditionally operated on a local level, but their actions are becoming increasingly visible and coordinated. One organization that supports environmental participation in policymaking is SEI Tallinn, an Estonian branch of the Stockholm Environmental Institute. SEI Tallinn aims to bridge science, policy and practice, focusing on environmental and development challenges. In 2022, SEI Tallinn founded the Estonian Association for Environmental Management and began to develop new partnerships at both the EU level, such as the European Energy Research Alliance, and regionally (SEI 2023). As of January 2023, when the annual report was compiled, there were 26 projects in process.
Citations:
SEI Tallinn. 2023. “Annual Report.” 2022. https://www.sei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/seit-annual-report-2022-eng.pdf
SEI Tallinn. 2023. “Annual Report.” 2022. https://www.sei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/seit-annual-report-2022-eng.pdf
Israel
The main formal mechanism for the involvement of environmental organizations is the Law of Representation of Public Environmental Organizations (2002). According to this law, every statutory committee handling environmental issues (e.g., water, land and planning) must include a representative from an environmental organization. This ensures that these organizations can express their opinions and have them considered, as they are full members of the committee. Although the decisions of the committees are transparent, the deliberations are not. In most cases, the minister of environmental protection selects the organizations that send representatives. Typically, environmental organizations agree among themselves on which organization will participate in which committee to prevent disputes and ensure inclusiveness.
In addition, environmental organizations are very active on planning issues, especially at the local level but also at the national level, particularly with regard to policymaking processes in the Ministry of Environmental Protection and the Ministry of Energy. Environmental organizations are regularly consulted on various policy issues, and can provide input through both formal and informal channels.
Moreover, environmental organizations often express their dissatisfaction with government policy in Knesset committees and through the media. Because environmental issues are not high on the government’s agenda, politicians usually do not pay much attention to them.
In addition, environmental organizations are very active on planning issues, especially at the local level but also at the national level, particularly with regard to policymaking processes in the Ministry of Environmental Protection and the Ministry of Energy. Environmental organizations are regularly consulted on various policy issues, and can provide input through both formal and informal channels.
Moreover, environmental organizations often express their dissatisfaction with government policy in Knesset committees and through the media. Because environmental issues are not high on the government’s agenda, politicians usually do not pay much attention to them.
Latvia
The Ministry of Environmental Protection and Regional Development is attempting to build a comprehensive approach for incorporating CSO insights into environmental matters. CSOs are invited to participate in task forces and advisory councils, outlining the mechanisms for their involvement in regional development and environmental protection. The ministry’s webpage provides a list of lobbying CSOs and serves as a resource for understanding the current landscape of environmental civil society organizations and their active engagement in governmental processes.
The State Audit Office conducted an audit on the involvement of CSOs in the agriculture sector in 2019. The audit revealed that an unorganized lobbying framework hinders access to information on critical decisions for various interest groups. The Law on Transparency of Interest Representation, which entered into force in January 2023, is expected to improve interest transparency.
Environmental civil society organizations (CSOs) often voice their dissatisfaction with policy outcomes in their sector. For example, environmental organizations in Latvia have expressed concerns about the government’s policies drifting away from sustainable development principles. These key environmental CSOs frequently express dissatisfaction with their level of involvement in policymaking. They feel their participation is often superficial and does not significantly influence policy decisions, particularly in environmental protection and sustainability.
Environmental CSOs expressed strong opposition to the appointment of the current Minister of Climate, Energy, and Environmental Protection before his appointment in 2023. Their concerns focus on the potential negative impact this appointment could have on the country’s environmental policies and sustainability efforts. This opposition underscores the critical role of ministerial appointments in shaping national environmental strategies and public trust in environmental governance. Despite these concerns from environmental organizations, the minister’s appointment was confirmed.
The State Audit Office conducted an audit on the involvement of CSOs in the agriculture sector in 2019. The audit revealed that an unorganized lobbying framework hinders access to information on critical decisions for various interest groups. The Law on Transparency of Interest Representation, which entered into force in January 2023, is expected to improve interest transparency.
Environmental civil society organizations (CSOs) often voice their dissatisfaction with policy outcomes in their sector. For example, environmental organizations in Latvia have expressed concerns about the government’s policies drifting away from sustainable development principles. These key environmental CSOs frequently express dissatisfaction with their level of involvement in policymaking. They feel their participation is often superficial and does not significantly influence policy decisions, particularly in environmental protection and sustainability.
Environmental CSOs expressed strong opposition to the appointment of the current Minister of Climate, Energy, and Environmental Protection before his appointment in 2023. Their concerns focus on the potential negative impact this appointment could have on the country’s environmental policies and sustainability efforts. This opposition underscores the critical role of ministerial appointments in shaping national environmental strategies and public trust in environmental governance. Despite these concerns from environmental organizations, the minister’s appointment was confirmed.
Citations:
Vides aizsardzības un reģionālās attīstības ministrija. 2021. “Sabiedrības līdzdalība.” https://www.varam.gov.lv/lv/sabiedribas-lidzdaliba
Vides aizsardzības un reģionālās attīstības ministrija. 2023. “Padomes un komisijas.” https://www.varam.gov.lv/lv/padomes-un-komisijas
Vides aizsardzības un reģionālās attīstības ministrija. 2023. “Interešu pārstāvības organizāciju saraksts.” https://www.varam.gov.lv/lv/media/37536/download?attachment
Saeima. 2022. Law on Transparency of Interest Representation. https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/336676-law-on-transparency-of-interest-representation%20
Valsts kontrole. 2019. “Nevalstisko organizāciju iesaiste Zemkopības ministrijas nozarēs aiz necaurskatāma aizsega.” https://www.lrvk.gov.lv/lv/getrevisionfile//uploads/reviziju-zinojumi/2018/2.4.1.-14_2018/Revi%CC%84zijas%20zin%CC%A7ojums_03.07.2019.pdf
Latvijas Dabas fonds. 2022. “Vides organizācijas pauž bažas par politikas attālināšanos no ilgtspējīgas attīstības principiem.” https://lvportals.lv/dienaskartiba/339611-vides-organizacijas-pauz-bazas-par-politikas-attalinasanos-no-ilgtspejigas-attistibas-principiem-2022
Latvijas Dabas fonds. 2023. “Latvijas Vides Organizācijas Kategoriski Iebilst Pret Melni (ZZS) Klimata, Enerģētikas un Vides Aizsardzības Ministra Amatā.” https://lvportals.lv/dienaskartiba/354831-latvijas-vides-organizacijas-kategoriski-iebilst-pret-melni-zzs-klimata-energetikas-un-vides-aizsardzibas-ministra-amata-2023
Vides aizsardzības un reģionālās attīstības ministrija. 2021. “Sabiedrības līdzdalība.” https://www.varam.gov.lv/lv/sabiedribas-lidzdaliba
Vides aizsardzības un reģionālās attīstības ministrija. 2023. “Padomes un komisijas.” https://www.varam.gov.lv/lv/padomes-un-komisijas
Vides aizsardzības un reģionālās attīstības ministrija. 2023. “Interešu pārstāvības organizāciju saraksts.” https://www.varam.gov.lv/lv/media/37536/download?attachment
Saeima. 2022. Law on Transparency of Interest Representation. https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/336676-law-on-transparency-of-interest-representation%20
Valsts kontrole. 2019. “Nevalstisko organizāciju iesaiste Zemkopības ministrijas nozarēs aiz necaurskatāma aizsega.” https://www.lrvk.gov.lv/lv/getrevisionfile//uploads/reviziju-zinojumi/2018/2.4.1.-14_2018/Revi%CC%84zijas%20zin%CC%A7ojums_03.07.2019.pdf
Latvijas Dabas fonds. 2022. “Vides organizācijas pauž bažas par politikas attālināšanos no ilgtspējīgas attīstības principiem.” https://lvportals.lv/dienaskartiba/339611-vides-organizacijas-pauz-bazas-par-politikas-attalinasanos-no-ilgtspejigas-attistibas-principiem-2022
Latvijas Dabas fonds. 2023. “Latvijas Vides Organizācijas Kategoriski Iebilst Pret Melni (ZZS) Klimata, Enerģētikas un Vides Aizsardzības Ministra Amatā.” https://lvportals.lv/dienaskartiba/354831-latvijas-vides-organizacijas-kategoriski-iebilst-pret-melni-zzs-klimata-energetikas-un-vides-aizsardzibas-ministra-amata-2023
New Zealand
Environmental CSOs have historically achieved notable successes in shaping environmental policy. However, these successes were primarily achieved through legal means (e.g., by bringing claims before the Waitangi Tribunal) or through direct protest action and civil disobedience (Kurian et al. 2022). Formal institutional mechanisms designed to involve CSOs in the policymaking process – such as public consultations, submissions or working groups – have been less important avenues for influencing environmental policy outcomes.
Governments have employed institutional mechanisms to engage with CSOs on environmental policy. For example, the Labour-led coalition under Ardern actively involved environmental CSOs in developing and drafting the Zero Carbon Act. Passed in 2019, the Act sets a framework for New Zealand to transition to a low-emission, climate-resilient future.
Formal consultation mechanisms do not guarantee that input from civil society organizations (CSOs) will be adequately considered or implemented. For instance, during the drafting of the Zero Carbon Act, environmental CSOs like Greenpeace expressed concerns about setting softer reduction goals for dairy and agricultural gases such as methane. These concerns were ignored by the government (Morton 2018).
Governments have employed institutional mechanisms to engage with CSOs on environmental policy. For example, the Labour-led coalition under Ardern actively involved environmental CSOs in developing and drafting the Zero Carbon Act. Passed in 2019, the Act sets a framework for New Zealand to transition to a low-emission, climate-resilient future.
Formal consultation mechanisms do not guarantee that input from civil society organizations (CSOs) will be adequately considered or implemented. For instance, during the drafting of the Zero Carbon Act, environmental CSOs like Greenpeace expressed concerns about setting softer reduction goals for dairy and agricultural gases such as methane. These concerns were ignored by the government (Morton 2018).
Citations:
Kurian, P. et al. 2022. “Social Movements and the Environment.” In J. L. MacArthur and Maria Bargh, eds., Environmental Politics and Policy in Aotearoa New Zealand. Auckland: Auckland University Press.
Morton, J. 2018. “Greenpeace Want Agricultural Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Carbon Act.” New Zealand Herald, June 7. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/greenpeace-want-agricultural-greenhouse-gas-emissions-in-carbon-act/VSRXUTAN4TF76VUXD6IGFL3CXE/
Kurian, P. et al. 2022. “Social Movements and the Environment.” In J. L. MacArthur and Maria Bargh, eds., Environmental Politics and Policy in Aotearoa New Zealand. Auckland: Auckland University Press.
Morton, J. 2018. “Greenpeace Want Agricultural Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Carbon Act.” New Zealand Herald, June 7. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/greenpeace-want-agricultural-greenhouse-gas-emissions-in-carbon-act/VSRXUTAN4TF76VUXD6IGFL3CXE/
Portugal
Environmental civil society organizations, along with those focused on social welfare, are represented in the Economic and Social Council. However, in this constitutional entity, only a single representative from national environmental associations is present among its 56 members. This structure offers a forum for dialogue and enables environmental groups to engage in the political decision-making process, yet their representation is notably limited, which presents a significant challenge.
In the domain of environmental matters, numerous investment projects undergo public evaluation and discussion for a set period. For instance, consider the agroforestry venture in the municipality of Alcácer do Sal, in the Alentejo region of southern Portugal. This initiative aims to establish avocado orchards and involves creating 34 wells for water extraction. The public consultation phase for this venture concluded at the end of January 2024, with the Participa portal recording 341 submissions. Data indicate that the Alentejo and Algarve regions in southern Portugal are experiencing water scarcity.
A coalition of environmental organizations is voicing concerns about the project’s ecological ramifications. ZERO, a prominent environmental CSO, warns that the project may jeopardize local water resources. The transformation of conservation areas – such as through agricultural intensification – is at odds with objectives to protect nature. The potential effects on water quality and availability in an already water-scarce region are alarming. Consequently, ZERO opposes the agroforestry project due to the risks it poses to the environment.
In the domain of environmental matters, numerous investment projects undergo public evaluation and discussion for a set period. For instance, consider the agroforestry venture in the municipality of Alcácer do Sal, in the Alentejo region of southern Portugal. This initiative aims to establish avocado orchards and involves creating 34 wells for water extraction. The public consultation phase for this venture concluded at the end of January 2024, with the Participa portal recording 341 submissions. Data indicate that the Alentejo and Algarve regions in southern Portugal are experiencing water scarcity.
A coalition of environmental organizations is voicing concerns about the project’s ecological ramifications. ZERO, a prominent environmental CSO, warns that the project may jeopardize local water resources. The transformation of conservation areas – such as through agricultural intensification – is at odds with objectives to protect nature. The potential effects on water quality and availability in an already water-scarce region are alarming. Consequently, ZERO opposes the agroforestry project due to the risks it poses to the environment.
Citations:
Law nº 108/91. Diário da Républica, nº 188, Série I-A, p. 4199. https://diariodarepublica.pt/dr/detalhe/lei/108-1991-674430
RTP. 2024. “Planta��o de 722 hectares de pera-abacate em Alc�cer do Sal em consulta p�blica.” https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/economia/plantacao-de-722-hectares-de-pera-abacate-em-alcacer-do-sal-em-consulta-publica_n1541176
SAPO. 2024. “Zero diz que plantação de abacates em Alcácer do Sal pode ser ‘machadada’ na conservação.” https://greensavers.sapo.pt/zero-diz-que-plantacao-de-abacates-em-alcacer-do-sal-pode-ser-machadada-na-conservacao/
Participa. (n.d.). “Portal https://participa.pt/pt/consulta/projeto-agricola-de-producao-de-abacates”
Law nº 108/91. Diário da Républica, nº 188, Série I-A, p. 4199. https://diariodarepublica.pt/dr/detalhe/lei/108-1991-674430
RTP. 2024. “Planta��o de 722 hectares de pera-abacate em Alc�cer do Sal em consulta p�blica.” https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/economia/plantacao-de-722-hectares-de-pera-abacate-em-alcacer-do-sal-em-consulta-publica_n1541176
SAPO. 2024. “Zero diz que plantação de abacates em Alcácer do Sal pode ser ‘machadada’ na conservação.” https://greensavers.sapo.pt/zero-diz-que-plantacao-de-abacates-em-alcacer-do-sal-pode-ser-machadada-na-conservacao/
Participa. (n.d.). “Portal https://participa.pt/pt/consulta/projeto-agricola-de-producao-de-abacates”
Switzerland
Historically, the Swiss neocorporatist regime was dominated by major economic umbrella associations, which were central political actors in the pre-parliamentary phase of decision-making, including in extra-parliamentary committees and consultation procedures (Mach, Varone & Eichenberger 2020). Since the 1990s, however, there has been a significant reconfiguration toward a more pluralist system in which interest groups, including environmental CSOs, have actively sought to influence the parliament (Mach, Varone & Eichenberger 2020; Eichenberger, 2020). This shift is attributed to factors such as the declining role of the pre-parliamentary phase, the revalorization of the parliament and the increasing role of media in politics (Mach, Varone & Eichenberger 2020).
Eichenberger (2020) notes that the share of access granted to noneconomic interest groups, including environmental CSOs, has increased in both the administrative and legislative venues across all federal departments and most legislative committees in Switzerland. This change suggests an adaptation of the Swiss system of interest intermediation to the growing significance and organizational consolidation of these groups.
Noneconomic interest groups are very heterogeneous in Switzerland. Nevertheless, some environmental groups, undertaking cooperative efforts with academic bodies, offer reasonable proposals and hold considerable capacity for political mobilization. Recent research emphasizes the growing importance of environmental CSOs such as the WWF (Eichenberger 2020; Mach et al. 2020).
The revalorization and growing professionalization of the Swiss parliament have made the parliamentary venue more hospitable to citizen groups defending general causes and objectives. Nevertheless, economic interest groups have also adjusted their political strategies and expanded their presence within the parliamentary venue, indicating a nuanced strengthening of citizen groups (Mach, Varone & Eichenberger 2020).
Eichenberger (2020) notes that the share of access granted to noneconomic interest groups, including environmental CSOs, has increased in both the administrative and legislative venues across all federal departments and most legislative committees in Switzerland. This change suggests an adaptation of the Swiss system of interest intermediation to the growing significance and organizational consolidation of these groups.
Noneconomic interest groups are very heterogeneous in Switzerland. Nevertheless, some environmental groups, undertaking cooperative efforts with academic bodies, offer reasonable proposals and hold considerable capacity for political mobilization. Recent research emphasizes the growing importance of environmental CSOs such as the WWF (Eichenberger 2020; Mach et al. 2020).
The revalorization and growing professionalization of the Swiss parliament have made the parliamentary venue more hospitable to citizen groups defending general causes and objectives. Nevertheless, economic interest groups have also adjusted their political strategies and expanded their presence within the parliamentary venue, indicating a nuanced strengthening of citizen groups (Mach, Varone & Eichenberger 2020).
Citations:
Eichenberger, S. 2020. “The Rise of Citizen Groups within the Administration and Parliament in Switzerland.” Swiss Political Science Review 26: 206-227.
Mach, A., Varone, F. and Eichenberger, S. 2020. “Transformations of Swiss Neo-corporatism: From Pre-parliamentary Negotiations toward Privileged Pluralism in the Parliamentary Venue.” In The European Social Model under Pressure, eds. Careja, R., Emmenegger, P. and Giger, N. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-27043-8_4
Eichenberger, S. 2020. “The Rise of Citizen Groups within the Administration and Parliament in Switzerland.” Swiss Political Science Review 26: 206-227.
Mach, A., Varone, F. and Eichenberger, S. 2020. “Transformations of Swiss Neo-corporatism: From Pre-parliamentary Negotiations toward Privileged Pluralism in the Parliamentary Venue.” In The European Social Model under Pressure, eds. Careja, R., Emmenegger, P. and Giger, N. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-27043-8_4
USA
The ability of environmental CSOs to engage with federal government policymakers largely depends on the political inclinations of the administration in power. Democratic administrations tend to be favorable to environmental groups, whereas Republican ones, especially in recent times, tend to be relatively hostile or neutral (Turner, 2018). This partisan divide on environmental issues was not always the case; one of the greatest environmentalists in the White House was Republican Richard Nixon, founder of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (McCright et al. 2014).
During the development of the EPA’s Clean Power Plan, the Obama administration invited environmental CSOs, such as the Sierra Club and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), to participate in crafting these regulations and to provide recommendations on how to best reduce carbon emissions from power plants (Gonzalez 2019).
In some cases, CSOs are integrated into the infrastructure of the environmental agencies in the federal government. For example, the EPA’s Clean Air Advisory Committee includes representatives from environmental CSOs. This committee advises the EPA on air quality standards and accompanying regulations (Reversz and Lienke 2016).
The Department of the Interior, responsible for managing federal lands and relations with Native American tribal communities, frequently consults with environmental CSOs on its conservation initiatives. For example, representatives from the Wilderness Society provide guidance on national park management plans. Experts from the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) serve on the Marine Protected Areas Federal Advisory Committee and advise the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) on marine conservation strategies.
During the development of the EPA’s Clean Power Plan, the Obama administration invited environmental CSOs, such as the Sierra Club and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), to participate in crafting these regulations and to provide recommendations on how to best reduce carbon emissions from power plants (Gonzalez 2019).
In some cases, CSOs are integrated into the infrastructure of the environmental agencies in the federal government. For example, the EPA’s Clean Air Advisory Committee includes representatives from environmental CSOs. This committee advises the EPA on air quality standards and accompanying regulations (Reversz and Lienke 2016).
The Department of the Interior, responsible for managing federal lands and relations with Native American tribal communities, frequently consults with environmental CSOs on its conservation initiatives. For example, representatives from the Wilderness Society provide guidance on national park management plans. Experts from the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) serve on the Marine Protected Areas Federal Advisory Committee and advise the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) on marine conservation strategies.
Citations:
James Turner. 2018. The Republican Reversal: Conservatives and the Environment from Nixon to Trump. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
George Gonzalez. 2019. “The Obama Administration’s Global Warming Legacy: Going With the Flow and the Politics of Failure.” In Looking Back on President Obama’s Legacy, ed. W. Rich. Palgrave.
Aaron McCright, Chenyang Xiao, and Riley Dunlap. 2014. “Political Polarization on Support for Government Spending on Environmental Protection in the USA, 1974-2012.” Social Science Research.
Christopher Bailey. 2018. “Environmental Policy.” In G Peele et al., eds., Developments in American Politics 8. Palgrave.
Christopher Klyza and David Sousa. 2013. American Environmental Policy: Beyond Gridlock. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Frank Thompson, Kenneth Wong, and Barry Rabe. 2020. Trump, the Administrative Presidency, and Federalism. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Richard Reversz and Jack Lienke. 2016. Struggling for Air: Power Plants and the War on Coal. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
James Turner. 2018. The Republican Reversal: Conservatives and the Environment from Nixon to Trump. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
George Gonzalez. 2019. “The Obama Administration’s Global Warming Legacy: Going With the Flow and the Politics of Failure.” In Looking Back on President Obama’s Legacy, ed. W. Rich. Palgrave.
Aaron McCright, Chenyang Xiao, and Riley Dunlap. 2014. “Political Polarization on Support for Government Spending on Environmental Protection in the USA, 1974-2012.” Social Science Research.
Christopher Bailey. 2018. “Environmental Policy.” In G Peele et al., eds., Developments in American Politics 8. Palgrave.
Christopher Klyza and David Sousa. 2013. American Environmental Policy: Beyond Gridlock. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Frank Thompson, Kenneth Wong, and Barry Rabe. 2020. Trump, the Administrative Presidency, and Federalism. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Richard Reversz and Jack Lienke. 2016. Struggling for Air: Power Plants and the War on Coal. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The government is rarely able to effectively involve leading environmental CSOs in policy development.
5
Australia
The environmental movement has grown and become more active in recent years, engaging with governments and influencing public opinion on climate change. This has pressured governments to address environmental issues, evidenced by the growing success of the Greens party. However, the fossil fuels industry’s influence, including significant contributions to major parties, remains a barrier to decisive action.
It should be noted that the environmental movement is not a unified whole. There are significant divisions within it (Pearse 2023). Some segments such as the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF), a large environmental charity, tend to adopt a relatively pragmatic and incremental approach to reform. They believe it is best to “take what you can get” as a step toward greater progress. Other actors in the environmental movement, including the Greens political party, believe more in transformative change and are inclined to reject what they perceive to be “weak” changes. These tensions have sometimes weakened the coherence and effectiveness of the environmental movement (Pearse 2023).
Tensions were apparent in the divisions within the environmental movement during the 2023 debate about the Labor government’s environmental “safeguard” mechanism. The proposal included a commitment to require large industrial emitters to reduce the intensity of their emissions by 4.9% a year to achieve a reduction of 205 metric tons of greenhouse gas by 2030 (Karp 2023). While the ACF urged the Greens to accept the government’s initial proposal, the Greens held out for a stronger measure that included a commitment to no new coal and gas power stations. The Greens eventually supported the bill following negotiations with the government, securing some compromises. Most notably, these include the introduction of a declining total cap on emissions, which will mean that the total emissions permitted under the scheme will decrease over time.
It should be noted that the environmental movement is not a unified whole. There are significant divisions within it (Pearse 2023). Some segments such as the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF), a large environmental charity, tend to adopt a relatively pragmatic and incremental approach to reform. They believe it is best to “take what you can get” as a step toward greater progress. Other actors in the environmental movement, including the Greens political party, believe more in transformative change and are inclined to reject what they perceive to be “weak” changes. These tensions have sometimes weakened the coherence and effectiveness of the environmental movement (Pearse 2023).
Tensions were apparent in the divisions within the environmental movement during the 2023 debate about the Labor government’s environmental “safeguard” mechanism. The proposal included a commitment to require large industrial emitters to reduce the intensity of their emissions by 4.9% a year to achieve a reduction of 205 metric tons of greenhouse gas by 2030 (Karp 2023). While the ACF urged the Greens to accept the government’s initial proposal, the Greens held out for a stronger measure that included a commitment to no new coal and gas power stations. The Greens eventually supported the bill following negotiations with the government, securing some compromises. Most notably, these include the introduction of a declining total cap on emissions, which will mean that the total emissions permitted under the scheme will decrease over time.
Citations:
Pearse, R. 2023. “Pragmatism versus Idealism? Behind the Split between Environmental Groups and the Greens on the Safeguard Mechanism.” The Conversation April 6. https://theconversation.com/pragmatism-versus-idealism-behind-the-split-between-environmental-groups-and-the-greens-on-the-safeguard-mechanism-203139
Karp, P. 2023. “Labor Agrees to Absolute Cap on Emissions to Secure Greens Backing for Safeguard Mechanism Climate Bill.” The Conversation. March 28. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/mar/27/labor-agrees-to-absolute-cap-on-emissions-to-secure-greens-backing-for-safeguard-mechanism-climate-bill
Pearse, R. 2023. “Pragmatism versus Idealism? Behind the Split between Environmental Groups and the Greens on the Safeguard Mechanism.” The Conversation April 6. https://theconversation.com/pragmatism-versus-idealism-behind-the-split-between-environmental-groups-and-the-greens-on-the-safeguard-mechanism-203139
Karp, P. 2023. “Labor Agrees to Absolute Cap on Emissions to Secure Greens Backing for Safeguard Mechanism Climate Bill.” The Conversation. March 28. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/mar/27/labor-agrees-to-absolute-cap-on-emissions-to-secure-greens-backing-for-safeguard-mechanism-climate-bill
Greece
Prominent environmental CSOs in Greece have minimal involvement in the early stages of policymaking on crucial environmental issues. Although numerous environmental CSOs exist, they often lack sufficient organizational strength and fail to form lasting alliances.
Criticism of government measures and the mobilization of environmental CSOs against successive governments’ environmental policies and industrial investment plans have occurred but are not systematic. These actions rarely gain nationwide traction and are often confined to local settings (Velegrakis and Frezouli 2016).
For example, in the fall of 2021, an alliance of environmental CSOs mobilized against draft legislation that bureaucratized the registration process for voluntary associations in Greece. Around 300 CSOs, including environmental groups, co-signed a petition and participated in protests (Hellenic Platform for Development 2024).
In the summer of 2022, environmental CSOs critically assessed the government’s “Voluntary National Review on the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” before its submission to the UN. The CSOs also drafted their own review (Presidency of the Hellenic Republic 2022: 16). During this period, the Greek government engaged in systematic consultations with stakeholders, including environmental CSOs. The Ministry of Energy and Environment also held talks with 11 environmental CSOs that opposed the environmental policy measures under preparation.
As in other policy sectors, the relevant ministry is required to upload draft environmental legislation to its official website and solicit feedback from organizations and citizens before finalizing the bill for submission to parliament. Subsequently, there is a legislative mechanism for consulting environmental CSOs, with MPs consulting representatives of environmental CSOs and experts in environmental studies during parliamentary debates. The parliament has also established a “Special Permanent Committee on Environmental Protection” to monitor developments in Greece’s natural environment.
Overall, consistent consultation between environmental CSOs and government officials is lacking, and there is no comprehensive policy to involve these CSOs in policymaking.
The weakness of environmental organizations in Greece is also reflected in the minimal political influence of Green parties, which consistently fall short of the 3% electoral threshold required by electoral law to elect MPs in national elections. The reasons for the electoral failure of Green parties in Greece (van Versendaal 2023) are similar to the challenges faced by environmental CSOs: a lack of a political culture that prioritizes environmental issues, antagonistic political trends that polarize the political party system and society, and persistent internal conflicts within the environmental movement.
Criticism of government measures and the mobilization of environmental CSOs against successive governments’ environmental policies and industrial investment plans have occurred but are not systematic. These actions rarely gain nationwide traction and are often confined to local settings (Velegrakis and Frezouli 2016).
For example, in the fall of 2021, an alliance of environmental CSOs mobilized against draft legislation that bureaucratized the registration process for voluntary associations in Greece. Around 300 CSOs, including environmental groups, co-signed a petition and participated in protests (Hellenic Platform for Development 2024).
In the summer of 2022, environmental CSOs critically assessed the government’s “Voluntary National Review on the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” before its submission to the UN. The CSOs also drafted their own review (Presidency of the Hellenic Republic 2022: 16). During this period, the Greek government engaged in systematic consultations with stakeholders, including environmental CSOs. The Ministry of Energy and Environment also held talks with 11 environmental CSOs that opposed the environmental policy measures under preparation.
As in other policy sectors, the relevant ministry is required to upload draft environmental legislation to its official website and solicit feedback from organizations and citizens before finalizing the bill for submission to parliament. Subsequently, there is a legislative mechanism for consulting environmental CSOs, with MPs consulting representatives of environmental CSOs and experts in environmental studies during parliamentary debates. The parliament has also established a “Special Permanent Committee on Environmental Protection” to monitor developments in Greece’s natural environment.
Overall, consistent consultation between environmental CSOs and government officials is lacking, and there is no comprehensive policy to involve these CSOs in policymaking.
The weakness of environmental organizations in Greece is also reflected in the minimal political influence of Green parties, which consistently fall short of the 3% electoral threshold required by electoral law to elect MPs in national elections. The reasons for the electoral failure of Green parties in Greece (van Versendaal 2023) are similar to the challenges faced by environmental CSOs: a lack of a political culture that prioritizes environmental issues, antagonistic political trends that polarize the political party system and society, and persistent internal conflicts within the environmental movement.
Citations:
Greenpeace. 2022. “Press Release on the Meeting of Environmental CSOs with the Minister of Energy and Environment.” https://www.greenpeace.org/greece/issues/perivallon/47046/anakoinosi-perivallontikon-organoseon-synantisi-ypen/
Presidency of the Hellenic Government. 2022. “Voluntary National Review on the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.” https://hlpf.un.org/sites/default/files/vnrs/2022/VNR%202022%20Greece%20Report.pdf
Van Versendaal, H. 2023. “Why Greece’s Parties are Failing to Bloom.” He Kathimerini July 30. https://www.ekathimerini.com/in-depth/analysis/1216628/why-greeces-green-parties-are-failing-to-bloom/
Velegrakis, G., and H. Frezouli. 2016. Environmental Conflicts and Social Movements: 12 Greek Case Studies. Athens: Harokopeion University.
The website of the “Special Permanent Committee on Environmental Protection” is https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Koinovouleftikes-Epitropes/CommiteeDetailView?CommitteeId=9f9d3ea9-40b0-4571-916e-8fa9fde448c7
Greenpeace. 2022. “Press Release on the Meeting of Environmental CSOs with the Minister of Energy and Environment.” https://www.greenpeace.org/greece/issues/perivallon/47046/anakoinosi-perivallontikon-organoseon-synantisi-ypen/
Presidency of the Hellenic Government. 2022. “Voluntary National Review on the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.” https://hlpf.un.org/sites/default/files/vnrs/2022/VNR%202022%20Greece%20Report.pdf
Van Versendaal, H. 2023. “Why Greece’s Parties are Failing to Bloom.” He Kathimerini July 30. https://www.ekathimerini.com/in-depth/analysis/1216628/why-greeces-green-parties-are-failing-to-bloom/
Velegrakis, G., and H. Frezouli. 2016. Environmental Conflicts and Social Movements: 12 Greek Case Studies. Athens: Harokopeion University.
The website of the “Special Permanent Committee on Environmental Protection” is https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Koinovouleftikes-Epitropes/CommiteeDetailView?CommitteeId=9f9d3ea9-40b0-4571-916e-8fa9fde448c7
UK
The answer to this question is essentially the same as for G4.2. Numerous NGOs, think tanks, and research institutes specializing in environmental analysis and policy contribute to policymaking, both through formal consultations and, often more effectively, through informal means. Formal consultations include those conducted by arm’s-length bodies such as the Climate Change Committee, which issues calls for evidence and collaborates closely with researchers and advocacy bodies to conduct policy-relevant research.
In summary, while major CSOs understood as social partners do not play a prominent role in shaping environmental policy, other organizations significantly influence this area.
In summary, while major CSOs understood as social partners do not play a prominent role in shaping environmental policy, other organizations significantly influence this area.
Citations:
https://www.theccc.org.uk/publicationtype/0-report/08-supporting-research/
https://www.theccc.org.uk/publicationtype/0-report/08-supporting-research/
4
France
Some environmental CSOs are very visible in France, including Greenpeace, Réseau Action Climat and Les Amis de la Terre. Cécile Duflot, a former leading green politician and minister under François Hollande, became director-general of Oxfam France in 2017, initiating a “green” turn for this association. Most of these associations rely on the propagation of their positions in the public, public events and the generation of expert reports to influence policymaking. Case-study research has shown that many of these organizations show signs of increasing professionalization and institutionalization (Berny 2018).
In recent years, new CSOs have emerged that are often more attractive to younger people, and are frequently much more radical than older counterparts. This includes the French chapter of Extinction Rebellion, Soulèvement de la Terre and Dernière Rénovation. They respond to the perceived inaction of public actors and the ineffectiveness of older organizations, and employ more radical methods of gaining public attention.
Though some cooperation between public actors and environmental associations takes place (Flahault, Robic 2007), governments have not regularly included them in policymaking. More radical actions – including the occupations and blockades carried out by newer organizations – have been met with a rather strict police reaction. Minister of the Interior Gérald Darmanin has regularly called them “eco-terrorists.” Ultimately, this has served to scale back the environmental program of the current government.
In recent years, new CSOs have emerged that are often more attractive to younger people, and are frequently much more radical than older counterparts. This includes the French chapter of Extinction Rebellion, Soulèvement de la Terre and Dernière Rénovation. They respond to the perceived inaction of public actors and the ineffectiveness of older organizations, and employ more radical methods of gaining public attention.
Though some cooperation between public actors and environmental associations takes place (Flahault, Robic 2007), governments have not regularly included them in policymaking. More radical actions – including the occupations and blockades carried out by newer organizations – have been met with a rather strict police reaction. Minister of the Interior Gérald Darmanin has regularly called them “eco-terrorists.” Ultimately, this has served to scale back the environmental program of the current government.
Citations:
Berny, Nathalie. 2018. “Institutionalisation and Distinctive Competences of Environmental NGOs: The Expansion of French Organisations.” Environmental Politics 27 (6): 1033-1056.
Flahault, Érika and Paulette Robic. 2007. “Les associations d’environnement partenaires privilégiés des pouvoirs publics : un paradoxe qui dynamise la gestion de l’environnement.” In L’économie sociale entre formel et informel, eds. Annie Dussuet and Jean-Marc Lauzanas. Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 183-198.
Berny, Nathalie. 2018. “Institutionalisation and Distinctive Competences of Environmental NGOs: The Expansion of French Organisations.” Environmental Politics 27 (6): 1033-1056.
Flahault, Érika and Paulette Robic. 2007. “Les associations d’environnement partenaires privilégiés des pouvoirs publics : un paradoxe qui dynamise la gestion de l’environnement.” In L’économie sociale entre formel et informel, eds. Annie Dussuet and Jean-Marc Lauzanas. Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 183-198.
Italy
In Italy, 81 CSOs are legally recognized in the environmental field, many of which receive public funding. These organizations are recognized as political actors and should be consulted at both national and regional levels when decisions on environmental issues are made. However, consultation at the national level is often primarily ritualistic, and their political positions are not systematically incorporated into government policies. This is evident from the strong disagreement expressed by the three most important CSOs – Legambiente, WWF Italia, and Greenpeace Italia – with the environmental policies of both the Draghi and Meloni governments. The capacity of environmental CSOs to influence policies and decisions is generally greater at the regional and local levels, though this depends significantly on the political alignment of the local government.
Citations:
for the positions critical of the last governments of the major environmentalist CSOs see:
https://greenreport.it/
https://www.greenpeace.org/italy/
https://www.legambiente.it/
for the positions critical of the last governments of the major environmentalist CSOs see:
https://greenreport.it/
https://www.greenpeace.org/italy/
https://www.legambiente.it/
Japan
Environmental civil society organizations in Japan suffer from similar organizational limitations as in other areas. Most are locally based, have only limited outreach potential and seem preoccupied with promoting specific policies. Several advisory councils under the Cabinet Secretariat deal with environmental issues, such as the Expert Council for Promotion of Climate Change Countermeasures or the Expert Panel on Clean Energy Strategy. However, private-sector members of these bodies are almost exclusively scholars and CEOs of big corporations, not representatives of environmental NGOs. Civil society groups are also rarely represented in the advisory councils established by the Ministry of the Environment. NGOs are consulted by the ministerial Nature Restoration Council, though mainly on the regional level. Overall, the influence of civil society groups on governmental policy – for example, regarding global warming – has remained minimal.
The government’s reluctance to extensively consult civil society organizations probably results from its intention to contain dissenting voices. Many NGOs specializing in environmental issues remain rather critical of and distant from the government, mainly due to the reactivation of nuclear power plants and slow progress on decarbonization. As a result, impartiality, transparency and the scope of the consultation process is disturbed.
The government’s reluctance to extensively consult civil society organizations probably results from its intention to contain dissenting voices. Many NGOs specializing in environmental issues remain rather critical of and distant from the government, mainly due to the reactivation of nuclear power plants and slow progress on decarbonization. As a result, impartiality, transparency and the scope of the consultation process is disturbed.
Citations:
Kameyama, Yasuko. 2016. Climate Change Policy in Japan: From the 1980s to 2015. London: Routledge.
Ministry of the Environment. 2020. “Shizen Saisei Kyôgikai” [Nature Restoration Council]. https://www.env.go.jp/nature/saisei/tebiki_k/guide-saisei_2-1.html
Kameyama, Yasuko. 2016. Climate Change Policy in Japan: From the 1980s to 2015. London: Routledge.
Ministry of the Environment. 2020. “Shizen Saisei Kyôgikai” [Nature Restoration Council]. https://www.env.go.jp/nature/saisei/tebiki_k/guide-saisei_2-1.html
Poland
Public authorities are obliged to invite public participation in the initial stages of document formulation. These documents are made public, and the results are published. However, the degree to which social proposals are actually incorporated in the area of environmental protection remains extremely low.
Most organizations maintained a high level of independence under the PiS government. They criticized the government’s inability to address Poland’s environmental challenges, for instance in the areas of decarbonization, air quality or wild species protection. In 2020, Greenpeace called on Poland to discontinue policies inconsistent with achieving climate neutrality goals. These policies included draining peatlands, hindering the development of renewable energy sources, failing to develop a sustainable transportation policy, and inadequate building thermal modernization.
In the 2022 – 2023 period, CSOs continued to highlight the overexploitation of Polish forests, the lack of management and oversight leading to the Oder River environmental disaster, and the need to change legislation regarding wind energy. Consultations were conducted as part of the legal requirements set out by EU regulations. The local dialogue process with environmental organizations evaluating regional strategies was well developed.
Most organizations maintained a high level of independence under the PiS government. They criticized the government’s inability to address Poland’s environmental challenges, for instance in the areas of decarbonization, air quality or wild species protection. In 2020, Greenpeace called on Poland to discontinue policies inconsistent with achieving climate neutrality goals. These policies included draining peatlands, hindering the development of renewable energy sources, failing to develop a sustainable transportation policy, and inadequate building thermal modernization.
In the 2022 – 2023 period, CSOs continued to highlight the overexploitation of Polish forests, the lack of management and oversight leading to the Oder River environmental disaster, and the need to change legislation regarding wind energy. Consultations were conducted as part of the legal requirements set out by EU regulations. The local dialogue process with environmental organizations evaluating regional strategies was well developed.
Citations:
https://www.fhi360.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/csosi-europe-eurasia-2022-report.pdf
https://www.fhi360.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/csosi-europe-eurasia-2022-report.pdf
Slovakia
Institutional mechanisms exist to ensure the active involvement of environmental CSOs from the initial stages of policymaking on issues central to this sector. Legislative rules and other regulations mandate the engagement of environmental CSOs in expert commissions, public hearings, and performance monitoring. In 2019, the Council for the Green Agreement was established to further this involvement. However, compared to the mechanisms in labor, capital, and welfare, the consultation process in the environmental sector has been more irregular, selective, and lacking in transparency during the period under review.
During this period, some environmental CSOs and their representatives received significant government support. For instance, Michal Šipoš, the chair of the parliamentary club of OĽANO (2020–2023), repeatedly declared that environmental protection was a major priority for the government. The OĽaNO-nominated minister, Ján Budaj, was active and frequently consulted with major environmental CSOs. Many of these organizations, such as Clima Coalition, Via Iuris, and Friends of the Earth Slovakia, were involved in consultations on the Clima Law prepared by the Ministry in February 2023. However, the law was not approved by the government due to politicization before the early elections in September 2023.
The new Fico government, in power from autumn 2023, indicates at least partly antagonistic relations with environmental CSOs. These CSOs played a critical role in the massive and successful protests against the nomination of Rudolf Huliak to the position of minister of the environment (see, for example, Mäkká and Grečko, 2023).
A notable example of the politicized situation in environmental protection is the issue of the brown bear. Some relevant CSOs state that the number of brown bears in Slovakia is at the optimal level, between 1,000 and 1,500 bears. Other CSOs claim there are 3,000 to 4,000 brown bears in Slovakia, exceeding the country’s real territorial capacity. The State Environmental Protection body of the Ministry of Environment ordered a study to estimate the real number of brown bears. Two Czech universities conducted the study to ensure its accuracy, determining the number to be between 1,012 and 1,275. However, some environmental experts claim that the study was manipulated because only 2,200 biological samples were collected and analyzed, suggesting that with 4,000 samples, the results would be different (see Správy RTVS, 27 July 2023). This case study highlights the variability of opinions and the frequent manipulation of facts in the sector. Reflecting its positions, the OĽANO government did not issue any regular permits to shoot brown bears (only a few were shot based on specific licenses), while the Fico government plans to significantly reduce the number of brown bears.
During this period, some environmental CSOs and their representatives received significant government support. For instance, Michal Šipoš, the chair of the parliamentary club of OĽANO (2020–2023), repeatedly declared that environmental protection was a major priority for the government. The OĽaNO-nominated minister, Ján Budaj, was active and frequently consulted with major environmental CSOs. Many of these organizations, such as Clima Coalition, Via Iuris, and Friends of the Earth Slovakia, were involved in consultations on the Clima Law prepared by the Ministry in February 2023. However, the law was not approved by the government due to politicization before the early elections in September 2023.
The new Fico government, in power from autumn 2023, indicates at least partly antagonistic relations with environmental CSOs. These CSOs played a critical role in the massive and successful protests against the nomination of Rudolf Huliak to the position of minister of the environment (see, for example, Mäkká and Grečko, 2023).
A notable example of the politicized situation in environmental protection is the issue of the brown bear. Some relevant CSOs state that the number of brown bears in Slovakia is at the optimal level, between 1,000 and 1,500 bears. Other CSOs claim there are 3,000 to 4,000 brown bears in Slovakia, exceeding the country’s real territorial capacity. The State Environmental Protection body of the Ministry of Environment ordered a study to estimate the real number of brown bears. Two Czech universities conducted the study to ensure its accuracy, determining the number to be between 1,012 and 1,275. However, some environmental experts claim that the study was manipulated because only 2,200 biological samples were collected and analyzed, suggesting that with 4,000 samples, the results would be different (see Správy RTVS, 27 July 2023). This case study highlights the variability of opinions and the frequent manipulation of facts in the sector. Reflecting its positions, the OĽANO government did not issue any regular permits to shoot brown bears (only a few were shot based on specific licenses), while the Fico government plans to significantly reduce the number of brown bears.
Citations:
Mäkká, S., and Grečko, T. 2023. “Kto je možný minister životného prostredia Rudolf Huliak.” Denník N, October 12. https://e.dennikn.sk/3622481/navadzal-na-obesenie-ochranara-kto-je-mozny-minister-zivotneho-prostredia-rudolf-huliak/
Správy RTVS. 2023. “Vedci a zoológovia obhajovali výsledky štúdie o počte medveďov. Narazila na kritiku lesníkov a poľovníkov.” https://spravy.rtvs.sk/2023/07/vedci-a-zoologovia-obhajovali-vysledky-studie-o-pocte-medvedov-podla-analyzy-dna-narazila-na-kritiku-lesnikov-a-polovnikov/
Mäkká, S., and Grečko, T. 2023. “Kto je možný minister životného prostredia Rudolf Huliak.” Denník N, October 12. https://e.dennikn.sk/3622481/navadzal-na-obesenie-ochranara-kto-je-mozny-minister-zivotneho-prostredia-rudolf-huliak/
Správy RTVS. 2023. “Vedci a zoológovia obhajovali výsledky štúdie o počte medveďov. Narazila na kritiku lesníkov a poľovníkov.” https://spravy.rtvs.sk/2023/07/vedci-a-zoologovia-obhajovali-vysledky-studie-o-pocte-medvedov-podla-analyzy-dna-narazila-na-kritiku-lesnikov-a-polovnikov/
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The government is not able to effectively involve leading environmental CSOs in policy development.
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Hungary
Environmental advocacy in Hungary, distinct from sectors such as capital, labor and social welfare, is marked by a high degree of internationalization. This is largely due to the global and regional scope of environmental issues and the strong competencies of the European Union in this area. Prominent global NGOs like WWF and Greenpeace, along with their Hungarian subbranches, dominate the scene. However, the Hungarian government has stigmatized foreign CSOs through the Lex NGO, labeling them as alien to the Hungarian nation. Consequently, these organizations operate in a challenging environment. They often face stigmatization, though not to the extent experienced by CSOs focused on human rights or feminism (Gerő et al. 2023). Unsurprisingly, their ability to influence lawmaking remains minimal.
There are some access points via EU funds, where oversight mechanisms such as consultation rights and regulatory impact assessments (RIAs), are part of the administrative process. The EU has called for changes in the participatory competence of CSOs and the strengthening of RIAs. In response, the Hungarian parliament made some adjustments to the relevant legislation. Nonetheless, the structural problem persists: a confrontation between foreign-funded CSOs and an illiberal government that places little emphasis on environmental issues.
Smaller NGOs and grassroots movements have resorted to local spaces, aiming to depoliticize their campaigns (Kovács and Eszter-Pataki 2021: 47). By distancing themselves from more prominent transnational social players and opposition parties, they have attempted to influence local affairs (Buzogány, Kerényi and Olt 2022), though with limited success. The situation is exacerbated by the government’s lukewarm and skeptical stance on sustainability. This was reflected in a 2023 speech by Prime Minister Orbán, in which he declared, “Yes to green energy, no to green ideology” (Magyar Nemzet 2023). Differences between environmental NGOs and the government appear irreconcilable with regard to issues such as establishing new battery plants in the country.
There are some access points via EU funds, where oversight mechanisms such as consultation rights and regulatory impact assessments (RIAs), are part of the administrative process. The EU has called for changes in the participatory competence of CSOs and the strengthening of RIAs. In response, the Hungarian parliament made some adjustments to the relevant legislation. Nonetheless, the structural problem persists: a confrontation between foreign-funded CSOs and an illiberal government that places little emphasis on environmental issues.
Smaller NGOs and grassroots movements have resorted to local spaces, aiming to depoliticize their campaigns (Kovács and Eszter-Pataki 2021: 47). By distancing themselves from more prominent transnational social players and opposition parties, they have attempted to influence local affairs (Buzogány, Kerényi and Olt 2022), though with limited success. The situation is exacerbated by the government’s lukewarm and skeptical stance on sustainability. This was reflected in a 2023 speech by Prime Minister Orbán, in which he declared, “Yes to green energy, no to green ideology” (Magyar Nemzet 2023). Differences between environmental NGOs and the government appear irreconcilable with regard to issues such as establishing new battery plants in the country.
Citations:
Buzogány, A., Kerényi, S., and Olt, G. 2022. “Back to the Grassroots? The Shrinking Space of Environmental Activism in Illiberal Hungary.” Environmental Politics 31(7): 1267-1288.
Kovács, K., and Eszter-Pataki, G. 2021. “The Dismantling of Environmentalism in Hungary.” Politics and the Environment in Eastern Europe 25-51.
Gerő, M., Fejős, A., Kerényi, S., and Szikra, D. 2023. “From Exclusion to Co-optation: Political Opportunity Structures and Civil Society Responses in De-democratising Hungary.” Politics and Governance 11(1): 16-27.
Magyar Nemzet. 2023. “PM Orban: Yes to Green Energy, No to Green Ideology.” 24 November. https://magyarnemzet.hu/english/2023/11/pm-orban-yes-to-green-energy-no-to-green-ideology
Buzogány, A., Kerényi, S., and Olt, G. 2022. “Back to the Grassroots? The Shrinking Space of Environmental Activism in Illiberal Hungary.” Environmental Politics 31(7): 1267-1288.
Kovács, K., and Eszter-Pataki, G. 2021. “The Dismantling of Environmentalism in Hungary.” Politics and the Environment in Eastern Europe 25-51.
Gerő, M., Fejős, A., Kerényi, S., and Szikra, D. 2023. “From Exclusion to Co-optation: Political Opportunity Structures and Civil Society Responses in De-democratising Hungary.” Politics and Governance 11(1): 16-27.
Magyar Nemzet. 2023. “PM Orban: Yes to Green Energy, No to Green Ideology.” 24 November. https://magyarnemzet.hu/english/2023/11/pm-orban-yes-to-green-energy-no-to-green-ideology
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