Consensus-Building
#30Key Findings
Hungary is the SGI 2024’s lowest scorer (rank 30) in the area of consensus-building.
The Orbán governments have shown little interest in seeking independent advice. By limiting decision-making to an inner circle, they risk groupthink and low-quality decisions detached from societal realities. The government seeks to suppress groups with ideological or financial independence, limiting consultations with societal actors.
The government selectively consults with civil society organizations (CSOs) that align with its conservative worldview, particularly on issues like family matters, while excluding those with modern or feminist agendas. Organizations supporting the government receive funding and are co-opted, while others face smear campaigns.
Environmental CSOs are often internationally connected. As such, they are stigmatized, though less so than human rights or feminist groups, and have little ability to influence policy. Government openness is minimal. The administration is fearful of releasing information without the explicit consent of high-ranking officials. Public access to open data remains.
The Orbán governments have shown little interest in seeking independent advice. By limiting decision-making to an inner circle, they risk groupthink and low-quality decisions detached from societal realities. The government seeks to suppress groups with ideological or financial independence, limiting consultations with societal actors.
The government selectively consults with civil society organizations (CSOs) that align with its conservative worldview, particularly on issues like family matters, while excluding those with modern or feminist agendas. Organizations supporting the government receive funding and are co-opted, while others face smear campaigns.
Environmental CSOs are often internationally connected. As such, they are stigmatized, though less so than human rights or feminist groups, and have little ability to influence policy. Government openness is minimal. The administration is fearful of releasing information without the explicit consent of high-ranking officials. Public access to open data remains.
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To what extent is the government successful in effectively harnessing the best available scientific knowledge for policymaking purposes?
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9
The government is able to harness the best available scientific knowledge for policymaking purposes.
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In most cases, the government is able to harness the best available scientific knowledge for policymaking purposes.
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3
Only rarely is the government able to harness the best available scientific knowledge for policymaking purposes.
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1
The government is not able to harness the best available scientific knowledge for policymaking purposes.
The Orbán governments have shown little interest in seeking independent, knowledge-based advice and have alienated many leading experts who initially sympathized with them politically. The culture war waged by Fidesz and the growing restrictions placed on academic freedom have further intensified this alienation (Enyedi 2018, 2022; Labanino and Dobbins 2022). The government has invested significantly in creating a network of partisan experts in pseudo-independent institutions that can influence public opinion, and has used such institutions to promote government views in international debates. Limiting decision-making functions to an inner circle and disregarding broad-based advice leads to groupthink and low-quality decisions that are often detached from societal reality. In 2023, the government announced a tender for the organization of policy advice until the end of 2026. There were only two applications, both pro-government: the Századvég Group Foundation and two companies close to Nézőpont (Observer Budapest Médiafigyelő Kft). Századvég Group won consultancy contracts worth over HUF 24 billion (€57 million), while Nézőpont secured contracts worth HUF 22 billion (€54 million). The advice is likely to be neither unbiased nor of high quality, and the funds are vulnerable to corruption, given the close ties between the owners of the companies/think tanks and Prime Minister Orbán. A broad study on the subject states: “In Hungary, the level and types of advisory activity of political scientists is more limited by demand-side factors than by the supply side of knowledge production and by viewpoints within the scholarly community itself” (Molnár 2022: 199). In other words, Hungary has good advisory competence, but the government is not interested in utilizing it.
Citations:
Enyedi, Z. 2018. “Democratic Backsliding and Academic Freedom in Hungary.” Perspectives on Politics 16(4): 1067-1074.
Enyedi, Z. 2022. “Academic Solidarity and the Culture War in Orbán’s Hungary.” PS: Political Science & Politics 55(3): 582-584.
Labanino, R., and M. Dobbins. 2022. “‘The Goal is Not Necessarily to Sit at the Table’ – Resisting Autocratic Legalism in Hungarian Academia.” Higher Education Quarterly 76(3): 521-536.
Molnár, G.T. 2022. “Coping with a Closed and Politicized System: The Advisory Roles of Political Scientists in Hungary.” In The Advisory Roles of Political Scientists in Europe, eds. M. Brans and A. Timmermans, 181-203. Palgrave Macmillan. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-86005-9_9
Citations:
Enyedi, Z. 2018. “Democratic Backsliding and Academic Freedom in Hungary.” Perspectives on Politics 16(4): 1067-1074.
Enyedi, Z. 2022. “Academic Solidarity and the Culture War in Orbán’s Hungary.” PS: Political Science & Politics 55(3): 582-584.
Labanino, R., and M. Dobbins. 2022. “‘The Goal is Not Necessarily to Sit at the Table’ – Resisting Autocratic Legalism in Hungarian Academia.” Higher Education Quarterly 76(3): 521-536.
Molnár, G.T. 2022. “Coping with a Closed and Politicized System: The Advisory Roles of Political Scientists in Hungary.” In The Advisory Roles of Political Scientists in Europe, eds. M. Brans and A. Timmermans, 181-203. Palgrave Macmillan. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-86005-9_9
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To what extent does the government facilitate the participation of trade unions and business organizations in policymaking?
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The government is able to effectively involve trade unions and business organizations in policy development.
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Most of the time, the government is able to effectively involve trade unions and business organizations in policy development.
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The government is rarely able to effectively involve trade unions and business organizations in policy development.
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1
The government is not able to effectively involve trade unions and business organizations in policy development.
To consolidate its control over public narratives and remove limits on its authority, the governing administration has sought to undermine and suppress groups in society that maintain ideological and financial autonomy from the governing party. This approach has escalated the likelihood of societal discord, as opportunities for mediating and resolving divergent viewpoints have been increasingly reduced. Consequently, the Orbán governments have rarely and selectively consulted with societal actors. Trade unions and social and environmental groups have had little influence in the policy process. The two main exceptions have been the representatives of large multinational firms, upon which the Hungarian economy depends, and the churches, which have aligned closely with the government. In addition, the government has organized so-called national consultations and fake referendums based on letters to citizens containing misleading and manipulated questions. The actual function of these letters is to keep Fidesz voters in a state of perpetual mobilization, partly by making it possible to compose lists of those who have answered these letters.
Additionally, trade unions and employers’ associations struggle due to the government’s disregard of tripartite interest reconciliation, with the exception of trade unions that have been co-opted by the government. For instance, the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (HCCI), whose annual meetings are often attended by the prime minister and members of his cabinet, is frequently used as a source of legitimation for unpopular economic measures. Collective bargaining is highly decentralized. The National Economic and Social Council (NGTT) serves as the central social dialogue platform, and includes representatives of employers, employees, churches, civil society, academia and the arts. However, the government does not participate in these discussions, thus relegating the body to a consultative role. Even in this capacity, the government does not utilize the expertise available via the NGTT.
The reduction of state involvement in labor relations, as seen in the labor code reform, enhances the negotiation partners’ autonomy. However, this relationship is skewed in favor of employers. In this context, it is unsurprising that unions and employers’ associations are rarely consulted in the context of policy formulation. The government did not consult business organizations before adopting its controversial October 2021 decree, which allowed employers to mandate COVID-19 vaccinations for employees. This decree prompted extensive legal debates and interpretations, resulting in chaos. The government eventually withdrew it quietly, which was at least a minor success for employers. Overall, the neoliberal stance of the Hungarian government positions employers’ associations as the government’s natural partners. These associations have some influence if they support the government’s general policy direction. This influence, however, does not extend to unions. By intentionally reducing institutionalized patterns of social dialogue, the government has widened the gap between the state and society. “The lack of an autonomous social dialogue supports anti-pluralist trends, a characteristic feature of populist governance,” as Hungler (2022: 114) correctly stated.
Citations:
Hungler, S. 2022. “Labor Law Reforms after the Populist Turn in Hungary.” Review of Central and East European Law 47(1): 84-114.
Additionally, trade unions and employers’ associations struggle due to the government’s disregard of tripartite interest reconciliation, with the exception of trade unions that have been co-opted by the government. For instance, the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (HCCI), whose annual meetings are often attended by the prime minister and members of his cabinet, is frequently used as a source of legitimation for unpopular economic measures. Collective bargaining is highly decentralized. The National Economic and Social Council (NGTT) serves as the central social dialogue platform, and includes representatives of employers, employees, churches, civil society, academia and the arts. However, the government does not participate in these discussions, thus relegating the body to a consultative role. Even in this capacity, the government does not utilize the expertise available via the NGTT.
The reduction of state involvement in labor relations, as seen in the labor code reform, enhances the negotiation partners’ autonomy. However, this relationship is skewed in favor of employers. In this context, it is unsurprising that unions and employers’ associations are rarely consulted in the context of policy formulation. The government did not consult business organizations before adopting its controversial October 2021 decree, which allowed employers to mandate COVID-19 vaccinations for employees. This decree prompted extensive legal debates and interpretations, resulting in chaos. The government eventually withdrew it quietly, which was at least a minor success for employers. Overall, the neoliberal stance of the Hungarian government positions employers’ associations as the government’s natural partners. These associations have some influence if they support the government’s general policy direction. This influence, however, does not extend to unions. By intentionally reducing institutionalized patterns of social dialogue, the government has widened the gap between the state and society. “The lack of an autonomous social dialogue supports anti-pluralist trends, a characteristic feature of populist governance,” as Hungler (2022: 114) correctly stated.
Citations:
Hungler, S. 2022. “Labor Law Reforms after the Populist Turn in Hungary.” Review of Central and East European Law 47(1): 84-114.
To what extent does the government facilitate the participation of leading social welfare CSOs in policymaking?
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The government is able to effectively involve leading social welfare CSOs in policy development.
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Most of the time, the government is able to effectively involve leading social welfare CSOs in policy development.
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The government is rarely able to effectively involve leading social welfare CSOs in policy development.
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The government is not able to effectively involve leading social welfare CSOs in policy development.
The illiberal government under Prime Minister Orbán filters civil engagement through an ideological lens. The inclusion of CSOs is determined by whether organizations share the governing party’s worldview. As a result, substantial sectoral and topic-based differences have emerged. For instance, in family matters, the government promotes traditional family structures while opposing modern forms of engagement. Generally, the government epitomizes “populist policymaking,” which means that interest groups, experts and intermediary groups are rarely consulted (Bartha et al. 2019). During the COVID-19 pandemic, the government occasionally consulted societal actors, but continued to do so selectively and without transparency. In the case of older people, a group particularly hard-hit by the pandemic, the government refrained from engaging with traditional interest associations representing this demographic. Instead, it referred to “negotiations” with the Council of the Elderly People, a body comprising 12 members loyal to Fidesz and chaired by Prime Minister Orbán himself. Vulnerable social groups such as the Roma are underrepresented in social dialogue. The discourse on the social welfare of migrants is particularly problematic, with experts being criminalized through various legal instruments rather than consulted. The government’s anti-feminist stance creates hurdles to consultations on gender issues, and entities pursuing LGBTQ+ rights are demonized as well. Advocacy in these areas has been interrupted due to government ideology. The government uses a multitier strategy to tackle feminist and family-oriented issues with a differentiated approach toward the CSOs involved in policymaking. Organizations that support the conservative, traditional narrative of the government are usually co-opted, and may receive funding for projects. Another strategy includes the organization of mergers, the creation of GONGOs, and the establishment of or fusion with CSOs close to the government. In contrast, CSOs that push a modern, feminist agenda are excluded and may quickly become victims of smear or othering campaigns. The situation somewhat resembles the famous cultural policy of György Aczél during the communist period, where the mechanisms of being forbidden, tolerated or supported (tiltott, türt, támogatott) were used in the cultural sphere (Gerő et al. 2023).
Citations:
Bartha, A., Boda, Z., and Szikra, D. 2020. “When Populist Leaders Govern: Conceptualising Populism in Policy Making.” Politics and Governance 8(3): 71-81.
Gerő, M., Fejős, A., Kerényi, S., and Szikra, D. 2023. “From Exclusion to Co-optation: Political Opportunity Structures and Civil Society Responses in De-democratising Hungary.” Politics and Governance 11(1): 16-27.
Citations:
Bartha, A., Boda, Z., and Szikra, D. 2020. “When Populist Leaders Govern: Conceptualising Populism in Policy Making.” Politics and Governance 8(3): 71-81.
Gerő, M., Fejős, A., Kerényi, S., and Szikra, D. 2023. “From Exclusion to Co-optation: Political Opportunity Structures and Civil Society Responses in De-democratising Hungary.” Politics and Governance 11(1): 16-27.
To what extent does the government facilitate the participation of leading environmental CSOs in policymaking?
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The government is able to effectively involve leading environmental CSOs in policy development.
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Most of the time, the government is able to effectively involve leading environmental CSOs in policy development.
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The government is rarely able to effectively involve leading environmental CSOs in policy development.
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The government is not able to effectively involve leading environmental CSOs in policy development.
Environmental advocacy in Hungary, distinct from sectors such as capital, labor and social welfare, is marked by a high degree of internationalization. This is largely due to the global and regional scope of environmental issues and the strong competencies of the European Union in this area. Prominent global NGOs like WWF and Greenpeace, along with their Hungarian subbranches, dominate the scene. However, the Hungarian government has stigmatized foreign CSOs through the Lex NGO, labeling them as alien to the Hungarian nation. Consequently, these organizations operate in a challenging environment. They often face stigmatization, though not to the extent experienced by CSOs focused on human rights or feminism (Gerő et al. 2023). Unsurprisingly, their ability to influence lawmaking remains minimal.
There are some access points via EU funds, where oversight mechanisms such as consultation rights and regulatory impact assessments (RIAs), are part of the administrative process. The EU has called for changes in the participatory competence of CSOs and the strengthening of RIAs. In response, the Hungarian parliament made some adjustments to the relevant legislation. Nonetheless, the structural problem persists: a confrontation between foreign-funded CSOs and an illiberal government that places little emphasis on environmental issues.
Smaller NGOs and grassroots movements have resorted to local spaces, aiming to depoliticize their campaigns (Kovács and Eszter-Pataki 2021: 47). By distancing themselves from more prominent transnational social players and opposition parties, they have attempted to influence local affairs (Buzogány, Kerényi and Olt 2022), though with limited success. The situation is exacerbated by the government’s lukewarm and skeptical stance on sustainability. This was reflected in a 2023 speech by Prime Minister Orbán, in which he declared, “Yes to green energy, no to green ideology” (Magyar Nemzet 2023). Differences between environmental NGOs and the government appear irreconcilable with regard to issues such as establishing new battery plants in the country.
Citations:
Buzogány, A., Kerényi, S., and Olt, G. 2022. “Back to the Grassroots? The Shrinking Space of Environmental Activism in Illiberal Hungary.” Environmental Politics 31(7): 1267-1288.
Kovács, K., and Eszter-Pataki, G. 2021. “The Dismantling of Environmentalism in Hungary.” Politics and the Environment in Eastern Europe 25-51.
Gerő, M., Fejős, A., Kerényi, S., and Szikra, D. 2023. “From Exclusion to Co-optation: Political Opportunity Structures and Civil Society Responses in De-democratising Hungary.” Politics and Governance 11(1): 16-27.
Magyar Nemzet. 2023. “PM Orban: Yes to Green Energy, No to Green Ideology.” 24 November. https://magyarnemzet.hu/english/2023/11/pm-orban-yes-to-green-energy-no-to-green-ideology
There are some access points via EU funds, where oversight mechanisms such as consultation rights and regulatory impact assessments (RIAs), are part of the administrative process. The EU has called for changes in the participatory competence of CSOs and the strengthening of RIAs. In response, the Hungarian parliament made some adjustments to the relevant legislation. Nonetheless, the structural problem persists: a confrontation between foreign-funded CSOs and an illiberal government that places little emphasis on environmental issues.
Smaller NGOs and grassroots movements have resorted to local spaces, aiming to depoliticize their campaigns (Kovács and Eszter-Pataki 2021: 47). By distancing themselves from more prominent transnational social players and opposition parties, they have attempted to influence local affairs (Buzogány, Kerényi and Olt 2022), though with limited success. The situation is exacerbated by the government’s lukewarm and skeptical stance on sustainability. This was reflected in a 2023 speech by Prime Minister Orbán, in which he declared, “Yes to green energy, no to green ideology” (Magyar Nemzet 2023). Differences between environmental NGOs and the government appear irreconcilable with regard to issues such as establishing new battery plants in the country.
Citations:
Buzogány, A., Kerényi, S., and Olt, G. 2022. “Back to the Grassroots? The Shrinking Space of Environmental Activism in Illiberal Hungary.” Environmental Politics 31(7): 1267-1288.
Kovács, K., and Eszter-Pataki, G. 2021. “The Dismantling of Environmentalism in Hungary.” Politics and the Environment in Eastern Europe 25-51.
Gerő, M., Fejős, A., Kerényi, S., and Szikra, D. 2023. “From Exclusion to Co-optation: Political Opportunity Structures and Civil Society Responses in De-democratising Hungary.” Politics and Governance 11(1): 16-27.
Magyar Nemzet. 2023. “PM Orban: Yes to Green Energy, No to Green Ideology.” 24 November. https://magyarnemzet.hu/english/2023/11/pm-orban-yes-to-green-energy-no-to-green-ideology
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To what extent does the government publish data and information that empowers citizens to hold the government accountable?
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The government publishes data and information in a manner that empowers citizens to hold the government accountable.
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Most of the time, the government publishes data and information in a manner that empowers citizens to hold the government accountable.
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The government rarely publishes data and information in a manner that strengthens citizens to hold the government accountable.
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The government does not publish data and information in a manner that strengthens citizens’ capacity to hold the government accountable.
The Hungarian government cannot be characterized as an open government. Quite the contrary is true. Hungary joined the Open Government Initiative during the second Orbán government in 2013, but withdrew in 2016 when the first reports were conducted, accusing the organization of distorting facts. Since then, governance openness has been reduced or eliminated. Access to relevant information is complicated, even for members of parliament, scientists and ordinary citizens. This may be rooted in Fidesz’s general mistrust of openness due to paranoia and the insecurity in the public administration about releasing information without explicit consent from top-ranking officials. However, the government must react to criticism from the general public and international organizations to a certain extent. In December 2016, the Orbán government approved a White Paper on National Data Policy that called for strengthening efforts to make public sector information available as open data. The datasets available at the central open data portal, www.kozadat.hu, are very basic (referring to homepages of institutions), limited in reach and difficult to use. Much of the information that would be of public interest – for example, the asset declarations of parliamentarians and government members – are published in non-searchable, non-machine-readable formats like scanned PDFs, making it very difficult to analyze them. In the 2020 – 2021 Open Data Inventory Report (Open Data Inventory 2020/21), Hungary ranks 39th with an overall score of 65, and eighth out of 10 in the “Eastern Europe” category. That means the country fulfills several ODIN coverage/openness criteria, but many essential gaps remain. The list of problems includes the issues of gender statistics, resource use and reproductive health.
The Hungarian government has provided selective information about the COVID-19 pandemic, with vital data on case numbers by region and municipality published inconsistently and unreliably. As the state of emergency continues, secrecy remains high, and there are few signs of change. Open government is alien to Prime Minister Orbán’s illiberal regime. Some NGOs and media organizations such as anti-corruption watchdogs Transparency International Hungary, K-Monitor and atlatszo.hu attempt to fill these gaps by launching court cases to access information and maintaining their own databases. However, their work is hindered by administrative obstacles, and their public impact is limited.
Citations:
Open Data Inventory 2020/21, https://odin.opendatawatch.com/ReportCreator/ExportCountryReportUpdated/HUN/2020
The Hungarian government has provided selective information about the COVID-19 pandemic, with vital data on case numbers by region and municipality published inconsistently and unreliably. As the state of emergency continues, secrecy remains high, and there are few signs of change. Open government is alien to Prime Minister Orbán’s illiberal regime. Some NGOs and media organizations such as anti-corruption watchdogs Transparency International Hungary, K-Monitor and atlatszo.hu attempt to fill these gaps by launching court cases to access information and maintaining their own databases. However, their work is hindered by administrative obstacles, and their public impact is limited.
Citations:
Open Data Inventory 2020/21, https://odin.opendatawatch.com/ReportCreator/ExportCountryReportUpdated/HUN/2020